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    Madhao Narayanrao Ghatate v. Mt. Watsalabai

    1. This is a miscellaneous (first) appeal against the order of Mr. V.B Sarwate, First Additional District Judge, Nagpur, in Execution Case No. 7A of 1937 passed on 27-3-1942.

    2. The appellant is an auction-purchaser who bought a house on 1-11-1940 for Rs. 6050. When he did not deposit 25 percent, of the purchase-money, the house was attempted to be resold by the sale amin the same day but no bidders were found. Later, under orders of the Court, the house was again brought to sale and on 4-10-1941 the appellant bought it for Rs. 2100. The present appeal concerns proceedings under O. 21, R. 71 of the CPC, for the recovery of the deficiency in price. The auction-purchaser who is the appellant resisted this recovery on various grounds. The lower Court has ordered that the expenses attending the resale and the deficiency of price be recovered from the auction-purchaser. The decree under which the sale had taken place is Ex. P-1. It was a maintenance decree in favour of one Mt. Vatsala Bai, widow of Ganpat Rao Deshmukh, and included an amount of Rs. 2460 as arrears of maintenance from March 1936, to July 1939, inclusive. The execution application was filed on 2-4-1940 and the total amount claimed was Rs. 3008-12-8. In the decree, it is mentioned that the maintenance allowance shall be a charge on the immovable property left by the decree-holder's deceased husband Ganpat Rao Deshmukh and that the defendant shall allot a portion of the house at Nagpur for the residence of Vatsala Bai.

    3. In the sale proclamation which was issued these two facts were not mentioned, but the decree-holder who was responsible for the omission later applied to the Court that she was willing to waive these rights provided the auction-purchaser paid the full amount under the first sale. The auction-purchaser who had earlier signified his readiness to pay the full amount of Rs. 6050 provided the rights of respondent were waived, did not care to accept the offer of the decree-holder.

    4. Since this matter was not amicably adjusted the Court ordered the sale of the property with the result mentioned above. On the application of the decree-holder the learned Additional District Judge has ordered the auction-purchaser to pay the difference between the two prices, under O. 21, R. 71 of the CPC. The contentions of the auction-purchaser were rejected. Hence this appeal.

    5. It was first contended that O. 21, R. 71 of the CPC is subject to the considerations mentioned in R. 84 of the same-Order. Under R. 84 if 25 percent, of the price is not deposited the Officer conducting the sale has to resell the property ‘forthwith.’ It is said that ‘forthwith’ means as expeditously as possible. It is argued that the sale which took place a year later does not comply with the terms of R. 84. Therefore, the auction-purchaser is not liable to make up the deficiency. As to the attempted and abortive sale on the same day, it is said that was a bogus and fictitious transaction and no sale at all. It is, therefore, contended that since R. 84 has not been strictly complied with the auction-purchaser is not bound and R. 71 does not apply to his case.

    6. In support of this contention reliance is placed on A.I.R 1987 Lah. 924.1 That ruling follows an earlier case of the same High Court reported in A.I.R 1929 Lah. 744.2 The earlier case of the Lahore High Court was dissented from in 53 Mad. 9003 and A.I.R 1937 ALL. 656.4 A delay of a few months does not matter has been held in A.I.R 1944 Pesh. 27.5 at p. 28 and A.I.R 1940 Mad. 566.6 The same meaning has been given to the word ‘forthwith’ in I.L.R (1941) Nag. 4857 at p. 492. In 29 N.L.R 528 and in A.I.R 1944 Pesh. 27 at p. 28 it has been held that O. 21, R. 71 of the CPC applies to all cases in which a resale has been occasioned due to the failure of the auction-purchaser to deposit either the 25 percent, of the sale price or the balance thereof. I respectfully agree with the cases which dissent from the Lahore view and say with all due respect that the Lahore High Court's view is too strict, and contrary to the intention disclosed in O. 21, R. 71 of the CPC. In all cases where the word ‘forthwith’ occurs it must ordinarily be understood to me an ‘within a reasonable time’. See Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes Edn. 8, p. 351, where the following passage occurs:

    “When a statute requires that something shall be done ‘forthwith’, or ‘immediately’, or even ‘instantly,’ it would probably be understood as allowing a reasonable time for doing it.”

