1. This is an application in revision by Debidutt Dube to set aside the order dated 6th March 1943 passed by the Court of the Additional District Judge, Jubbnlpore, in Miscellaneous Appeal No. 2/4 of 1943. The Central India Electrical Supply Company Ltd., Lahore, appointed Debidutt Dube as a shift engineer in their power house at Katni by their letter of appointment dated 5th August 1937 on an initial salary of Rs. 60 per mensem. Two of the conditions on which he was appointed were: (i) he was to be on a probation for a period of six months and if his work was found satisfactory he was to be confirmed on a grade of Rs. 60-5-80, (ii) the services were terminable on one month's notice on either side. The last condition was subsequently modified, on 20th August 1940 and it was mutually agreed that the services were terminable on 8 days notice on either side or in the absence of 8 days' notice, 8 days salary will be paid by the party desiring to sever connections. Debidutt Dube signed a letter embodying these terms and the letter has been filed in the case. A copy of the bye-laws of the company in force at the time of his appointment has been filed in the case. The relevant Rr. 7(b) and (c) are reproduced below:

“7(b) In case of negligence of duty, the General Manager and heads of sections shall have power to fine employees at fault and further shall have power to suspend them in case of serious misconduct, (c) All employees of the Company are liable to dismissal without notice for neglect of duty, dishonesty, or any other sufficient cause, without assigning any reason.”

2. Debidutt Dube joined his appointment on 23rd August 1937. He was never confirmed by the company as they considered his work unsatisfactory and he was suspended on 20th May 1941 by Mr. Sood, engineer-in-charge, Katni, under instructions from the Head Office. Section 2(d), National Service (Technical Personnel) Ordinance, No. 2 of 1943, defines ‘industrial undertaking’ to mean any concern sugared in the supply or distribution of light, power or water. The Central India Electrical Supply Company, Ltd., was thus an industrial undertaking as defined by the Ordinance. Under S. 13(3) of the Ordinance no owner or manager of an industrial under, taking can discharge, dismiss or release any person unless he has given fifteen days previous notice in writing of the contemplated discharge, dismissal or release to the Tribunal constituted under the Ordinance. As required by S. 13(3) of the Ordinance, a notice was given on 4th June 1941 by the company to the Chairman National Service Tribunal, Central Provinces and Berar, Nagpur, intimating that they were dismissing Debidutt Dube after 20th June 1941 for misconduct, complicity and incompetency. Debidutt Dube complained to the Chairman of the Tribunal about his suspension and intimated to him that he felt no inclination to serve in the company any more. The Chairman of the Tribunal informed him by the letter dated 28th/31st July 1941 that his name had been struck off the list of technical personnel maintained in the office on the receipt of report dated 4th June 1941 from the company intimating that they were dismissing him from service after 20th June 1941. The company sent a notice on 9th August 1941 to Debidutt Dube intimating that he was dismissed and his services were dispensed with, with effect from 21st June 1941 due to misconduct, insubordination and incompetency. The notice was served on him on 12th August 1941. The company remitted to him Rs. 62-8-0 less moneyorder commission on account of his pay from 20th May 1941 to 20th June 1941.

3. Debidutt Dube applied under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, for a direction for refund of Rs. 965 to him under sub-s. (3) of S. 15 of the Act. His claim consisted of three items — Rs. 120 on account of pay from the 21st June 1941 to 20th August 1941; Rs. 345 on account of increment due from 1938 to 1941; Rs. 500 on account of damages arising out of the breach of the condition of eight days' notice. The case was tried by the Subordinate Judge, 1st Class, Jubbulpore, who was em-powered under S. 15(1) of the Act to try and decide all claims arising out of deductions from wages. The Subordinate Judge by his order dated 2nd January 1943 held that Debidutt Dube was entitled to Rs. 465 and directed the company to pay him the sum.

