JUDGMENT
1. Rao Bahadur D. Laxminarayan of Kamptee died on the 30th September 1930 leaving a will dated the 3rd May 1930. By that will (Ex. P.-1) he purported to dispose of movable and immovable property, but mainly movable property, which has been valued at about 50 lakhs of rupees. The property described in the schedule annexed to the will is described in the will as his self-acquired property acquired with the gains and profits earned by him in mining business during the last 25 years, of which he was the sole and absolute owner. The other property consisted of house property at Nagpur, Kamptee and Secunderabad and malikmakbuza and absolute occupancy fields in mauza Waregaon in the Nagpur district. After providing for certain legacies to his wife and others he left the residue of the estate to the Nagpur University
“ear-marked for the teaching of applied Science and Chemistry to the Hindu students domiciled for not less than six-years in the Central Provinces and Berar.”
2. Letters of Administration (Ex. D-4) were granted to the Nagpur University by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner on the 3rd November 1931. R.B Laxminarayan had 2 younger brothers, D. Gangadhar Rao and Gopalkrishna. They were born and brought up in Kamptee, and some time after the death of their father Pullaiya in 1886 went with their mother, who died in 1902, to live with Kakolam who had a brick and tile factory and various contracts including a lucrative contract for carting manganese. Kakolam died on the 29th July 1904 leaving a will dated the 11th November 1899 (Ex. P. 83) by which he left all his movable and immovable property to Laxminarayan, Gangadhar Rao and Gopalkrishna who were directed to take possession of his property as his legal heirs and to get the contracts in his name transferred to their names. Gopalkrishna had already died in 1903. Laxminarayan and Gangadhar Rao thereafter continued to carry on the business and contracts as before. In 1906 leases from Government of manganese minej were granted in the name of Laxminarayan. There is ample evidence to show that both R.B Laxminarayan and Gangadhar Rao looked after the manganese mines and were generally regarded as equal owners, and most of the estate covered by R.B Laxminarayan's will admittedly came from the profits of these manganese mines.
3. In April 1924 Gangadhar Rao left Kamptee and went with his family to live at Bet Narayan in the Poona district in the vicinity of his Guru Narayan Maharaj. Gangadhar Rao himself returned to Kamptee on two occasions, in April-May 1925 and again in December 1925, but his family never returned. On the 20th October 1925 the manganese mines were sold for 30 lakhs of rupees, of which 10 lakhs was paid on the 13th August 1925, 10 lakhs was paid on the 30th September 1925, and the remaining 10 lakhs was to be paid on the 31st December 1925: vide Ex. P. 2. On the 2nd November 1925 R.B Laxminarayan wrote a letter (Ex. P. 25) to Gangadhar Rao enclosing a cheque for 10 lakhs and saying that he was giving it to him out of brotherly affection and suggesting that it should be invested in the National, Chartered or Mercantile Bank, in which case it would bring him in Rs. 40,000 p.a as interest. After his departure from Kamptee in April 1924 Gangadhar Rao received out of the estate Rs. 31,000 between the 27th May 1924 and the llth June 1925, and after the receipt of the above 10 lakhs he received a further Rs. 1500 on the 13th April 1926 and Rs. 10,000 on the 29th November 1926. That appears from the evidence of Harihar Rao (P.W 10), which shows that these sums were remitted to Gangadhar Rao, by drafts drawn by R.B Laxminarayan in favour of Gangadhar Rao on Messrs Killick, Nixon and Co.
4. Gangadhar Rao died at Bet Narayan on the 18th November 1927 leaving deposits in his name of 4½ lakhs in the National Bank of India and 4 lakhs in the Chartered Bank of India: vide Ex. P. 17. On the 30th January 1928 his widow Buchibai, the plaintiff in this case, applied in the Court of the District Judge, Poona, for the grant of a succession certificate to enable her to claim the deposits and on the same day she asked for permission to pay the Court-fees, which amounted to about Rs. 40,000, later: vide Ex. P. 15. Notices were issued to the various relations of Gangadhar Rao, including B.B Laxminarayan. As a result of negotiations it was eventually agreed on the 15th September 1928 that a succession certificate in respect of these deposits should be granted to Buchibai on the conditions embodied in the compromise petition (Ex. D-1) and a document termed a settlement deed (Es. D. 3). Exhibit D. 3, which was registered by a sub-registrar of Poona City, was in these terms:
“I. In order that there may not be any dispute and squandering of money in Court among us in connection with the estate of the late D. Gangadhar Rao and, in the same way in order that good relations and harmony may be maintained among us and with a view that afterwards there may not be left any kind of right, dispute or claim against each other, it has been settled as follows:
Buohibai admits that the property existing at different places in the possession of Rao Bahadur D. Laxminarayan, either in his own name or in the name of the late D. Gangadhar Rao, is wholly of the absolute ownership of Rao Bahadur D. Laxminarayan and is his self-acquired property. Buchibai has no right whatever over that property or any part thereof either in her own right or as heir to the late D. Gangadhar Rao and she shall not lay any Claim.
[II] Rao Bahadur D. Laxminarayan, without raising any objection, gives his consent on the undermentioned conditions to the issue of succession certificate, according to the application of Buchibai in respect of the deposits with regard to which she has made the said application.
(a) When the amount of deposits is recovered on the strength of the certificate, Buchibai should keep aside therefrom the amount required for expenses. On the request of Buchibai, Rao Bahadur D. Laxminarayan has lent to her money free of interest required for the expenses on account of the stamp for the certificate and other expenses required for the application in connection with the said application proceedings. That amount should first be returned to Rao Bahadur D. Laxminarayan.
(b) Deducting the amount required for the said expenses from the amount of deposits in the above application that will be obtained back, the remaining amount shall be invested in securities mentioned in the Trust Act in the names of both of us. Buchibai shall uninterruptedly get the annual interest received during her life-time. It has been decided to put in the name of Rao Bahadur D. Laxminarayan along with Buchibai at the time of taking securities and investing the amount only in order that the original amount shall remain unobstructed and intact for those who may become the heirs of the late D. Gangadhar Rao after the death of Buchibai. Rao Bahadur D. Laxminarayan will not lay any kind of claim to the amount of deposits or to the securities purchased therefrom or to the interest on the securities that may be received.
(c) Whatever property of any kind that may be in the possession of Buchibai belongs to her as the widow and heir of the late D. Gangadhar Rao. Rao Bahadur D. Laxminarayan will not lay any kind of claim to that property.
(d) Rao Bahadur D. Laxminarayan has agreed not to demand now from Buchibai the amounts lent to the late D. Gangadhar Rao during his life-time from time to time in the year 1926.”
5. Exhibit D. 1, the compromise petition which was presented in the Court of the District Judge of Poona, was in similar terms except that it is therein stated that R.B Laxminarayan had advanced Rs. 50,000 to Buchibai to pay for the stamp and other expenses incurred in obtaining the succession certificate, that 8 lakhs out of the deposit was to be invested in the names of R.B Laxmi narayan and Buchibai, leaving the remainder, which including interest amounted to over Rs. 85,000, for Buchibai's personal use, and that the amount lent by R.B Laxminarayan to Gangadhar Rao in 1926 was Rs. 25,000 which R.B Laxminarayan had agreed to write off. On the presentation of that petition the District Judge passed the following order; “Upon the compromise put in by the parties certificate to issue to applicant” (Exhibit D. 2).
