The Deputy Collector passed a decree for over Rs. 100 for the rent of a tanki-tenure. The learned Deputy Collector has upon a remand by this Court found that these tanki-tenures are not transferable. The decree-holder put in an application for execution and soon after an application that some other property of the judgment-debtor might be sold; this other property a kharida mafi-tenure of the judgment-debtor was accordingly sold. Having come to know of the sale he deposited the decretal amount with costs and the 5 per cent, payable to the auction-purchaser and asked for the cancelment of the sale; he also alleged fraud, irregularity and loss. The Deputy Collector held that sec. 310A, C.P.C, did not apply to sales under Act X of 1859 and there was no other law under which he could set aside the sale. On an appeal the Collector upheld the decision of the Deputy Collector and on motion to us we at first issued the above rule and being desirous to know whether the property had been rightly sold in accordance with law we asked for findings as to the nature of the tenure in respect of which arrears had been decreed and also the one sold. The findings have been sent and at the further hearing of the rule a preliminary objection has been taken that we have no jurisdiction to interfere with the orders of the Deputy Collector and Collector passed under Act X of 1859 and reliance is placed on the case of Huro Mohun Mukerjee v. Kedar Nath Das. In this case L.S Jackson and Ghosh, JJ., held that the power of control and superintendence given by sec. 15 of the Charter Act was in reference to the general appellate jurisdiction of the Court and not to particular cases in which that jurisdiction is extraordinarily exercised or to a superintendence vested in the Commissioner and the Board of Revenue by the express provisions of the Act. This view certainly supports the objection but it has been subsequently departed from in a series of cases and virtually overruled. Very soon after the above case was decided the case of Bhyrab Chandra v. Shama Soondari in which Norman, J., said, “it is clear that the Collector's Court is a Court over which at the time of the passing of the Charter Act the Sudder Court possessed appellate jurisdiction and therefore it is clear that the 15th section of the Charter Act gives us a superintendence over such Courts for the purpose to which I have already alluded:” the purpose is set cut in the earlier part of the judgment and is “to compel them to do any act which by law they should do, to command them to execute all powers with which they are vested and to ??? them from meddling when they have no jurisdiction.” L.S Jackson, J., agreed. This was a case in which the Collector had entertained an appeal which lay to the District Judge. The same question came before the Full Bench in the next year in the case of Golinda Coomer v. Kristo Coomar. In this case the Deputy Collector refused to entertain an application for restitution of, an excess realised in execution of a decree subsequently modified. The Judge did not entertain an appeal as he thought an appeal was incompetent as the matter was subsequent to decree. The High Court compelled the Deputy Collector to entertain the application. It may be noted that there is no provision for such restitution in Act X of 1859 and the order must have been made in accordance with the general Civil Procedure Code.
Then in the case of Deanutoollah v. Nawab Nazim, Sir Barnes Peacock, C.J, and D.N Mitter, J., held that Act X of 1859 confers upon the Revenue Courts merely a limited jurisdiction and the High Court under its general power of control has the right to prevent them from exceeding that jurisdiction. In this case the attachment and sale order passed by a Collector in respect of properties of the judgment-debtor other than the tenure in arrear was set aside by the High Court as it was not shown that the Collector was satisfied that execution could not be obtained against the person and moveable property of the judgment-debtor.
In the case of Gudadhar v. Nund Lall, the order of the Collector ordering execution against a person against whom the decree passed had been cancelled, was set aside by the High Court. In the case of Rooknee Ray v. Amirt Lal, an appellate decree of the Collector was set aside as passed without jurisdiction. In the case of Naisir Jan v. Akbur, the Collector was compelled to entertain an intervention which he bad disallowed. The matter went up to the Privy Council in the case of Nilmony Singh v. Taranath Mukerjee. In that case an order of the Collector transferring a decree for execution to another district was s?t aside by the High Court as passed without jurisdiction on the authority of Gobinda Coomer v. Kristo Coomar and their Lordships of the Judicial Committee agreed with the High Court as to its jurisdiction under sec. 15 of the Charter Act.