4. The Central India Electrical Supply Company Limited filed an appeal on 30th January 1943 in the District Court, Jubbulpore. The appeal was allowed, the direction of the Subordinate Judge regarding payment of Rs. 465 to Debidutt Dube was set aside and the application was dismissed with costs in both the Courts. It is against this order that the present revision application has been directed. The learned counsel for the non-applicant raised a preliminary objection that no revision lies against an order passed by the District Court under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act. An appeal lies to the District Court under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, against a direction made under sub-s. (3) or sub-s. (4) of S. 15 of the Act by the authority appointed under the Act. The District Court is subordinate to the High Court: see Section 3 of the CPC. A District Court decides a ‘case’ within the meaning of Section 115 of the CPC, when it decides an appeal under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act. The word ‘case’ has not been defined either in the Code of Civil Procedure or in the General Clauses Act. It is wider and more comprehensive than the word ‘suit’. It must be understood in its broadest and most ordinary sense as including any matter affecting the rights of parties whether in a suit or other proceedings under any other Act.

5. In 40 Mad. 7931 at page 799 it has been held that Section 115 of the CPC, applies to jurisdiction alone, irregular exercise, or non-exercise of it, or the illegal assumption of it and is not directed against the conclusions of law or fact in which the question of jurisdiction is not involved. The applicant here has challenged the order of the District Court on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to entertain and decide the appeal and that in the alternative even if it had it has acted in the exercise of its jurisdiction with material illegality. All the conditions necessary to attract the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under S. 115 of the Code are thus fulfilled in this case. A distinction should be drawn between the power of the High Court to revise an order passed by the District Court in appeal under Section 17 of the Payment of Wages Act, and the power of the High Court to revise an order passed by the authority empowered under S. 15 of the Act to decide all claims arising out of deductions from wages. In the former case no doubt can possibly arise as regards the power of the High Court. In the latter case, however, there may be a divergence of opinion whether the authority empowered to decide the case under S. 15 of the Act is a Court and whether it is a Court subordinate to the High Court.

6. The learned counsel for the non-applicant relies on the decision of Bose, J. in I.L.R (1944) Nag. 5312 in which he has decided that the authority appointed by the Provincial Government under Section 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act, to settle the claims under the Act is a persona designate and not a civil Court subordinate to the High Court within the meaning of Section 115 of the CPC, and that the High Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a revision against a decision of such an ‘authority’. A contrary decision of Bobde, J. has been published in I.L.R (1944) Nag. 5403 in the same issue, in which it has been held that an application for revision under Section 115 of the CPC, is maintainable against an order, made under Section 15(3) of the Payment of Wages Act. If it had been necessary for me to reconsider these cases I would have referred the matter to the Honourable the Chief Justice for constitution of a Division Bench to resolve the conflict. I however consider it unnecessary to do so as here the revision is directed not against an order of the authority appointed under Section 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act, but is a revision against the order of the District Court.

7. The learned counsel relied on another decision of Bose, J. in civil Revn. No. 291 of 1943.4 This, however, does not discuss the matter but follows his previous decision reported now in I.L.R (1944) Nag. 531. The learned Judge has not drawn a distinction between a revision of the order of the authority appointed under Section 15(1) of the Payment of Wages Act, and of an order of the District Court. I hold that the High Court has power to revise an order passed by the District Court under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act. The preliminary objection fails and is overruled. The questions which arise for decision in this application are: (i) whether the District Court had jurisdiction to entertain and hear the appeal; (ii) whether the appeal was properly filed; (iii) whether the order of suspension of Debidutt Dube was justified; (iv) whether he was entitled to pay from 20th June 1941 to 20th August 1941; (v) whether he was entitled to claim Rs. 345 or any other sum on account of the increment of pay from 1938 to 1941, and whether they were wrongfully withheld and (vi) whether the claim for Rs. 345 was within limitation.