6. The present suit was filed by Buchibai on the 14th September 1932. She alleged in the plaint that Laxminarayan and Gangadhar Rao took as tenants-in-common under Kakolam's will property worth more than a lakh of rupees which formed the nucleus of all subsequent acquisitions of which they always remained tenants-in-common. She therefore claimed that R.B Laxminarayan had thus initially a disposing power only over 25 lakhs [taking the value of the total estate as 50 lakhs], which share had been reduced by the gift of 10 lakhs to Gangadhar Rao on the 2nd November 1925, and she asked for a decree declaring her entitled to a half share in the estate and directing a partition of it. The defendant, the University of Nagpur, denied that the properties left by Kakolam formed the nucleus of the subsequent acquisitions and contended that the mining business was the exclusive property of R.B Laxminarayan and that the entire estate was acquired out of the profits of this mining business. In the alternative it contended that, if the properties acquired under Kakolam's will did form the nucleus of the subsequent acquisitions, the entire estate was joint family property and on the death of Gangadhar Rao, R.B Laxmi narayan became the sole owner by survivor, ship. It also contended that the plaintiff was bound by the compromise of the 15th September 1928 by which she had relinquished all claim to this estate. To that the plaintiff replied that if R.B Laxminarayan and Gangadhar Rao ever formed a Hindu joint family, they separated in April 1924 when Gangadhar Rao left Kamptee to live in Bet Narayan that the compromise of the 15th septmber, 1928 was ineffective for want of valid registration and that she was not bound by that compromise because her agreement to it had been induced by undue influence and fraud.
7. The lower Court held that Laxminarayan and Gangadhar Rao formed a Hindu joint family and acquired the estate in dispute as such and that there had been no disruption so that on the death of Gangadhar Rao, R.B Laxminarayan became the sole owner by survivorship. It also held that the agreement of Buchibai to the compromise of the 15th September 1928 had not been induced by undue influence or fraud, that it was validly registered, and that it was binding on her. It accordingly dismissed her claim. Against that decision Buchibai has preferred this appeal.
8. At a late stage of the trial the plaintiff produced certified copies of a statement made by Laxminarayan to the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax on the 17th August 1922 and of two orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner on the 23rd March and the 17th August 1922. These documents have now been numbered as Ex. A.1, A.2 and A.3 These copies were obtained from the Income-tax Department by B.B Laxminarayan's widow. On the 19th February 1987 the plaintiff stated that it had very recently come to her knowledge that these documents had been obtained by R.B Laxminarayan's widow and she asked for permission to summon her to produce these documents. These documents were produced on the 8th March 1937 and were rejected by the lower Court, partly on the ground that they were inadmissible in evidence by virtue of Section 54 of theIncome-tax Act and partly because they had been produced at so late a stage. They were produced when 61 out of 68 witnesses for the plaintiff had been examined and after the recording of evidence had been going on for nearly three years. It is conceded that these certified copies were obtained from Laxminarayan's widow at the instance of the plaintiff, but that, in our opinion, is not necessarily a reason for rejecting the documents. Under Sub-S. (1) of Section 54 of the Income-tax Act all particulars contained in any statement made in the course of proceedings under the Act or in any record of any assessment proceeding shall be treated as confidential, and no Court shall, save as provided in the Act, be entitled to require any public servant to produce before it any such document or to give evidence before it in respect thereof; Sub-S. (2) provides that any public servant disclosing such particulars shall be punishable. The direction that such document shall be treated as confidential is a direction to officials of the Income-tax Department, and in our opinion it is open to an assessee to waive that right and to give evidence, if he desires, of particulars contained in such a record, as was held in I.L.R (1940) Mad. 969.1 There is nothing in section 54 which prohibits the giving of such evidence; the section merely directs officials of the income, tax department to treat such documents as confidential and prohibits the Court from requiring public servants to produce such documents or to give evidence about such documents.
9. It is conceded that the statement made by Laxminarayan before the Assistant Commissioner and the orders of the Assistant Commissioner are all public documents as defined in section 74 of the Evidence Act. When the original is a public document within the meaning of section 74 secondary evidence may be given by production of a certified copy of the document, in accordance with section 65 of the Evidence Act. Section 76 of that Act enacts that.
10. “A public officer having the custody of a public document, which any person has right to inspect, shall give that person on demand a copy of it together with a certificate that it is a true copy of that document … and such copies so certified shall be called certified copies.”
11. It is not in our opinion necessary that the public generally must have a right to inspect, and it is sufficient if there is any single person who has a right to inspect. As to whether an assessee has a right to inspect the record in his case there has been some difference of opinion. In 2 Rang 3912, 56 Bom. 3243 and ILR (1939) 2 Cal. 3944 it has been held that there is no such right. The contrary view has been taken in I.L.R (1940) Mad. 969. At page 301 of the Income-tax Manual, 8th edition, it is stated that an income-tax return is not a “public document” and therefore no one has any right to inspect or to receive a copy of it, but the assessee or any partner in a firm to whose income the return relates or any adult member of a Hindu undivided family to whose income the return relates will, in practice, be allowed to do so. Statements recorded or orders passed by income-tax officers are, as we have said, public documents, and there is no express provision in the Manual dealing with the right to inspect or obtain copies of such documents. At page 351 however it is stated that all copies certified to be true copies by officers of income-tax department are liable to stamp duty if they are chargeable to Court-fee, and there is a provision for charging Court-fees for copies of orders. In actual practice an assessee is, we understand, allowed to inspect the record of his case, and it might be difficult if not impossible, for him to appeal against such an order if such inspection were not allowed. We therefore respectfully agree with the decision in I.L.R (1940) Mad. 969 that an assessee has a right to inspect statements recorded or orders passed by income-tax officers and that certified copies granted by the department, as here, will therefore be admissible in evidence to prove the contents of those documents. The copies in this case however were obtained not by R.B Laxminarayan but by his widow after his death, and it has been contended that the University of Nagpur is, by virtue of the grant of the letters of administration, the sole legal representative of R.B Laxminarayan. In our opinion R.B Laxminarayan's widow is a representative of his estate and was entitled to obtain these copies.
12. These documents were undoubtedly produced at a very late stage, but we do not consider that was in itself a sufficient ground for rejecting them, and the order of the learned District Judge, was, we think, based mainly on the ground that the documents were inadmissible in evidence by virtue of section 54 of the Income-tax Act. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee observed in 56 Cal. 10035 at p. 1011 that leave should not ordinarily be refused where the documents are official records of undoubted authenticity which may assist the Court to decide rightly the issue before it. It has been contended by the learned counsel that the defendant would have been placed in an unfair position if these documents had been admitted in evidence at the stage when they were produced. The defendant's case was primarily that the entire estate was Laxminarayan's self-acquired property, and alternatively that it was the joint family property of Laxminarayan and Gangadhar Rao. In Exhibit A-2 Laxminarayan is recorded as stating on the 17th August 1922:
“I and my brother Mr. D.G Gangadhar Rao are separate and our shares are also separate. We do not form a joint Hindu family though we live in one house.”
