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  • (Regulation) Act.Section 2(c) of the Hyderabad Cinemas (Regulation) Act
  • provisions of the Hyderabad Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1952,
  • provisions of the Hyderabad Cinemas (Regulation) Act,
  • Rule 67 of the Hyderabad Cinematograph Rules, 1953,
  • clause (b) of sub-section (2) of the above section
  • clauses (a) and (b) of section 5,
  • sub-section (3) of Section 5
  • sub-section (1) of Section 9
  • sub-section (2) of Section 5
  • SECTION 3 INTEREST ACT
  • (Regulation) Act, 1952
  • rule 62(a).Rule 67,
  • Section 9 a rule
  • section 9(2)(b).
  • section 2(c)
  • rule 62(b)
  • rule 3(e)
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • (Regulation) Act.Section 2(c) of the Hyderabad Cinemas (Regulation) Act
  • provisions of the Hyderabad Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1952,
  • provisions of the Hyderabad Cinemas (Regulation) Act,
  • Rule 67 of the Hyderabad Cinematograph Rules, 1953,
  • clause (b) of sub-section (2) of the above section
  • clauses (a) and (b) of section 5,
  • sub-section (3) of Section 5
  • sub-section (1) of Section 9
  • sub-section (2) of Section 5
  • SECTION 3 INTEREST ACT
  • (Regulation) Act, 1952
  • rule 62(a).Rule 67,
  • Section 9 a rule
  • section 9(2)(b).
  • section 2(c)
  • rule 62(b)
  • rule 3(e)

    A. Shelvarajan Petitioner v. The State Of Mysore And Another

    Somnath Iyer, J.:— The Petitioner is an exhibitor of a travelling cinematograph show. In the year 1960 he applied for a licence under the provisions of the Hyderabad Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1952, for a licence to exhibit his cinematograph shows in a village called Gangavathi in the District of Raichur. He was granted a licence authorising him to exhibit his cinematograph shows during a period of four months. He again made another application for the renewal of that licence for a further period of four months during the year 1960. His application was rejected by the licensing authority on the ground that under rule 67 of the Hyderabad Cinematograph Rules, 1953 as amended by the notification issued by the State Government on November 19, 1960, no license for a travelling cinematograph show could be issued more than once during the same year. The Petitioner then appealed to the State Government under section 5(3) of the Act. His appeal was dismissed. It is against these orders, made by the licensing authority in the first instance and later by the State Government that this writ petition is directed.

    What is urged on behalf of the Petitioner is that the amendment made to rule 67 of the Hyderabad Cinematograph Rules, 1953 was an invalid amendment since the State Government had no competence to make it. It would be necessary, to understand this submission, to refer to the relevant statutory provisions.

    The Hyderabad Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1952 which continued to operate in those Districts of the old Hyderabad State which were added to the new State of Mysore regulated cinematograph exhibitions. Section 3 of that Act prohibited the “exhibition by means of a cinematograph” except under a licence issued under the Act. That section reads:—

    “Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no person shall give an exhibition by means of a cinematograph elsewhere than in a place licensed under this Act or otherwise than in compliance with any conditions and restrictions imposed by such licence.”

    The word “place” occurring in this section is defined by section 2(c) which reads—

    “‘Place’ includes a house, building, tent and any description of transport, whether by river, land or air.”

    Section 4 provides that the licensing authority shall be the concerned Collector. Section 5 prescribes the procedure to be adopted by the adoption of which an application for a licence under the Act should be disposed of by him. Section 7 enumerates the penalties for contravention of the Act. Section 8 confers power to revoke the license. Section 9 confers on the State Government the power to make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of the Act.

    The Petitioner was exhibiting his shows in a tent and so it was that rules 61 to 68 of the Hyderabad Cinematograph Rules, 1953 made under section 9 of the Act became applicable to him. Those eight rules are contained in Part VIII of the Rules and are applicable to all travelling cinematograph shows. Rule 62(a) defines a ‘building’ and that definition is:—

    “‘Building’ shall include any booth, tent or similar structure.”

