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  • section 147 and sections 323 and 324 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code.
  • section 302, Indian Penal Code read with section 149, Indian Penal Code.
  • sections 147 and 302 read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 147 and section 302 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code
  • section 147 and section 323 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code
  • section 302, Indian Penal Code read with section 34, Indian Penal
  • sections 148 and 302 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code.
  • section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code.
  • section 323 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code.
  • section 149 or section 34 of the Indian Penal Code
  • provisions of section 149 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 423(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • provisions of section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 323 read with section 149, Indian Penal
  • sections 34 and 149, Indian Penal Code.
  • section 149 of the Indian Penal Code,
  • section 147 of the Indian Penal Code
  • provisions of section 149 or 34,
  • section 147, Indian Penal Code.
  • section 149, Indian Penal Code
  • section 141, Indian Penal Code,
  • section 302, Indian Penal Code
  • section 34, Indian Penal Code.
  • section 34, Indial Penal Code
  • section 423(1)(b)(2)
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • section 147 and sections 323 and 324 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code.
  • section 302, Indian Penal Code read with section 149, Indian Penal Code.
  • sections 147 and 302 read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 147 and section 302 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code
  • section 147 and section 323 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code
  • section 302, Indian Penal Code read with section 34, Indian Penal
  • sections 148 and 302 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code.
  • section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code.
  • section 323 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code.
  • section 149 or section 34 of the Indian Penal Code
  • provisions of section 149 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 423(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • provisions of section 34 of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 323 read with section 149, Indian Penal
  • sections 34 and 149, Indian Penal Code.
  • section 149 of the Indian Penal Code,
  • section 147 of the Indian Penal Code
  • provisions of section 149 or 34,
  • section 147, Indian Penal Code.
  • section 149, Indian Penal Code
  • section 141, Indian Penal Code,
  • section 302, Indian Penal Code
  • section 34, Indian Penal Code.
  • section 34, Indial Penal Code
  • section 423(1)(b)(2)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Full Bench: Sankar Saran, J., Bind Basni Prasad, J., Harish Chandra, J., et al.)

Factual and Procedural Background

A serious riot occurred in which one person named Bhoja was killed and several others received grievous and simple hurt. Fifteen persons were placed on trial. Some of the accused were charged under section 147 and section 302 read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code; others were charged under section 147 and sections 323 and 324 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code.

The Sessions Judge acquitted fourteen of the accused but convicted one accused named Gulab. The Sessions Judge found that Gulab had participated in the attack on Bhoja and that he had confederates, but he was unable to identify with certainty whether at least four other specified named persons (so as to make up an unlawful assembly of five or more) had participated. For this reason the trial judge did not apply section 149 but convicted Gulab under section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code.

Two legal questions were referred by a Bench to the Full Bench for decision: (1) whether a conviction under section 34 can be upheld when the trial court acquits other named co-accused (giving them the benefit of the doubt) but finds that the appellant was associated with some of those acquitted; and (2) whether an appellate court may, without a Government appeal against the acquittal of those acquitted, hold that some acquitted persons had in fact taken part in the crime and thereby uphold the appellant's conviction.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a conviction under section 34, Indian Penal Code, can be sustained where a trial court acquits other named persons (giving them the benefit of the doubt) but finds that the appellant was associated with some at least of those acquitted in the commission of the act.
  2. Whether an appellate court may, in the absence of a Government appeal against the acquittal of co-accused, hold that some or all of the acquitted persons were wrongly acquitted and thereby uphold the appellant's conviction.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Gumani v. Rex Where prosecution names all who formed an unlawful assembly: if only some (less than five) are found guilty and the rest are found not guilty, sections 147 and 149 cannot apply; but if the court can identify some and cannot fix identity of others, yet is satisfied there were more than five, then sections 147 and 149 would apply. The passage from Gumani was adopted with approval by Sankar Saran, J., and forms the basis for permitting section 34/149 to be applied when the court is satisfied on evidence that there were additional participants even if the identities of some named persons remain unascertained.
Sadho v. Emperor Bajpai, J.: If the trial judge's finding is that more than five persons took part in the riot, section 147 can apply even if the court is unable to convict five persons on each side after giving benefit of doubt to some. Discussed as reflecting a view that section 147 applies where the court is satisfied there were five or more participants; Bajpai's general proposition was compared with later cases and considered by the Full Bench.
Ram Rup v. Emperor Wali-Ullah, J.: Where all assailants were named and some are acquitted, it is illogical to say those acquitted were not guilty yet were present for a subsidiary purpose; one cannot both acquit them and treat them as participants to convict others. The case was distinguished from the present facts because in Ram Rup there was no finding that some of the acquitted had in fact participated; the Full Bench used Ram Rup to explore the limits of convicting on the basis of association with named acquitted persons.
Harchanda v. Rex Contains differing views: Dayal, J. held convicted persons could be held responsible for the result even if others were acquitted; Agarwala, J. held that an appellate court must accept the trial judge's acquittals where no Government appeal had been filed. Discussed at length. The Full Bench examined the divergent lines in Harchanda and considered Wanchoo, J.'s reference decision; the case was used to illustrate conflicting approaches and to support the conclusion reached by the Full Bench.
Emperor v. Ramadhin Where evidence discloses that in addition to the men on trial there were other persons (known or unknown) not before the court, conviction under section 147 may be permissible. Distinguished from cases where all assailants were named; used to show that the presence of unknown/untraced participants supports application of constructive liability provisions.
Kapildeo Singh v. The King Federal Court: For section 147 the essential question is whether there was an unlawful assembly of five or more persons; identity is a matter for determining individual guilt; section 147 can apply even if only one person is convicted if the court is able to hold there was an assembly of five or more known or unknown persons. Applied mutatis mutandis to section 34: the Court adopted the principle that section 34 applies if the criminal act was done by several persons in furtherance of a common intention, even if only one person is convicted and others are unidentified or among the acquitted; this underpins the three-step approach set out by the Court.
Zamir Qasim v. Emperor Full Bench held an appellate court could alter a finding of acquittal into one of conviction even though no State appeal had been preferred, subject to the limitation that sentence cannot be enhanced. Cited as authority for the proposition that an appellate court may go behind a trial court's acquittal and alter it into a conviction (so long as sentence enhancement is not involved); relied upon to answer the second referred question affirmatively.
Bawa Singh v. The Crown Sale, J.: "Alteration" means a change in form without changing the underlying character of the thing to be changed. Quoted to support the view that appellate "alteration" of findings is permissible within the statutory power to alter findings and not confined by restrictive wording.
King v. Plummer Bruce, J.: Warning against treating verdicts of not guilty as fully establishing innocence; in jury trials a conviction cannot stand if co-defendants tried for the same conspiracy were acquitted. Cited by Agarwala, J.; the Full Bench noted the limited value of these English jury-trial authorities for judge-tried cases in India and distinguished the jury context from judge-trials.
Rex v. Thompson Lord Campbell, C.J.: In conspiracy indictments, acquittal of co-conspirators prima facie involves acquittal of the remaining accused. Discussed as an English authority illustrating limits on convicting one when co-defendants are acquitted in conspiracy contexts; Bajpai, J. distinguished conspiracy from riot and the Full Bench analysed the reasoning.
Rex v. Sadhbury English authority where two were convicted while others were acquitted; held that the two could not commit a riot (circumstances not fully detailed in the opinion). Referred to in discussing English precedents; used by Bajpai, J. to illustrate earlier English cases though the Full Bench emphasized differences between jury trials and judge-decided trials.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Full Bench proceeded by examining the legal effect of the trial judge's findings and relevant statutory provisions and authorities. The central themes of the Court's legal analysis were:

  • Distinction between section 34 and section 149: both create constructive liability but differ in prerequisites. Section 149 applies only when an unlawful assembly (five or more persons as defined in section 141) is proved; section 34 requires that the criminal act be done by several persons in furtherance of a common intention, and does not require the existence of an unlawful assembly.
  • Effect of the trial judge's findings: the Sessions Judge found Gulab to be an assailant and also found that he had confederates who participated in the assault but could not identify with certainty which of the other named persons were the confederates; thus the judge acquitted the other named accused because of inability to fix identity, not because he found them definitely absent.
  • Identification versus existence of multiple participants: following the Federal Court's reasoning in Kapildeo Singh, the Court emphasized that the identity of co-participants is a separate issue from the question whether several persons acted in furtherance of a common intention. If the record satisfies the court that a criminal act was done by several persons in furtherance of common intention, section 34 applies even if the identities of some participants are unknown or cannot be fixed among the named accused.
  • When named co-accused are acquitted because identity could not be fixed, that acquittal does not necessarily mean the court must treat them as wholly innocent for purposes of convicting another accused for an act done in furtherance of a common intention; the trial judge's precise factual findings matter. The Full Bench distinguished cases (such as Ram Rup) where the judge had not found any of the acquitted to have participated, from cases (like the present) where the judge did find that some of the acquitted had participated even though their specific identities could not be ascertained.
  • Appellate power to alter findings: the Court examined section 423(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and relied upon Zamir Qasim v. Emperor to hold that an appellate court can alter a finding of acquittal into one of conviction even where no Government appeal against the acquittal exists, subject to the limitation that the appellate court cannot enhance the sentence imposed by the trial court. The Bench accepted that the appellate court may maintain a conviction by altering the factual findings of the lower court where justified by evidence and law.
  • Weight of English jury authorities: the Court carefully considered English cases (e.g., King v. Plummer; Rex v. Thompson; Rex v. Sadhbury) but emphasized the difference between jury trials (where juries give no reasons for acquittal) and judge trials (where the judge states findings). The Full Bench concluded that many English jury-trial authorities are of limited assistance in judge-decided cases in India.
  • Three-step practical approach (drawn from the opinion and Kapildeo Singh): (1) Determine whether several persons acted in furtherance of a common intention; (2) If so, section 34 applies even if only one person is ultimately convicted and others are unidentified or among acquitted; (3) Examine the case of each individual accused to determine participation and guilt.

On the basis of these reasoned principles, the Court concluded that where a trial judge finds that an accused acted with others in furtherance of a common intention, a conviction under section 34 can be sustained even if the judge gave acquittals to other named persons by reason of inability to fix their identity. Further, an appellate court has the statutory power to alter findings and to uphold such convictions (subject to the limitation on increasing sentence).

Holding and Implications

Holding: By unanimous decision, the Full Bench answered both referred questions in the affirmative.