13. The Assistant Commissioner stated in his order (Exhibit A. 1) on the 23rd March 1922:
“Rao Sahib D. Laxminarayan of Kamptee files a return of income for Rs. 51,960-5-5 and declares that his concern is a partnership between himself and his brother D. Gangadhar Rao. He claims that each should, be assessed separately … They mess jointly but it is stated emphatically that they are not a joint Hindu family. They divide shares half and half in the business and each has control over his, share of income. They are thus not members of a joint Hindu family. They are merely partners in business. As this is a partnership, I cannot assess them separately would treat this as a unit for assessment purposes according to the present law. Last year they were assessed on an income of Rs. 67,805.”
14. It is clear then that Laxminarayan represented to the income-tax authorities that he and his brother did not form a Hindu joint family and that each had a half share in the business. These statements have been put in to rebut the defendant's contention that the estate was Laxminarayan's alone or that it was a joint family estate. The defendant knew the case it had to meet, and the case would in no way be changed by the admission of these documents. It has been suggested that some of the witnesses who have given evidence for the plaintiff might have been further cross-examined if these documents had been on the record. We do not think that any further cross-examination would have helped the defendant's case for all that these witnesses said on the point was that to all appearances the two brothers seemed to be living as a joint family and to be equal owners of the business. In our opinion therefore these documents should be admitted in evidence. If these documents were accepted, at their face value, it would appear that there was a partnership between Laxminarayan and Gangadhar Rao, but counsel on both sides are agreed that there was never a partnership.
15. Pullaiya, the father of Laxminarayan, Gangadhar Rao and Gopalkrishna, was a poor mendicant Brahmin who died in 1886, leaving nothing behind him except a small hut worth about Rs. 25, which was later rebuilt by Kakolam. After 2 or 3 years Pullaiya's widow and her three sons went to live with Kakolam who had a flourishing business and was a fairly wealthy man by the standards of the locality. He brought up these boys as his sons, and as they grew up they helped him in his various enterprises. There is ample evidence to prove this. The learned District Judge has discussed the evidence in detail and we think it unnecessary to add anything to what he has said as his conclusions have been only faintly challenged in this Court. There is also ample evidence, which is unrebutted, to show that these boys had no independent business of their own while Kakolam was alive. The mere fact that a banking account with the firm of R.B Bansilal Abirchand (Exhibit P. 38) was opened in the name of all four does not necessarily mean that Kakolam had taken them into partnership with him, and all the evidence, including a recital in Kakolam's will, is the other way. In the will (Exhibit P. 83), by which Kakolam left all his property to these three brothers, it is stated that for several years he had owed money to Pullaiya on account of debts incurred by his father-in-Law and this was given as one of the reasons for his leaving his property to Pullaiya's sons. We find it impossible to believe that any such debt could have existed, for it is most unlikely that Pullaiya was ever in a position to make a loan or that Kakolam would have allowed it to remain unpaid for so many years, and the reason for this statement is explained by Sir Maneekji Dadabhoy (P.W 40) as due to the belief that is was advisable to show some sort of consideration in the will.
16. The decision of this case turns largely on the construction of that will and on whether Laxminarayan and Gangadhar Rao succeeded as joint tenants or tenants in common. The relevant portion of the will runs as follows:
“I consider the three brothers as my sons and they pay me their respects as a son does to his father, and help me in every respect and do me the needfull, for which I am not giving them any remuneration and in consideration of which I do hereby bequeath all my movable and immovable property in my possession to the said three brothers. On my death the said three brothers should perform my obsequies and funeral rites in a legitimate manner and should take possession of my property as shown below after my death as my legal heirs and they should get my contracts transferred to their names from P.W.D, M.W.D and Railways etc.”
17. Kakolam was not related to Laxminarayan and Gangadhar Rao, and it is well settled in such cases that, even if Laxminarayan and Gangadhar Rao were members of a coparcenary, they would take as tenants in common and not as joint tenants unless a contrary intention appears from the will, as was laid down in 23 Cal. 670.6 The learned District Judge has relied on the statement about the debt due to Pullaiya as showing that, even if there was never such a debt, Kakolam wanted the legatees to take the property as if it were their own ancestral property, but in our opinion the reference to the debt was made purely in defence to the belief that it was necessary to show some sort of consideration. We agree with the learned District Judge that it was improbable that Kakolam was aware of the distinction between tenants-in-common and joint tenants, but we do not think that there is anything in the will to show that he intended that they should succeed as a joint family. There is no reference to the joint family and no indication that we can find that he intended to leave his property to the joint family of the three brothers and not to the three brothers as individuals. The statement, that the three brothers should take possession of his property after his death as his legal heirs does not, in our opinion, indicate that he intended that they should take it in the same way as sons succeeding to the estate of their father. We hold that, the presumption that they took as tenants-in-common has not been rebutted.
18. In 1900 nearly 19 acres of malikmakbuza land in Waregaon was acquired in the names of Laxminarayan, Gangadhar Rao and Gopal Krishna at a cost of Rs. 1400, and in 1904 a house, known as the Kahhan house, was acquired in the name of Laxminarayan at a cost of Rs. 275: vide Exhibits P. 3, 9 and 8. We agree with the learned District Judge that it must have been Kakolam who paid for these acquisitions and that the house was rebuilt at the expense of Kakolam. There is no suggestion in the pleadings that Laxminarayan had any property of his own apart from that left by Pullaiya or Kakolam out of which he could subsequently have acquired his estate. As we have held that Pullaiya owned nothing except a hut, it follows that the foundation of Laxminarayan's fortune was what was left to him by Kakolam. In April 1905 Laxminarayan stated that he had applied for a prospecting licence and proposed to undertake mining of coal, copper, manganese and such other minerals as he could discover and was in a position to invest a lakh of rupees in the mining business; Exhibit p. 45. In January 1905 he had applied for a prospecting license to prospect for manganese ore in the villages of Jamrapani, Saouri, Cheekmara and Chowkhandi in the tahsil and district of Balaghat: Exhibit p. 98. The licenses were subsequently granted, so presumably his financial position was found to be satisfactory, and eventually on the 20th October 1925 the mining lease in Jamrapani, Cheekmara, Chowkhandi and Saouri were sold for 30 lakhs: Exhibit p. 2. It is possible that when Laxminarayan said that he was in a position to invest a lakh of rupees in the mining business he was relying partly on credit but he must have had substantial means in order to obtain that credit, and we agree with the learned District Judge that the means must have come from Kakolam alone.
