1. This is plaintiff's appeal from the reversing judgment of the Second Additional District Judge, Nagur, in Civil Appeal No. 20A of 1939, delivered on 28th March 1939. The dispute relates to a strip of land marked by letters KPNM in the map attached to the decree. The disputed land lies between the plots owned by the parties. Originally the land which was No. 439 belonged to Raje Baghojirao a part of it which lies to the north was sold by him to the Model Mills. To the south of that plot lies the road No. 439/2 which vests in the Municipal Committee. The plot No. 439/3 lies to the south of that road. It was acquired by the plaintiff from Raje Bahadur under a sale-deed dated 2nd March 1921. The defendant's plot is No. 439/4 which lies to the south of the plaintiff's plot. It was acquired on 23rd January 1927 from Raje Baghojirao by Motichand and others from whom the defendant acquired it by purchase on 19th January 1936. The plaintiff's plot measures O. 54 and that of the defendant O. 56 according to their respective sale deeds. The case of the plaintiff was that the southern boundary of his plot was along the line shown by letters MN in the Commissioner's map, and that in March 1934 the defendant had encroached upon the site in dispute by removing some stone marks and that he erected huts there. The main issue in the case was whether the site in dispute formed part of the plaintiff's plot or the defendant's plot. Both parties filed their respective maps and examined witnesses to show that the disputed land formed part of their respective plots. The plaintiff succeeded in the Court of first instance but failed in the lower appellate Court. That Court negatived the plaintiff's title on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to prove either his sale deed or adverse possession. It also rejected the testimony of the surveyor who had prepared the plan of the plaintiff's plot. The first point for determination is whether the plaintiff's sale-deed dated 2nd March 1921 was rightly rejected fee in the lower appellate Court as inadmissible on the ground that its execution was not proved. The point is really of technical importance since the sale-deed does not contain any detailed description of the plot comprised in it and is therefore altogether worthless so far as the point in controversy is concerned. Out of deference for the learned counsel for the appellant, who has addressed an elaborate argument, I have to consider whether the evidence produced by the plaintiff to prove the sale-deed is sufficient.
2. Balaji (P.W 1) is a solitary witness who identifies the hand-writing of Shambhaji, the petition-writer, who scribed the plaintiff's sale-deed. Manifestly this evidence cannot prove the genuineness of the document. Even a forged document has to be scribed by somebody.
3. It is therefore clear that mere proof of, the fact that certain document was scribed by certain person can hardly go to prove that the document was executed by the person whose name appears in it as an executant. It is however argued on the authority in 33 Cal. 537,1 A.I.R 1922 P.C 562 and 18 N.L.R 853 and other cases that the registration of the document must be regarded as sufficient to prove the execution of the document. I do not see my way to accede to the argument for the obvious reason that the cases relied on do not lend countenance to it. In 33 Cal. 537 there was one Lakhi Nath Muzumdar who affirmed in the witness-box that he had seen Brojo Nath Chowdhry making his signature on the document. Similarly, in A.I.R 1922 P.C 56, there were two witnesses who swore that they had seen the deed signed. In 18 N.L.R 85 the identification was in the hand-writing of a deceased scribe who had noted that the mark appearing in the document was that of the executant. That was an indirect proof of the execution of the document. The case in 57 Mad. 6624 was one in which the signature of a deceased attesting witness was accepted as sufficient proof of the execution of the document by its alleged executant. That was because an attesting witness is presumed to have witnessed the execution of the document. There is no doubt a case reported in A.I.R 1929 Lah. 7115 to show that there was no witness to prove directly or indirectly the execution of the document and the question was whether the certificate of registration was admissible. The learned Judge who decided the case held on the authority of the observations made by the Judicial Committee in 33 Cal. 537 that the certificate of registration was relevant and admissible to prove the execution. The learned Judge, however, observed whether the certificate of registration itself is sufficient to establish execution or not would depend on the circumstances of each case.
