1. This petition and Miscellaneous Petition No. 104 of 1952 have been made under Article 226 of the Constitution and this order will govern the decision of both of them.
2. The petitioner in this petition, Laxman, is a raiyat of certain fields in the village Badi Dumarpali, Chhoti Dumarpali and Ada Pathara in the Kharsia Tahsil of Raigarh district. These fields are held by him along with some other persons. There are tendu trees and tendu plants in these fields and the petitioner alleges that he sells the leaves of these trees and plants to the manufacturers of bidis in the district. The petitioner in Miscellaneous Petition No. 104 of 1952 is a partner in the firm known as ‘Hiralal Bros.’ carrying on business of purchasing and selling tendu leaves to the manufacturers of bidis. On the 16th January 1952, the Divisional Forest Officer, Raigarh, announced that an auction of the theka of tendu leaves will be held on the 19th February 1952 at Raipur and published the terms on which the auction will be held. In term No. 23, it was stated that the Deputy Commissioner, Raigarh, would fix the rate at which tendu leaves grown in the fields of the cultivators or collected by them should be sold, and the persons to whom they should be sold will make a declaration regarding these matters. At the auction held on the 19th February 1952 the firm of Babaji Motibhai was the highest bidder and their bid was accepted.
3. On the 30th April 1952, the Deputy Commissioner, Raigarh, issued a pamphlet in Hindi styled as ‘soochana patra’ and under cl. 23(1) of the Central Provinces States Land Tenure Order, 1949, directed the raiyats of Kharsia tahsil to sell tendu leaves plucked by them from the trees and plants in their fields to the firm of Babaji Motibhai and to none else. According to the petitioners in both the petitions, the Deputy Commissioner was not entitled to give such a direction. They contend that as a result of the direction of the Deputy Commissioner the purchasers are afraid of purchasing tendu leaves from the cultivators and that the action of the Deputy Comipissioner infringes the rights guaranteed to them under Article 19(1)(f) and (g) and Article 31 of the Constitution.
4. The petitioner Laxman further contends that as provided for by Section 56 of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights (Estates, Mahals, Alienated Lands) Act 1950 (Act I of 1951), he deposited on the 13th February 1951 an amount equal to twice the annual rent of the fields for acquiring malik makbuza rights in them and that having acquired those rights he had further improved his position with the result that cl. 23(1) of the Central Provinces States Lands Tenure Order, 1949, became inapplicable to him. He thus challenges the direction made by the Deputy Commissioner on two grounds firstly, that the Deputy Commissioner could not direct even a raiyat to dispose of tendu leaves obtained by him from his own holding to any particular person or to fix the rate at which he should sell them and, secondly, that he having acquired malik makbuza rights, cl. 23(1) of the Central Provinces States Land Tenure Order under which the Deputy Commissioner had issued the direction was not applicable to him. On behalf of Hiralal, a further contention was raised that by giving the right to purchase tendu leaves and by directing the cultivators to sell tendu leaves gathered by them from their fields to the highest bidder at the auction, a monopoly was created and that this was unconstitutional.
5. According to the learned Additional Government Pleader, who appears for the State as well as for other parties, the appropriate remedy for the petitioners was by way of a regular suit and not by way of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Further according to him, the petitions were made after undue delay and could not be entertained. As regards Hiralal, he urged in addition that this person having actually bid at the auction but failed in securing the contract, was estopped from challenging the validity of the auction. On merits, the learned Additional Government Pleader contended that no question of infringement of any right conferred by Article 19 of the Constitution arises, that the petitioner in this petition had, as a raiyat, only a limited right to dispose of tendu leaves gathered from his holding and also that he had not acquired malik makbuza rights as contended by him. As regards Hiralal, the learned Additional Government Pleader contended that his right was only one to carry on a trade or business and that right was in no way infringed either by the auction which was held or by reason of the direction made by the Deputy Commissioner. We propose to decide both the petitions on merits and therefore it is not necessary to consider the first three objections raised by the learned Additional Government Pleader.
6. While dealing with the merits of the petitions, it is necessary to state that prior to the integration of the former Chhattisgarh States in the Central Provinces and Berar (now the State of Madhya Pradesh), a raiyat had restricted rights over his holding and over the produce from his holding. It was with the intention of liberalizing his rights in the land that the Central Provinces States and Makrai State Land Tenure Order, 1949, was made by the Provincial Government in the exercise of the powers conferred by Section 4 of the Extra-Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947 (XLVII of 1947), read with the Government of India, Ministry of States, Notification No. 173-I-B, dated the 23rd March 1948. One of the objects of this Order was to permit the raiyats to collect tendu leaves and harra and propagate lac on the trees in their holdings subject however to certain conditions.