19. In the application for a prospecting license (Exhibit P. 98) Laxminarayan described himself as “managing proprietor” and continued to describe himself as such until January 1906. Thereafter he described himself as “proprietor”. All mining leases were in his name alone. Carting contracts, formerly in the name of Kakolam, were after Kakolam's death, in the name of Laxminarayan alone. The banking account with the firm of Rai Bahadur Bansilal Abirchand, formerly in the name of Kakolam, Laxminarayan, and Gangadhar Rao, was in the name of Laxminarayan alone from 1906 onwards. The current account opened with the Bank of Bengal (Exhibit D. 31) in 1906 was in his own name alone, though admittedly Gangadhar Rao had authority to draw cheques on it. In January 1927 Laxminarayan sold a house at Kamptee to Radhesham Wahi (P.W 4) who regarded Laxminarayan and Gangadhar Rao as members of a joint family and was satisfied with a sale deed executed by Laxminarayan alone. The sale deed of the mines (Exhibit P-2) was also executed by Laxminarayan alone without any indication in the deed that there was any other owner. Sir Maneckji Dadabhoy (P.W 40), who negotiated the sale for a syndicate, has explained that they were anxious to get the sale deed executed without further delay as they had already paid 20 lakhs out of the 30 lakhs fixed as the price and that there would have been delay in getting Gangadhar Rao's signature as he was away in Poona. The learned District Judge considered that Sir Maneckji Dadabhoy would not have taken a sale deed from Laxminarayan alone unless he had regarded the mines as joint-family pro-perty and Laxminarayan as the manager, but Sir Maneckji Dadabhoy was well acquainted with the facts of the case, for he had been the legal adviser of Kakolam and Laxminarayan and Gangadhar Rao, and we see no reason to doubt his statement that he was satisfied that a sale deed executed by Laxminarayan alone would suffice though he regarded Gangadhar Rao as an equal owner. The validity of the sale has never been contested.
20. The learned counsel for the defendant has contended that the use of Laxminarayan's name alone on all those occasions shows that he was the sole owner and that it was merely out of family affection that he allowed Gangadhar Rao to assist him and to draw what money he required for his expenses. The mining business, which was built up largely through the energy and ability of Gangadhar Rao, was supervised by him at the mines while Laxminarayan attended to the office work at Kamptee. Laxminarayan told Sir Maneckji Dadabhoy (P.W 40) that he had been told by a sadhu that if he ever went to the mines he would lose the mines and he gave that as an excuse for not going to the mines himself. Gangadhar Rao got just as much from Kakolam as Laxminarayan did, and it is prima facie improbable that Gangadhar Rao would have been content to use his ability and energy for all those years to pile up wealth for Laxminarayan alone. It is clear that Gangadhar Rao took the leading part in effecting the sale of the mines for 30 lakhs after Laxminarayan had offered them to Mr. Coggan (P.W 53) for 10 lakhs. As we have said, there is ample evidence to show that they were generally regarded as equal owners, and the fact that they were equal owners is proved beyond all possible doubt by the unimpeachable evidence of such respectable and disinterested witnesses as Sir Maneekji Dadabhoy (P.W 40), Mr. K.G Khandekar, a retired Subordinate Judge (P.W 47), and Mr. H.D Coggan formerly the President of the C.P and Berar. Mining association, (P.W 53), amongst others that in 1924–1925 Gangadhar Rao demanded a partition of the estate and Laxminarayan asked them to try to pursuade Gangadhar Rao to abandon this demand for a partition. There was no suggestion that Gangadhar Rao was not entitled to a partition and that partition could be refused if he persisted in his demand. There is also the statement made by Laxminarayan in a civil suit in Bombay in August 1906 in which he said: “These mines belong to me and my brother-we are a joint family”, and his statement to the Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax in August 1922 that be and his brother Gangadhar Rao had separate shares in the business and were not members of a joint Hindu family: vide Exhibits P. 39 and A-2. We therefore hold that the estate was not the self-acquired property of R.B Laxminarayan but belonged equally to him and Gangadhar Rao, either as co-owners or co-parceners.
21. It is, we think doubtful whether Laxminarayan and Gangadhar Rao ever thought about the question whether they were joint tenants or tenants-in-common. We have held that they took the estate of Kakolam as tenants in common and that estate formed the sole foundation for the subsequent acquisitions. The evidence shows that the two brothers were joint in residence, food and worship and that there was a common purse upon which either drew according to his needs. The learned District Judge has held that this evidence, combined with the evidence that all the business was conducted in the name of Laxminarayan alone, shows that they treated the property as joint family property. On the other hand the revenue records show that an occupancy field in mauza Singori in the Ramtek tahsil was recorded in the name of Gangadhar Rao alone, (Ex. P. 4); and that malik-makbuza absolute occupancy and occupancy fields in mauza Waregaon were recorded in the names of Laxminarayan and Gangadhar Rao and the widow of Gopalkrishna, as were the two occupancy fields in mauza Bidbin that had been acquired by Kakolam in 1897: see Exhibits P. 4 to 7 and 18. It is admitted that on the death of Gangadhar Rao the name of Buchibai was recorded in the revenue records in his place. In a letter written in May 1927 by R.B Laxminarayan to Gangadhar Rao at Poona he stated that he was sending Rs. 515 as the sub-lease money of the Singori field for the current year. This is some indication that the fields were not regarded as joint family property.
22. In 25 Mad. 6787 at p. 688 their Lordships of the Judicial Committee remarked:
“But their Lordships do not think that the evidence so unmistakably negatives ownership in common as distinguished from joint ownership as to render it safe to decide the case on this ground alone. There is certainly nothing in the evidence which supports the view that the grandsons held the property in common rather than jointly: there is no separate dealing with any share. It is not suggested that if they succeeded jointly they ever ceased to hold it in the same way. The property was treated and dealt with as a whole and so far joint ownership rather than ownership in common is the more probable. After their mother's death and while their father was living Niladri managed the whole property and acted as his brother's guardian during his minority which would hardly have been the case if the brothers had their separate interests in undivided shares. But there is nothing so clearly decisive eitter way as to render it unnecessary in their Lordships' opinion to decide the nature of the ownership which was acquired by the grandsons when “they succeeded to the property.”
23. Here also the evidence appears to us not to be clearly decisive either way. The most valuable evidence would have been the account books which were admittedly maintained from 1905 to 1927, but these are not forthcoming and each side accuses the other of doing away with them. We think it unlikely that Buchibai or anyone on her behalf could have destroyed these account books after the announcement of B.B Laxminarayan's will without some one knowing about it. On the other hand B.B Laxminarayan in 1928 had obtained an admission from Buchibai that the entire estate, apart from the deposits in the name of Gangadhar Rao and any property in possession of Buchibai, was his self-acquired property. Now it undoubtedly was not his self-acquired property and the account books would almost certainly have shown that it was not, so he at least had a motive for destroying the account books. There is also the statement of Laxminarayan in Bombay in 1906 that they were joint and in 1922 in the income-tax proceedings that their shares were separate. In the absence of the account books or any decisive evidence to show that the property was converted into joint family property we have come to the conclusion that Laxminarayan and Gangadhar Rao were tenants in common and not joint tenants. We agree with the learned District Judge that the so-called gift of 10 lakhs in 1925 accompanied by an offer to give him certain houses (Exhibits p. 25) was merely an attempt to keep Gangadhar Rao from persisting in his demand for a division of the estate.
