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Judgment Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This second appeal concerns whether a trustee of a temple, who mortgaged land (later sold in court auction at the instance of the mortgagee), can sue on behalf of the temple to recover the melvaram (turn of worship) interest that had been dedicated to the temple by the trustee's father, or whether he is estopped from asserting that the interest is trust property against a bona fide purchaser for value.

Procedural history (as stated in the opinion): The District Munsif found the plaintiff estopped and dismissed the suit. On appeal the Subordinate Judge reversed that decree and granted the plaintiff a decree for possession of the melvaram interest. The matter reached this Court by second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether estoppel in pais arising from a trustee's prior act of mortgaging trust property bars that trustee, when suing in his capacity as trustee, from recovering trust property from a bona fide purchaser for value.
  2. Whether a trustee who mortgaged trust property for private purposes may subsequently sue (in his capacity as trustee) to set right the wrong done to the trust.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • The plea of estoppel arising against a mortgagor disputing the title he has himself granted should apply against the plaintiff regardless of the capacity in which he sues; in other words, estoppel should bind the plaintiff even when he sues solely as trustee.
  • Authorities such as Gulzar Ali v. Fida Ali, Sidhu Sahu v. Gopi Charan Das and Mahamaya Debi v. Haridas Haldar were cited in support of the contention that a trustee who has mortgaged trust property may be estopped from later recovering it.

Plaintiff's / Respondent's Position

  • The plaintiff sues solely as the trustee for the idol, claiming no personal beneficial interest; the melvaram right was dedicated to the idol by his father and thus became property of the idol.
  • The mortgage was made for the plaintiff's private purposes (to meet his daughter's marriage expenses) and was executed without any mention of the trust; the plaintiff did not purport to act as trustee when making the mortgage.
  • Therefore, a personal estoppel against the plaintiff arising from his private conduct should not be allowed to prejudice the rights of the idol (the cestui que trust) and should not bar a trustee from recovering trust property for the trust.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shri Ganesh Dharnidhar Maharajdev v. Keshavrav Govind Kulgavkar Estoppel arising from the mortgagor's conduct in representing trust property as his own works not against succeeding trustees but against the heirs of the alienor in his personal capacity. Referred to by Spencer J. to show that estoppel operates personally and does not automatically bind successors in the trusteeship; used to argue estoppel should not bar recovery by the trustee for the trust.
Syed Gulam Nabi Sahib v. Nagammal Recognised that the right to sue to recover possession of wrongfully alienated trust property is not confined to succeeding trustees but may be exercised by the same trustee who made the alienation. Cited by both judges as authority that a trustee who wrongfully alienated trust property may still sue to set right the wrong.
Subbiah Chetty v. Mandaleswara Katari Illustrates that a person may act in one capacity when making a representation and in another when claiming as trustee; bench rejected the plea of estoppel. Followed by the Court (Spencer J. and Krishnan J.) as directly applicable and persuasive in rejecting the plea of estoppel against the trustee suing for the trust.
Mahamaya Debi v. Haridas Haldar If a legal custom exists allowing a Shebait to transfer his turn of worship, then mortgaging that turn may be an exercise of a private right (not of trusteeship) and estoppel may arise; Beachcroft J. preferred to base decision on existence of a valid custom of transferability. Not treated as controlling here; acknowledged as a situation where estoppel could arise if transferability by custom made the act private, but distinguished from present facts.
Doe v. Home An English authority quoted for the proposition that a mortgagor cannot set up against the mortgagee the title of another person; applied by Mookerjee J. to extend estoppel even to trustees acting in a public capacity. Not adopted by Spencer J. as a reason to extend estoppel to bar the trustee here; Spencer J. declined to follow the extension based on foreign authorities.
Maharanee Shibessouree Debia v. Mothooranath Acharjo Observations of the Privy Council that a dedication of a right (here melvaram) to an idol made it the idol's property. Relied upon by Krishnan J. to show that the melvaram right became the idol's property and thus should not suffer from a personal estoppel against the trustee.
Raja of Palghat v. Raman Unni Noted as a case that departed from the view that alienee's possession did not become adverse to the trust while the trustee who made the alienation remained in office. Krishnan J. observed that the departure on that point strengthens the argument that limitation should not run against the trust where a trustee is estopped from suing; used to underline anomaly if estoppel were upheld.
Juggut Mohini Dossee v. Mussamat Sokkeemoney Dossee Observation that a former abuse of trust in another instance cannot be pleaded against a trustee who seeks to prevent a repetition of abuse; court should not decline to protect the property merely because plaintiff had previously abused his trust. Quoted by Krishnan J. to support the proposition that a trustee attempting to set right a wrong should not be prevented by estoppel based on a former breach of trust.
Sidhu Sahu v. Gopi Charan Das Mookerjee J.'s observation that the Privy Council remark applies strictly to repetition of abuse; contains discussion on estoppel and trustees. Referred to by Krishnan J.; the court regarded some of Mookerjee J.'s broader applications of estoppel as distinguishable from present facts and not controlling.
Gulzar Ali v. Fida Ali (I.L.R. 6 All. 24) Found that the plaintiff had a considerable beneficial interest and was attempting to recover the land for himself though suing as trustee; estoppel upheld against that plaintiff. Distinguished by Krishnan J. because in the present case the trustee asserts no personal beneficial interest and sues solely for the trust; therefore the earlier decision was not applicable.
Case reported in 19 Mad. L.J. 305 Reasoning adopted (as earlier cited); appears to be the Madras report of the decision in Subbiah Chetty (as used in the opinion). Krishnan J. expressly followed the reasoning adopted in that report in concluding estoppel should be disallowed in the present circumstances.
Calcutta cases cited (18 I.C. 989; I.L.R. 42 Cal. 455) Cases dealing with trustees, ekrarnamah and Shebait rights; one concerned whether an ekrarnamah would bind a trustee and another involved mortgage by a Shebait where the beneficial enjoyment was in him and transferability by custom was relevant. Distinguished by Krishnan J. on their facts (beneficial enjoyment in the Shebait or agreement ground) and not followed as controlling for the present case.
Srimati Malika Dasi v. Ratnamani Chakravarti Referenced as part of the conflict of opinion in the Calcutta High Court on rules about pleading against one's own deed versus trustee restrictions. Mentioned as part of wider jurisprudential conflict; the Court reserved opinion on broader conflicts but did not apply the case to decide the present appeal.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis is presented through two judgments (Spencer J. and Krishnan J.), each addressing the estoppel question and applying precedent to the facts found by the Lower Appellate Court.