The case of Mohant Gobind Ramanuja v. Lakhan Parida may seem at first blush to go a step further but we think it quite in keeping with the older decisions read by the light of the decision of the Judicial Committee in the case of Nilmony Singh v. Taranath.
We have therefore no doubt that we have jurisdiction to interfere under sec. 15 of the Charter Act. It was further con tended by the learned Vakil for the Opposite Tarty that as the original suit was valued at above Rs. 100 an appeal lay to the District Judge and not to the Collector and we cannot therefore interfere in revision. We cannot uphold this objection. In the first place the sale in this case is impeached as ultra vires and illegal and in the second place the case was one under sec. 310A, C.P.C, the auction-purchaser being a third party and in either case the proceedings of the Deputy Collector are amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of this Court and not to an appeal.
On the merits of the case it is contended by the learned Vakil for the Petitioner, firstly, that the learned Deputy Collector had no jurisdiction to hold the sale of other lakhiraj property of the Petitioner in the manner in which he did it and that on that ground the sale and all subsequent proceedings are ultra vires and void; and, secondly, that the learned Deputy Collector was quite competent to entertain the application under sec. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code and in re-fusing to do so refused to exercise lawful jurisdiction.
On the first point the learned Deputy Collector has found that the tanki-tenure in respect of which arrears had been decreed was not saleable. The case, therefore, was clearly one under sec. 109 of Act X of 1859 and the other property of the Petitioner could be sold only if satisfaction of the judgment could not be obtained by execution against his person or moveable property. In this case that procedure was not followed. There is nothing to show that any attempt was made to execute the decree against the person or the moveable property of the Petitioner. All that the learned Deputy Collector says is “on the 26th February 1909, the decree-holder made an affidavit that the tanki-tenure for which he had obtained a decree for arrears having been allotted for the sheba of Jaggannath temple, other properties of the judgment-debtor may be sold for realisation of the decretal amount and according to his prayer the mafi-kharida land 162 acres were sold.” As the jurisdiction of the Deputy Collector ??? limited one and the procedure under sec. 109 was not followed, the sale of the lakhiraj land of the judgment-debtor was ultra vires and must be set aside, see Deanutoollah v. Nawab Nazim.
The second question raised by the Petitioner is whether sec. 310A was applicable to the case. If the sale had been held in due compliance with the provisions of secs. 109 and 110, the sale would be “under the provisions of the law, for the time being in force, applicable to the sale of such under-tenures for demands other than, those of arrears of rent due in respect thereof,” i.e, under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. This would naturally attract all the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code with regard to sales, from attachment to delivery of possession at least, and there is no special provision in Act X of 1859 dealing with these matters. It is contended however that only those sections of the Code are applicable which provide for proceedings up to and inclusive of the sale and none else: reliance is placed for this contention on the case of Harish Chandra v. Ananta Charan. The learned Judges are reported to have said “the Code of Civil Procedure applies up to the sale and does not apply after. Sec. 310A comes in after the provisions relating to sale:“although there is no discussion of the reasons pro and con and no reference is made to what the law is after sale in such cases, we should have felt ourselves somewhat embarrassed by this case if it were not for the further contentions of the learned Vakil that this decision is in direct contravention of the ratio decidejndi of the case of Nilmony Singh v. Taranath Mukerjee decided by the Privy Council in 1882 and not referred to by the learned Judges. That was a case in which their Lordships had to consider whether a Collector could transfer a decree for rent for execution to a Civil Court in another district. The High Court had held that there was no provision for such a transfer in Act X, of 1859 and the transfer was therefore incompetent. Their Lordships in setting aside the order of the High Court say that Revenue Courts deciding suits under Act X of 1859 are Civil Courts and “there is nothing in the Act (X of 1859) which provides for any execution beyond his (Collector's) jurisdiction and there is nothing to forbid the conclusion that such executions are left to the operations of Act XXXIII of 1852 or the corresponding portion of Act. VIII of 1859.” This and other reasons given for the decision seem to leave no room for doubt that their Lordships thought that except upon points expressly provided for by Act X of 1859 the procedure of the Revenue Courts when trying questions arising under that Act must be governed by the Civil Procedure Code. It cannot be said however that the ratio decidendi of their Lordships has been uniformly kept in sight in subsequent cases. The mojority of the Allahabad Court followed up the said reasoning of their Lordships and held that sec. 43 of the Civil Procedure Code was applicable to rent suits under Act XII of 1881, the local Rent Act. This decision of the Allahabad Court was followed by our own Court in the case of Adhirani v. Raghu(11). In the case of Radha Madhub v. Lakhi Narain, the learned Judges held that sec. 373 of the Civil Procedure Code did not apply to suits before Revenue authorities. Mr. Justice Ameer Ali, as he then was, who delivered the judgment of the Court, said “we think the point has been virtually decided by the reasoning in the Full Bench decision in Nogendra Nath v. Mathura Mahun.” The latter case however was in respect of the provisions of sec. 14 of the Limitation Act, applying to rent suits in Revenue Courts.