    7. In fact, as has been said in 53 Mad. 900, it would be in the interests of the auction-purchaser that the sale be properly advertised so that the deficiency arising on a resale be as little as possible. I am of opinion that the deficiency in price can be recovered from the auction-purchaser in this case unless he can escape liability in any other way.

    8. It was next contended that as the facts of the maintenance being a charge on the property, and the right of residence given to the decree-holder were not mentioned in the gale proclamation, the auction-purchaser was thereby misled and offered a larger price. As a result of this the auction-purchaser claims that he is excused from making up the deficiency. In support of this contention reliance is placed on 36 Bom. 329,9 A.I.R 1931 Bom. 367,10 16 Cal. 535,11 25 Cal. 9912 and A.I.R 1937 Lah. 924. The respondents argue that the auction-purchaser has a right to resort to O. 21, R. 90 of the CPC, to have the sale set aside and he cannot, having once bought the property, challenge the sale except under O. 21, R. 90 of the Code. Reliance is placed on I.L.R (1939) Nag. 357.13 That case, however, only lays down that an auction-purchaser is one of the persons whose interests are affected by the sale and has a right of making an application to get the sale set aside on the ground of illegality or material irregularity in conducting the sale. It has been held in a large number of cases that the auction-purchaser can resist the demand for the deficiency in price on the ground that he was deceived and misled into making a larger bid by reason of material omission in the proclamation of the sale. It was said in 16 Cal. 685:

    “In the present case, alter the decree-holder has succeeded in misleading the defaulting purchaser to bid a high price, by withholding information as to encumbrances which it was his duty to notify, if he were allowed to recover the deficiency of price at the resale, it would be allowing him to take advantage of his own neglect of duty. That would so manifestly inequitable that we are unable to hold that the Legislature could have ever intended such a result.”

    9. In the Bombay cases it was laid down that the defaulter can question the defect in the sale proclamation and escape liability if it can make out a case showing a sufficient ground for exemption. The sufficiency of the grounds were examined in A.I.R 1931 Bom. 367, but in that case the grounds were not found to be sufficient.

    10. Bearing these cases in mind, I have there, fore to see whether there was such a misdescription of the property or such omission in the sale proclamation of vital information which was likely to induce the auction-purchaser to offer a bigger price than he would have other, wise done, and whether he did so to his own prejudice. This case is different from the rulings cited because the same person has been the purchaser on both the occasions and no equities except those existing between the decree-holder and the auction-purchaser have to be considered. It is true that the judgment-debtor has challenged the sale but if the price fetched at the first sale is recovered, the question of inadequacy of price disappears.

    11. Two facts, here, are mentioned: firstly that this is a charge decree and fact of a recurring charge was not mentioned and secondly that the right of residence has not been mentioned. It must be pointed out that the decree-holder was willing to forego both these rights and at one time the suggestion had also emanated from the auction-purchaser that if these rights were given up he was willing to pay the full price. Though the decree-holder is willing to stand by this offer the auction-purchaser obviously does not want now to implement what he stated in his application dated 17-1-1941.

    12. As to the charge and the right of residence, I fail to see how they interested the auction-purchaser. They were not mentioned in the sale proclamation and the decree-holder would prima facie have been estopped from urging them at a subsequent stage. As to the charge the property was being sold in furtherance of the charge decree itself. It was argued that the charge is a recurring charge and would bind the property when the arrears of maintenance accumulate. No authority was cited in support of the contention that this would be so even if the charge was not mentioned in the sale proclamation. In Chitaley's Transfer of Property Act, Vol. II, under S. 100, note 27 at p. 1483, there is a passage which supports the contention that a charge continues to bind the property in the hands of the auction purchaser. It is said there:

    “Bat where a charge is of a recurring nature, as in the case of maintenance allowance, if the property is sold in execution of a decree for arrears, the liability in respect of future payments remains after the sale and is not extinguished by it. The effect of the sale is to satisfy the claim for the arrears only. The charge foe future maintenance still remains attached to the property and the auction-purchaser gets the property subject to the charge.”

