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Judgment Summary — Jagannadhadas, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant was a clerk in the office of the Running Shed Foreman of the East Indian Railway at Kanpur. He was charged with accepting illegal gratification of Rs. 150 on 6 January 1951 from the complainant (Kurphekan, a retrenched cleaner, examined as P.W.2) as a motive for getting the complainant re-employed in the Railway by arranging with some superior officer. A trap was arranged by the Special Police Establishment; the appellant was caught receiving Rs. 150 and the amount was seized. The appellant admitted receipt of the money but claimed it was repayment of a prior loan, denying that it was accepted as a bribe. He was convicted under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code, sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year and nine months and to pay a fine of Rs. 200. The conviction and sentence were upheld on appeal to the Sessions Judge and in revision by the High Court. The present matter is an appeal to this Court on special leave.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether acceptance of money by a public servant who is not himself in a position to give a job (but who holds out that he will render assistance "with any public servant") falls within Section 161, IPC, or is instead an offence of cheating.
  2. Whether the phrase "with any public servant" in Section 161, IPC, requires the charge to specify the particular public servant who was to be influenced.
  3. Whether the prosecution had a valid sanction under Section 6(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 — specifically, whether the authority granting sanction (Superintendent Power, Shri L.R. Gosain) was competent to remove the appellant from his office under Article 311(1) of the Constitution and Rule 1705(c) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code.
  4. Whether the findings of fact of the courts below were so unsustainable as to warrant interference on appeal on special leave.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant argued that he was not in a position to give the complainant a job nor shown to have influence with any particular official who could give a job; therefore the offence, if any, was cheating and not acceptance of a bribe under Section 161, IPC.
  • It was contended that the charge did not specify the particular public servant who was intended to be influenced by the appellant, and that Section 161 would not apply unless a particular public servant was identified because of the phrase "with any public servant".
  • A principal contention was that there was no valid sanction for prosecution under Section 6(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, because the appellant was a civil servant of the Indian Union and, under Article 311(1) of the Constitution and Rule 1705(c) of the Railway Establishment Code, could not be removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed; the sanction had been granted by Shri L.R. Gosain, Superintendent Power, who was not shown to be an officer not lower in rank than the Divisional Personnel Officer who signed the appointment (Ex. F).
  • At trial the appellant also presented a factual defence that the money accepted was repayment of a debt previously owed by the complainant.

Prosecution / Complainant's Position

  • The prosecution's case, accepted by the trial court and the courts below, was that the appellant accepted Rs. 150 as illegal gratification (a bribe) to arrange, with some superior officer, the re-employment of the complainant; a trap was laid and the appellant was caught receiving the sum which was seized.
  • The prosecution relied on the terms of Section 161, IPC, and the evidence of P.W.2 (complainant) and other witnesses to show the money was accepted as a motive for rendering or attempting to render service with another public servant.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court declined to re-examine the factual findings at length because this was an appeal on special leave and no serious error in the findings of fact had been shown that would justify interference. The Court therefore confined itself to the main legal arguments advanced.

On the contention that Section 161, IPC, does not apply where the public servant receiving gratification is not in a position to give the job: the Court analysed the language and statutory explanations of Section 161. It held that the offence is made out where a public servant accepts illegal gratification as a motive for rendering service "with any other public servant" — it is immaterial whether the recipient is actually able to render the assistance or even intends to do so. The Court relied on the fourth explanation to Section 161 (quoted in the opinion) which states that a person who receives gratification as a motive for doing what he does not intend to do (or as a reward for doing what he has not done) comes within the words. The Court also cited illustration (c) to Section 161 (reproduced in the opinion) to show that inducing someone to believe that the receiver has influence with the Government and receiving money as a reward for that service constitutes the offence. The Court therefore rejected the appellant's argument that the matter was only one of cheating.

On the point that "any public servant" requires specification of the particular public servant: the Court considered the relevant phrase in the statutory provision and its context. It observed that the section uses broad language: "for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central or Provincial Government or Legislature, or with any public servant as such." The Court reasoned that the phrase "Central or any Provincial Government or Legislature" does not require specification of an individual, and there is no reason why "any public servant" in the same context should be read as requiring a specified individual. The Court noted that in the present case the complainant's evidence and the High Court's finding were that the appellant purported to attempt to render a service with another public servant, viz., the Head-clerk at Allahabad, but emphasised that specification is not a statutory requirement.

