1. This order will also dispose of Civil Revision No. 496 of 1941 as both the applications arise out of the proceedings before the Tribunal constituted under Sections 60 and 62 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act. The applicant is the malik makbuza holder of plots Nos. 301 and 806, area 21.68 acrea, land revenue Rs. 50 in mauza Dhantoli in Nagpur. The plots are within the limits of the municipality of Nagpur. The area was acquired for the Industrial Area Expansion Scheme of the Nagpur Town Improvement Trust. The Land Acquisition Officer delivered an award on 26th April 1940, and determined Rs. 9330 as compensation payable to the applicant. The applicant was, dissatisfied with the award and applied to the officer to make a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. As no Tribunal had been constituted under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, the Land Acquisition Officer made a reference to the District Judge, Nagpur, on 28rd May 1940. After this reference a Tribunal was constituted on 24th July 1940 under ss. 60 and 62 of the Act. After the Tribunal was constituted the reference was heard by the Tribunal. In the course of the proceedings before the Tribunal, the applicant filed two applications. The first application was made on 2nd December 1940. The applicant contended that the acquisition of his plots was not for carrying out any of the purposes of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act; that a town expansion scheme under S. 35(1) must relate to an area outside the limits of the Nagpur Municipality and that it cannot relate to an area within the limits of the municipality; that the reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, should be heard by the Court and not by the Tribunal; that the compensation payable to the applicant must be determined with reference to Section 23(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, and not with reference to the section as amended by cl. 10(3)(a) of the schedule of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, and that the amended cl. 23(3)(a) is ultra vires of the Legislature as it is in contravention of Section 299 of the Government of India Act of 1935. The President of the Tribunal by the order dated 11th March 1941 decided some of the points raised. It is against this order that civil Revision No. 495 of 1941 is directed.

2. On 18th February 1941 the applicant formulated certain points and asked the Tribunal to refer them to the High Court for a decision under O. 46, R. 1 of the CPC, read with Section 53 of the Land Acquisition Act. This was rejected by the President of the Tribunal on 11th March 1941 on the ground that it was not maintain, able. It is against this order that Civil Revision No. 496 of 1941 has been filed. At the hearing the applicant filed an application for referring the two applications to a Full Bench as they involved substantial questions of law and were of great public importance and the decision of the Division Bench in First Appeal No. 39 of 19411 to which one of us (Pollock, J.) was a party may necessitate a reconsideration. We did not consider it necessary to do so as we are of opinion that the revision applications are not maintainable. The learned Government Pleader raised a preliminary objection that no revision application lies under Section 115 of the CPC, against an order passed by the President of the Tribunal as it is not a Court subordinate to the High Court. We consider that the objection is sound and must prevail, and these applications must be dismissed as not maintainable. A revision under Section 115 of the CPC, lies to a High Court against an order passed by any Court subordinate to the High Court on the conditions stated therein. Under S. 3 of the Code the District Court is subordinate to the High Court, and every civil Court of a grade inferior to that of a District Court and every Court of Small Causes is subordinate to the High Court and District Court, for the purposes of the Code. Under S. 96 of the Code an appeal lies from every decree passed by any Court exercising original jurisdiction to the Court authorised to hear appeals from the decisions of such Court, save where otherwise expressly provided in the body of the Code or by any other law for the time being in force.

3. The question for decision is whether the Tribunal constituted under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act is a civil Court subordinate to the High Court. Under Section 60 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, 1936, a Tribunal is constituted for the purpose of performing the functions of the Court in reference to the acquisition of land for the Trust, under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894). The constitution of the Tribunal is as stated in Section 62 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act. It consists of a President and two assessors. The President of the Tribunal must have the qualifications mentioned therein. The President and one of the assessors are appointed by the Provincial Government and the other assessor is appointed by the municipal committee. Under S. 66 the Provincial Government has power to make rules for the conduct of business by Tribunals established under the Act. The relevant portion of S. 61 of the Act is in these terms:

“For the purpose of acquiring land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), for the Trust—

(a) the Tribunal shall except for the purposes of S. 54 of that Act, be deemed to be the Court, and the President of the Tribunal shall be deemed to be the Judge thereunder…….

(c) the President of the Tribunal may summon witnesses and enforce their attendance…. by the same means, and so far as may be, in the same manner, as is provided in case of a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), and

(d) the award of the Tribunal shall be deemed to be the award of the Court under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) and shall be final.”

