1. This appeal arises out of a suit brought for the balance of an account, the defendants having borrowed money and made repayments from Sambat 1960 to Sambat 1968 (1903-1904 to 1911-12). It is alleged in the plaint that on 14th October 1911 defendant 1, who is the father of defendants 2 and 3, signed a stamped acknowledgment for Rs. 1,549 Ex. P-4 in the plaintiffs' account book. The suit which was brought on 7th October 1914 was for Rs. 2,100, being Rs. 1,549 and interest. The first Court held the suit to be barred by time. There are two acknowledgments, Ex. P-3 and P-4, dated 11th November 1910 and 14th October 1911 respectively, and it is admitted that unless these acknowledgments suffice to bring the suit within time it is time barred. A one-anna receipt stamp was affixed to each acknowledgment, but the stamps were not cancelled in any way. The first Court held that the acknowledgment required to be stamped under Article 1, Sch. 1, Stamp Act, that under S. 12(1) the stamps were required to be cancelled, and as the stamps were not cancelled the acknowledgments must, under S. 12(2), be deemed to be validated by acceptance of stamp duty and penalty. The lower Court held the acknowledgments inadmissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Stamp Act. In appeal before the Divisional Judge it was urged (1) that the acknowledgments, being unconditional implied a promise to pay and could be validated by payment of stamp duty and penalty, (2) that though unstamped, the agreement may be used for the collateral purpose of showing an existing liability: and (3) that having been once admitted in evidence, the acknowledgments could not afterwards be rejected according to Section 36 of the Stamp Act. On the first ground it was urged that the acknowledgments implied a promise to pay and could be validated as an agreement under Article 5 Sch. 1, and reliance was placed upon Maniram v. Seth Rupchand [1906] 33 Cal. 1047 , 30 I.A 165 , 2 N.L.R 130 (P.C). In this Court the same argument is repeated in the third ground of appeal. In the above Privy Council ruling it is said that an unconditional acknowledgment has always been held to imply a promise to pay. The ruling however has reference to Section 19 of the Lim. Act, 1877 and has no connexion with the question whether the acknowledgment is admissible in evidence under the provisions of the Stamp Act. Article 1, Sch. 1, Stamp Act, covers an acknowledgment of a debt, provided that such acknowledgment does not contain any promise to pay the debt. I am of opinion that the learned Divisional Judge was right in holding that Article 1, Sch. 1 of the Act, must be construed strictly for the purposes of the Stamp Act.
2. The second contention in the lower appellate Court is repeated in the fourth ground of appeal to this Court.
3. That contention is supported by Fatechand v. Kisan [1894] 18 Bom. 614, but the view there followed was overruled by the Full Bench in Mulji Lala v. Lingu Makaji [1897] 21 Bom. 201 (F.B), where it was held that an acknowledgment of a debt coming under Article 1, Sch. I, Stamp Act, cannot if unstamped be given in evidence for any purpose including the purpose of saving limitation. The third contention in the lower appellate Court is repeated as the fifth ground of appeal in this Court. I need not only refer to Chunilal Tulsiram v. Mulahai [1910] 6 I.C 903, where it was held as follows: The expression admitted in evidence in Section 36 of the Stamp Act, means the act of letting the document in as part of the evidence, but it must be taken in as a result of judicial determination of the question whether it can be admitted in evidence of not for want of stamp. In other words the Court admitting it must have applied its mind consciously to the question whether the document is admissible or not. In the present case the Divisional Judge says that at the time of hearing evidence when the original books of account were produced it was noticed for the first time that the stamps had not been cancelled. The acknowledgments were never admitted in evidence in the proper sense of the term. Moreover Er. 3, and 4, O. 13, Sch. 1 of the CPC, show that the copy of an entry in an account book can be tentatively put in evidence pending a final decision whether the original entry is inadmissible or not, and p. 4 of the Judicial Commissioner's Circular 114, supports the view that “admitted in evidence” means finally admitted in evidence after judicial consideration of all circumstances relating to its admissibility. The words at any stage of the same suit, in Section 36 of the Stamp Act, mean at a stage sub sequant to a judicial determination as to the admissibility of the instrument. The second and only remaining ground of appeal is not pressed. The appeal is dismissed with costs.
P.N/R.K
4. Appeal dismissed.