    “Travelling Cinematograph Show” is defined by rule 62(b) and that definition is:—

    “Travelling Cinematograph Show” shall mean an outfit comprising of cinematograph apparatus and plant taken from place to place in the State for giving cinematograph exhibitions.”

    It is not disputed that the Petitioner applied for a licence for a travelling cinematograph show within the meaning of the definition contained in rule 62 and it cannot be disputed that the tent in which the Petitioner wished to exhibit his show is a building within the meaning of its definition contained in rule 62(a).

    Rule 67, before its amendment which was made to it on November 19, 1960, read:—

    “No building constructed of inflammable materials shall be licensed for a period longer than four months a time.”

    After its amendment which came into force on November 19, 1960 that rule reads:—

    “A building constructed of inflammable materials may be licensed for any period not exceeding four months and a licence granted in respect of any such building shall not be renewed again within the same year for the same place.

    Explanation— For purposes of this Rule ‘place’ means an area within a radius of five miles from the building at which a Travelling Cinematograph show is exhibited.”

    The refusal of the renewal of the Petitioner's licence was made under this amended rule which had come into force when his application for renewal had to be considered. Although “inflammable material” is not defined by the Act or by the rules, it is clear from rule 3(e) that inflammable material is material out of which a building other than a permanent building is constructed. I will assume for the purpose of this case, although no argument has been addressed on behalf of the Petitioner about it, that the tent in which the Petitioner wished to exhibit his cinematograph shows was constructed with inflammable material. The question whether the cloth out of which the tent is constructed is or is not inflammable material, is not one on which it is necessary for us in my opinion, to express any opinion since no arguments were addressed about it.

    The short question which arises for decision is whether the application of the Petitioner for the renewal of the licence was liable to be dismissed by the licensing authority on the ground that rule 67 as amended does not authorise an application for a licence more than once during a year.

    The argument addressed on behalf of the Petitioner was twofold. It was first urged that the new rule is so unreasonable as to be struck down as invalid. It was also urged that the new rule had the effect of depriving the Petitioner of the fundamental right guaranteed to him by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and was therefore void.

    The justification for the amendment of the rule, as revealed by paragraph 3 of the counter-affidavit produced on behalf of the State of which the deponent is one of its Under Secretaries reads:—

    “The object of the amended rule which provides that a licence granted to a cinema which is run in a building constructed of inflammable materials, shall not be renewed within the same year for the same place, is to ensure that persons who want to run a cinema in a place for long periods should construct theatres out of non-inflammable materials so that the persons who visit the cinema may not be exposed to the risk of accidents of fire. Unless there is such a restriction on the renewal of the licence, there will be a tendency in persons who run cinemas in buildings constructed out of inflammable materials to get extension of the licence from time to time so as to circumvent the policy of the Government that cinemas which are run for a reasonably long period should be housed in buildings of non-inflammable materials.”

    The grounds contained in this paragraph of the counter-affidavit are those on which the learned Government Pleader relied in support of his argument that there was no infraction of any fundamental right of the Petitioner.

    According to the learned Government Pleader, the new rule which imposed no more than a reasonable restriction on the fundamental right was fully within the competence of the State Government and was therefore beyond the criticism that it violated the fundamental right guaranteed by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

    According to the Petitioner, the rule resulted in a partial deprivation of his fundamental right to carry on his trade or business since under that rule a person could not carry on the business of exhibition of travelling cinematograph shows for more than four months during the year. According to the argument, during the remaining eight months, the rule brought about a deprivation of the right of the petitioner to conduct the said business.

    In Narendrakumar v. The Union of India(1) it was pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the word “restriction” contained in Article 19(6) of the Constitution was sufficiently wide to save laws totally taking away the right conferred by the Article, provided such deprivation was demanded by the interests of the general public.

    If the case made out in the counter-affidavit that rule 67 as amended, had for its objective the prevention of the dangers and accidents likely to arise from the exhibition of cinematograph shows in buildings constructed with inflammable materials is accepted, it would be clear that according to the pronouncement of the Supreme Court, even if the rule resulted in substantial deprivation of the right of the Petitioner to carry on his trade or business guaranteed to him by Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, such deprivation being the outcome of a restriction imposed under Art. 19(6) and being plainly a reasonable restriction the imposition of which was demanded by public interests it would not be open to him to assail the validity of the new rule.

