1. The plaintiffs sued in January 1936 under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, to recover possession of certain occupancy fields from which they alleged they had been dispossessed by the defendant in November 1935. The plaintiffs alleged that they had bought these fields by an unregistered sale deed from the defendant's brother, since deceased, in 1931 and that they had been in undisturbed possession from 1931 to 1935. The defendant denied that there had ever been any such sale or that the plaintiffs had ever been in possession. The lower Court held that, assuming the plaintiffs' allegations to be correct, the plaintiffs' possession was based on a transfer prohibited by law and that therefore the plaintiffs had never had that juridical possession which would entitle them to invoke the provisions of Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act. S. 9 itself says nothing about juridical possession, but merely says that a person dispossessed without his consent of immoveable property otherwise than in due course of law may recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such a suit. It is stated in Pollock and Mulla's Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts, at p. 751, Edn. 6, that it is only a person who has had “juridical” possession that may sue under this section and that a trespasser who has been dispossessed is not entitled to sue. In 15 Bom 6851 the Court considered whether it was competent for a defendant in a suit instituted under Section 9 of the Specific Relief Act, to show that the plaintiffs possession previous to dispossession was that of a trespasser and it held that the plaintiffs' possession was that of a trespasser and had not been acquiesced in by the defendant, so that it never became juridical possession which would entitle in to sue under S. 9. On the other hand, in 31 Cal 6472 at p. 656, Ghose, J. remarked that section lays down only a summary remedy applicable alike to a person, whether he be a trespasser, a tenant or an owner of the land, when he is ejected without due course of law.
2. Assuming the plaintiffs' allegations to be correct, they obtained possession of occupancy fields by a method prohibited by the C.P Tenancy Act which provides for an application either by the landlord or by the heirs of the transferring tenant to be placed in possession of the holding. The transfer may have been invalid, and it may be that where a trespasser has obtained possession for a short time and that possession has not been acquiesced in, be is not entitled to maintain such a suit, but where a person has obtained possession peacefully and has remained in undisturbed possession for a reasonable time, then he is certainly entitled under S. 9 to 1 maintain a suit. Possession is good against all the world except the person who can show a good title and the possession required by S. 9 cannot, I think, mean merely possession under a valid title; it must include possession that is at least excusable. Here the plaintiffs' possession was excusable, and the suit would therefore lie.
3. I should not ordinarily interfere in revision in a case under S. 9, but here there has been no trial of the lease at all and the suit has been dismissed under a misapprehension of the scope of S. 9. If the lower Court's view were accepted, no suit would ever lie under S. 9 unless the plaintiff had a valid title, and the whole object of the section, which is to prevent people from taking the law into their own hands, would be frustrated. The application for revision is therefore allowed, and the case is remanded for trial. Costs will abide the event. Counsel's fee on this Court, Rs. 10.
D.S/R.K
4. Case remanded.