7. The relevant provisions of this Order are cls. 21, 22 and 23 which run thus:
‘21(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or any entry in the wajib-ul-arz, custom or decree or order of a civil Court or any contract to the contrary, but subject to the provisions of clause 23, a raiyat other than a sub-tenant shall have, during the period of his tenure, the same right in all trees standing in his holding as he has in the holding itself…’
22. Notwithstanding any entry in the wajib-ul-arz, custom, or decree or order of a Civil Court, or any contract, but subject to the provisions of clause 23, a raiyat other than a sub-tenant shall be entitled to propagate lac on trees in the holding and take the produce thereof or to pluck and appropriate the leaves of tendu (Dio spyros melanxlor) plants or trees in his holding:…
‘23.(1) In any area to which this sub-clause is extended by the Provincial Government in respect of any specified forest produce as defined in the Indian Forest Act, 1927, any raiyat, who desires to sell such forest produce, shall sell the same to such person and at such price as the Deputy Commissioner may from time to time direct. ……’
8. By a notification No. 3754-838-XII, dated the 2nd April 1949, the provisions of sub-clause (1) of clause 23 quoted above have been extended to the Raigarh district in respect of three specified forest produce, viz., Harra, tendu leaves and lac.
9. We may mention here that the validity of the Land Tenure Order is not challenged before us on the ground that it was made in the exercise of delegated power of legislation. The argument advanced is that the right to collect tendu leaves from plants and trees in his holding has been granted to a raiyat without any qualification. In this connection, it is said that cl. 22 of the Order does not itself contain any qualifications even though it says that the provisions thereof would be subject to cl. 23. Clause 23(1) no doubt enables the Deputy Commissioner to direct a raiyat to sell certain forest produce to such person and at such price as the Deputy Commissioner may direct, but it is said that this clause does not apply to tendu leaves. The actual expression used in cl. 23(1) is ‘forest produce’.
10. “Forest produce” has been defined in the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (XVI of 1927) in these terms:
“‘forest produce’ includes:
(a) the following whether found in, or brought from, a forest or not, that is to say: timber, charcoal, caoutchouc, catechu, wood-oil, resin, natural varnish, bark, lac, mahua flowers, mahua seeds and myrabolams, and
(b) the following when found in, or brought from, a forest, that is to say,
(i) trees and leaves, flowers and fruits, and all other parts or produce not hereinbefore mentioned, of trees……”
(omitting the unnecessary clauses)
11. On behalf of the petitioners, it is contended that tendu leaves do not come within the purview of ‘forest produce’ as defined above as under cl. (b)(i) of the definition tendu leaves could be said to be forest produce only if found in or brought from a forest. As in the case before us, the tendu leaves admittedly come from the lands belonging to the raiyat, the argument proceeds further, they could not come within the mischief of cl. 23(1) of the Central Provinces States Land Tenure Order, 1949.
12. On the face of it, the argument is very plausible, but it has been argued on behalf of the Government that cls. 21, 22 and 23 have got to be read together and given their full meaning. Clause 21 has the effect of conferring on a raiyat rights in trees which he did not previously possess. Similarly, by cl. 22 he has been given rights to propagate lac on trees in the holding and to pluck and appropriate leaves of tendu plants or trees in his holding. But each of the three varieties of rights dealt with by cls. 21 and 22 is subject to the limitation laid down in cl. 23. It was therefore contended on behalf of the Government that the conditions laid down in cl. 23 must apply with full force to each one of the three rights conferred by cls. 21 and 22 respectively. The argument further is that if only tendu leaves found in or brought from a forest were to be brought under the operation of cl. 22 then the intention of the Provincial Government, which has functioned as the legislating body and whom we shall hereafter refer to as the law-making body, would be entirely nullified because cl. 22 dealt with tendu leaves not found in or brought from a forest but such leaves on trees in a raiyat's holding; in other words, tendu leaves as coming within the definition of ‘forest produce’ under the Forest Act would be wholly outside the purview of cl. 22 and thus cl. 23 also would be entirely out of the way. But the lawmaking body has created the right in favour of the raiyat in respect of tendu leaves subject to the conditions laid down in cl. 23. Therefore, in order to give full effect to the provisions of cl. 23(1) with reference to the tendu leaves dealt with in cl. 22 we have to reconcile the provisions of the order with the definition in the Forest Act. The only way, it is argued, to bring about such a consistency in the two enactments is to look to the list of articles contained in the definition and ignoring the place from where those things have been found in or brought from.
13. The term ‘forest’ has not been defined anywhere in the Forest Act. In the absence of such a definition the word ‘forest’ must be taken in its ordinary dictionary sense. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. I, gives the following meaning to it:
‘1. An extensive tract of land covered with trees and undergrowth, sometimes intermingled with pasture……….