    But it seems to me unnecessary to pursue this discussion further or to consider in any great detail the validity of the argument addressed before us about the unreasonableness of the new rule, since the new rule in the form in which it stands after it replaced the old one, is, in my opinion, in excess of the statutory provisions authorising the rule-making authority to make rules under the Hyderabad Cinemas (Regulation) Act.

    section 2(c) of the Hyderabad Cinemas (Regulation) Act which defines a ‘place’ makes it clear that the legislative intent when the Act was enacted was to permit the exhibition of cinematograph shows even in places like tents and even in places constructed with inflammable materials. The Act itself does not forbid the exhibition of such shows in places other than permanent buildings or in places constructed with inflammable materials. The expression “inflammable materials” does not occur in the Act, and the place in which that expression for the first time is found is rule 3(e).

    The policy of the Legislature when it made its law not to forbid altogether the exhibition of cinematograph shows either in a tent in which the Petitioner has been exhibiting his shows or in places constructed with inflammable materials. What the Legislature on the contrary did was to permit in terms the exhibition of cinematograph shows even in tents. It however regulated such exhibitions by requiring the exhibitor to obtain, before exhibiting his shows, a licence under section 5 of the Act. This, is the requirement of section 3 of the Act.

    When we turn to section 5 under which the licensing authority has to consider and dispose of an application made for a licence, all that section provides is that the licensing authority shall not grant a licence unless it is satisfied that the rules made under the Act have been substantially complied with and adequate precautions have been taken in the place in respect of which the licence has to be granted to provide for the safety of Persons attending the exhibitions therein.

    It therefore becomes clear from section 5 that if the rules made under the Act are not transgressed and adequate precautions are taken by a licensee to provide for the safety of persons attending the exhibitions in the place in which he had to be licensed, the licensing authority cannot refuse to grant a licence.

    It is not the case for the Respondents that in the place in which the Petitioner wished to exhibit the shows he had not made adequate provisions for the safety of the persons attending the exhibitions therein. That being so, the licensing authority in this case could not have refused the application made by the petitioner, unless he was satisfied that the rules made under the Act had not been substantially complied with.

    It is not also the case for the Respondents that any other rule made under the Act had not been complied with by the Petitioner. Part II of the rules contains elaborate provisions as to the procedure to be adopted by an applicant for the grant of a licence. It prescribes the form in which the application has to be presented. It specifies the documents to be produced along with the application and it provides for many other details which the applicant is required to comply with when he applies for a licence.

    Rule 11 of the rules contained in Part II specifies a period of one year as the maximum period for which a licence may be granted. There is also provision in those rules for the renewal of a licence. Part IV contains provisions in respect of permanent buildings. Parts V, VI and VII are not relevant for our present purpose. Then occurs Part VIII which contains special provisions in respect of travelling cinematograph shows with which alone we are concerned in this case. It is in this Part that the impugned rule, viz., rule 67, is contained.

    The ground on which the Petitioner's application was refused in this case by the licensing authority was that during the year 1960 he had already applied for a licence to exhibit his shows in a non-permanent building and that he was therefore ineligible to, apply for a renewal of the licence since rule 67 as amended empowers the grant of a licence to an applicant only once during a year and not more than once.

    The question is whether this rule was one which the State Government had the power to make under the Act. If the rule was within the competence of the State Government, it is clear that this rule disentitled the Petitioner to the grant of a licence in respect of his travelling cinematograph show more than once, since if he had been granted during the year 1960 one licence, he was not entitled to apply for its renewal.

    This rule is made under section 9 of the Act and that section reads:—

    “9(1) The Government may, by notification in the Jarida, make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of this Act.

    (2) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing powers, rules made under this Act may provide for:—

    (a) the terms, conditions and restrictions, if any, subject to which licence may be granted under this Act;

    (b) the regulation of cinematograph exhibitions for securing public safety;

    (c) the time within which and the condition subject to appeal under sub-section (3) of Section 5 may be preferred.”

