Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • sec. 17 of the Indian Registration Act,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • sec. 17 of the Indian Registration Act,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns whether the rent of a tenure held by the Defendant Appellant under the Plaintiffs Respondents is enhanceable. The Plaintiffs are a joint-stock company headquartered in Bombay with a local office in Canning Town. On 20 October 1876 the company appointed Cowasjee Edalji as their agent for taking possession of certain property, which included the disputed tenure. On 8 March 1885 Cowasji Edalji drew up a memorandum recording an arrangement with five grantees (teachers operating as "Teacher and Company"), by which, from 12 April 1884, they took possession of 1,000 bighas in three parcels for reclamation. The memorandum provided for contribution by the lessor towards reclamation, rent-free occupation for the first four years and progressive rents in the subsequent four years, the last-mentioned rate (Re. 1-1 per bigha) being stated as the maximum for a maurasi mokurari tenure. The lessees carried out the reclamation and occupied the land; the land was later partitioned among them and formal maurasi mokurari leases were executed in 1898 in favour of representatives of two grantees. The Defendant Appellant is the representative of one of the original grantees. On 11 March 1910 (25 years after the memorandum) the company sued for enhancement of rent. The Court of first instance held that the rent was not liable to enhancement but that the company could have the rent re-adjusted by assessment of excess lands. On appeal, the District Judge held the tenure enhanceable and remitted the matter for inquiry into the fair rent payable. The present appeal challenges the District Judge's order of remand.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the rent of the tenure granted under the memorandum is enhanceable (i.e., whether the tenancy was subject to enhancement after the specified progressive rents and stated maximum).
  2. What was the legal nature of the tenancy — specifically, whether the tenure was a maurasi mokurari tenancy (and correspondingly non-enhanceable) or a different form of lease.
  3. Whether the memorandum produced in evidence was admissible and whether it should be treated as a lease or merely as a memorandum of an arrangement.
  4. Whether the company's manager/agent (Cowasjee Edalji) was competent, within the scope of his authority under the power of attorney dated 20 October 1876, to grant a maurasi mokurari lease of the kind in question.
  5. Whether the tenancy created by the agent was ratified by the company, and if so, whether such ratification bound the company to the transaction in its entirety.

Arguments of the Parties

Defendant Appellant's Arguments

  • The tenancy was maurasi and mokurari and therefore not enhanceable (the memorandum and conduct showed an intention that the stated maximum rate would be final).
  • The agent (Cowasjee Edalji) was acting within the apparent scope of his authority and/or the company ratified the transaction; therefore the company is bound by the tenancy as created by the agent.
  • The term "maurasi" in practice was used by the company to mean "maurasi and mokurari," and subsequent leases executed by the company described such pattas in language consistent with a maurasi-mokurari grant.
  • The company, by maintaining systematic business entries (the book produced), had means of knowledge of the transaction and therefore ratified the arrangement recorded in that book.