4. Under S. 67(1)(c) the decision of the President of the Tribunal on all questions of law and procedure is final. Under S. 67(2) every award of the Tribunal, and every order made by the Tribunal for the payment of money, shall be enforced by a competent civil Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was made as if it were a decree of that Court. We have underlined (here italicized) a few words to emphasise the nature of the Tribunal and the award. A Tribunal has not been constituted a Court under the Act, but for the purposes of the Act the Tribunal is deemed to be the Court, and the award of the Tribunal is deemed to be the award of the Court. That is importing a fiction. For the interpretation of the expression “deemed to be” see, 54 Bom. 2162 at p. 223; I.L.R (1941) Nag. 5883 at p. 591 and I.L.R (1944) Nag. 14 at p. 12. The only meaning possible is that the Tribunal is not, in reality, a Court but that the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act requires it to be treated as if it were a Court for certain specific purposes. In I.L.R (1940) 2 Cal. 4935 at p. 503 it has been observed that where the analogy only arises by legal fiction, it must be limited to the purposes indicated by the context, and cannot be given a larger effect. We shall apply this principle and determine what is the scope of the statutory fiction introduced by the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act and restrict it within its legitimate sphere.

5. Under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, a reference is made to the Court if the applicant is not satisfied with an award made by a Collector. Under S. 3 of the Act ‘Court’ has been defined to mean a principal civil Court of original jurisdiction, unless the Local Government has appointed a special judicial officer within any specified local limits to perform the functions of the Court under the Act. Under S. 54 of the Act an appeal lies to the High Court from the award passed by the Court. There was no provision for an appeal from the order passed by the High Court on appeal. In 40 Cal. 216 it was held that no appeal lay to the Privy Council against a decision of the High Court passed on appeal by the High Court under S. 54 of the Act. An Amending Act, 19 of 1921, was passed and a new S. 54 was substituted which provides for an appeal to the High Court against the award of the Court and for an appeal to the Privy Council from the decree passed by the High Court on appeal. A sub-section was added to S. 26 of the Act in these terms:

“Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award a judgment within the meaning of Section 2, clause (2), and Section 2, clause (9), respectively of the CPC, 1908.”

6. 6 Lah. 697 was a decision after the amendment had been effected, and it was held that an appeal to the Privy Council was competent. An order passed by a Court under the Land Acquisition Act is subject to revision by the High Court: 56 ALL. 656; 8 I.L.R (1940) Mad. 791.9 Where a dispute arises as regards the award delivered by a Collector the matter is referred to a civil Court. Under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act the Trust has been given power to acquire land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as modified by the provisions of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act for carrying out any of the purposes of the Act, and the Tribunal except for the purposes of S. 54 of the Act is deemed to be a Court and the President of the Tribunal is deemed to be the Judge thereunder. Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, provides for an appeal. Section 61(a) of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act excludes the application of Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. The award of the Tribunal is deemed to be the award of the Court under the Land Acquisition Act and is final. The effect of these provisions is that there is no appeal to the High Court from the award of the Tribunal. This has been so held in Civil Revn. No. 539 of 194310 to which one of us (Sen, J.) was a party. In order that the award of the tribunal, might be executable it was necessary to provide that the award of the Tribunal should be enforced by a competent civil Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was made as if it were a decree of that Court. But for S. 67(2) of the Act the award of the Tribunal could not be executed in a civil Court. The provisions of the Bombay Trust Act (Act 4 of 1898) were almost in similar terms to those of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, except that under the Bombay Act there was an appeal to the High Court on a certificate from the President of the Tribunal, and the rules were to be framed by the President and not by the Provincial Government. In 27 Bom. 42411 at p. 444 it has been observed with reference to the position of the Tribunal constituted under the Act:

“In considering whether the Tribunal of appeal is a Court, it is important in the first place to observe what is its constitution. It consists of a President and two Assessors, of whom only the President need have any legal training: the award of the majority (except on points of law) prevails: the President and one Assessor ore appointed by the Government, the other Assessor by the Corporation, by which is presumably meant the Municipal Corporation of Bombay: the members of the Tribunal are appointed for one year and are eligible for re-appointment: they are removable by Government for inability, misbehaviour or other good and sufficient cause: the President alone has power to make rules for the conduct of the Tribunal subject to the sanction of the Government, while under the High Courts Act of 1861 (Stat. 24 & 25 Vict., c. 104), S. 15, it is the High Court that is empowered to frame rules of practice for subordinate Courts: the Act does not purport to constitute the Tribunal a Court, but provides that it shall perform the functions of the Court under the Land Acquisition Act, and shall be deemed to be the Court: the President is deemed to be the Judge, and the Tribunal's award (subject to the right of appeal I have mentioned) is final. Can it reasonably be said that a body so constituted is a Court of Justice? I think not; it appears to me that the manifest purpose of the Legislature was to create a Tribunal that should not be a Court, but a body free from the control and superintendence of this Court, except so far as intervention by way of appeal might be sanctioned by its President.”