Spencer J.'s reasoning

  1. He framed estoppel in pais as a personal disability attaching to an individual (and his representative) from denying the truth of what he has led others to believe by his acts or representations.
  2. He explained that when a trustee alienates trust property for his own purposes he acts not as trustee but in breach of the trust; however, the estoppel arising from conduct of the mortgagor ordinarily operates against the mortgagor personally and not against succeeding trustees (citing Shri Ganesh Dharnidhar Maharajdev v. Keshavrav Govind Kulgavkar).
  3. He acknowledged authority (Syed Gulam Nabi Sahib v. Nagammal) that a trustee who wrongfully alienated trust property may himself sue to set right the wrong.
  4. He relied on Subbiah Chetty v. Mandaleswara Katari to illustrate the capacity-distinction (acting in private capacity vs. acting in trustee capacity) and held that the plea of estoppel should be rejected in the present circumstances.
  5. He noted the limited factual circumstance in which Mahamaya Debi v. Haridas Haldar would give rise to estoppel (i.e., where custom made the act an exercise of a private right), but found that it did not control here.
  6. He expressed reluctance to follow Mookerjee J.'s wider extension of estoppel to trustees based on foreign (American) authorities, and invoked a caution against allowing Indian courts to be led by foreign rulings in matters of Indian trusts; on that basis he dismissed the appeal with costs.