Implications (direct consequences stated in the opinion):

  • A conviction under section 34, Indian Penal Code, can be upheld where the trial court acquitted other named co-accused (giving them the benefit of the doubt) but nonetheless made a definite finding that the appellant acted in association with some of those acquitted in furtherance of a common intention.
  • An appellate court is empowered under section 423(1)(b) CrPC to alter findings of the trial court and may convert an acquittal into a conviction even where no Government appeal against the acquittal exists, subject to the restriction that it cannot enhance the sentence imposed by the trial court (as established in Zamir Qasim v. Emperor and applied by the Full Bench).
  • The decision clarifies that identity of participants is a separate inquiry from the existence of multiple participants acting with common intention; unknown or unascertained participants (including some among those acquitted for inability to fix identity) do not automatically prevent application of constructive-liability provisions (section 34 and, where applicable, section 149) when the evidence supports the requisite factual findings.

Questions answered in the affirmative. The case was to be placed before the Bench concerned, per the Court's order in the opinion.

    Gulab v. State

    Sankar Saran, J.:— The following two questions have been referred to us by a Bench for our decision:

    ‘1. An act is alleged to have been committed by a number of specified persons; five or more in, number, in furtherance of the common intention of all of them. They are prosecuted for rioting and for the commission of the alleged act in view of the provisions of section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The Court acquits all except the appellant, giving them the benefit of the doubt. At the same time its definite finding is that the appellant was associated with some at least of those acquitted parsons in the commission of the alleged act. It accordingly convicts the appellant of the commission of the alleged act applying the provisions of section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. Can such conviction be upheld?

    “2. Whether in such a case it is open to the appellate court to find, there being no Government appeal against the acquittal of such acquitted persons, that, although it cannot interfere with such acquittal, such persons or some of them had been wrongly acquitted and had in fact taken part in the commission of the alleged act in association with the appellant and on this ground hold that the appellant was rightly convicted?”

    The facts of the case so far as they are necessary for the purposes of this reference very briefly are that a serious not took place in which one Bhoja lost his life and several persons received grievous and simple hurts. Fifteen persons were on their trial, some under section 147 and section 302 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code and others under section 147 and sections 323 and 324 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code. The learned Sessions Judge, however, acquitted all of them except one man Gulab whom he convicted of an offence under section 302 read with section 34., Indian Penal Code. In doing so he came to the following finding:—

    “There is no doubt that Gulab who had been named by all the prosecution witnesses was certainly one of the assailants. His name was mentioned on the first opportunity in the telegram given by Banwari soon after the assault. In my opinion, the prosecution witnesses' evidence about the participation of Gulab accused in assaulting Bhoja must be believed. I find that Gulab was one of the assailants of Bhoja.”

    The learned Sessions Judge gave the other appellants the benefit of doubt and observed as follows:—

    “The result is that it has not been possible for the prosecution to conclusively prove who were the other associates of Gulab, but there is no doubt that there were such associates since Gulab had, only a sword and there were only two injuries on the person of the deceased which could have been caused by such a weapon and which were not mainly responsible for his death. The wounds with the sword were not sufficient to cause by themselves his death, which was caused by multiple injuries inflicted on him by Gulab and others. The question, therefore, is what offence has been committed by Gulab. He cannot be said to have committed an offence under section 302, Indian Penal Code alone since the injuries caused by him were not in themselves sufficient to cause the death of Bhoja, but if it is proved that he was a member of an unlawful assembly the common object of which was to beat Bhoja and Bhoja was killed by the unlawful assembly or any member thereof in prosecution of that common object, Gulab is certainly guilty of an offence under section 302, Indian Penal Code read with section 149, Indian Penal Code. However it has not been possible for me to come to a definite conclusion that the other associates of Gulab were at least four in number. In the absense of such evidence it cannot be said that there was an unlawful assembly and Gulab was a member thereof.”

    For the conviction of Gulab, however, the learned Sessions Judge came to the following conclusion:—

    “In my opinion, therefore, the death of Bhoja was due to his beating by Gulab and his confederates who had a common intention to cause his death or to cause such bodily injuries to him as were likely to cause his death. He is, therefore, guilty under section 302, Indian Penal Code read with section 34, Indian Penal Code.”

    The findings in this case amount to this that Gulab was certainly in the fight in which more persons than one participated. The number of the participants might or might not have been five. Section 147, Indian Penal Code cannot apply unless it can be established that the participants were five or more in number, but section 34 would apply if the finding of the Court that including Gulab there were persons more than one in the fight and that death was caused in furtherance of the common intention of them all, is correct. As the learned Sessions Judge has acquitted the appellant of an offence under section 147, all we are concerned with is the question of applicability of section 34 on the findings arrived at by him.

    This case would have presented no difficulty upon; the authorities had not all the participants in the fight been named. If there were some unspecified persons in the fight, the position would have been simple and it could have easily been held that Gulab along with, certain unknown persons was responsible for the offence. In this case, however, the petition is that all the participants were named and the learned Sessions-Judge has not been able to find as a fact which of those named persons barring Gulab were actually engaged in the fight. That Gulab had companions who participated in the fight has been found by the Judge, but he is not able to make up his mind as to who they were. It is a case where the Judge has not held that the prosecution evidence with regard to the complicity of the persons named is disproved. All that he has found is that the case against the individual accused persons whom he has acquitted is not proved. Had the Judge said that these, persons were not there, the position would have been different. He has, however, held that it is doubtful whether they were there. In these circumstances it cannot be asserted that these men were not in the fight. The effect, of course, of the acquittal is that they are not guilty, but I am unable to subscribe to the view that they can be said to be wholly innocent.

