In this case, the question for decision is one under section 7(3)(a)(iii) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949. The petitioner is a tenant of a non-residential godown-bearing door No. 502/12 in Nellore town, where he is carrying on business. The respondent is the landlord. The respondent filed B.R.C No. 77 of 1958 before the Rent Controller, Nellore, for eviction of the petitioner on the ground that the godown in question is bona fide required by him for carrying on his own business. The Rent Controller ordered eviction, and on appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge, Nellore, confirmed the order of eviction. The building originally belonged to the respondent's adoptive father who executed a settlement deed, Exhibit P-1, dated 21st October, 1954. The petitioner was a tenant of the suit godown for over twenty years from the original owner, that is, the respondent's adoptive father, Subbarayulu Chetty. In M.B.C No. 80 of 1946, the said Subbarayulu Chetty attempted to eivict the petitioner, but ultimately in C.M.A No. 13 of 1947 the petitioner herein succeeded and the petition for eviction was dismissed. Subbarayulu Chetty himself had another godown of his own, running his shroff business, and therefore could not succeed in evicting the petitioner. As stated above, as per Exhibit P-1, the suit godown was settled on the respondent and the petitioner herein attorned to him and was paying him rent subsequent to the deed of settlement.
2. Two points are argued by Sri A. Kuppuswami, the learned counsel for the petitioner in this Civil Revision Petition. He contended that the settlement deed, Exhibit P-1, is only a nominal one executed with the purpose of enabling the respondent to file another petition for eviction. He pointed out (hat the adoptive father, Subbarayulu Chetty, is still in possession of the properties covered by the deed of settlement, that the respondent is only 17 years old, and he also referred me to the recitals in Exhibit P-1 which indicate that the deed of settlement is only a make-believe. I am unable to agree with this contention for the reason that the petitioner recognised the respondent as the owner of the building and attorned to him and was paying him the rent agreed upon from the time of the deed of settlement. There is no substance in this contention.
3. Secondly, it is argued that admittedly the respondent is carrying on business in a godown taken on lease by him from one Ranganayakamma in Korada Street, Nellore. The respondent adduced evidence which was accepted by the Rent Controller and on appeal by the learned Subordinate Judge, Nellore, to prove that the respondent bona fide wanted to carry on business and in fact rented a godown as per Exhibit P-8 from Ranganayakamma on 9th September, 1958, for a period of six months and that he applied for the necessary licences for carrying on business and that in fact he was carrying on business in the premises obtained under Exhibit P-8. The business was started in the said premises by the respondent on 10th September, 1958. It is stated that the present application for eviction was filed on 28th November, 1958. Therefore, it is argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the respondent is occupying for the purpose of the business which he is carrying on in a non-residential building in Nellore town to the possession of which he is entitled under the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949, and that therefore the respondent is not entitled to an order of eviction against the petitioner under section 7(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. It is necessary to refer to the said section which reads as follows:—
“(3)(a) A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building;
(iii) in case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord is not occupying for purposes of a business which he is carrying on, a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise.”