24. If it were held that the estate was joint family property, the question would then arise whether there had ever been a severance, and as it is possible that there may be an appeal against this judgment we think it desirable to express our opinion on that point. The plaintiff pleaded that, assuming that the estate was joint family property, the two brothers evinced a clear determination to separate themselves from each other and they ceased to be joint co-parceners from April 1924 when Gangadhar Rao left Kamptee and went to live at Bet Narayan. Until then the two brothers had been joint in mess, residence and worship; thereafter they were not. All that is required to effect severance is a definite and unequivocal indication by one member of his intention to separate himself from the family and enjoy his share in severalty, and the intention may be evinced either by explicit declaration or by conduct. The] manganese mines were advertised for sale in the press in February 1924. Gangadhar Rao had offered the mines to Sir Maneckji Dadabhoy (P.W 40), who offered 10 lakhs, which was refused, and advised advertising them; both brothers told Sir Maneckji that they wanted to sell the mines, Gangadhar Rao because he wanted to separate from his brother an-i settle down at Bet Narayan with his Guru, and R.B Laxminarayan because he could not manage the concern in the absence of Gangadhar Rao. It was apparently in April 1925 that Sir Maneckji, at R.B Laxminarayan's request, tried to persuade Gangadhar Rao not to demand an actual partition, but he says that Gangadhar Rao would not hear of this. Gangadhar Rao offered the mines also to Mr. Coggan (P.W 53), apparently early in 1924, saying that he wanted to give up business and go and live with his Guru: and some months later in September 1924 R.B Laxminarayan offered the mines to Mr. Coggan for 10 lakhs, saying that his health was not good and he could not manage the business properly without his brother.
25. Mr. Khandekar (P.W 47), who was on more intimate terms with the brothers, paid a visit to Kamptee in the summer of 1924 and found R.B Laxminarayan morose because Gangadhar Rao had gone to live separately at Bet Narayan, after hot words between them over the amount of money that was being spent on Narayan Maharaj and quarrels between the ladies of the household, and did not intend to return and wanted the property to be divided. In May 1925 Mr. Khandekar paid another visit to Kamptee and found both the brothers there. At R.B Laxminarayan's request Mr. Khandekar tried to persuade Gangadhar Rao to return to live at Kamptee and not to insist on an actual division of the property, but Gangadhar Rao flatly refused to come back and live in Kamptee though he agreed that the actual division might be postponed for some time. There is also the evidence of Gangadharrao (P.W 38), a retired Circle Inspector of Police, who married the sister of Laxminarayan and Gangadhar Rao. When this witness heard that Gangadhar Rao was leaving with his family for Bet Narayan he went to see him, and Gangadhar Rao told him that he no longer desired to live at Kamptee, that the entire concern was to be sold and converted into cash, and that he would get a partition made after the sale had been effected. Ramchandra Joshi (P.W 45) has related a conversation that took place in the summer of 1925 when Gangadhar Rao agreed that, if Laxminarayan did not want to give him his share then, it could be given later. To much the same effect is the evidence of Rajanna (P.W 50), who married the first cousin of Laxminarayan and Gangadhar Rao, and Govindswamy (P.W 51.)
26. All this evidence, which we think is substantially true, shows that Gangadhar Rao had determined early in 1924 to break up the common household, wind up the business, take his half share in the estate after the sale had been effected, and migrate to the Poona district and settle down there with his Guru. R.B Laxminarayan had perforce to agree to this and, in spite of all his efforts to persuade Gangadhar Rao to change his mind, all that he could achieve was a postponement of the actual division of the estate. In our opinion the conduct of the brothers shows that, if they formed a joint family and the estate was joint family property, there was a disruption in April 1924, and the subsequent concession by Gangadhar Rao that the actual division might be postponed is entirely consistent with such a disruption. The defendant's contention that R.B Laxminarayan became the sole owner of the estate by survivorship on the death of Gangadhar Rao must therefore fail.
27. We now turn to the compromise of the 15th September 1928. On the 30th January 1928 Buchibai applied for a succession certificate for the bank deposits of 8½ lakhs together with interest. Notice was issued to R.B Laxminarayan who decided to oppose the application and engaged Mr. B.N Dhekne (P.W 28) as his counsel. Mr. Dhekne filed his power on the 30th March on behalf of R.B Laxminarayan, and on 1st June asked for further time in which to file a written statement. No written statement however was ever filed and Mr. Dhekne was never informed by R.B Laxminarayan of the grounds on which he intended to oppose the grant of succession certificate to Buchibai; in view of the letter (Ex. P. 25) stating that he had given 10 lakhs of Rupees to Gangadhar Rao for ever out of brotherly affection it is difficult to see on what ground he could have opposed this apphcation. It has been suggested somewhat faintly that the 8½ lakhs in deposit need not necessarily have been part of the 10 lakhs mentioned in Exhibit p. 25, but we consider it quite impossible that there could have been any other source. If Gangadhar Rao had left any other money in deposit or any investments or loans, the plaintiff would have applied for a succession certificate in respect of that property also and if there had been cash or jewellery left by him, it is obvious she would not have experienced such difficulty in raising Rs. 40,000 to pay for the stamp required in the succession certificate case. It may also be observed that the deposits were in two of the banks recommended by B.B Laxminarayan when he sent the 10 lakhs.
28. The principal witnesses of the events that led up to the compromise are Mr. Dhekne (P.W 28) who was R.B Laxminarayan's counsel in the case, Mr. T.G Gokhale (P.W 27) who was engaged in the succession case as counsel on behalf of Buchibai by one Mr. Rege, Buchibai herself (P.W 59), and her son-in-law Chiranjiv Rao (P.W 63). Mr. Bhalerao, since deceased, who was Mr. Gokhale's partner, also represented Buchibai in that case. On the evening of the 14th September 1928 there was a conference in the office of Mr. Bhalerao in Poona at which R.B Laxminarayan offered to withdraw his opposition to the grant of the succession certificate to Buchibai if she agreed not to lay any claim in future to the movable and immovable property standing in the name of either Gangadhar Rao or himself and that the money in deposit should be invested in the joint names-of Buchibai and himself. Buchibai's legal advisers at first refused to accept these terms as they knew nothing about the property of either R.B Laxminarayan or Gangadhar Rao or about the family and did not wish to bind Buchibai in that way, and do not seem to have been much perturbed when R.B Laxminarayan said he would strongly oppose the grant of certificate, as they thought that he was bluffing. R.B Laxminarayan then changed his tactics and pathetically said that he was feeling the loss of his brother, that he had no issue, and that whatever he and Gangadhar Rao possessed would be left to Gangadhar Rao's grandson, Balmukund, the son of Chiranjiv Rao (P.W 63). He also pointed out that it was undesirable that Buchibai should be left in possession of so large an estate which was likely to be squandered under the influence of persons taking advantage of her ignorance. R.B Laxminarayan also offered to advance Rs. 50,000 to pay for the stamp and other expenses of the succession certificate case. On this Buchibai's legal advisers withdrew their opposition to the proposed terms, and it is clear from Mr. Gokhale's evidence that they did so because they agreed with R.B Laxminarayan that it was undesirable that Buchibai should be left in uncontrolled management of so large an estate and that in the interests of the family as a whole they thought that the matter should be compromised in that way.