The most substantial legal challenge concerned the validity of the sanction required under Section 6(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The Court accepted that the Act applied and that sanction needed to be given by the authority "competent to remove the appellant from his office". The appellant argued that, under Article 311(1) of the Constitution and Rule 1705(c) of the Railway Establishment Code, the sanctioning authority could not be subordinate to the appointing authority. The sanction in this case (Ex. 10) was given by Shri L.R. Gosain, Superintendent Power, East Indian Railway, Allahabad; the appointment order (Ex. F) showed the Divisional Personnel Officer as the appointing authority. The Sessions Judge had found — and this finding was not challenged before the Supreme Court — that the Divisional Personnel Officer was in the same grade as the Superintendent Power. The Sessions Judge recorded a categorical finding to that effect.

The Court examined the evidence on inter se rank: P.W.4 (Head-clerk of the Divisional Superintendent's office) testified that the Divisional Personnel Officer and various Superintendents (including Superintendent Power) were officers of the same rank and not subordinate to each other. While oral evidence might have been less satisfactory than official records, the Sessions Judge had also referred to the Classified List of Establishment of Indian Railways, which showed both the Divisional Personnel Officer and Superintendent Power on the senior scale drawing equal pay (Rs. 625-50-1375). The Court held that this corroborated the oral evidence and confirmed that the Superintendent Power was not lower in rank than the appointing authority and was thus competent to grant the sanction required by Section 6(c). The Court also observed that the trial court might have more explicitly considered the validity of the sanction by reading Section 6 together with Article 311(1) and Rule 1705(c), but on the material before it the Court was not satisfied there was reason to reverse the findings of the courts below that the sanction was valid.

Having rejected the principal legal objections, the Court held that all contentions raised were untenable and that the appeal must fail on the merits of conviction. However, the Court took into account mitigation factors urged by counsel — that the appellant had been refused bail when leave was granted but had subsequently been granted bail, had already served nearly six months in custody in the intervening period, was a young man and had lost his job — in deciding not to order further imprisonment. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal but modified the sentence of imprisonment by reducing it to the period already undergone; the fine was left intact.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is DISMISSED, subject to modification of the sentence of imprisonment. The sentence of imprisonment (rigorous imprisonment for one year and nine months) is reduced to the period already undergone (nearly six months); the sentence of fine of Rs. 200 remains.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The appellant's conviction under Section 161, IPC, and sentence are upheld in substance; imprisonment is reduced to time already served and the fine remains payable. The appellant remains convicted and has lost his employment as noted in the opinion.
  • Interpretative guidance: The Court reaffirmed that Section 161 covers acceptance of gratification by a public servant as a motive for rendering or attempting to render service "with any public servant", even if the receiver is not actually in a position to perform or procure the official act, or does not intend to do so — pursuant to the fourth explanation and illustration (c) to Section 161 as reproduced in the opinion.
  • Sanction requirement: The Court accepted that the sanction under Section 6(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act must come from the authority competent to remove the public servant, but that competence is satisfied where the sanctioning authority is of the same rank/grade as the appointing authority (consistent with the constitutional protection in Article 311(1) and Rule 1705(c) read together), as demonstrated by the factual findings and supporting pay-scale evidence in this case.
  • No new legal precedent was expressly announced beyond the application of the statutory explanations and the factual conclusion on sanction; the decision stands as an affirmation of the courts below on the facts and statutory interpretation set out in this opinion.

Final result as given in the opinion: Appeal dismissed; imprisonment reduced to time already served; fine maintained.

V.R.B

    Mahesh Prasad v. State Of Uttar Pradesh .

    Jagannadhadas, J.:— The appellant in this case was a clerk in the office of the Running Shed Foreman of the East Indian Railway at Kanpur. He was convicted under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for one year and nine months, and also to a fine of Rs. 200. The conviction and sentence have been upheld by the Sessions Judge on appeal and by the High Court in revision.

    2. The charge against the appellant was that on the 6th of January, 1951, he accepted illegal gratification of Rs. 150 from the complainant, Kurphekan — a retrenched cleaner in the Locomotive Department of the Railway, examined as P.W 2 — as a motive for getting him re-employed in the Railway (by arranging, with some superior officer). There was an alternative charge under Section 162 of the Indian Penal Code but it is no longer necessary to notice it since the conviction is for the main charge under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code. The Special Police Establishment having received information of the demand of the bribe arranged for a trap and caught the appellant just at the time when he received the sum of Rs. 150 from the complainant and seized the amount. The appellant admitted the receipt of the money but denied that he demanded or accepted it as a bribe. His case was that the complainant had previously borrowed money from him and that this money was paid in discharge of the debt. The courts below have rejected the defence and accepted the prosecution case and conviction followed thereupon.

