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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Disposition
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  • SECTION 23 LIMITATION ACT
  • Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act.
  • Central Provinces Land Revenue Act.
  • O. 9, Rule 9.6.
  • Land Revenue Act
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
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  • SECTION 23 LIMITATION ACT
  • Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act.
  • Central Provinces Land Revenue Act.
  • O. 9, Rule 9.6.
  • Land Revenue Act

    J.H.S Evangelical German Mission, Superintendent Leprosy Asylum, Ghandkhuri v. Mahant Ramsahaigir Chela Sunsergir Gosawi .

    1. The question in this appeal is whether the plaintiff's suit is barred under O. 9, R. 9 of the CPC. He is the malguzar of the village in which the two portions of land in suit belong. They both form part of the abadi. In the year 1935 the plaintiff sued for possession of these two-pieces of land under two different suits. The plaint in respect of the first portion is Ex. D-1 and the relevant passages are as follows:

    2. The defendant has, without being entitled thereto, forcibly and illegally taken possession of a plot of land …. in the month of March 1935 for the purpose of building a house and has since constructed a house. The defendant has no right to take possession of any part of the plaintiff's abadi land in this manner nor had he any right previously. The defendant's possession of the land in suit constitutes a trespass.

    3. At the time when the defendant took the possession in the plaintiff's abadi land, the plaintiff prohibited him not to, orally, but he refused to listen. Then the plaintiff served a notice in writing on the defendant on 17th April 1935 forbidding him not to proceed with building the house. But even then the defendant did not stop and having completed the house…… he established his possession there. Even after the notice the defendant was asked to quit but he refused.

    4. In spite of repeated demands, the defendant refused to quit the possession of the plaintiff's abadi land.

    2. The prayer clause is that the defendant be ejected from the land and be ordered to remove the materials of the house which he has constructed there and to make over possession to the plaintiff. Ex. D-2 is the plaint in the other suit relating to the other plot of land. The relevant passages are as follows:

    2. The defendant without any right took forcible and wrongful possession of plaintiff's tank … and having filled up the Dabri tank which belonged to the plaintiff in the month of March 1935, he has taken possession of the land thereof. The defendant has no right to fill up the plaintiff's abadi tank nor had he any previously. With the intention of causing damage to the plaintiff, the defendant has filled up the tank with earth and taken possession of the land …. and his possession of the land in suit constitutes a trespass.

    3. At the time of filling up the tank in the month of March 1935 the plaintiff made a protest to the defendant orally but the latter did not listen. Then the plaintiff served a notice in writing on the defendant on 17th April 1935 forbidding him not to fill up the tank and take wrongful possession. But even then the defendant did not stop and having filled up the tank, he took possession of the land. Even after serving the notice, the plaintiff prevented him but he did not listen.

    3. The relief, as before, is for ejectment and for an order that the earth be removed from the tank, that it be restored to its former condition and that the plaintiff thereupon be placed in possession. On the date of hearing, the defendant appeared and the plaintiff did not appear. Consequently after the Court had ascertained whether the defendant admitted the claim or part thereof and having discovered that he did not, it dismissed the suits under O. 9, R. 8 of the CPC. The present suit is for possession of both these plots of land.

    4. The allegations are precisely the same as before except that here it is also stated that the “forcible and wrongful possession of the portions of this abadi land” constitutes a tort and a continuing trespass and that therefore the cause of action being a continuing one, the suit is maintainable. It is to be observed that the plaintiff still complains of the forcible and wrongful possession of the defendant. He still states that he has built a house on one part of the land and filled up the tank so far as the other portion is concerned. He also states, as before, that this has been done in spite of his protest and notice.

    5. The first Court dismissed the claim under O. 9, R. 9, but the lower Appellate Court held that the acts complained of constituted a continuing trespass apparently within the meaning of Section 23 of the Limitation Act, that the cause of action for the present suit was not the same as the causes of action in the previous two suits and that therefore the present suit was not barred under O. 9, R. 9. The case was therefore remanded for trial on the merits. I am clear that the lower Appellate Court is wrong and that the first Court is right. It is in my opinion impossible to regard dispossession of the character complained of in these suits as a continuing wrong. If that was so, it would be impossible ever to apply Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act. Of course dispossession is a trespass and in one sense a continuance of possession thereafter is a continuance of the original wrong, but that is not the meaning of S. 23. The Limitation Act must be read as a whole and due regard paid to its different provisions. It must clearly be construed in such manner that there is no conflict between S. 23 and Articles 142 and 144. Complete usurpation of possession and occupation such as appears here and consequent dispossession of the owner of the land is a wrong which is complete from the moment of the dispossession. It is not a continuing trespass of the character contemplated by S. 23. Consequently, the cause of action in the present case is clearly the same as the causes of action in the two previous suits and therefore the present suit is barred by O. 9, Rule 9.

    6. It was argued on behalf of the respondent that since the land was in the abadi, of the village, it constituted common village land and was communal land in which everybody had a right, and it was urged that trespass on communal land would be a continuing trespass. I am unable to accept this contention. Whether the land belongs to a community or not, if one person takes sole and exclusive possession of it, or some portion of it, and excludes all others who have a right to occupation from possession, then the trespass is not a continuing trespass of the kind contemplated by S. 23 but is dispossession of the character dealt with in Articles 142 and 144. But apart from that, I am clear that the village abadi is not communal land. Expressions like ‘common land’ and ‘communal land’ which are used in connexion with the Land Revenue Act of these Provinces refer to land in which no person has a right to sole and exclusive occupation of any particular portion of it. Every member of the community to which the land belongs, or in which they have an interest, has an equal right to the use of every square inch of it. That is certainly not the case in the abadi. Persons entitled to plots of land in the abadi are entitled, when they receive possession of it, to exclusive possession and are entitled to exclude every other member of the community from occupation. Therefore, it is not communal land nor is it so dealt with in any portion of the Central Provinces Land Revenue Act. It was argued then, that however that may be with respect to the site on which the house has now been built, those considerations cannot apply to the tank. So far as that is concerned, it is communal and any right to obstruct taking of water from that tank constitutes a continuing trespass. It is also suggested that every member of the village community has a right to the use of the water of this tank. None of these facts has been pleaded and even if it had, there is a difference between obstructing a person from, drawing water from a well, or from obstructing water from water course, or from preventing him from exercising a right of way, and from taking complete possession of an area of land even if it happens to be under water. I need not therefore examine the cases cited by the learned counsel for the respondent which deal with undoubted cases of continuing wrongs. None of them is in the slightest degree relevant to the facts of this case. The learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court has relied upon AIR 1926 All 34. (1926) 13 AIR All 34 , 89 IC 379 But that case is clearly distinguishable because the finding there was that the cause of action in the second suit was different from that in the former. If that had been the fact here, then of course this suit would not have been barred, but as I have said the cause of action here is identical with the causes of action in the previous suits. Consequently, the decision of the lower Appellate Court is wrong and that of the first Court right. The appeal is allowed. The decree of the lower Appellate Court is reversed and that of the first Court restored. Costs here and in the Courts below will be paid by the respondent. Counsel's fee Rs. 25.

    D.S/R.K

    7. Appeal allowed.

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    J.H.S Evangelical Ge... v. Mahant Ramsahaigir C...
    (Oct 17, 1938)