2. Law. A woodland district, usually belonging to the king, set apart for hunting wild beasts and game etc.,………
3. A wild uncultivated waste.’
14. Clauses (ii), (iii) and (iv) under sub-heading (b) of the definition of ‘forest produce’ (not quoted above) would indicate that the word ‘forest’ has been used in the definition in its widest significance. The Forest Act divides forests for the purposes of the Act into three classes, viz., reserved forests, village forests, and protected forests. Any reserved forest assigned to any village community has been designated as village forest by S. 28 of the Act. Apparently, tendu leaves contemplated by cl. 22 of the Order would be outside the definition of a forest produce as they are derived from trees on a raiyat's holding, which would be cultivated fields and not waste lands.
15. Hence according to the contention of the petitioners tendu leaves as defined in the Forest Act are outside the purview of cls. 22 and 23 of the Order. But cl. 23 being in the nature of a limitation on the rights created by cl. 22 cannot exist separately from cl. 22 in so far as it relates to tendu leaves. Hence when the law-making body created the rights in tendu leaves by cl. 22 and made it subject to the operation of cl. 23, which makes the definition of forest produce in the Forest Act applicable to the tendu leaves derived from trees in a raiyat's holding, the inference is irresistible that the law-making body intended to import a fiction, that is to say, intended to treat tendu leaves derived from trees in a tenant's holding as if they were found in or brought from a forest.
16. If the petitioner's contention were accepted, we should hold that tendu leaves from trees in a raiyat's holding were not subject to the conditions laid down in cl. 23. But that result can be arrived at only by holding that the emphatic clause ‘but subject to the provisions of cl. 23 has no significance so far as the second of the two rights conferred by cl. 22, viz.: the right to pluck and appropriate the leaves of tendu plants or trees in a tenancy holding, was concerned. But one of the elementary principles of construction of a statute is that all the component parts of a clause or a section should be given effect to. In order to give full effect to the provisions of cl. 23, the provisions of which are specifically made applicable to the two subject-matters of cl. 22, we have to read as if leaves of tendu plants or trees in a raiyat's holding were on the same footing as those found in or brought from a forest.
17. The same result may be arrived at by ignoring the words ‘found in, or brought from, a forest.’ In this connexion, on account of the inconsistency between the provisions of cls. 22 and 23 on the one hand and cl. (b) of the definition clause of ‘forest produce’ in the Forest Act on the other, the Court has two alternatives, viz., (1) to ignore the words ‘found in, or brought from, a forest’ in the definition clause of the Forest Act or to ignore the clause ‘but subject to the provisions of clause 23’ appearing in cl. 22 in so far as they refer to the rights created in favour of a raiyat to pluck and appropriate leaves of tendu plants or trees in his holding. We have to choose between these two alternatives, and in our opinion, the alternative which effectuates the real intentions of the legislating body should be preferred. In the instant case, there is no difficulty in holding that the intention of that body was to create a right in favour of a raiyat to pluck and appropriate leaves of tendu plants or trees in his holding, but at the same time to make it subject to the condition that in the event of the raiyat desiring to sell such leaves he is bound to sell the same to a nominee of the Deputy Commissioner. This condition has been superadded to all the three rights created in cls. 21 and 22 referred to above with a view to ensuring the revenue derived from forest produce. Otherwise, a contractor acquiring by highest bid the right to appropriate forest produce may be faced with the situation that a lot of forest produce may be pilfered and sold in the market as coming not from a forest belonging to Government but from trees outside such forests. If, on the other hand, we were to ignore the words ‘but subject to the provisions of cl. 23’ occurring in cl. 22, the result would be that the right to pluck and appropriate leaves of tendu plants or trees in a raiyat's holding would be dissociated from the conditions laid down in cl. 23, which clearly was not the intention of the law-making body. It, therefore, appears to us that the intention of that body was not to incorporate into the provisions of cls. 21, 22 and 23 all the words of the definition clause of ‘forest produce’ in the Forest Act. That such a construction sometimes becomes necessary in order to give full effect to the intention of the legislating body is illustrated by — ‘Salmon v. Duncombe’, 11 AC 627.
18. In that case their Lordships of the Privy Council ignored the full effect of the words ‘as if such subject resided in England’ in order to give full effect to the clearly expressed intention of Natal Ordinance No. I of 1856. In this connexion their Lordships make the following observations:
‘It is, however, a very serious matter to hold that when the main object of a statute is clear, it shall be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskilfulness or ignorance of law. It may be necessary for a Court of Justice to come to such a conclusion, but their Lordships hold that nothing can justify it except necessity or the absolute intractability of the language used. And they have set themselves to consider, first whether any substantial doubt can be suggested as to the main object of the Legislature; and, secondly, whether the last nine words of S. 1 are so cogent and so limit the rest of the Statute as to nullify its effect either entirely or in a very important particular.”