    It frequently happens that in a court of law an accused person is acquitted “without a stain on his character.” On the other hand there are acquittals in which it is held that “upon a consideration of all the circumstances it is safe to give the accused the benefit of doubt.”

    Our attention has been invited to a few English and Indian cases on the subject. The latest is an unreported case of this Court, Gumani v. Rex in which there was a difference of opinion between the learned Chief Justice and Dayal, J. The case was referred to me and I adopted with approval a passage from the judgment of the learned Chief Justice upon which I shall rely. The passage is reproduced below:

    “Where the prosecution has mentioned the names of all those who formed an unlawful assembly and the Court is satisfied that only some of them, less than five, are guilty and the rest axle not guilty, then sections 147 and 149 cannot be applicable. If, however, the Court is satisfied as regards the identity of some, but is not able to fix the identity of the others, though it is satisfied on the evidence that there were more than five persons, to my mind, to such a case also sections 147, and 149 would be applicable.”

    The controversy has arisen in this Court on account of an apparent difference of opinion between the judgments of this Court in Sadho v. Emperor (2) and Ram Rup v. Emperor (3). The facts in both the cases were similar in that in both cases all the assailants had been specified and in neither case was it said that there were any persons other than those who had been recognised or identified in the riot. In Sadho's case Bajpai, J., expressed himself in a very general manner and observed as follows:

    “If the finding of the learned Judge is that more than five persons on each side took part in the not the mere fact that on the evidence he is not able to convict five persons on each side could not result in the acquittal of the convicted persons also under Section 147, Indian Penal Code. The finding in the present case undoubtedly is that there were more than five persons on each side.”

    In the later case Walli-Ullah, J., laid emphasis on the fact that the assailants seven in number had all been named and he came to the following conclusion—

    “…it is impossible to hold on the one hand, that five of the accused persons who were acquitted by the learned Sessions Judge were not guilty of the offences charged and at the same time to hold that these very five persons were in a sense participating in the crime … To my mind it would be utterly illogical and also unsound in law to hold that the other five men were not guilty of the offences charged but they were there for a subsidiary purpose, mainly for the purpose of convicting the remaining two of the riot and of the offence of simple hurt under section 323 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code.”

    The learned Judge considered a Bench case of this Court, Emperor v. Ramadhin and distinguished that case from the one which he was considering. In Ramadhin's case the evidence disclosed that in addition to the men who were actually on trial, there were others, known or unknown, who were not before the court and it was held that in such circumstances the conviction under section 147 would be permissible.

    As I have pointed out above, the fact that all the assailants had been named was not brought out in the judgment of Bajpai, J., when he laid down the general proposition of law quoted above. His decision was more on the lines of Ramadhin's case although that case was not mentioned by the learned Judge and he did not consider the distinction which has been pointedly brought out in the judgment of Walliullah, J. The proposition of law laid down in Ramadhin's case has not been disapproved by Walliullah, J., and one might, therefore, say that there is no vital difference between the earlier case of Sadho decided by Bajpai, J., and the later case of Ram Rup decided by Walliullah, J.

    These two cases have, however, been discussed at length in Harchanda v. Rex where, upon a difference of opinion of Dayal and Agarwala, JJ., the case was referred to Wanchoo, J. In this case seven persons were charged for offences under sections 148 and 302 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code. It was not, the prosecution case that there were any unidentified persons amongst the assailants. The learned Sessions Judge had given the benefit of doubt to five accused and convicted the two appellants under section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code. Dayal, also in discussing the cases of Sadho v. Emperor and Ram Rup v. Emperor (4) does not seem to have found much of a contradiction between these two cases. Referring to Sadho's case he observed:

    “It was held that if the court finds that there were at least five persons who took part in the transaction, the court can still record a finding of conviction under section 147 against such persons who are proved to have taken part in the incident even if the number of such persons be, less than five and the number of persons who have taken part in the incident was limited, and after giving the benefit of the doubt to certain people, the number left becomes less than five. It is unnecessary at this stage to say anything about the correctness of this view. There is nothing wrong with this view if it be practically possible for a court to find as a definite fact that though persons less than five in number have been proved to have taken part in the incident and that the case against the others of having taken part in the incident is doubtful, yet it feels satisfied that at least five persons had taken part in that incident. As pointed out it Ram Rup's case , there is some illogicality in convicting persons less than five for an offence of riot, if the remaining persons alleged to have taken part in the incident have been acquitted. It will, however, to my mind, be a greater illogicality if the convicted persons be held to be the only assailants and yet be held not to have caused all the injuries merely because the prosecution witnesses alleged the causing of certain injuries to have been by such persons who have been acquitted. I am, therefore, of opinion that whatever line of reasoning be adopted, the practical view to which I find no legal objection is that in cases like the one before us the convicted persons must be held to be responsible for the result of the injuries which are alleged to have been caused by the persons who had been acquitted.”

    Agarwala, J.:— on the other hand, was of the opinion that the learned Sessions Judge had not held that “the incised wounds were caused by one or the other of the five accused acquitted by him. Although it is true that the learned Sessions Judge does not definitely say, in so many words, that none of the five persons were responsible for the injuries, yet he clearly envisages the possibility of none of them having been so responsible and definitely came to the conclusion that the two appellants were responsible for all the injuries.”