8. The Subordinate Judge in exercise of the powers issued a direction to the non-applicant to pay Rs. 465 to the applicant. Under Section 17(1)(a) of the Payment of Wages Act, an appeal lies against a direction, if the total sum directed to be paid exceeds Rs. 300. The contention of the counsel is that an appeal is not competent as no sum has been awarded by way of compensation. An appeal lies if the sum exceeds Rs. 300 and it is not necessary that a sum payable should include the amount payable on account of compensation. Under Section 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, the authority appointed has jurisdiction to hear and decide all claims arising out of deductions from the wages or delay in payment of wages of the persons employed. The claim for compensation for wrongful dismissal does not fall within the definition given in S. 2(vi) of the Act. Under S. 15(3) of the Act, however, the authority is empowered to award compensation but that will not include compensation for wrongful dismissal. Here the claim for compensation for Rs. 500 had been dismissed. There was no appeal against that claim and it is not the subject before me. The direction was for payment of Rs. 120 on account of pay from 21st June 1941 to 20th August 1941 and Rs. 346 on account of increment of pay wrongfully withheld.

9. The words “by way of wages and compensation” in Section 17(1)(a) of the Payment of Wages Act, are by way of a description and not a condition precedent for the maintainability of an appeal. The fact that no compensation had been awarded did not deprive the company of the right of appeal which is conferred under S. 17(1)(a) of the Act. This was the view taken by the District Court in the order dated 6th March 1943. I consider that the decision arrived at is correct and is affirmed. The District Court had jurisdiction to entertain and decide the appeal filed under Section 17(1)(a) of the Payment of Wages Act, and the order is not liable to be challenged on the ground of want of jurisdiction. The next ground taken is that the company did not comply with R. 12, Payment of Wages (Procedure) Rules, 1937, as the grounds of objection were not accompanied with a certified copy of the directions. This was also the objection which was taken in the lower Court. In the order dated 6th March 1943 the learned Judge has dealt with the question in these terms:

“The counsel for the appellant pointed out that the learned Judge delivered his order on 2nd January 1943 and that the appeal was filed on 30th January 1943 within 30 days of the order, that the learned Judge failed to draw a direction on the prescribed form and that he had to point out to the Judge what had to be done. On perusal of the record I find that the learned Judge sent for the record and drew up the directions in the prescribed form on 4th February 1943. The appellant filed the copy of the order along with his memo of appeal and he complied with the rules. The objection of the respondent that the appeal should be thrown out on the particular ground is overruled.”

10. The appellate Court notes that a copy of the order was filed along with the memorandum of appeal and that there was a compliance with the rules. The copy of the order would be found in File D as required under R. 355 of the Rules and Orders (Civil), p. 190, chap. 16. This finding was not challenged in the application in revision. The applicant did not send for File D in order to show that no copy of the order was on record nor has he filed any affidavit to challenge the correctness of the statement made by the District Court. In the absence of any rebutting evidence, I must accept that a copy of the order was filed along with the memorandum of appeal. The order dated 2nd January 1943 gave a statement of the case, the issues framed, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision. The Subordinate Judge did not, however, draw up the direction in the prescribed form. As he had not signed the prescribed form on 30th January 1943, when the appeal was filed no copy of the direction could possibly have been filed. There was a substantial compliance with the rules. The District Court did not ask the appellant to file a copy of the direction after it had been drawn up. The District Court must be deemed to have dispensed with the formality. The fact that a certified copy of the direction in the prescribed form had been filled up on 4th February 1943 did not affect the validity of the appeal which was filed on 30th January 1940 and did not in any way affect the merits of the case. The principle underlying Section 99 of the CPC, to the effect that any error not affecting the merits of the case cannot be a ground for setting aside the decree or order passed in the case is applicable. I hold that the appeal was properly filed, that the directions in the prescribed form were not filed with the appeal as the Subordinate Judge had not drawn up the directions in the prescribed form within a month, that it was filled up by him subsequently on 4th February 1943 and that the competency of the appeal was in no way affected.