19. That case was followed by a Division Bench of this Court in — ‘Provincial Government, Central Provinces and Berar v. Haji Habib’, (1), in which the head-note to the following effect fully reproduces their Lordships' decision:
“Where no meaning can be given to certain words of a Statute without rejecting some of those used in it, or where the Statute becomes a nullity if all the words therein are retained, the Court has power to read it as though the words which make it a nullity are not there, and it is competent for the Court to modify the language so as to carry out the intention of the Act.”
20. It may be argued that if the Court has to make a choice as to which of the two alternatives referred to above should be adopted, why not adopt the alternative of ignoring the words ‘but subject to the provisions of clause 23’ occurring in clause 22, which would have the effect of conferring full rights on a raiyat untrammelled by any conditions which are in the nature of limitations upon his rights? But that construction, in our opinion, will lead to the conversion of a conditional gift into an absolute gift. This would be quite contrary to the expressed intention of the donor of the right. The function of the Court is not to be generous to any party but to be just to all of them and to construe the law as intended by the law-making body. We are thus of the opinion that tendu leaves collected by a raiyat from his own holding fall within Cl. 23(1) and that therefore it is competent to the Deputy Commissioner to direct that they should be sold to a particular person and at a particular price.
21. The argument then is that Cl. 23(1), thus infringes the fundamental right of a raiyat to dispose of property and that it has therefore become void by the operation of Article 31 read with Article 19(1)(f) and (g) of the Constitution. This argument assumes that the raiyat had an unfettered right which was taken I away by Cl. 23(1). The right to collect and appropriate tendu leaves was first conferred on a raiyat by the Land Tenure Order. We have therefore to ascertain the nature and extent of the right upon consideration of the relevant portions of the Land Tenure Order. These provisions are cls. 22 and 23(1) of the Land Tenure Order. We are clear that reading these clauses together it is apparent that the right intended to, be conferred was not an unqualified one but a qualified one. The effect of the Constitution is not to enlarge a proprietary right or any other right in property or in a holding of a citizen before the commencement of the Constitution. Where the right itself is, as here, of a limited character, it would remain so despite the coming into force of the Constitution.
22. As regards the contention of the petitioner Laxman that he had acquired ‘malik mukbuza’ rights, we may point out that though he has deposited the amount as stated by him, he has not yet made an application to the Tahsildar for being declared ‘malik makbuza’ as required by the rules made in this behalf by the State Government. Under the rules every person who wishes to secure ‘malik makbuza’ rights must make an application to the Revenue Officer in Form A prescribed by the rules. After such application is made, the Revenue Officer is required to issue a proclamation in Form B prescribed by the rules. After issuing a proclamation, the Revenue Officer is required to hear objections, if any, which may be made before him, examine the applicant and hear such evidence as is adduced before him. Having done so, if the Revenue Officer finds that the applicant before him is not entitled to a declaration he must dismiss the application and order refund of the amount deposited by him. If, on the other hand, he finds that the applicant is entitled to a declaration he is to grant it and has to fix the land revenue payable. The declaration is then to be made in Form C prescribed by the rules. It is not by merely making a deposit of the amount prescribed by Section 56 of the Madhya Pradesh Abolition of Proprietary Rights Act, 1950, that persons desirous of obtaining ‘malik makbuza’ rights get these rights. The entire procedure provided for in the rules has to be followed and a formal declaration in Form C obtained before he can acquire those rights. In this view, the contention of the petitioner must fail.
23. Now coming to the contention of the petitioner Hiralal, we may point out that he is wrong in saying that his right to carry on a trade or business is infringed by the order of the Deputy Commissioner. It is open to him to purchase tendu leaves from ‘malik makbuzas’ in the Kharsia tahsil and carry on his business.
24. The learned counsel referred us to the decision of the Madras High Court in — ‘Kandaswami v. Textile Commissioner’, , and said that where the effect of an order or notification is to create a monopoly, the fundamental right set out in Article 19(1)(g) is violated and that therefore such notification or order is unconstitutional. It is not necessary for us to say whether we agree with the view taken in that case because that case is distinguishable on facts. In that case it was found by the Court that the effect of a certain notification was to prevent merchants altogether from carrying on any business and that would result in the extinction of their trade. Such is not the case here.
25. The same argument is put in a different form when it is said that where the result of an order or notification is to create a monopoly such order or notification is invalid. The answer to this argument is also the same, that is, that in the instant case Hiralal is not precluded from carrying on his business in the Kharsia tahsil itself, though he may be precluded from purchasing tendu leaves from ordinary raiyats. It may be that but for the direction of the Deputy Commissioner, Hiralal would have been able to make his purchases from a larger group of persons. Merely because he could not do so, and had to content himself with making purehases from a smaller group, the direction cannot be said to interfere with any of his fundamental rights as contended for by him. In the view we take, both the petitions are dismissed. Accordingly we dismiss them with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 50/- in each case.
A/R.G.D
26. Petitions dismissed.