Plaintiff Respondents' (Company) Arguments

  • Challenged admissibility of the memorandum: the company argued in this Court that the memorandum was either a present demise (a lease) or an agreement to lease and hence compulsorily registrable under sec. 17 of the Indian Registration Act read with the definition of "lease" in sec. 3.
  • Submitted that the power of attorney should be strictly construed and that the agent was authorised only to accept maurasi (hereditary) leases but not mokurari leases (i.e., not leases fixing rent in perpetuity), relying on authorities about strict interpretation of powers.
  • Argued that a subsequent document (lease of 25 April 1908) should not be used to interpret the earlier power of attorney executed more than 20 years before.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Lall Jha v. Negroo Cited by the company to support the contention that the memorandum effected a present demise (i.e., was a lease or agreement to lease requiring registration). The Court recorded the citation as part of the company's argument but rejected the contention that the memorandum was a lease or agreement to lease; it treated the document as a memorandum of arrangement and admissible evidence.
Pumanunddas v. Dharsey Same contextual use as above (support for view that memorandum was a present demise). Cited by the company; the Court did not accept that the memorandum was a lease and therefore did not treat these authorities as decisive for registration requirements in this case.
Ramaswamy v. Tirupathi Same contextual use — cited to support the argument that the memorandum effected a present demise. Cited by company; the Court rejected the argument that the document was a lease.
Champaklatika v. Nafar Chandra Also cited in support of the proposition that the memorandum effected a lease or agreement to lease. The Court did not accept the submission and held the document to be a memorandum of arrangement rather than a lease.
Mohipal Sing v. Lalji Sing Cited by the company in the argument about the nature of the memorandum (lease/agreement to lease). Cited by company; the Court treated the memorandum as not a lease, rejecting the registrability argument tied to these authorities.
Soora Soondery v. Golam Ally Cited for the principle that, in similar contexts, tenures arranged for reclamation with progressive rents up to a stated maximum were not intended to be enhanceable. The Court relied upon this line of authority (including related cases) to support the conclusion that the tenure was not intended to be enhanceable.
Sutto Surun v. Mohesh Same grouping of authority on non-enhanceability of reclamation tenures with a stated maximum rent. Used by the Court as part of the reasoning that the tenure was not intended to be enhanceable.
Dhunput v. Gooman Part of the authorities relied on concerning the nature of reclamation leases and intent regarding enhancement. Included among cases the Court treated as supporting non-enhanceability.
Huro Prosad Roy Chaudhury v. Chundee Charan Boyragee Cited in the group of authorities indicating a tenancy of this description was not intended to be enhanceable. Relied on by the Court in concluding the tenure was not enhanceable.
Robert Watson & Co. v. Radha Nath Singh Also cited among authorities supporting non-enhanceability in similar factual contexts. Used by the Court in its reasoning that the arrangement pointed to a non-enhanceable tenure.
Huro Prosad v. Chundi Gharari (per Wilson J.) Quoted to illustrate that it would be improbable parties intended rent to be raised immediately after reaching a stated "maximum." The Court adopted the reasoning as persuasive support for the inference that parties intended no further increase after the specified maximum.
Bryant v. La Banque Du Peuple Cited by the company to support strict construction of a power of attorney. The company relied on this authority, but the Court observed it was not necessary to decide the strict-construction point for the outcome; the decision turned on apparent authority and ratification.
Roy Radhakissen v. Nauratan Lal Cited in support of strict construction of powers granted to agents. Cited by the company; the Court did not rest its decision on strict construction and proceeded on other grounds.
Bindubashini v. Giridhari Also cited for the rule of strict construction of powers of attorney. Cited by company; Court did not make a definitive ruling based on this authority for the ultimate decision.
Munrunjun v. Leelanand Cited to highlight the distinction between maurasi and mokurari leases (company's argument that agent could only grant maurasi). The Court noted the distinction but did not need to accept the company's narrow construction; it resolved the case on apparent authority and ratification.
Bhagwat v. Sheo Prosad Cited by the company to argue a subsequent document should not be used to interpret an earlier power of attorney. The Court acknowledged the point but held it unnecessary to decide that issue to resolve the appeal.
Kamaleshwari v. Rahmari Same purposive citation as Bhagwat v. Sheo Prosad (on not using later documents to interpret earlier instruments). Cited by company; Court did not base its decision on this point.
National Bank Co. v. Wilson Cited for the principle that acts of an agent within apparent authority bind the principal unless the agent is known to be unauthorised. The Court relied on this principle to hold that the agent's acts, made within the apparent scope of authority, bound the company.
Duke of Beaufort v. Neeld Authority supporting the binding effect of acts done by an agent within apparent authority. Used by the Court as part of the body of authority establishing that apparent authority binds the principal.
Trickett v. Tomlinson Same principle regarding agency and apparent authority. Relied upon by the Court in concluding the agent's acts bound the principal.
Royal British Bank v. Turquand Cited for the proposition that persons dealing with an agent are entitled to presume regularity of the agent's authority (indoor-management/appearance of authority principles). The Court invoked this principle to support that the grantees were entitled to presume the agent acted within authority.
Agar v. Athenaeum Society Similar rule on presumption respecting an agent's authority when dealing with third parties. Used by the Court as an authority for the proposition that acts within apparent authority bind the principal.
Bargate v. Shortridge Also cited in relation to the presumption of regularity of an agent's acts. Included among authorities supporting binding effect of agent's acts within apparent authority.
Montreal Co. v. Robert Another supporting authority on agency and apparent authority principles. Relied upon by the Court as part of the authorities establishing that the acts of the agent bound the principal.
Attwood v. Small Cited for the rule that a principal cannot ratify part of a transaction and repudiate the remainder; ratification, if established, must be of the whole transaction. The Court accepted the principle but then examined whether ratification in fact occurred; if ratification existed it would bind the company to the transaction in entirety.
Bristow v. Whitmore Same principle on the indivisibility of ratification. Accepted by the Court as the correct statement of the law on ratification's effect.
Savery v. King Cited for the proposition that a principal must have full knowledge or means of knowledge of essential facts before ratification can be imputed. The Court applied this principle, finding the company's business book provided the means of knowledge and therefore supported a finding of ratification.
Haseler v. Lemoyne Also cited for the requirement of knowledge/means of knowledge before ratification. Used by the Court in assessing whether the company had means of knowledge sufficient to ratify the agent's acts.
Gunn v. Roberts Same principle on knowledge as prerequisite for ratification. Applied by the Court in concluding the company had means of knowledge and hence ratified the transaction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded through a sequence of interrelated questions addressing (1) the nature of the tenancy, (2) admissibility and character of the memorandum, (3) authority of the agent, and (4) ratification by the company.