Krishnan J.'s reasoning

  1. He set out the factual findings of the Lower Appellate Court: the plaintiff inherited both the property and trusteeship; the plaintiff mortgaged the whole land for private purposes and did not disclose the trust in the mortgage deed; the mortgagee obtained sale and the land was purchased at court auction; defendants are transferees for value.
  2. He observed that the plaintiff sues solely as trustee for the idol (seeking a declaration of entitlement to the melvaram right and recovery of melvaram dues for three years) and claims no personal beneficial interest in the land.
  3. He relied on Privy Council observations in Maharanee Shibessouree Debia v. Mothooranath Acharjo to confirm that the dedication made the melvaram right the idol's property.
  4. He concluded that a personal estoppel in pais arising from the plaintiff's private conduct cannot be successfully pleaded in a suit brought by the plaintiff in his trustee capacity to vindicate the trust's rights; to allow estoppel would unfairly prejudice the cestui que trust (the idol) because of the personal acts of the trustee.
  5. He cited Subbiah Chetty and Syed Gulam Nabi Sahib v. Nagammal to support the view that a trustee who wrongfully alienated trust property may still sue to recover it, and noted that other authorities relied upon by appellants were distinguishable on their facts (for instance where the trustee had a substantial personal beneficial interest or where custom made the right effectively his own).
  6. He analysed and differentiated the Calcutta decisions and the I.L.R./All. reports relied upon for the appellants, finding their factual matrices materially different and therefore not controlling for this appeal.
  7. He therefore disallowed the defendants' plea of estoppel and ordered dismissal of the second appeal with costs.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Second appeal dismissed. The Court held that the defendants' plea of estoppel was not available in the circumstances of this case and that the trustee, suing solely in his capacity as trustee to vindicate the trust's rights, was not estopped from recovering the melvaram interest dedicated to the idol.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The decree of the Lower Appellate Court in favour of the plaintiff (for possession of the melvaram interest and related relief as stated in the lower judgment) is upheld; the appeal against that decree is dismissed with costs, and the memorandum of objections was not pressed and was dismissed with costs.
  • Scope and precedent: The Court relied on existing authorities to refuse to extend estoppel so as to bar a trustee who sues solely for the trust (and who claims no personal beneficial interest) from recovering trust property wrongfully alienated by him. The opinion carefully distinguishes prior decisions where trustees had personal beneficial interests or where local custom made the right transferable. The Court did not purport to lay down a novel or sweeping rule beyond its factual conclusion; it distinguished contrary authorities on their facts rather than overruling them.

By Court: The memorandum of objections was not pressed and is dismissed with costs. (Order recorded: Appeal dismissed as also memorandum of objection.)

    Sena Yasin Sahib v. Kodour Ekarama Aiyar

    JUDGMENT

    Spencer, J. — The point of law argued in this second appeal is whether the trustee of a temple who himself mortgaged land which was afterwards sold in court auction at the instance of the mortgagee, can sue on behalf of the temple to recover the land-lord's interest, which was dedicated to the temple by the trustees father, or whether he is estopped from setting, up a claim against a bona fide purchaser for value that it is trust property. The District Munsif found that he was estopped and dismissed the suit. The Subordinate Judge in appeal reversed the District Munsif's decree and gave the plaintiff a decree for possession of the melvaram interest. Estoppel in pais creates a personal disability attaching to an individual and his representative of denying the truth of a thing which he has led others by his acts or representations to believe to be true.

    If a trustee alienates trust property for his own purposes, he acts not as trustee but in breach or repudiation of his trust. Therefore, as Telang J. in Shri Ganesh Dharnidhar Maharajdev. v. Keshavrav Govind Kulgavkar(1) points-out, the estoppel arising out of the conduct of the mortgagor in representing the trust property to be his own property, works not against succeeding trustees, but against the heirs of the alienor in his personal capacity. In Syed Gulam Nabi Sahib, v. Nagammal(2) it was recognised that the right of suing for the recovery of possession of trust property wrongfully alienated was not confined to succeeding trustees but might be exercised by the same trustee who made the alienation in order to set right the wrong done to the trust.

    That a man may act in one capacity when he makes a representation that a village is his private property and in another capacity when he claims as trustee to recover the village as trust property of the idol is well illustrated by Subbiah Chetty v. Mandaleswara Katari(3).

    I think that we should follow that decision and pronounce against the plea of estoppel in this case. As regards the decision in Mahamaya Debi v. Haridas Haldar(4) it seems to me that if a legal custom is found to exist whereby a Shebait may transfer his turn of worship, the act of mortgaging his turn is not an act done by virtue of his trusteeship but one which he does in exercise of his private right of worship. In that way estoppel may arise in such cases although it is noticeable that Beach croft, J., who sat with Mookerjee, J., preferred to preserve his opinion on the question of estoppel and to base his decision on the existence of a valid custom of transferability.

    At page 468 Mookerjee, J., first lays down the principle that a mortgagor cannot set up against the mortgagee the title of another person. He then extends this even to a case where the mortgagor is a trustee, acting in a public capacity and not for his own benefit, and he quotes an English decision as an authority for his proposition Doe v. Home(5). The learned Judge in the next step proceeds on the strength of some American decisions to apply the same principle to cases where the trustee mortgages trust property which he has no right to mortgage. With due respect, I am not prepared on the strength of American authorities to follow him in the application of estoppel to cases where the trustee acts to the prejudice of the trust, especially after the recent warning expressed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council against the danger of Courts in India allowing themselves to be guided by the rulings of foreign Courts. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

    Krishnan, J.—The only question raised in this second appeal is one of estoppel and it is raised on the following facts as found by the Lower Appellate Court.