4. The certificate of registration has indeed an evidentiary value attached to it by Section 60 of the Registration Act. But it must be noted that it is made admissible only for the purpose of proving that the document has been duly registered and that the fact mentioned in the endorsements made under Ss. 52 and 58 of that Act has occurred as there mentioned. Under S. 58 the registering officer has to endorse the signature of the person admitting the execution of the document. It would thus appear that the certificate of registration proves the admission of execution by the person who purported to execute I the document. The certificate may be considered for the purpose of corroboration, but, in my opinion, it cannot serve as substantive evidence. If it is I accepted as substantive evidence of execution that would deprive Section 90 of the Evidence Act, of all its significance. Even in the case of ancient documents the law authorises the Court to make a presumption as regards due execution and attestation. If the learned counsel's arguments were to prevail then it would do away altogether with the necessity of examining any witness to prove execution of a sale deed which is registered. I cannot persuade myself that such could be the intention of their Lordships of the Privy Council when they stressed the solemnity of registration. It must also be observed that the admission of execution is good evidence against the executant and his representatives but it would not be a binding on third parties. It is true that in this case the defendant purchased his plot from the executant of the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff but that would not make him a representative of the executant inasmuch as vis-a-vis the plaintiff's plot the defendant is not his representative. In any case mere proof of admission of execution does not satisfy the requirements of Section 67 of the Evidence Act, which provides that the signature of the executant must be proved to be in his hand-writing. The lower appellate Court was technically not wrong in holding that the sale deed was not proved but as I have already said the rejection of that document does not really affect the issue because nothing contained in it is helpful to the decision of this case.
5. The point for determination in this case is not whether the plaintiff had title to the plot of which he is in actual possession and about which there is no dispute but whether the site in dispute formed part of the plot which he had acquired from Raje Bahadur. On that issue the sale deed throws no light and it is for this purpose that the plaintiff relied on adverse possession. The lower appellate Court did not care to discuss the evidence bearing on the point of adverse possession. That was because there is in reality no evidence on the point. The plaintiff himself refrained from going into the witness-box and the witnesses that he examined do not make any substantial contribution. Lala Mian (P.W 2) says that at the request of the plaintiff he had fixed the wooden posts to enclose, the plaintiff's plot and that as the people of the locality removed them he fixed stones the next year. He does not make it clear in what year he had put the wooden posts or stones. He did not take the measurements of the plot himself and he could not give the width of the land covered by the road. He did not particularly mark the stones to see whether they were existing or not after he had once fixed them. He could not give the measurements of the plaintiff's land. Govinda (P.W 3) speaks of the plot having been demarcated by stones and the defendant having removed a corner stone 12 months before the date he deposed about it. But he is unable to say whether by removing the stone the plaintiff lost any portion of his land. Budhuf P.W 4) only speaks of having seen boundary stones two years before his deposition and he does not know anything about the plaintiff's possession for 12 years. Gopal (P.W 5) also came on the scene only 1½ years before his deposition. P.W 6 and P.W 7 are surveyors who say nothing about the plaintiff's possession. There is thus no evidence of adverse possession on the part of the plaintiff.
6. There remains the testimony of Ganpat (P.W 7) who was the commissioner appointed to draw a map. He was discredited by the lower appellate Court and the plan (Ex. P-3) prepared by him was rejected. He prepared the map on the assumption that the southern boundary of the plot belonging to the Model Mills was the correct one. Evidently no expert in surveying could ever regard it as permanent mark to serve as a standard for measurements. Although he noted the length of the western boundary of the Model Mills plot to be 789 feet the length, if measured according to the scale (feet 40=1 inch) on which he drew the map, comes to 800 feet. The distance between the points A and F is 20 inches which makes out a length of 800 feet. It is not surprising that the lower appellate Court refused to accept his map as correct. Some argument was addressed to show that the defendant's plot included the nala to the south. But that is contradicted by the contents of Ex. P-1, the plaintiff's sale deed itself, as also the settlement map (Ex. D-1). The appeal is devoid of substance and is dismissed with costs.
7. Appeal dismissed.