1. Nature of the Tenancy and Admissibility of the Memorandum:

  • The Court considered whether the memorandum amounted to a lease or an agreement to lease (which would render it registrable). The company had argued in this Court that it was a present demise and therefore registrable under sec. 17 of the Indian Registration Act read with the definition of "lease" in sec. 3.
  • The Court rejected that contention. It held that the document did not demise any property and was not a lease or an agreement to lease but was what it stated on its face — a memorandum of an arrangement made by the agent on behalf of the company under which the grantees had taken possession from 12 April 1884.
  • The Court therefore considered the memorandum properly admissible in evidence. It noted that in the Court of first instance the defendant had called for the company's counterpart; the company said it could not be found, and produced instead a business book entry that was an abstract of the original memorandum made some years later. The Court treated the book entry as corroborative and sufficient to show the essential terms.
  • Relying on authorities concerning reclamation arrangements and progressive rents (Soora Soondery and related cases), and on the terms of the memorandum and the abstract book-entry, the Court inferred that the arrangement intended a progressive rent up to a stated maximum and no further enhancement thereafter. The Court found additional support for this inference in the undisputed fact that no attempt to enhance the rent had been made for at least 17 years following the arrangement.

2. Authority of the Agent (Apparent Authority):

  • The Court examined whether the agent (Cowasji Edalji) had authority under the power of attorney dated 20 October 1876 to grant a maurasi mokurari lease. The company urged strict construction of the power and contended the agent could grant only maurasi (hereditary) leases, not mokurari leases.
  • The Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the power's language should be construed loosely or strictly in the abstract. Instead it focused on whether the agent's act was within his apparent authority and whether third parties could reasonably presume such authority.
  • It was admitted and supported by the record that Cowasji Edalji was the company's chief local representative, acted over many years without direction by a superior, retired in 1903, and was not accused of fraud or betrayal of trust. There was evidence he had, in fact, granted maurasi and mokurari leases in other cases.
  • Relying on the established agency principles (National Bank Co. v. Wilson and related authorities), the Court held that where an agent acts within the apparent scope of authority, and the person dealing with him has no notice of limitation, the principal is bound. The grantees were entitled to presume regularity and authority on the part of the agent.
  • Accordingly, the Court concluded the lease granted by the agent was within the apparent scope of his authority and therefore binding on the company.