    3. Learned counsel for the appellant has tried to persuade us, with reference to the evidence in the case, that the view taken by the Courts below is unsustainable. It is unnecessary to notice this argument in any detail because this is an appeal on special leave and nothing so seriously wrong with the findings of fact have been shown, which call for interference by this Court. It is sufficient to notice the main legal arguments that have been advanced.

    4. It is pointed out that the appellant though employed in the Railway was not himself a person who was in a position to give a job to the complainant nor is it shown that he had any intimacy or influence with any particular official who could give a job. It is urged therefore that the offence, if any, committed by the appellant could only be one of cheating and not the receiving of a bribe. This argument is without any substance. By the terms of Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code a person who is a public servant and accepts illegal gratification as a motive for rendering service, with any public servant as such, is guilty of the offence thereunder.

    5. To constitute an offence under this section it is enough if the public servant who receives the money takes it by holding out that he will render assistance to the giver “with any other public servant” and the giver gives the money under that belief. It may be that the receiver of the money is in fact not in a position to: render such assistance and is even aware of: it. He may not even have intended to do what he holds himself out as capable of doing. He may accordingly be guilty of cheating. Nonetheless he is guilty of the offence under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code. This is clear from the fourth explanation to Section 161, I.P.C which is as follows:

    “‘A motive or reward for doing’. A person who receives a gratification as a motive for doing what he does not intend to do, (or as a reward for doing what he has not done) comes within these words”.

    6. Illustration (c) to Section 161, I.P.C which runs as follows also elucidates this:

    “A, a public servant, induces Z erroneously 1 to believe that A's influence with the Government has obtained a title for Z and thus induces Z to give A money as a reward for this service. A has committed the offence defined in this section”.

    7. Thus where a public servant who receives illegal gratification as a motive for doing or procuring an official act whether or not he is capable of doing it or whether or not he intends to do it he is quite clearly within the ambit of Section 161, I.P.C

    8. The next contention that has been raised is that the charge does not specify the particular public servant who was intended to be influenced by the appellant in consideration of his receiving the money. It is urged that Section 161, I.P.C would not apply to such a case. It is suggested that the phrase “with any public servant” in Section 161, I.P.C must relate to a specified public servant. In the present case the evidence of the complainant and the finding of the High Court is that the appellant “purported to attempt rendering of a service to the complainant with another public servant, viz., the Head-clerk at Allahabad”. But even apart from such a finding there is nothing in the terms of Section 161, I.P.C requiring that the public servant contemplated therein must be a specified public servant. The material portion of the section is as follows:

    “for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central or Provincial Government or Legislature, or with any public servant as such.”

    9. The phrase “Central or any Provincial Government or Legislature” does not contemplate any specified individual or individuals. There is no reason why the phrase “any public servant” used in the same context should be taken to mean any specified public servant. The gist of the offence under Section 161, I.P.C (in so far as it is relevant here) is the receipt by a public servant of illegal gratification as a motive or reward for the abuse of official position or function, by the receiver himself or by some other public servant at his instance. There is, therefore, no substance in this argument.

    10. The only serious argument that has been advanced and which requires a little closer examination is that there was no valid sanction for the prosecution. There is no doubt that this is a case to which the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 would apply and that by virtue of Section 6(c) thereof the prosecution requires the sanction of the authority “competent to remove the appellant from his office”. It is urged that this requirement was not satisfied on the facts of this case. It has been pointed out that the appellant is a civil servant of the Indian Union and that by virtue of Article 311(1) of the Constitution he cannot be removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. This appears also to be the position under Rule 1705(c) of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Vol. I (1951 Edn.) which is as follows:

    “No railway servant shall be removed (or dismissed) by an authority lower than that by which he was appointed to the post held by him substantively.”

    11. The sanction for the prosecution in this case was granted under Ex. 10 by one Shri L.R Gosain, Superintendent Power, East Indian Railway, Allahabad. The order of appointment of the appellant, Ex. F, shows the Divisional Personnel Officer, East Indian Railway, Allahabad, as the appointing authority. It may be mentioned that in the appeal before the Sessions Judge a contention was raised that the appointment of the appellant was in fact made by the Divisional Superintendent and that Ex. F was only signed by the Divisional Personnel Officer on his behalf.