    The plaint land originally belonged to plaintiff's father Sallam Battar. He dedicated the melvaram right in it to the Ekambaranatha Swami idol in the Big Conjeeveram temple for the performance of certain religious ceremonies and charities in that temple and directed that the oldest member of his family should be the trustee for the time being of the trust he created. He retained the Kudivaram, himself. On his death the property as well as the trusteeship passed to the plaintiff. Sometime thereafter plaintiff mortgaged the plaint land for his own private purposes to meet the expenses of his daughter's marriage. In doing so he did not make any mention of the trust or reserve of the melvaram right. Indeed it was his case in the Lower Courts, that he mortgaged only the Kudivaram right; but the language of the mortgage deed being against that contention, the Lower Courts have decided that he mortgaged the whole land and that finding is not now disputed. The mortgagee sued for sale of the land and got a decree and the land was sold in due course in court auction and purchased by one Umamaheswara Mudali. The defendants are transferees for value from that purchaser. Plaintiff now sues as the trustee of the aforesaid trust for declaration that he is entitled to the melvaram right in the land as such trustee and for the recovery on behalf of the trust the melvaram due for three years before suit. The learned Subordinate Judge, finding the dedication proved, held that the mortgage and the court sale did not affect the rights of the idol and overruling the plea that plaintiff was estopped from suing for the melvaram right by his conduct in mortgaging the whole property as his own gave a decree as sued for.

    It is argued for the appellants that the question of estoppel has been wrongly decided by the Lower Appellate Court; for, it is contended that the estoppel arising against a mortgagor disputing the title he has himself granted will apply against the palintiff in whatever capacity he may sue.

    Plaintiff is now suing solely as the trustee of the trust in favour of the idol, for property in which he has no personal interest whatever. The suit is in effect on behalf of the idol by its trustee or manager, the plaintiff. That by the dedication of the Melvaram right to the idol it became the property of the idol is clear from the observations of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Maharanee Shibessouree Debia v. Mothooranath Acharjo. It is then difficult to see how a personal estoppel in pais arising against the plaintiff from his conduct can be pleaded in this suit or why the idol should be made to suffer for anything done by the plaintiff in his private capacity, because he happens to be the trustee at the time of the suit. It is conceded before us that in making the mortgage the plaintiff did not act in any way as the trustee of the endowment; he did not even mention the existence of the trust. It is also conceded that the plea of estoppel will not avail if the trust were represented by any other trustee. Should we then uphold the plea of estoppel in this case, a plea which is really more against the cestui que trust than against the plaintiff as he is claiming no beneficial interest for himself in the suit Melwaram, merely on account of what one may call the accident of plaintiff being the trustee? I think the answer should be in the negative.

    A very similar plea of estoppel was raised before a bench of this Court in Subbiah Chetty v. Mandaleswara Katari, with only this difference that whereas here the plea is based on the act or conduct of the trustee, there it was based on a representation made by the trustee, a difference which is not material regarding the applicability of the rule of estoppel under Sect. 115 of the Evidence Act; and the learned Judges rejected the plea. Their observations on p. 307 are very instructive on the question and seem to me to apply exactly to the facts of this case.

    A similar view was taken by another Bench of this Court in an earlier case in Syed Gulam Nabi Sahib v. Nagammal, where the right of a trustee who wrongfully alienated trust property to set right the wrong done by him to the trust, by himself suing the alienee for recovering possession was recognised. It is true, as the learned counsel for the appellants points out, that the view taken in that case on another point namely that the alienee's possession did not become adverse to the trust during the time the trustee who made the alienation continued in office has since been departed from in Raja of Palghat v. Raman Unni. But this instead of weakening the force of the decision on the first point has rather enhanced it, for it will be an anomaly if limitation by adverse possession is allowed to run against the trust when the person representing the trust is held to be estoppel from suing for possession. The trust may thus lose the property by adverse possession without the trustee being able to prevent it.