3. Ratification by the Company:

  • The Court addressed whether the company ratified the tenancy. It accepted the legal principle that ratification, if established, must be of the whole transaction and cannot be partial (Attwood v. Small; Bristow v. Whitmore; Story on Agency).
  • The Court noted that before ratification can be imputed the principal must have full knowledge or at least means of knowledge of the essential facts of the transaction (Savery v. King and related cases).
  • There was a business book kept in the ordinary course containing systematic entries similar to the entry produced in this case. The Court considered that an examination of this book would have disclosed to a company director or supervising officer the nature of the settlement made by the agent.
  • On that basis the Court held the company must be deemed to have had means of knowledge and therefore to have ratified the transaction recorded by their agent.

4. Synthesis and Outcome:

  • Combining the conclusions that (a) the tenure was a maurasi mokurari arrangement not intended to be enhanceable, (b) the agent's acts were within his apparent authority and bound the principal, and (c) the company ratified the transaction (and could only ratify it in its entirety), the Court concluded that the District Judge's order remitting the question for enhancement inquiry was incorrect.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL ALLOWED.

Holding:

  • The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the District Judge (which had held the tenure enhanceable and remitted the matter), and restored the decree of the Court of first instance (which had held the rent was not liable to enhancement but allowed re-adjustment by assessment of excess lands, if any).
  • The Court ordered that costs be awarded to the Appellant both in this Court and in the Court of appeal below, and assessed the hearing fee in this Court at three gold mohurs.

Implications:

  • Direct consequence: The decree of the Court of first instance stands — the tenure is not liable to enhancement under the arrangement described, and the company's appeal to enhance rent (as remitted by the District Judge) is dismissed.
  • The opinion rests on findings about the nature of the memorandum (a memorandum of arrangement rather than a lease), the agent's apparent authority and the company's ratification through business records; it does not purport to establish a broader new legal principle beyond applying established authority on agency, ratification and interpretation of reclamation-tenure arrangements.

This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add facts or interpretations beyond that text.

    Katyayani Debi v. Port Canning And Land Improvement Co.

    The substantial question in controversy in this appeal is, whether the rent of the tenure held by the Defendant Appellant under the Plaintiffs Respondents is enhanceable. The Plaintiffs constitute a joint-stock company which has its headquarters in Bombay and its local office in Canning Town. On the 20th October 1876, the company appointed one Cowasjee Edalji as their attorney to take and obtain possession of the property which includes the disputed tenure. On the 8th March 1885 Cowasji Edalji drew up a memorandum which embodied the arrangement made by him on behalf of the company with five persons who were teachers by profession and constituted a company known as “Teacher and Company”. The memorandum recited that with effect from the commencement of the year 1291, that is, from the 12th April 1884, Teacher and Company had taken possession of a thousand bighas of land, in three separate parcels within defined boundaries. The jungles were to be cleared by the lessees, the lessor company to contribute to the expenses of reclamation at the rate of Re. 1 per bigha in the case of two of the parcels and at the rate of Re. 1-8 per bigha in the case of the other parcel. The land was to be held rent-free for the first four years; in the fifth year, rent was to be paid at the rate of four annas per bigha; in the sixth year at 8 annas per bigha; in the seventh year at 12 annas and in the eighth year at Re. 1-1 per bigha. It was further stated that the last mentioned rate of Re. 1-1 per bigha was to be the maximum rate of rent in a maurasi mokurari tenure. This memorandum was signed by Cowasji Edalji as agent of the lessor company and also by Dwarkanath Roy, their Superintendent, and was made over to the lessees. It is not disputed that the terms of this arrangement have been carried out and in accordance therewith the lessees have constructed the usual embankments and culverts, have reclaimed the land and have been in occupation thereof. A few years after the memorandum, the land was divided amicably amongst the lessees, and in 1898 the representatives of two of them obtained maurasi mokurari leases formally executed in their favour by the lessors. The Defendant Appellant is the daughter and representative in interest of one of the five original grantees. On the 11th March 1910, that is, 25 years after the date of the memorandum of arrangement, the company instituted the present suit for enhancement of rent of the tenure. The Court of first instance held that the rent was not liable to enhancement, but that the company was entitled to have the rent re-adjusted by assessment of excess lands, if any. Upon appeal, the District Judge has held that the tenure was enhanceable and has remitted the case to the Court of first instance for an enquiry as to the fair rent payable. The present appeal is directed against the order of remand.