    Having expressed himself thus, the learned Judge went on to observe that inasmuch as no Government appeal had been filed against the acquittal of the other accused

    “Therefore, we have to take the findings of the learned Sessions Judge, so far as those five accused are concerned, as correct.”

    He has emphasised this fact by subsequently again referring to it in his judgment in the following terms:

    “Having regard to the fact that there is no appeal against the acquittal of the other five accused before us, and having regard to the fact that we cannot interfere with the finding of the learned Sessions Judge, so far as it concerns those accused, we cannot hold that either Durga Das or Sukhbir was responsible for inflicting the incised wounds; and since it was not the prosecution case that there was some unknown person along with the accused, who was also holding a sharp-edged weapon, we cannot ascribe the infliction of the incised wounds to some such unknown person.”

    The learned Judge went on to observe as follows:

    “When the evidence on the record is conclusive against an accused, we hold that he is guilty. When it is conclusively in favour of an accused, and also when it is inconclusive—neither conclusive this way or that—in both, cases we hold the accused ‘not guilty’—and acquit him. When there is a verdict of not guilty or acquittal, an accused person is entitled to say that he must be presumed to be absolutely innocent whatever be the nature of the finding. Unless it can be conclusively established against an accused that he is guilty, he is entitled to be proclaimed free from blemish and his honour cannot be sullied by any suspicion on court's mind. Thus in the present, case each of the five acquitted persons can say, ‘I did not participate in the assault and I am innocent.’ If each one of them can say that, it cannot be held that some one or more of them were participants in the crime. The appellants cannot be held guilty for the action of some one or more of these five acquitted persons, in the face of the verdict of not guilty and acquittal of every one of those five persons.”

    In support of his view the learned Judge placed reliance upon certain English cases. He relied particularly upon a dictum of Bruce, J., in King v. Plummer which runs as follows:

    “As to the note by Mr. Greaves in Russell on Crimes, 4th Ed., Vol. III, page 146, referred to in the judgment of Wright, J., where it is suggested that a verdict of not guilty is not to be taken as establishing the innocence of the persons acquitted, because the verdict may have been arrived at simply in consequence of the absence of evidence to prove his guilt, I think it is a very dangerous principle to adopt to regard a verdict of not guilty as fully establishing the innocence of the person to whom it relates.”

    The learned Judge also referred to another case with approval, Rex v. Thompson . That was a case of conspiracy between Thompson and one other, either Tillotson or Moddock who were both acquitted. Lord Campbell, C.J, in the course of his judgment observed:

    “Prima facie, therefore, at least, where the indictment is that three defendants conspired the acquittal of two involves the acquittal of the third for, when the jury declare that neither of those two conspired with the third, it is difficult to see how the third can have conspired with the other two, or with either of them.”

    Bajpai, J.:— in his judgment distinguished the case of a conspiracy and observed that it

    “requires a clear mention of the conspirators and if on the paucity of evidence an acquittal follows regarding the rest of the accused it is not possible to convict a single man on a charge of conspiracy.”

    In Thompson's case as the result of the acquittal of ‘Tillotson and Maddock only one man was left and he could not have conspired by himself. As a matter of fact that acquittal in Plummer's case was upon the view expressed by Bruce, J., that when two persons are tried together upon a charge of conspiracy with one another and one is acquitted the conviction of the other obviously cannot stand.

    Wanchoo, J.:— to whom this case was referred upon a difference of opinion, found himself in general agreement with the view expressed by Agarwala, J. He considered that there was a difference between the case of Sadho v. Emperor decided by Bajpai, J., and the case of Ram Rup v. Emperor decided by Wali-ullah, J., and chose the view expressed in Ram Rup v. Emperor .

    Having given respectful consideration to the views expresed by the learned Judges of this Court. I have come to the conclusion that there is no reason for me to alter the following view that I had expressed in Gumani v. Rex :

    “Where the prosecution has mentioned the names of all those who formed an unlawful assembly and the Court is satisfied that only some of them, less than five, are guilty and the rest are not guilty, then sections 147 and 149 cannot be applicable. If, however, the Court is satisfied as regards the identity of some, but is not able to fix the identity of the others;, though it is satisfied on the evidence that there were more than five persons, to my mind, to such a case also sections 147 and 149 would be applicable.”

    In the view that I take, I would answer the first question in the affirmative.

    With regard to the second question, I consider it necessary to refer to section 423(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which deals with the powers of an appellate court in an appeal from a conviction which runs as follows:

    “in an appeal from a conviction, (1) reverse the finding and sentence, and acquit or discharge the accused or order him to be re-tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Court or committed for trial, or (2) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or with or without altering the finding, reduce the sentence, or (3) with or without such reduction and with or without altering the finding alter the nature of the sentence, but subject to the provisions of section 106….”