The learned Judges said “Act X of 1859 has always been considered a Code complete, in itself and unaffected by the general laws of limitation or procedure.” The discussion was confined to the question of limitation and the case of Nilmony Singh Deo was not so much as mentioned, The expression “complete Code” must therefore be understood as complete as to matters specially provided for in the Act. In this view of the case it was not a sound basis for the judgment in Radha Madhub v. Lakhi Narain. In the next case on the point, however, Makunda Bullabh v. Bhogban Chandra(14), another Bench held the same view as to sec. 373. The learned Judges say as to the case of Nilmony Singh that it held that “there being nothing in Act X of 1859 to prohibit the Collector acting under that Act from transferring an execution case from his own file to the file of a Civil Court, the procedure laid down in the Civil Procedure Code might be followed in the matter of the transfer of the decree for execution to some other Codes” and they distinguish it as not specifically dealing with sec. 373 of the Civil Procedure Code. With great deference to the learned Judges we may point out that the Judicial Committee in the case of Nilmony Singh does not hold that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code might be followed as if the Collector had a discretion in the matter but their Lordships say “These considerations lead to the conclusion that the Revenue Courts established by Act X of 1859 must be held to fall within sec. 284 of Act VIII of 1859 of the same year.” Sec. 284 of Act VIII of 1859 ran as follows: “A decree of any Civil Court …. which cannot be executed within the jurisdiction of the Court whose duty it is to execute the same may be executed within the jurisdiction of any other such Court in the manner following.” The result of the ruling of their Lordships is, we think, that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code must be followed in such cases. In the case of Hare Krishna v. Bhusan Chandra, Stephen and Mookerjee, JJ., express a serious doubt as to whether in view of the ruling in Nilmony Singh's case it can still be said that Act X of 1859 is a complete Code in itself in the sense of excluding the application of the Civil Procedure Code to proceedings thereunder. In the case of Ram Lochan v. Beni Prosad, another Bench of this Court relied upon the case of Nilmony Singh and the Full Bench ruling of the Allahabad Court in Madho Prokash v. Murli Monohar(17) for holding that the provisions of sec. 492 of the Civil Procedure Code as to injunctions applied to rent-decrees under the North-Western Provinces Rent Act XII of 1881 transferred for execution to a Civil Court. We think, therefore, that the cases decided in disregard or under a misconception of the ruling of the Privy Council in the case of Nilmony Singh cannot stand in the way of our holding that sec. 310A of the Civil Procedure Code was applicable to the present case and the learned Deputy Collector failed to exercise a lawful jurisdiction vested in him by law.
In the result, therefore, the orders of the Deputy Collector and the Collector are set aside. The sale is held to be ultra vires and void.
The parties are relegated to the position in which they were before the sale. The auction-purchaser will get back the amount paid by him. The decree-holder will realise his decretal amount first from the deposit made by the Petitioner under sec. 310A and any balance in due course of law. Each party will pay its own costs in connection with this proceeding in all Courts.
Rule made absolute.