    The first and the most vital question for consideration is, what was the nature of the tenancy? It has not been disputed that if the memorandum of arrangement is genuine instrument and is admissible in evidence, the tenure was maurasi and mokurari. In the Court of first instance, objection was taken to the reception of this document in evidence on the ground that it was neither stamped nor registered as required by law. This objection was overruled and the Sub-Judge also expressed a doubt as to its genuineness. Upon appeal, no question of admissibility of the document was raised before the Judge who pronounced in favour of its genuineness, and the case has been decided on the assumption that the document had been properly received in evidence. In this Court, an earnest endeavour has been made on behalf of the company Respondent to support the position that the document is not admissible in evidence. It has been argued that the document is an agreement to lease, if not a lease, and that in either view the document was compulsorily registrable under sec. 17 of the Indian Registration Act, read with the definition of the term “lease” given in sec. 3. Reference has been made to the cases of Lall Jha v. Negroo(1), Pumanunddas v. Dharsey(2), Ramaswamy v. Tirupathi(3), Champaklatika v. Nafar Chandra(4), and Mohipal Sing v. Lalji Sing(5) to support the argument that there was a present demise made by the memorandum which was consequently either a lease or an agreement to lease. We are not prepared to accept this contention as well-founded. The document does not demise any property and is neither a lease nor an agreement to lease. It is what it purports to be on the face of it, namely, a memorandum of the arrangement which had been made with the grantees by the agent of the company on their behalf, under which they had taken possession with effect from the 12th April 1884. In this view, the document was rightly admitted by the Court of first instance. We may add that in that Court the Defendant called upon the Company to produce the counterpart of the memorandum. Her case was that the memorandum had been drawn up in duplicate, that one copy was given to her predecessor-in-interest and that the other copy was retained by the company. On behalf of the company, it was stated that the counterpart had been lost; but it has been explained before us that this did not mean that the company admitted the genuineness of the document produced by the Defendant, but merely indicated that no trace of a counterpart could be found in their office. The company, however, produced a book which contained an abstract of this memorandum, entered some years after the date when the original was executed. This is plain from the circumstance that at the foot of the entry there is a note that the land had been partitioned and the shares of the grantees as arranged amongst themselves are stated in detail. It may be taken then that the entry in the book produced by the company was not contemporaneous with the execution of the memorandum of arrangement. Even if we confine our attention to this entry, it is plain that the tenure was intended to be maurasi and mokurari. The entry is to the effect that the land would be held rent-free for the first four years, and that during the next four years the rent would be progressive, namely, four annas, eight annas, twelve annas and seventeen annas in successive years. But there is no statement as to who was to reclaim the jungle. This indicates conclusively that the entry was not intended to be an absolutely full and accurate copy of the original memorandum it was in essence an abstract of the terms as arranged between the agent of the company and the grantees. If, now, we confine our selves to the abstract as contained in the book and bear in mind the principle recognised in the cases of Soora Soondery v. Golam Ally(6), Sutto Surun v. Mohesh(7), Dhunput v. Gooman(8), Huro Prosad Roy Chaudhury v. Chundee Charan Boyragee(9) and Robert Watson & Co. v. Radha Nath Singh(10), it becomes plain that the tenure was never intended to be enhanceable; and we are fortified in this view when we find further that no attempt has been made to enhance the rent during a period of at least 17 years. The land was obviously let out for purposes of reclamation, to be effected by the lessees at their expense though the lessor also undertook to make a contribution thereto. It was to be held during the first four years without payment of rent. The rent was thereafter to be progressive till the maximum mentioned was reached, and there was no provision for a further rise. The reasonable inference to draw from these circumstances is that the parties intended that when the specified maximum had been reached, there would be no further increase. As was well observed by Mr. Justice Wilson in Huro Prosad v. Chundi Gharari, if the contrary view were adopted, the inference would follow that after the maximum had been reached, the lessors might, in the very next year, seek to enhance the rent payable, which could hardly have been the intention of the parties. Whether, therefore, we look to the memorandum produced by the Defendant which contains an express recital that the tenure was maurasi and mokurari or confine our attention to the entry in the book produced by the company, which though merely an abstract, sets out the material terms with sufficient fulness, there is no room for doubt that the tenure was intended to be not enhanceable.