    It would thus appear that it is open to an appellate court to uphold a conviction not only upon the findings of facts arrived at by the court below but even after altering the findings of the court below. In this connection I would refer to the decision of a Full Bench of this Court, Zamir Qasim v. Emperor . In this case, after an elaborate discussion of the authorities, the Full Bench held by majority that the appellate court could alter a finding of acquittal into one of conviction even though no appeal has been preferred by the State Government, subject, of course, to the limitation that the appellate court cannot enhance the sentence imposed by the trial court. The mere omission of the State Government to appeal against an order of acquittal does not, in all cases, give finality to such finding and it can be altered by the High Court. There is no limitation imposed upon the powers of the Court to alter any finding so long as it does not involve an enhancement of sentence. It seems to me that in the words of Sale, J., in Bawa Singh v. The Crown , alteration means “change in form, without changing the underlying character of the thing to be changed,” and in that view there does not seem to be, in my judgment, any prohibition upon the Court against the alteration of a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. In the words of Iqbal Ahmad, C.J—

    “the power to ‘alter the finding’ is not circumscribed by any words or limitation and as there is nothing in clause (b) of section 423 to prohibit the appellate Court from going behind a finding of acquittal, the answer to the question (whether a Court of appeal is empowered under section 423(1)(b)(2) to alter a finding of acquittal into one of conviction)…. must in my opinion be in the affirmative.”

    It would thus appear that there is nothing to bar the Court from holding that the acquittal of some of the accused persons was wrong and that they or some of them had taken part in the crime in association with the appellant and that, therefore, the conviction of the appellant was correct.

    For the reasons given above, I would answer the second question also in the affirmative.

    Bind Basni Prasad, J.:— I had the advantage of going through the judgments of my learned brothers. I entirely agree with the answers; which they propose to give to the two questions referred to this Full Bench and desire to add the following:

    The cases of Sadho v. Emperor , Ram Rup v. Emperor and Harchanda v. Rex have already been discussed by my learned brothers in their judgments. In the first two cases learned Sessions Judge had convicted the appellants for a certain substantive offence read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, whereas in the third one the appellants were convicted by the Sessions Judge under section 302 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. In Gumani v. Rex which has also been referred to by my learned brother. Sankar Saran, the appellants had been convicted under sections 147 and 302 read with section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. In the present case the appellant was prosecuted along with 14 other persons. Some of them were charged under section 147 and section 302 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code and others under section 147 and sections 323 and 324 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code. The appellant alone has been convicted and sentenced to transportation for life under section 302 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code. The findings of the learned Sessions Judge as regards the remaining fourteen, who were acquitted, have been quoted in extenso by my learned brother Justice Sankar Saran. In substance, the finding is that some out of these fourteen were certainly associated with the appellant in the commission of the offence. It was not possible, however, to say definitely whether the number of these participants along with the appellant was five or more, hence section 149, Indian Penal Code could not be applied. While the learned Sessions Judge was definite that some of the acquitted persons were the confederates of the appellant in the commission of the offence, on the evidence produced before him he could not fix them it was in these circumstances that he acquitted the remaining fourteen. It may be noted that it was not the prosecution case that any unidentified person, who were not before the court, also took part in the commission of the offence. It was the definite case of the prosecution that only the 15 named persons took part in the offence.

    There is a certain resemblance between sections 34 and 149, Indian Penal Code. Both the sections deal with liability for constructive criminality. Both deal with combinations of persons who become punishable as shares in an offence. They overlap to some extent. The difference between the two sections is that section 149 is applicable only where an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly whereas for the application of section 34 the existence of an unlawful assembly is not necessary. Another distinction between these two sections is that under section 34 a criminal act must be done by several persons “in furtherance of the common intention of all”, whereas under section 149 the mere membership of an unlawful assembly, any member of which commits an offence “in prosecution of the common object of that assembly”, is punishable. In so far as the cases under section 149, Indian Penal Code lay down the principle of constructive criminality, they are applicable to the present case also in which we have to consider the provisions of section 34. There has recently been a decision of the Federal Court also in Kapildeo Singh v. The King . The following observations of Justice Mukherjea who delivered the judgment in that case are important:

    “The essential question in a case under section 147 is whether there was an unlawful assembly as defined in section 141, Indian Penal Code, of five or more than five persons. The identity of the persons comprising the assembly is a matter relating to the determination of the guilt of the individual accused, and, even when it is possible to convict less than five persons' only, section 147still applies if upon the evidence in the case the court is able to hold that the person or persons who have been found guilty were members of an assembly of five or more persons, known or unknown, identified or unidentified.”

    The same principle is applicable to a case where a peorson has been charged for a substantive offence read with section 34, Indian Penal Code. The dictum laid down by the Federal Court in Kapildeo Singh's case mutatis mutandis would then read as follows:—

    “The essential question where a person is charged with a substantive offence read with section 34, Indian Penal Code is whether or not a criminal act was done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all. The identity of the persons is a matter relating to the determination of the guilt of this individual accused and even when it is possible to convict one person only, section 34 still applies, if upon the evidence in the case the court is able to hold that the criminal act was done by some other persons also, known or unknown, identified or unidentified, in furtherance of the common intention of all.”

    The view expressed by Bajpai, J., in Sadho v. Emperor and by Malik, C.J, and Sankar Saran, J. in Gumani's case is in accord with the principle laid down by the Federal Court in Kapildeo Singh's case . The observations of the Federal Court mean that where several persons are charged for having jointly committed an offence, the case should be approached in the following manner:—

    1. Did several persons, no matter whether they are known or unknown, identified or unidentified, do the criminal act “in furtherance of the common intention of all”? The Court should first see whether there were more than one person.