29. Two drafts were then drawn up by Messrs Dhekne, Bhalerao and Gokhale, one of the settlement or release deed and one of the compromise petition. The draft of the settlement deed was taken away by Mr. Dhekne and the draft of the compromise petition was kept in Mr. Bhalerao's office. R.B Laxminarayan said that he would obtain the consent of Buchibai to these terms. R.B Laxminarayan then sent Chiranjiv Rao (P.W 63) and Mr. Rege to fetch Buchibai from Bet Narayan and she arrived at Poona the next morning and was taken to Joglekar's bara. The compromise petition and settlement deed (Exhibits D. 1 and 3) were produced there and she signed them. The settlement deed was attested by Mr. Jatar (D.W 1), Chiranjiv Rao (P.W 63), and Mr. V.S Bakhale (P.W 24) who was appearing in the case as counsel for Buchibai's daughter, the wife of Chiranjiv Rao and mother of Balmukund, and was registered then and there by a sub-registrar who was in attendance for that purpose. Neither of Buchibai's legal advisers was present on that occasion. The party then went to the Court of the District Judge where the compromise petition was read out by the clerk and admitted by Buchibai and an order was passed by the Court granting a succession certificate to Buchibai (Exhibit P. 7). Mr. Bakhale (P.W 24), who appeared on the scene for the first time on the 15th September, apparently considered that he was adequately safe-guarding the interests of Buchibai's daughter, on whose behalf he had been engaged by R.B Laxminarayan, by merely stating: “This opponent has nothing to urge with regard to the application” vide Exhibit P. 41.
30. Buchibai had been living at Bet Narayan under the spiritual guidance of Narayan Maharaj since April 1924, and Mr. Rege, who died after the suit was instituted, was apparently some sort of secretary to Narayan Maharaj. It was he who engaged counsel to represent Buchibai in the succession certificate case at Poona. The learned counsel for the defendant has contended that Buchibai's interests in the succession certificate case were protected by so powerful a man as Narayan Maharaj who hoped eventually to acquire most of her estate for himself. Apart however from the fact that it was Mr. Rege who was empowered to represent her and to engage counsel for her in that case, there is no indication that Narayan Maharaj took any active part in the affair. The persons who were present when the terms of the compromise were agreed on were R.B Laxminarayan himself, and his counsel R.B.S.R Pandit, who has not been examined, and Mr. Dhekne (P.W 28); Messrs Bhalerao and Gokhale who had been engaged by Mr. Bege to represent Buchibai; Mr. S.B Bakhale, the father of Mr. V.S Bakhale (P.W 24); Mr. Eege; Mr. Gogte, a retired Subordinate Judge who has not been examined; and Chiranjiv Rao (P.W 63). It has been suggested that Messrs Gokhale and Gogte were disciples of Narayan Maharaj, but it is clear that they were also friends of R.B Laxminarayan and they appear to have taken little, if any, part in the discussion. The estate was obviously not the self-acquired property of R.B Laxminarayan but it was very difficult to say whether it was joint family property or not and, if it was joint family, whether there had been any disruption, and therefore whether Buchibai was entitled to a half share or not. That was a matter which it was obviously desirable to settle by agreement rather than by litigation. By the agreement however R.B Laxminarayan gave up nothing. It is difficult to see how he could make any valid claim to the bank deposits, and he certainly never indicated how he could, but it was agreed that they should be invested jointly in the names of himself and Buchibai, or low he could claim repayment of Rs. 25,000 on account of money drawn by Gangadhar Rao in 1926. His offer to advance Rs. 50,000 to pay for the stamp was not really a generous offer, because it was agreed that it was to be repaid out of the deposits as soon as they were withdrawn and it was in fact so repaid, and it was necessary for someone in the family to pay for the stamp before the deposits could be touched. Buchibai, on the other hand, renounced all claim to a half share in a large estate and retained only such property as was in her possession; as she was unable to raise more than Rs. 5,000 towards the payment of the stamp it is obvious that property was worth comparatively little. If it had been a term of the compromise that the entire estate should eventually go to Balmukund, the compromise might have been considered reasonable, and it was obviously that promise that mainly induced Buchibai to agree to the compromise, but R.B Laxminarayan was left free to leave the estate as he wished.
31. According to the evidence of Buchibai (P.W 59), R.B Laxminarayan paid her a condolence visit at Bet Narayan 5 days after Gangadhar Rao's death and requested her to return and take up her residence with him at Kamptee again but she refused as there had been continual quarrels between the women in the family. After that Chiranjiv Rao (P.W 63) and Mr. Khandekar (P.W 47) came to see her and Mr. Khandekar informed her that R.B Laxminarayan proposed to leave his entire estate to Balmukund and wanted her to agree to his proposals as she was an ignorant woman likely to be deprived of her property. Both Chiranjiv Rao and Mr. Khandekar advised her to accept R.B Laxminarayan's proposals, though what those proposals were was not stated, as otherwise R.B Laxminarayan would fight the succession certificate case and would not allow her to get a pie out of the money in the bank. In February R.B Laxminarayan himself came again and repeated more or less what Mr. Khandekar and Chiranjiv Rao had said. In about June 1928 R.B Laxminarayan came again to Bet Narayan and urged her to agree to his proposals, and then on the 15th September 1928 Buchibai was fetched from Bet Narayan by Mr. Rege and Chiranjiv Rao and taken to Joglekar's bara in Poona. There she sat in a separate room and R.B Laxminarayan brought in the documents which she signed, and from there she was taken to the Court and was asked whether she agreed to the terms and she stated that she did. It is a remarkable fact that neither of her counsel on any occasion ever spoke to Buchibai; when the documents were signed and registration took place they were not even present. They never explained to her the terms of the agreement or advised her to accept those terms and they were content to leave it to R.B Laxminarayan to obtain the consent of Buchibai to the terms of the compromise and her signatures on the two documents. The drafts themselves were not taken away. Her counsel in fact seems to have adopted a remarkably detached attitude and to have allowed R.B Laxminarayan and Buchibai to arrange the matter between themselves.
32. In these negotiations there was on one side R.B Laxminarayan, a very wealthy, shrewd and experienced business man, and on the other side his younger brother's widow who, though not pardanashin had comparatively little contact with the outside world and was illiterate except for her ability to sign her name. She had lived in the same house as R.B Laxminarayan for about 20 years and, apart from the traditional respect paid by a younger brother's wife to the eldest brother and head of the family, it is clear that R.B Laxminarayan was a dominating and somewhat hot-tempered person of whom she was rather afraid. It is true that she had been living at Bet Narayan since 1924 and had sufficient courage or obstinacy to refuse to return to live in Kamptee, but the effect of so dominating an influence exercised for many years cannot easily be erased. The learned District Judge, who did not himself see any of the witnesses, has stated that Buchibai had independent means of her own in the bank deposits, but she was unable to touch those and she could raise only Rs. 5,000 out of Rs. 40,000 required for the stamp, and that R.B Laxminarayan was dealing not directly with Buchibai but persons who could protect her interest. It is clear that it was through his personal persuasion that she agreed to accept the terms and that her legal advisers were considering the interests of the family as a whole and not her personal interests. There was also on the scene Chiranjiv Rao, who has been described by the learned District Judge as a law graduate, though he did not begin his law studies until later. He lived most of the time with R.B Laxminarayan and he no doubt thought that the interests of his wife and son would be better served by agreeing to the terms proposed by R.B Laxminarayan than by allowing a large estate to be managed by Buchibai, who, it was feared, would allow it to pass into the hands of Narayan Maharaj.