    The question next arises, whether the manager of the company was competent to grant a maurasi and mokurari lease of this description. The extent of his authority depends primarily upon a power of attorney, dated the 20th October 1876. It has been strenuously argued before us on behalf of the company that the terms of this power must be strictly construed; and reference has been made in support of this view to the rule recognised in Bryant v. La Banque Du Peuple(11), Roy Radhakissen v. Nauratan Lal(12), and Bindubashini v. Giridhari(13). Our attention has been invited specially to the passage in the power of attorney which authorises the agent to accept kabuliyats or counterparts of maurasi leases granted by the company to raiyats, and it has been argued that in view of the well-known distinction between maurasi and mokurari leases, Munrunjun v. Leelanand(14), the agent must thus be deemed to have been authorised to grant only maurasi or hereditary leases and not mokurari leases, that is, leases by which rent is fixed in perpetuity. The Appellant has, on the other hand, contended with considerable plausibility that the term “maurasi” has been used in the power of attorney, as it is familiarly used in popular language as equivalent to “maurasi and mokurari”, and that the agent was intended to be vested with authority to grant maurasi and mokurari leases, specially in view of the well-known fact that, for purposes of reclamation, maurasi and mokurari leases are ordinarily granted to lessees who have to bear the burden, wholly or partially, of the costs of reclamation. Reference has also been made to the terms of a lease granted to the representative of one of the original grantees on the 25th April 1908 after the land had been partitioned amongst the lessees. This lease is described in its commencement as a maurasi patta, and the concluding paragraph, states that, under the conditions previously mentioned, a mokurari patta is granted to the lessees named. An examination of the terms of the lease, however, shows plainly that what is granted is a maurasi and mokurari patta. It has been argued with some force on behalf of the Appellant that in so far as this company at any rate were concerned, the term “maurasi” was used by them as equivalent to “maurasi and mokurari”. In reply it has been argued on behalf of the Respondent that reference cannot rightly be made to a document of subsequent date to explain the terms of the power of attorney which had been executed more than 20 years before: Bhagwat v. Sheo Prosad(15), Kamaleshwari v. Rahmari(16). In our opinion, the Appellant need not rely upon the argument mentioned, and it is not material for the purposes of this appeal to hold that the term maurasi in the power of attorney was used in a loose or popular sense, as equivalent to maurasi and mokurari. The decision of the case must depend upon two fundamental questions, namely, first—was the lease granted by the agent within the apparent scope of his authority, and secondly—was the tenancy created by him ratified by the company?