    2. If there were several such persons, section 34, Indial Penal Code will apply, even if only one of them is found guilty and others cannot be ascertained. Such others may be unbraced or may even be among the acquitted persons. If however the Court finds that the criminal act was done by one person only, section 34 will not apply.

    3. The case of each individual accused should then be examined. If he participated, he will be guilty of the substantive offence read with section-34. If he did not participate he will not be guilty.

    For the application of section 149, Indian Penal: Code the further question to be examined is whether or not there were five or more than five participants, any one of whom committed an offence in “prosecution of the common object” of all. If there were five or more than five, no matter whether known or unknown, identified or unidentified, section 149, Indian Penal Code will apply. The court may be able to fix less than five, but if it is certain that five or more than five participated it must apply section 149, even though the unascertained persons may be among those whom it acquits on account of its inability on the evidence to fix them. The authorities are unanimous that if such unascertained persons are untraced, then section 149 applies.

    It will be noted that in Ram Rup's case the conviction of the appellants was maintained, but it was altered from one under section 147 and section 323 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code to one under section 323 read with section 34, Indian Penal Code. The case is distinguishable from the present one. In that case eight and only eight persons were alleged to have taken part in the commission of the offence. One of them died after the occurrence. Of the remaining seven, five were given the benefit of doubt and were acquitted. There was no definite finding of the Sessions Judge that out of the acquitted persons any of them had participated in the commission of the offence. Waliullah, J., while discussing; Sadhu's case observed:

    “To my mind the facts of that case were wholly distinguishable from the facts of the present case. The principle laid down in that case can be applicable to my mind only to cases where evidence discloses that in addition to the men who were actually put upon their trial there were others, known or unknown, who were not before the Court.”

    In the present case, there is a definite finding that some of the accused who have been acquitted also did the criminal act along with the appellant in furtherance of a common intention of all, but the court is not in a position to fix these confederates as they have been mixed with innocent persons. The generality of the principle laid down in Ram Rup's case and followed in Harchanda's case is modified by the observations of the Federal Court in Kapildeo Singh's case .

    I would, therefore, answer the first question in the affirmative.

    The answer to the second question is concluded by the decision of the majority in the Full Bench case of Zamir Qasim v. Emperor and I would answer it also in the affirmative, subject to the condition that the appellate court cannot enhance the sentence imposed by the trial court.

    Harish Chandra, J.:— In view of the judgment written by my learned brother Sankar Saran, it is unnecessary for me to mention the facts of the case. The authorities seem to be agreed that when the finding of the court is that an accused person committed a crime along with a number of others known or unknown who were not on trial, he may be convicted of an offence with the aid of either section 149 or section 34 of the Indian Penal Code according to circumstances. If, however, all the other persons who are alleged to have been associated with him in the commission of the crime were named and were on trial along with him, but were acquitted, the view taken in certain cases is that section 149 or 34 cannot be brought into aid to find the accused guilty of any offence. Waliullah, J., observes in the case of Ram Rup v. Emperor —

    “….it would be utterly illogical and also unsound in law to hold that the other five were not guilty of the offences charged but that they were there for a subsidiary purpose, namely, for the purpose of convicting the remaining two of riot and of the offence of simple hurt under section 323 read with section 149, Indian Penal Code.”

    Agarwala, J.:— in his judgment in Harchanda v. Rex observes—

    “When the evidence on record is conclusive against an accused, we hold that he is guilty. When it is conclusive in favour of an accused, and also when it is inconclusive—neither conclusive this way or that—in both cases we hold the accused ‘not guilty’—and acquit him. When there is a Verdict of not guilty or acquittal, an accused person is entitled to say that he must be presumed to be absolutely innocent whatever be the nature of the finding. Unless it can be conclusively established against an accused that he is guilty, he is entitled to be proclaimed free from blemish and his honour cannot be sullied by any suspicion in court's mind. Thus in the present case each of the five acquitted persons can say, ‘I did not participate in the assault and I am innocent.’ If each one of them can say that, it cannot be held that some one or more of them were presumed to be absolutely innocent whatever be participants in the crime. The appellants cannot be held guilty for the action of some one or more of these five acquitted persons, in the face of the verdict of not guilty and acquittal of every one of those five persons.”

    With all respect, my view is that the distinction that has been drawn between the two classes of cases mentioned above is not substantial. An accused person may be acquitted of an offence for a variety of reasons. In a conceivable case there may be a finding of fact against him that he had committed the crime, but he may still be acquitted because of certain defects in the manner in which the case was instituted or for want of sanction by the proper authority where such sanction was necessary before the institution of the case. An accused person may be acquitted in a case honourably and without any blemish on his character. It may also be otherwise. It not infrequently happens that although an accused person who is a public servant has been acquitted by a court of law, still departmental proceedings are taken against him and he may be punished departmentally even on the findings of the very court that acquitted him. The acquittal of an accused person in a case does not prevent another court which may be trying another person in connection with the same crime from holding that such person had not been properly acquitted and to make use of such finding in judging the guilt of the person accused before it.

    Bajpai, J.:— has, in the case of Sadho v. Emperor , favoured the contrary view and the following is reproduced from his judgment—

    “In the present case, however, the judgment of the court below satisfies me that he was of the opinion that more than five men undoubtedly took part in the riot. The three men who have been convicted on each side and the two dead men also took part in the riot and the feeling of the learned judge was that some of the others who were named in the cases were also involved in the offence., but as is very common in these cases some innocent persons might have been roped in, the learned Judge adopted certain sure tests for convicting the appellants. He however, was undoubtedly of the opinion that more than five persons were involved on each side. I am, therefore, of the opinion that there is no force in the plea that an offence under section 147 of the Indian Penal Code is not made out.”