    13. In support of this passage three cases are cited.* They are 45 Cal. 530,16 20 Pat. 8617 and I.L.R (1943) Nag. 713.18 To these may be added A.I.R 1939 ALL. 57919 which is relied upon in the Patna case and A.I.R 1933 ALL. 93415 and A.I.R 1940 Cal. 6014 at p. 62. The first case is not in point A.I.R 1939 ALL. 579 was a case in which the sale proclamation distinctly stated that the property was being sold subject to the charge. That apart one of the reasons given in support of the conclusion is that such a charge created by a decree does not fall either within charges created by act of parties or by law. This view was not approved in 20 Pat. 86 and I.L.R (1948) Nag. 713. The latter case does not lay down the proposition for which it is cited in the passage referred to above. The other cases do support the proposition urged by Mr. Bobde. I do not propose to examine this matter in detail because I am satisfied that the charge not having been mentioned in the sale proclamation by the decree-holder in whose favour the charge operated, the decree-holder was prima facie estopped from enforcing it against the auction-purchaser. In Chitaley's Code of Civil Procedure, Vol. II, (1944 Edn.) it is said:

    “But a mortgagee may be estopped by his conduct from setting up the mortgage against a bona fide purchaser. Thus, a decree-holder on whom a duty is cast by this rule (O. 21, R. 66) to give full and true information, so far as it is known to him, will be estopped from setting up, as against the auction-purchaser, any mortgage in his own favour, which he has not mentioned in his application under this rule, and which does not appear in the sale proclamation, provided the auction-purchaser has actually bought without notice of the mortgage.” (p. 2246).

    14. The same view is expressed on the same page in respect of charges in the following words:

    “In the case of a charge, however, it will not, as a general rule, be binding on the purchaser if he has no notice of such charge.”

    15. It is not necessary to discuss whether the doctrine of notice contained in Section 100 of the Transfer of Property Act, applies to an auction-purchaser or not. In the present case on either view the auction-purchaser was safe if there was no notice to him as he says there was none, and the decree-holder even till today says that the charge is waived. The charge in favour of the decree-holder had to be mentioned in the sale proclamation to bind the auction-purchaser.

    16. The next question is whether the property sold a second time was different from the property sold the first time. That it was the self-same property cannot be denied. I have compared the sale proclamations issued on the two occasions and in neither has the fact that the charge continues been mentioned. Thus apart from the knowledge which the auction-purchaser may Shave possessed from sources other than the proclamation of sale the resulting position as to the property in the two sales was the same. What I have said about the charge applies equally to the right of residence. That is not even mentioned in the application for execution. In view of this also the difference in price must be paid by the auction-purchaser.

    17. In my opinion failure to mention these rights in the sale proclamation prima facie estops the decree-holder from enforcing these rights if they existed. I find it necessary to state in this case that the decree-holder apart from his conduct in not mentioning the charge and the right of residence, in the sale proclamation has again and again reiterated that she is willing to waive these rights. The decree-holder's reiteration of this fact that these rights are waived must prima facie be taken to bind her.

    18. In my opinion the order of the trial Court is correct, though the law was somewhat inaccurately stated by the learned Additional District Judge. The result is that the sale for Rs. 2100 is confirmed and the auction-purchaser must also pay the difference between the price offered by him at the first sale and the second sale as well as the expenses attending the first sale as has been ordered by the trial Court. The appeal is dismissed. As to the costs of this appeal, the costs would have followed the event but I decline to grant costs to the respondents. On the date of arguments the learned counsel for the respondents were absent. Arguments were heard is their absence. Later they applied for the re-hearing of the case. This was allowed by me as the learned counsel for the appellant had no objection. I, however, think that such conduct must be discouraged. I, therefore, order that costs will be borne as incurred.

    19. Appeal dismissed.

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    Madhao Narayanrao Ghatate v. Mt. Watsalabai
    (Apr 12, 1947)