    In so far as the first of these questions is concerned it is plain that the lease granted was within the apparent scope of the authority of the agent. It has been admitted in this Court and the statement is fully borne out by the evidence on the record that Cowasji Edalji was appointed the first agent of the company in this part of the country on the 20th October 1876. He was their chief representative here, and there is no indication whatever that in the management of this property, he acted under the direction of any superior authority. He was in the service of the company for a long series of years and retired in 1903. There is also no suggestion that when this particular giant was made, Cowasji Edalji committed on act of fraud, or that he was, in any way, not entirely faithful in the discharge of his duties, or that he betrayed the trust reposed in him by his employers. The fact cannot be, and has not been, disputed that the agent, at any rate, was under the impression that he had authority to grant a maurasi mokurari lease on the terms already described. The grantees also were under the same impression. There is further evidence to show that Cowasji Edalji did, as a matter of fact, grant maurasi and mokurari leases to other, persons in respect of land which had to be reclaimed and brought under cultivation. This was, no doubt, sought to be qualified by one of the witnesses, who suggested that when a maurasi mokurari lease was granted by the agent, he obtained permission from the directors in Bombay. But there is nothing to show that the lessees were ever apprised of this fact. It cannot be disputed that every act done by an agent in the course of his employment, on behalf of his principal, and within the apparent scope of his authority, binds the principal, unless the agent is in fact unauthorised to do the particular act, and the person dealing with him has notice that in doing such act he is exceeding his authority: National B.N Co. v. Wilson(17), Duke of Beaufort v. Neeld(18), Trickett v. Tomlinson(19). The grantees, in the case before us, would be entitled to presume that the agent, who had admittedly authority to grant reclamation leases, had acted with regularity and within the scope of his authority: Royal British Bank v. Turquand(20), Agar v. Athenaeum Society(21), Bargate v. Shortridge(22), Montreal Co. v. Robert(23). In the circumstances of the present case, it is plain that the act done by the agent was within the apparent scope of his authority, and is binding upon his principals. The first ground upon which the Appellant seeks to hold the company bound by the lease must be maintained.

    In so far as the second question is concerned, it has been argued on behalf of the Appellant that the tenancy was ratified by the company, and that as it was ratified, it could be ratified only in its entirety; in other words, that even if the company be assumed to be entitled to repudiate the unauthorised act of their agent, they could not adopt it in part and repudiate it as to the remainder; that is, if they acquiesced in the arrangement made by their agent, they could accept the grantees as tenants only on all the conditions settled by him; the transaction could be confirmed either in its entirety or not at all. This contention is supported by the principle recognised in Attwood v. Small(24) and Bristow v. Whitmore(25) and enunciated by Story in his classical treatise on Agency (sec. 250) in the following terms:“The principal cannot, on his own mere authority, ratify a transaction in part and repudiate it as to the rest, and hence the general-rule is deduced that where a ratification is established as to a part, it operates as a confirmation of the whole of that particular transaction of the agent.” In view of this elementary doctrine, it has not been and it cannot be disputed; on behalf of the company Respondents, that if there was ratification, the transaction must be deemed to have been ratified in its entirety. But it has been argued, and very properly argued, that before the company can be held bound by ratification, they must be proved to have had full knowledge, or, at any rate, means of knowledge of all the essential facts of the transaction into which their agent had entered on their behalf: Savery v. King(26), Haseler v. Lemoyne(27), Gunn v. Roberts(28). In our opinion, there is ample material on the record to show that the company had such means of knowledge in the very book produced by them. The book, evidently kept in the regular course of business, contains a large number of entries similar to the one exhibited in this case. It is in fact a book in which entries were systematically made and a record was kept of transactions relating to settlements of land made by the agent on behalf of the company. An examination of the entries in the book would have disclosed to a director of the company or to any person entitled to exercise powers of supervision over the agent, the nature of the settlement made by him. We hold accordingly that the Company must be deemed to have ratified the particular transaction now before the Court. The second ground, upon which the Appellant seeks to hold the Company bound by the lease, must consequently prevail.

    The result is that the appeal must be allowed, the order of the District Judge set aside and the decree of the Court of first instance restored. This order will carry costs both here and in the Court of appeal below. We assess the hearing fee in this Court at three gold mohurs.

    Appeal allowed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Katyayani Debi v. Port Canning And Land Improvement Co.
    (Mar 9, 1914)