11. The non-applicant examined Mr. B. Paul, Chief Engineer, of the company to prove that Debidutt was suspended for inefficiency, insubordination and misconduct. He has given reasons why Debidutt Dube was not confirmed. He states that there were reports against him from the then engineers as a result of which he was transferred from Katni to Bilaspur. His work was not satisfactory and several reports were received from the engineer, Bilaspur, concerning his inefficiency, and insubordination and that he had been fined and warned on several occasions. He was again transferred from Bilaspur to Katni. He has given particulars of his misconduct, insubordination and inefficiency in work. The company was not satisfied with the work of Debidutt Dube and that he was subsequently dismissed on account of insubordination, inefficiency and serious misconduct. Mr. Sood, engineer-in-charge, Katni, has also been examined to prove that the work of Debidutt Dube was unsatisfactory and that he was guilty of misconduct, insubordination and inefficiency. From the evidence of the witnesses, it is clear that the company was not satisfied with the work of Debidutt Dube who was subsequently dismissed for insubordination, inefficiency and misconduct. Under the bye-law the company had power to suspend Debidutt Dube. There were valid grounds for his suspension. The company exercised the power which they had under the bye-law and suspended him. This was so stated in their several letters. An employee who is suspended in exercise of a valid power is not entitled to the pay during the period of his suspension. The effect of the order of suspension is to suspend the contract of service as a whole and the servant can neither insist on working nor claim his pay during the period of suspension: (1922) 2 K.B 66,5 I.L.R (1939) 1 Cal. 466 and Civil Revn. No. 325 of 1943.7 The counsel for the applicant relied on 30 N.L.R 1738 and I.L.R (1942) Nag. 343.9 Those are cases where the employer had no power to suspend the employee and they have no application to the present case. Ordinarily, the rights between the employer and his servants are regulated by the ordinary law of master and servant. There is no implied power in the employer to punish a servant by suspension: (1915) 1 K.B 698.10 An employer may in certain cases dismiss his servant; if, however, he does not dismiss him but suspends him he is bound to pay his salary during the period of suspension. The order of suspension in such cases does not amount to dismissal or termination of the contract of service and until the contract of service is terminated he is entitled to his pay even though he is under suspension: (1902) 18 T.L.R 420,11 (1915) 1 K.B 698, I.L.R (1943) Bom. 1,12 21 Pat. 60913 and Halsbury's Laws of England (Hailsham Edn.) vol. 22, para. 274, p. 162. After suspension on 20th May 1941, Debidutt Dube never worked as a shift engineer. As he was suspended under a valid power he was not entitled to his pay during the period of suspension, viz. 20th May 1941 to 12th August 1941. Under S. 13(3), National Service Ordinance No. 2 of 1940, as amended by Ordinance No. 11 of 1940, it was obligatory on the company to give 15 days notice of the dismissal to the National Service Tribunal. This notice was duly sent on 4th June 1941, to the Chairman, National Service Tribunal, that the company was dismissing Debidutt Dube after 20th June 1941. After the expiry of the period a formal notice was given on 9th August 1941 to Debidutt Dube intimating that he had been dismissed from 21st June 1941. The company remitted his pay from 20th May 1941 to 20th June 1941, both days inclusive. Debidutt was not entitled to the pay from 21st June 1941 to 20th August 1941. Debidutt Dube was on probation for 6 months. His work was not considered satisfactory by the company and he was not confirmed. The increment of pay was to arise only after he had been confirmed. It was not automatic on the expiry of the period of 6 months. Under the terms of the contract he was appointed on a salary of Rs. 60 and that after he was confirmed he was to be appointed on a grade of 60-5-80. As he was not confirmed he had not earned the increment and he was not entitled to the sum of Rs. 345 from 1938 to 1941. The claim was also barred by limitation as it was not made within 6 months from the time when the increments fell due according to him. The applicant had no claim for Rs. 345 on account of the increment of pay as he had not been confirmed and had not earned the increment under the terms of his appointment. He had, however, an arguable case as regards his pay from 21st June 1941 to 20th August 1941. The order of dismissal dated 9th August 1941 was served on him on 12th August 1941. This order directed his dismissal from 21st June 1941. Under the terms of the contract he had cause to believe that he was entitled to 8 days pay from 12th August 1941. He has thus a good ground for claiming his pay from 21st June 1941 to 20th August 1941. As I have found that he was not entitled to the pay during the period he was under suspension as he was suspended in exercise of the powers vested in the company, I direct that the parties should bear the costs of this revision application as incurred. The application fails and is dismissed.

12. Application dismissed.