    To my mind the view taken by Bajpai, J., in Sadho's case is perfectly sound. Agarwala, J., in taking a different view of the matter was guided by certain authorities of the courts in England.

    In Rex v. Sadhbury several persons were indicted for rioting. Two of them alone were found guilty while all the others were acquitted. It was held that the two could not commit a riot and could not be convicted of rioting. It does not however appear in what circumstances the other persons were acquitted in that case.

    In Rex v. Thompson one Thompson was indicted for conspiracy with two others by name Tillotson and Maddock and certain other persons. The evidence, however, was that he had conspired with Tillotson and Maddock. The jury found Tillotson and Maddock riot guilty but gave a verdict against Thompson. It was held that Thompson was entitled to an acquittal. Obviously the jury had not indicated on what grounds they found Thompson guilty although they had acquitted Tillotson and Maddock. The Judge took into consideration the possible reason which may have led the jury to convict Thompson in spite of its having acquitted Tillotson and Maddock that Thompson had conspired either with Tillotson or with Maddock, but that the jury did not know with whom. In the view of the Judge this was a bad finding and the following is reproduced from the judgment:

    “The only mode which occurred to me of supporting the indictment under the circumstances of this case was by taking the verdict to be, in effect, that Thompson had conspired with Tillotson or Maddock but the jury did not know with which. But, that would be, I think, a bad finding. I cannot conceive how, if an indictment to that effect would be bad, such a special verdict could be good. But then it is said that the verdict supports the indictment, inasmuch as this charges Thompson to have conspired with other persons unknown. But I find it difficult to say that Tillotson or Maddock can fall within the category of ‘other persons’; that could not be the meaning of the grand or petty jury.”

    Bajpai, J.:— in Sadho's case took the view that a conspiracy was different from a riot and distinguished that case. I, however, find myself unable to agree with the view expressed in that case. If the finding distinctly was that Thompson had conspired with either Tillotson or Maddock, there is no reason why he should not have been convicted of conspiracy.

    In the case of King v. Plummer , Plummer was prosecuted along with two other persons on an indictment of conspiracy. It was not alleged that there were any other unknown persons. Plummer pleaded guilty while the other two pleaded, not guilty and were acquitted. Plummer was convicted upon his plea of guilty. It was held that the conviction of Plummer was bad. In that case Bruce, J., observed:

    “…. I think it is a very dangerous principle to adopt to regard a verdict of not guilty as not fully establishing the innocence of the person to whom it relates. If it is to be applied at all, it would apply to persons tried at the same time, and yet it is perfectly clear upon the authorities that, if two persons are tried together upon a charge of conspiracy with one another, and one is acquitted by the jury and the other convicted, the conviction cannot stand, although it is perfectly clear that the verdict of acquittal may have been obtained simply upon the ground that there was a failure of evidence to establish the charge against the person who was acquitted.”

    As has been pointed out by Malik, C.J, in the case of Gumani v. Rex these English cases are in fact not a proper guide in a matter of this nature. They were all jury trials and after the jury had found a number of accused persons not guilty, the conviction of others who could not have been found guilty except on a finding that they were associated in the commission of the crime with the other accused persons who were acquitted, could not be upheld inasmuch as the verdict of the jury would in no case specify whether while acquitting some of the accused persons it was of the view that at least some of them had taken part in the crime so as to justify the conviction of the accused person who was found guilty by it for the offence with which he had been charged along with the other accused persons. The following is reproduced from the judgment:

    “The case of King v. Plummer may also be mentioned, but there is great difference between a trial with the aid of a jury and a trial by the Judge. If the jury returned a finding of not guilty and if the judge had not divided the question into two parts, (i) whether there were more than five persons who had taken part in the riot, and (ii) the persons named, or which of them, were there, it may not be possible to convict the accused under section 147. But where the question had been divided into two parts, and the jury returned a finding on the first part in favour of the prosecution and on the second part in favour of the accused that they were not satisfied about the identity of some of the accused, it would be difficult in such a case to hold that those whom the jury had held to be guilty could not be convicted of rioting.”.

    The observation of Agarwala, J. reproduced in an earlier part of the judgment would no doubt apply to an acquittal by a jury. For no reasons are given by the jury for holding the accused not guilty. But in case where there is a clear finding that although the court acquitted some of the accused persons it was satisfied on the evidence that some of them had in fact taken part in the crime in association with the convicted persons so as to attract the provisions of section 149 or 34, such conviction ought not to be interfered with.

    No doubt, an order of acquittal cannot be reversed except in an appeal from such order. But an appellate court has full liberty to maintain a conviction on grounds other than those upon which the conviction was based by the court below and in doing so to alter its finding, if necessary, with respect to the other accused persons who may have been acquitted by it and to hold that the appellant who could not have been convicted except on a finding that he was associated with certain other persons in the commission of the crime had been rightly convicted.

    I would answer both the questions which have been referred by the Bench in the affirmative.

    By the Court:— Our answer to both the questions is in the affirmative.

    Let the case be laid before the Bench concerned.

    Questions answered in the affirmative.

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