    Our attention was also drawn to certain observations of the Privy Council in the case in Juggut Mohini Dossee v. Mussamat Sokkeemoney Dossee that a former abuse of trust, in another instance cannot be pleaded against a trustee who seeks to prevent a repitition of abuse—and that the court could not with any propriety say “we will decline to protect the property and leave it exposed to further loss, and decline to make a declaration that it is trust property, merely because they would not trust the plaintiff with its administration.” Though as pointed out by Mookerjee J., in Sidhu Sahu v. Gopi Charan Das, this observation in terms applies only to a repetition of an abuse of trust. I think it in effect supports the view that a trustee who is trying to set right the wrong he has done should not be prevented from doing so by any estoppel based on a former breach of trust by him at any rate where he derives no personal benefit from his later action. Following the above rulings and particularly the reasoning adopted in the case in 19 Mad. L.J 305, I would hold that the defendant's plea of estoppel was rightly disallowed.

    The counsel for the appellants has however drawn our attention to the cases Reported in Gulzar Ali v. Fida Ali, Sidhu Sahu v. Gopi Charan Das and Mahamaya Debi v. Haridas Haldar(6), which he contends support his argument that his plea of estoppel is good in spite of the fact that this suit is brought by the plaintiff as trustee. These cases will on examination be found to be clearly distinguishable from the present case.

    In the case in I.L.R 6 All. 24 the facts show that the plaintiff Fida Ali had a very considerable beneficial interest in the suit property and that though he sued as a trustee, he was trying to recover the property for himself. The learned Judges say in the opening sentence of their judgment “Fida Ali virtually asks us to allow him to take advantage of his own wrong and recover the land in suit” and they again remark later on “we make no remark with regard to the beneficiaries under that trust as they, having made no effort to figure in the suit do not appear to be interesting themselves in the matter.” It is in these circumstances that the plea of estoppel was held good against the plaintiff and we cannot therefore take that judgment as laying down generally, as the appellants' counsel urges, that a trustee suing for trust property which he has mortgaged for his own private purpose is estopped from doing so, irrespective of whether he has a beneficial interest in it or not. In the case before us as the trustee is suing entirely for the benefit of the trust and he is not attempting to take any advantage for himself it is clearly distinguishable from the case cited, which is thus of no help to the appellants.

    The two Calcutta cases cited in 18 I.C, 989 and I.L.R, 42 Cal., 455 were both decided by the same Bench. In the former, the question was whether a trustee can ignore, an ekrarnamah entered into by him as trustee with the defendants, by which he recognised the right of certain others to intervene in the appointment and removal of the adhikari or trustee of the endowment. No question of estoppel like the one before us was raised in the case at all. The learned Judges were of opinion that the ekrarnamah would be binding on the plaintiff trustee, if it really bore the character of a deed executed for settlement of disputes even though his successor and the beneficiaries might not be bound thereby. That case has clearly no bearing on the case before us.

    The next case cited in I.L.R, 42 Cal., 455 seems at first sight to have some bearing on the question before us for Mr. Justice Mookerjee says in his judgment that the plea of estoppel, against the mortgagor disputing the title he has himself granted, is a good plea even though the property mortgaged was trust property which he had no right to mortgage. This opinion must however I think be taken with the facts of the case before the learned Judge. The property mortgaged there was the right of the mortgagor to perform certain turns of worship or “palas” in a certain temple and to take the emoluments attached and the offerings made. The property was thus property belonging to the Shebait or trustee and the beneficial enjoyment of it was in him and the mortgage was by him as Shebait. In these particulars the case differs materially from the case before us and could I think, therefore be distinguished from it. It was also found in that case that the mortgage objected to was really a valid one according to custom as it was made to a member of the family of Shebaits and Mr. Justice Beachcroft based his judgment entirely on that ground. The question of estoppel therefore really did not arise in the case and as Justice Mookerjee's opinion on that question does not affect the present case, it is unnecessary to examine it fully, or to consider whether it should be followed. The real question in such cases as those in Calcutta is whether the rules that a man should not be allowed to plead against his own deed and to deny the truth of a declaration, act or omission of his, which another man has believed and acted upon, to his disadvantage should prevail against the rule that a trustee cannot transfer his office of trusteeship or vary the terms of it. There is a conflict of opinion in that High Court as to the answer to that question. See Srimati Malika Dasi v. Ratnamani Chakravarti, and the two cases quoted above. I reserve my opinion on it in the circumstances.

    The authorities quoted for the appellants therefore do not affect the view I have already expressed. The plea of estoppel must thus be disallowed in the circumstances of this case and as that is the only plea raised before us the second appeal must be dismissed with costs.

    By Court.—The memorandum of objections is not pressed and is dismissed with costs.

    C. K.Appeal dismissed as also memorandum of objection.

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    Sena Yasin Sahib v. Kodour Ekarama Aiyar
    (Sep 30, 1919)