7. These observations were approved by their Lordships of the Privy Council in 59 Cal. 5512 at p. 66. These observations have our respectful concurrence. We hold that the tribunal is not a Court but is deemed to be a Court for certain specific purposes. In the Bombay Act there was an appeal to the High Court from the award of the Tribunal if the President granted a certificate that the case was a fit one for appeal. In view of the doubt expressed in the Bombay case as regards the power of the provincial Legislature to confer a right of appeal on the High Court a validating Act, 14 of 1904, was passed. Section 71 of the Calcutta Improvement Trust Act, 5 of 1911, is the same as Section 61 of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act, but simultaneously with the passing of the Bengal Act, Act 18 of 1911, was passed giving a right of appeal to the High Court from an award of the Tribunal. The same method was adopted in the United Provinces Town Improvement Trust Act, 8 of 1919; a right of appeal was provided by Act 3 of 1920. In 59 Cal. 55 at p. 56 the question for decision was whether an appeal was competent from a decision of the High Court on appeal from the award of the Tribunal. It was held that no appeal lay as the award of the Tribunal was final subject to the restricted appeal to the High Court. The provision of finality in the Act excluded any further appeal. Under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act the award of the Tribunal is final. The decision of the President on all questions of law and procedure is also final. Applying the principle stated in 59 Cal. 55, the provision of finality would exclude any interference either in appeal or in revision.

8. A close examination of the provisions of the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act will disclose that the Tribunal has not been made a Court subordinate to the High Court and that the High Court has no power of superintendence over the Tribunal. A.I.R 1932 Cal. 66013 and I.L.R (1943) 1 Cal. 6914 at p. 73 are cases under the Calcutta Improvement Trust Act wherein there was an interference by the High Court in revision. In the former case the power to revise was based on Section 115 of the CPC and Section 107 of the Government of India Act of 1915. No reasons have been given for the exercise of the power of revision under S. 115. In the latter case the reason for interference is stated to be

“that Act 18 of 1911 allowing an appeal from the Tribunal to the High Court had the effect of making the Tribunal a Court subordinate to this Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the CPC”

9. This is not applicable to the Tribunal constituted under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act as no appeal has been provided from the award of the Tribunal or from an order of the President to the High Court. There are cases which lay down the proposition that where a right of appeal is conferred from a Tribunal to the High Court that Tribunal is constituted a Court subordinate to the High Court. That principle is not applicable as in the local Act there is no provision for an appeal to the High Court and no indication that the Tribunal is to be deemed to be a Court subordinate to the High Court. In the absence of any such provision, it must be held that the High Court has no power to revise the order passed by the President of the Tribunal or the award delivered by the Tribunal constituted under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act. A reference may be made to the case in I.L.R (1941) Nag. 58115 in which it was held that the High Court had no power to revise the order passed by the District Court under Section 20 of the Belief of Indebtedness Act. Under Section 107 of the Government of India Act, a High Court under its power of superintendence exercised the powers of revision over inferior Courts, but under Section 224(2) of the Government of India Act, 1935, the power of superintendence does not carry with it the power of hearing an appeal or revision unless it is so expressly conferred by some express enactment. We hold that we have no power to revise the order passed by the President of the Tribunal.

10. In view of our decision on a preliminary point of jurisdiction we refrain from deciding other questions which have been argued before us. Section 113 of the CPC, confers jurisdiction on a Court to state a case and refer it for the opinion of the High Court and the High Court may make such order thereon as it thinks fit. The limitations for making a reference are stated in O. 46, R. 1 of the CPC. The question of law must arise at the hearing of a suit or appeal. The Legislature has made a distinction between a suit and an application. A suit is instituted by presentation of a plaint and ends in a decree: 57 Mad. 271, 16 54 ALL. 106717 at p. 1074. A reference made by the Collector to a Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, is neither a suit nor an appeal. In I.L.R (1941) Nag. 588 it was held that the District Court had no power to make a reference to the High Court in a case arising out of the Central Provinces and Berar Relief of Indebtedness Act as the proceedings before the Belief Courts were neither in the nature of a suit nor an appeal. We have already held that the Tribunal is not a Court. The President of the Tribunal is not competent to refer the case to the High Court for decision under O. 46, R. 1 of the CPC. Mr. Ghadge, counsel for the applicant, made an impassioned appeal that in questions affecting vitally the subject in the matter of payment of compensation on compulsory acquisition of his land a right of approach to the High Court should not be barred. His contention was that these cases involve intricate and complicated questions of law and that it is desirable that the High Court should have power to decide these questions finally in appeal or in revision. This is, however, a question of policy which is for the Legislature to decide. The application for revision fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsel's fee Rupees 25.

11. Application dismissed.