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  • section 302, Indian Penal Code,
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  • section 302, Indian Penal Code,

    Muniandi Alias Muniswamy Naidu (Prisoner). v. King Emperor,

    Ayling, J. — I have had the advantage of perusing the Judgment of my learned brother, and as regards the conviction need only say that I entirely agree with him that accused's guilt has been proved beyond all reasonable doubt and that the conviction must be confirmed.

    It is only as regards the sentence that I feel constrained to add a few words.

    The crime in this case was of the most atrocious character. The victm was a little girl of 8, who, as the Sessions Judge says had been a constant visitor to the accused's house, and had been made a pet of by accused and his wife. This child was cruelly murdered by accused for the sake of her gold necklace and other ornaments—the most sordid of motives for a most inhuman act. On the face of if it is difficult to imagine a case calling more imperativly for the extreme penatly allowed by law.

    The Sessions Judge has refrained from it for two reasons (1) the circumstantial nature of evidence, (2) the youth of the accused who is said to be aged 18.

    As regards the first, speaking with all respect to expressions of opinion to the contrary, it seems to me no reason at all. I am aware that eminent judges of this and other Courts have been averse to imposing or confirming death, sentences where the evidence is purely circumstantial but I have never seen a case in which any judge has laid down any principle for the guidance of others that such a sentence should not be imposed. The Sessions Judge says “In Referred Trial 25 of 1886 Kernar. J., has laid down the rule that in cases where the evidence is circumstantial, it is not safe to pass the extreme sentence of death.” A reference to the report (given in 2 Weir, 736) shows that the learned judge did nothing of the kind.

    He expressed it as his individual opinion, but was very careful to add that he quite agreed with Brandt, J. that no rule to that effect could be laid down. Brandt, J. in the very same case, has most lucidly set forth what in my humble judgment is the correct view—that where the Court is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of accused, the fact that the evidence is circumstantial and not direct is not a factor which should per se affect the sentence. I had occasion to consider the same point in a recent case and am glad to be fortified in my view by the opinion of Oldfield, J.

    I don't wish to say anything which might be interpreted as fettering the discretion of judges of original Courts in deciding which of the sentences allowable under section 302, Indian Penal Code, should be imposed: but I feel bound to express dissent from the view; which seems to be somewhat commonly held, that there is any unwritten rule or principle standing in the way of the imposition of a death sentence in cases where the evidence is purely circumstantial.

    The second point, that of age, is undoubtedly one which no court should leave out of consideration in determining the sentence to be imposed. Whether in the present case accused's youth in such as to outweigh the aggravated circumstances of a crime is a very difficult question. I may go so far as to say that if the Sessions Judge, in the exercise of his discretion, had imposed a death sentence, I should have been opposed to reducing it. But the substitution of a death sentence for one of transportation is a measure which must always be undertaken with reluctance, and having regard to the view taken by my learned brother I do not feel bound to differ and to necessitate a reference to a third Judge.

    I would, therefore, confirm both the conviction and sentence in this case.

    Kumaraswami Sastri, J.— The appellant has been found guilty of having murdered a girl of 8 years for the sake of her jewels and sentenced to transportation for life. Both the assessors found him guilty and the Sessions Judge agreeing with them imposed the lesser penalty on the ground of the youth of the accused (who is about 18 years) and the circumstantial nature of the evidence. The accused appeals against this conviction and he has been called upon to show cause why the sentence should not be altered into one of death.

    There can be little doubt that the girl Pethammal, who was residing with her parents at Virudupatti (where the accused also lives) was murdered and that her dead body was found in a trunk at Madura. The medical evidence shows that death was caused by a wound on the neck and there is absolutely nothing to support the suggestion made at the trial that the wound was caused after death.

    The evidence adduced by the prosecution shows (1) that the girl came to the house of the accused on the day she disappeared and was last seen there; (2) that there were blood stains in a room in the house (3) that the accused went to Madura with the trunk M. O. and was arrested at Madura Railway Station that night (4) that while in Madura the accused sold a gold Saradu belonging to the deceased girl; (5) that the body of the murdered girl was found in Madura inside the trunk M. O.; (6) that the trunk in which the body of the girl was found and the blood stained knife and Veshti belonged to the accused.

    I agree with the Sessions Judge in holding that there is absolutely no ground for disbelieving the evidence given by the wife of the accused, who is a girl 14 years old. Her evidence puts it beyond doubt that the accused and the deceased girl were in the room shortly before the accused left the house with the trunk in which the body of the girl was found. The accused himself took the police to the person to whom he had disposed of the jewel worn by the girl. On this part of the case there is no explanation, why the accused went to Madura or how he came by the jewel of the deceased girl. I have gone through the evidence carefully and am unable to come to any other conclusion than that the accused was rightly convicted.

    The question as to the sentence to be passed is one that presents considerable difficulty. The learned Sessions Judge who has written a very careful and considered judgment has after taking all the circumstances of the case into consideration sentenced the accused to transportation for life. The accused is only 18 years old and the evidence is mainly circumstantial.

    These facts have often been taken into consideration in passing sentences for murder and cases have occurred where the High Court has refrained from passing the death sentence even in cases of deliberate murder. In Queen-Empress v. Sami Justices Shephard and Muthusami Iyer were of opinion that the fact that the evidence was wholly circumstantial, justified them in sentencing the accused to transportation for life. A similar view was taken by Justice Karnan in 2 Weir, 736 Mr. Justice Brandt, however, rightly points out in the above case that a consideration of the species of evidence on which the guilt of an accused is found should not of itself determine the nature of the sentence.

    I do not desire it to be understood that the Court is bound in every case to pass the lesser sentence when the evidence is circumstantial. The following passage in Wells on Circumstantial Evidence (page 49 of the 6th Edition, by Justice Wells) is in point:—“For sometime back it has been the fashion with a great many people to treat “purely cirumstantial evidence” as implying an inherent weakness and as necessarily more or less unsatisfactory. There is hardly a case of murder in which a reprieve is sought or a conviction appealed against in which something of the kind is not urged. Fortunately there has been no recent judicial utterance countenancing such a general proposition; and the judges have been fully alive to the fact that circumstantial evidence, like any other, must in every case be tested and weighed, and prevail or not by its own inherent proving force'’.

    If the case rested only on the circumstantial nature of the evidence I would in the present case, enhance the sentence. I am, however, of opinion that the age of the accused is a fact that might well be taken into consideration in determining what sentence is to be passed in cases of murder. In The Emperor v. Jasha Bewa…Accused. age was held to be a sufficient ground for passing the lesser sentence even when the accused was guilty of a deliberate and heinous murder. I do not think that in the present case any exceptional circumstances exist which make it desirable that I should, in the exercise of the revisional powers of the High Court, interfere with the discretion exercised by the Sessions Judge.

    I confirm the conviction and sentence and dismiss the appeal.

    Appeal dismissed

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    Muniandi Alias Muniswamy Naidu (Prisoner). v. King Emperor,
    (Nov 16, 1914)