33. In our opinion R.B Laxminarayan by means of alternate threats and blandishments secured Buchibai's consent to a compromise that was entirely one-sided. Every one concerned thought that it was undesirable that a woman should be allowed to get possession of so large an estate, and under this advice she gave way and agreed to be content with the interest on 8½ lakhs and such property as was already in her possession rather than enter into a possibly prolonged fight with a determined and powerful litigant. The succession application had been filed nine months before and for all she knew it might go on indefinitely. She was unable to raise the money to carry on the case and so she gave away under pressure, in the belief that the entire estate would in any case come eventually to Balmukund.
34. We consider it established that Laxminarayan was in a position to dominate the will of Buchibai and to use that position to obtain an unfair advantage over her. As she herself said:
“He was the elder in the family and one of my family. If I am not to keep confidence in him, then on whom am I to keep confidence?”.
35. She may have had a rough idea of the value of the estate, but the implications of the agreement were never explained to her and she was, in our opinion, persuaded and overawed by R.B Laxminarayan into agreeing to his terms, partly because it solved her difficulties for the time being and partly because she thought that the entire estate would go eventually to Balmukund. Our conclusion is that the compromise was induced by undue influence and was therefore voidable at the instance of Buchibai.
36. Though in our opinion R.B Laxminarayan acted somewhat unscrupulously in obtaining this compromise, we believe that he acted in what he thought was the best interests of the family as a whole and that he probably did intend at that time to leave the estate to Balmukund.
37. The plaintiff also alleged that the compromise was induced by fraud. The plea, dings on the point were somewhat vague. At page 70 of the paper book there is an allegation:
“As a matter of fact her consent to the compromise petition and the deed was secured by R.B.D Laxminarayan by concealing facts and holding out false promise and practising undue influence on her … Her legal advisers for the time being were thus ignorant of the real state of things and had no information beyond what the late Rao Bahadur chose to disclose to them.”
38. The legal advisers certainly knew nothing about the extent of the property, but she herself knew at least that it was substantial and we do not think that there was any active concealment of a fact such as would constitute a fraud. The representation by R.B Laxminarayan that he had advanced Rs. 25,000 to Gangadhar Rao and would forego repayment does not seem to have been relied on as constituting fraud, and the writing off of his alleged loan seems not to have played any part in the negotiations but to have been merely thrown in as a make-weight in the terms of the compromise to make it look less one-sided. In her evidence Buchibai (P.W 59) said that the fraud committed on her was the promise of R.B Laxminarayan to leave the estate to Balmukund. R.B Laxminarayan eventually left nothing to Balmukund, but there was a codicil to the will, which was ineffective because it was unattested, leaving 2 lakhs to Chiranjiv Rao. If the promise was made without any intention of performing it that would constitute “fraud”, as defined in section 17 of the Contract Act, but we think that R.B Laxminarayan probably did intend at the time to leave the estate to Balmukund and changed his mind afterwards, for there is the evidence of Mr. Khandekar (P.W 47) and Ramchandra Joshi (P.W 46) that in January or February 1930 R.B Laxminarayan talked of preparing a draft of a will bequeathing his property to Balmukund. In this Court it was suggested that R.B Laxminarayan's creation of an impression that he proposed to leave his property to Balmukund was an act fitted to deceive and therefore was “fraud” as defined in clause (4) of section 17 of the Contract Act. The only representation made by R.B Laxminarayan at that time was a representation of his intention to leave this property to Balmukund and if, as we have held, he had that intention at that time, there was no misrepresentation and no fraud.
39. It was also contended that the agreement was induced by fraud because Buchibai never understood the nature of the agreement. She was cross-examined at a very great length and we do not wish to attach undue importance to isolated admissions in the course of so long a cross-examination but the general impression that we get from her evidence is that she did understand that she was giving up her share in the estate because she thought it worthwhile to do so, as she was going to get the interest on 8½ lakhs during her life and the whole estate was eventually going to Balmukund. Mr. K.S Jatar (D.W 1), formerly a Commissioner of a division in this province, was one of the witnesses in the case and he stated that the settlement deed was read over and explained to her and she stated that she understood it. Mr. Jatar was at one time Inspector-General of Registration in this province and we do not think that he would have agreed to attest the document unless he thought that Buchibai understood the contents. The document was admittedly read out in the Court of the District Judge, who satisfied himself that she understood the contents and he made an endorsement to that effect on Exhibit D. 1. It is therefore in our opinion established that Buchibai was aware of the nature of the document, and it is clear that she would have been perfectly willing to abide by it if R.B Laxminarayan had eventually left the entire estate to Balmukund as he had promised. It was his failure to carry out that promise that has led to the attack on the compromise.
40. It has been contended for the plaintiff that the compromise merely embodied an admission by Buchibai that the estate was the self-acquired property of R.B Laxminarayan, which was untrue and there, fore not binding on her, and that it could not create any title in R.B Laxminarayan. The compromise however went a good deal further than that, for Buchibai gave up all claim to any part of estate, except the bank deposits and what was in her possession, and recognized the right of R.B Laxminarayan to it, though the description of the property as self-acquired was inaccurate. In order that there may be a valid family arrangement it is not necessary that there should be a dispute in presenti or that each party to the compromise should believe himself justified on law and facts in the claim he is putting forward; it is sufficient if the parties are putting forward conflicting claims and intend to fight the matter out: see 52 All. 716,8 50 All. 2849 and 12 Luck. 63910. It was obviously possible, if not probable, that disputes would arise between R.B Laxminarayan and Buchibai over the estate and it was obviously desirable that those disputes should be settled once for all and not piecemeal. The settlement was in our opinion a bona fide settlement, in the sense that it was made for the preservation of the family property and to avoid family disputes. There was no question of creating any title; each party believed that he or she was entitled to part at least of the estate. In the words of the Judicial Committee:
“The compromise is based on the assumption that there was an antecedent title of some kind in the parties and the agreement acknowledges and defines what that title is”:
33 All. 356,11 at p. 357. Bath parties to that compromise were therefore bound by it though, as we have held, it was voidable at the instance of Buchibai because it was induced by undue influence.