4. Section 7(3)(e) provides:
“The Controller shall, if he is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building on such date as may be specified by the Controller…………”
5. With regard to clause (e), the lower Courts have found and it is also clear to my mind that the claim of the landlord is bona fide, but in my view the landlord is not entitled to an order of eviction under section 7(3)(a)(iii) if he is occupying for the purpose of the business which he is carrying on, a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned, which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under this Act or otherwise. As pointed but above, the respondent is occupying a godown which he got under the lease deed, Exhibit P-8, dated 9th September, 1958, from Ranganayakamma. No doubt, under Exhibit P-8, the term of lease is only six months and it has expired. But, he is entitled to possession of the said premises under this Act because Ranganayakamma could not evict the respondent from the premises covered by Exhibit P-8 except in accordance with the provisions of section 7 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1949. It is not suggested by the learned counsel for the respondent and it cannot be said that Ranganayakamma was entitled to evict the respondent, from her godown in accordance with section 7 of the Act. It follows that the respondent is entitled to continue in possession of the said godown within the meaning of section 7(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. Therefore, the respondent is not entitled to an order of eviction by reason of section 7(3)(a)(iii). The learned counsel for the respondent wanted to rely upon section 7(3)(c) of the Act under which a landlord who is occupying only a part of a building, whether residential or non-residential, may, notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a), apply to the Controller for an order directing any tenant occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining part of the building to put the landlord in possession thereof, if he requires additional accommodation for residential purposes or for the purposes of a business which he is carrying on, as the case may be. But, in my opinion, this clause (c) has no application at all to the present case. It applies only to a case where the landlord is occupying a part of a building and still requires the remaining part for the purpose of his own business as additional accommodation. The learned Subordinate Judge ordered eviction on the ground that the godown taken on lease by the respondent from Ranganayakamma under Exhibit P-8 and which he is occupying and he was carrying on business in, is a very small one and is not ki a business locality and that he required the suit godown situated in a proper business locality for running his shop business. Therefore, the learned Subordinate Judge held, that the question of the landlord being in possession or occupation of the non-residential building of Ranganayakamma does not arise for consideration. He also pointed out that the period of the lease under Exhibit P-8 was only for six months and that the respondent promised to vacate after the period of six months without notice. In my view, these are not at all relevant considerations. The only question is whether under the Act the respondent was entitled to the possession of the premises covered by Exhibit P-8 under the Act. In my opinion, he was entitled to continue in possession of the said premises under the Act until Ranganayakamma could make out a case to evict him in accordance with the provisions of section 7 of the Act. The considerations which weighed with the learned Judge to confirm the order of eviction are wholly irrelevant for deciding this case. The learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the decision in Thanappa Chetty v. Arcat Govindaswami 1952-1 M.L.J 248. It is a case under section 7(3)(a)(ii) which refers to non-residential building which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle. The language therein is substantially the same as the language of section 7(3)(a)(iii). It was argued before Subba Rao, J., (as he them was) who decided that case, that a statutory immunity is different from a right to possession, but the learned Judge held that statutory immunity is not inconsistent with right to possession. The statutory immunity itself creates a right in a person to continue in possession till he is evicted under the provisions of the Act and that therefore the landlord who is in occupation of any other non-residential building which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle and to the possession of which he is entitled under the Act cannot evict a tenant who is in possession of a similar building of his own. This decision clearly supports the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the present case. I am also referred to a decision in Vemana Veerabhadrudu v. Kancherla Ramarao 1958 A.L.T 728 = 1958-2 An. W.R 575. There it was pointed out that the terms of section 7(3)(a)(iii) are clear and mandatory and that a landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put him in possession of a non-residential building, only if he is not occupying for the purpose of his business, a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own or to the possession of which he is entitled whether under the Act or otherwise. In that case, the landlord owned another premises where he was carrying on business. Seshachelapati, J., who decided that case, held that there is no warrant for importing into the section considerations of convenience and suitability of the locality, etc., and that there is no justification for importing such considerations into the question as to whether under the terms of section 7(3)(a)(iii) a landlord can ask for eviction of his tenant and that he can do so only in terms of the sub-section and that if the landlord is in possession of any other non-residential building where he is carrying on his business and to whose possession he is entitled under the Act, he cannot apply for eviction of the tenant and that the Court will have no jurisdiction to order such eviction. The rights of the tenants and the landlords are regulated by the statute and should be strictly construed. It is not permissible to enlarge the scope of the provisions by importing into them considerations of expediency or convenience which are not warranted by the terms of the statutory provisions. It follows, therefore, that in this case the respondent is not entitled to get an order of eviction of the petitioner from the said premises. The Civil Revision Petition is allowed and B.R.C No. 77 of 1958 on the file of the Rent Controller, Nellore, is dismissed. Parties to bear their costs throughout.
Revision allowed.