    12. The Sessions Judge found against this contention and the same has not been challenged before us. What, however, is urged is that the Superintendent Power who gave the sanction for prosecution is ‘not’ shown to be an officer ‘not’ lower in rank than the Divisional Personnel Officer who made the appointment. The question as to the validity of the sanction has been raised both before the Sessions Judge as well as before the High Court. The High Court in considering the question appears to have merely satisfied itself that under the Railway Regulations, Shri L.R Gosain, Superintendent Power, was a person competent to remove the appellant from his office within the terms of Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

    13. The High Court does not appear to have considered the further question whether or not the requirements of Article 311(1) of the Constitution and Rule 1705(c) of the Railway Establishment Code have been satisfied with reference to the ‘inter se’ position as between the authority who appointed the appellant and the authority who sanctioned the prosecution. The learned Sessions Judge, however, has recorded a categorical finding that the Divisional Personnel Officer is in the same grade as the Superintendent Power. His finding is in the following terms:

    “I, therefore, hold that the accused could be and was actually appointed by the Divisional Personnel Officer ‘who is in the same grade as the Superintendent Power’. It cannot therefore be said that the Superintendent Power Mr. L.R Gosain was not authorised to remove the accused from service by virtue of Rule 1705 and this argument advanced against the validity of sanction, Ex. 10, falls to the ground.”

    14. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that the requirement both of the Constitution and of the rule of the Railway Code, contemplates that the authority competent to remove must be either the very authority who appointed or any other authority directly superior to the appointing authority in the same department. We do not think that this contention is tenable. What the Constitution requires is that a person should not be removed by an authority subordinate to the one by whom he was appointed and what the rule in the Railway Code prescribes is substantially the same, viz., “the authority competent to remove should not be lower than the one who made the appointment”.

    15. These provisions cannot be read as implying that the removal must be by the very same authority who made the appointment or by his direct superior. It appears to us to be enough that the removing authority is of the same rank or grade. In the present case it does not appear, into which particular branch of the department, the appellant was taken, in the first instance in 1944 under Ex. F. But it is in the evidence of P.W 4, the Head-clerk of the office of the Divisional Superintendent, that the office of the Running Shed Foreman in which the appellant was a clerk in 1951 was directly under the Superintendent Power. He was obviously the most appropriate officer to grant the sanction, provided he was of a rank not less than the Divisional Personnel Officer.

    16. Counsel for the appellant urges that the evidence does not support the finding of the learned Sessions Judge that Shri L.R Gosain, Superintendent Power, was of the same grade as the Divisional Personnel Officer who made the appointment. P.W 4 in his evidence, however, quite clearly speaks to this as follows:

    “Divisional Superintendent is the head of the entire administrative division. The Divisional Personnel Officer is under him. The Superintendent Power and Superintendent Transport are ‘also’ under him ‘and’ also such other officers of ‘the same rank’……….Divisional Personnel Officer and the various Superintendents ‘are officers of the same rank. They are not subordinate to each other’”.

    17. It has been commented that this should have been substantiated by the official records and not by oral evidence. That no doubt would have been more satisfactory. The learned Sessions Judge on appeal, in order to satisfy himself, has referred to the Classified List of Establishment of Indian Railways and the same has also been produced before us for our information. This shows that both the Divisional Personnel Officer as well as Superintendent Power are officers in the senior scale drawing equal scales of pay, Rs. 625-50-1375. This is an indication that they are officers of the same rank and confirms the oral evidence of P.W 4 who being the Head-clerk of the Divisional Superintendent's office must be competent to speak about these matters.

    18. It certainly cannot be said that the Superintendent Power who has granted the sanction for prosecution of the appellant at the time working under him, is of a rank or a grade lower than the Divisional Personnel Officer who appointed the appellant. This matter would probably have been more satisfactorily clarified in the trial court if the question as to the validity of the sanction had been raised not merely with reference to the wording of Section 6 of the Prevention of Corruption Act but also as read with Article 311(1) of the Constitution and Rule 1705(c) of the Railway Establishment Code. On the material we are not satisfied that there is any reason to reverse the findings of the courts below that the sanction is valid. All the contentions raised before us are untenable. This appeal must accordingly fail. It has been represented to us that the appellant who has been refused bail by this Court when leave to appeal was granted but has been granted bail subsequently has already served nearly six months of imprisonment in the intervening period, that he is a young man and has lost his job. In the circumstances we consider that it is not necessary to send him back to jail. The result, therefore, is that the appeal is dismissed subject to the modification of sentence of imprisonment. We reduce the sentence of imprisonment to the period already undergone. The sentence of fine stands.

    V.R.B

    19. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Mahesh Prasad v. State Of Uttar Pradesh .
    (Oct 29, 1954)