41. Under section 17(1)(b) of the Registration Act a non-testamentary instrument which declares any right, title or interest of the value of one hundred rupees and upwards to immovable property must be registered. It was suggested that clause (vii) of sub-section [2] of that section, as it then stood, rendered registration unnecessary as the terms of the compromise were embodied in the order of the Court, but it is clear that the order of the Court did not emboby those terms: it merely stated: “Upon the compromise put in by the parties the certificate to issue to applicant”. It was in our opinion necessary that the document should be registered, and under section 28 of the Registration Act it had to be presented for registration in the office of a sub-registrar within whose sub-district the whole or some portion of the property was situate. To the plaintiff's contention that the compromise petition and the settlement deed were inadmissible in evidence for want of registration and could be validly registered only at Nagpur or Secunderabad, where the immovable property is situated, the defendant merely pleaded that the registrar at Poona had jurisdiction to register the release deed executed at Poona; its counsel subsequently supplemented this bald contention by saying that part of the property to which the settlement deed referred was situated within the jurisdiction of the registering officer at Poona, such property being the house at Bet Narayan formerly occupied by Gangadhar Rao and after him by the plaintiff. Even assuming that house was included in the terms of the settlement deed, the defendant is faced by the difficulty, ignored by the lower Court, that, according to the evidence of Mr. Dhekne (P.W 28), an experienced Advocate of the Bombay High Court practising at Poona, the sub-registrar who registered the settlement deed had jurisdiction only in the Haveli taluq and that Bet Narayan is not situated in that taluq. The learned District Judge relied on the expression of opinion by Mr. Dhekne (P.W 28) that the document was validly registered, but it was clearly presented for registration before the sub-registrar for the Haveli taluq because there was no immovable property of any sort mentioned in the document and Mr. Dhekne was not aware that it was intended to apply to any immoveable property. It was accepted for registration at Poona because no immovable property was mentioned in the document, and the document was registered not in Book I, which is meant for the registration of non-testamentary documents relating to immovable property, but in Book IV, the miscellaneous register. The learned District Judge held that the bungalow at Bet Narayan had been erected out of funds supplied by Gangadhar Rao or R.B Laxminarayan and formed part of the estate covered by the agreement and that the document was therefore validly registered at Poona. We have no doubt that the bungalow was erected out of funds supplied by Gangadhar Rao, but it has been virtually admitted in this Court that the site on which the bungalow stands is the property of Narayan Maharaj. There is no suggestion that Gangadhar Rao ever purchased any land there and evidence has been given of purchases by Narayan Maharaj, though it is not very clear whether the site of the bungalow in dispute stands on such land. There is the evidence of Hari (P.W 31), Govind (P.W 22), Annappa (P.W 29), Shivaram (P.W 25), Narayandas (P.W 36), Vinayak (P.W 32) and Pandurangsao (P.W 37) that all the bungalows in Bet Narayan are the property of Narayan Maharaj and that the occupants are merely licensees. No attempt has been made to rebut that evidence, and it is in accordance with probabilities that his disciples should supply funds for erecting buildings there without retaining any title in the buildings. The mere fact that the bungalow was known as Gangadhar Rao's bungalow or by some such name is immaterial, for bungalows are known as frequently by the name of the occupant as by the name of the owner. In our opinion it is established that the bungalow was not the property of Gangadhar Rao or his widow and that R.B Laxminarayan, who was aware of the state of the affairs at Bet Narayan, must have been well aware of that. It follows that the sub-registrar, who registered the document, had no territorial jurisdiction to do so. The registration must therefore be ignored, and under section 49 of the Registration Act the document cannot affect any immovable property comprised therein.
42. The defendant contends that the present suit is barred by limitation under Article 91 of the Limitation Act because the suit, which was instituted on the 14th September 1932, was brought more than three years after the settlement deed which was executed on the 15th September 1928. The learned counsel for the plaintiff suggested somewhat tentatively that Article 91 would not apply because the settlement deed was not an instrument. “Instrument” is defined in the Stamp Act as including every document by which any right or liability is, or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished or recorded, and in the Registration Act the term “instrument” seems to be used as synonymous with “document”. In Stroud's Judicial Dictionary it is stated: “‘Instrument’ is a writing, and generally, imports a document of a formal legal kind”; and in Wharton's Law Lexicon it is defined in a formal legal writing e.g, a record, charter, deed or transfer, or agreement. We think that the settlement deed was undoubtedly an instrument within the meaning of Article 91, that the agreement, though voidable at the instance of Buchibai, because it was induced by undue influence, was binding on her until avoided, and that under Article 91 it could be avoided only within three years from the time when the facts entitling her to have the instrument cancelled or set aside became known to her. It has been suggested that the facts entitling the plaintiff to have the instrument set aside did not become known to her until R.B Laxminarayan's will had been announced and she had seen Kakolam's will and had been advised of the legal effect of that will. We have held that she was aware of the true nature of the deed at the time she executed it and that she executed it under undue influence in order to obtain a settlement of the dispute with R.B Laxminarayan believing that he would eventually leave the entire estate to Balmukund. She was not aware of the precise nature of her rights at the time and, even if she had known of Kakolam's will and had been advised of its effect, she would still have been uncertain of her exact rights which posed a difficult legal problem, on which the learned District Judge has taken one view and we have taken another. She knew at the time that she had been overawed by R.B Laxminarayan into entering into this agreement by which she gave up her claim to a very substantial estate, and there was, in our opinion, no subsequent fact which became known to her that entitled her to have the instrument cancelled she entered into the compromise voluntarily in the sense that she was aware of what she was doing, and the time for setting aside the settlement deed would, in our opinion run from the date of the compromise, because under Article 91 time runs from the date of the knowledge and not from the date of the removal of the undue influence: see, A.I.R 1945 P.C 54.12
43. Our conclusion therefore is that the settlement deed being unregistered cannot affect the immovable property but that as regards the movable property the settlement deed holds good and cannot now be avoided owing to the lapse of time. It has been suggested that the settlement deed is indivisible and must be accepted or rejected as a whole and that if it does not apply to the immovable property it cannot apply either to the movable property. In our opinion the compromise is divisible; it was simply that all property whether immovable or movable in the possession of Buchibai should remain in her possession and all the other property should remain in the possession of R.B Laxminarayan. The plaintiff has therefore established her right to a half share in the immovable property, and there will accordingly be a decree declaring her entitled to a half share in it and directing a partition of all the immovable property with all its improvements and accretions, and the allotment of a half share to the plaintiff. The appeal is allowed to this extent. The rest of the plaintiff's claim will stand dismissed. If the plaintiff had confined her claim to a half share in the immovable property, the Court-fee payable on the plaint would have been an ad valorem court-fee on about 2 lakhs, i.e Rs. 1925 instead of Rs. 3,000, and Rs. 2465 instead of Rs. 5,000 on the memorandum of appeal; the difference is due to the increase in the scale of Court-fees effected in 1935 by the Court-fees (C.P Amendment) Act (C.P XVI of 1985). The other expenses of the suit, however, such as the costs of the witnesses and the paper book, would have been much the same. We therefore think that the plaintiff should be allowed Rs. 1925 out of Rs. 3000 paid as court-fee on the plaint and Rs. 2465 out of Rs. 5,000 paid on the memorandum of appeal and all other costs, except counsel's fees, in full. We allow the plaintiff Rs. 1600 as counsel's fee in each Court, the fee permissible on a claim for 2 lakhs. The defendant will bear its own costs in both Courts.
K.S/D.H
44. Appeal partly allowed.