    According to the learned Government Pleader, the new rule, viz., rule 67, was made under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of the above section and was made for the purpose of securing public safety.

    It was urged that there was a tendency on the part of those who were exhibiting cinematograph shows in non-permanent buildings to carry on the exhibition of such shows in buildings constructed with inflammable materials such as tents without ever making any endeavour to construct permanent buildings for such shows, thereby exposing the members of the public to great danger, peril, discomfort and privation. The State Government, according to the argument, by prohibiting the grant of a licence for shows in a non-permanent building more than once in a year, hoped to create an incentive in the exhibitors to construct permanent buildings.

    If it was made clear to an exhibitor of a travelling cinematograph show that he could not hope to get a licence for exhibiting a cinematograph show for more than four months during a year, it was submitted, that he would, realising the danger of his not being able to exercise his trade or business during eight months in the year, proceed to construct a permanent building. The rule, therefore, according to the learned Government Pleader, had the commendable objective to persuade an exhibitor to construct a permanent building if he wished to carry on his trade during the entire year.

    We are not in this case concerned with the objective underlying rule 67 as it stands now. However commendable and laudable may be the object of the rule, it is clear that rule will not be valid or enforceable unless it was within the competence of the rule making authority to make it. The question therefore to which I should now advert would be whether, even if the new rule is a rule which is not open to the criticism that it was not demanded by the public interests, was one which the Act under which the Government has the power to make the rule, permitted.

    It is difficult to find in the Act any provision which aims at the exhibition of cinematograph shows only in permanent buildings. The Act makes it permissible for the exhibitor not only to exhibit the shows in a permanent building but also in a non-permanent building such as a tent. That is what is clearly indicated by the definition of the word ‘place’ contained in section 2(c).

    Whether tested by the purpose of the Act or its language, it is clear that it was not the legislative intent that cinematograph shows which are regulated by it should be exhibited only in permanent buildings, or that if they were exhibited in non-permanent buildings such as tents, a person should not be allowed to exhibit his shows in such non-permanent buildings throughout the year. If it was the intention of the Legislature that the exhibition of a cinematograph show in a place other than a permanent building should be permitted only during a portion of the year, it was for the Legislature to make a provision in that regard in the Act. The imposition of a restriction to that effect being one which could be made only by the Legislature, if it considered it to be its policy not to permit the exhibition of cinematograph shows in non-permanent buildings during the entire year, a restriction to that effect was one which the Legislature alone could have imposed by appropriate legislation.

    I am unable to agree with the submission made that the prohibition contained in the rule forbidding the grant of a licence for more than four months during the year to an applicant, is one relating to a mere detail in respect of which no essential legislative function was involved. Although it was argued by the learned Government Pleader that there are indications in the Act that the Government was the repository of the power to make all the necessary rules for the purpose of ensuring public safety, and that it was in the exercise of such power that the new rule was made by the Government, I am not disposed to think that the Act confers on the Government any such wide or extensive power in a matter in which the Legislature alone could have legislated.

    Although, it may not be necessary on this occasion to consider the question whether it was open to the Legislature to delegate any such power to the rule making authority or to consider the question whether such power is a delegable power it would be necessary nevertheless to proceed to consider whether the Act contains any provisions bestowing on the State Government the competence to make a rule like the one which is impugned in this case.

    The only provision which has been pointed out by the learned Government Pleader in this context is, as I have mentioned, section 9(2)(b). I am unable to find in that clause which I have already extracted, any power confided to the Government authorising it to make a rule restricting the exhibition of cinematograph shows in non-permanent buildings constructed with inflammable materials during only a portion of the year. In my opinion, the scheme and object of the Act is only to forbid the exhibition of cinematograph shows even in non-permanent buildings without a licence. The only restriction in the Act is, that an exhibitor whether he exhibits his shows in a house or a building or a tent or any other place such as the one referred to in sec. 2(c), should before making such exhibition obtain a licence under the Act.

    Although the Act itself contains no provision to that effect, the rule for the first time provided that a licence granted in respect of a permanent building shall be for a year and in respect of others only for a period of four months.

    Now in regard to the period of four months prescribed as the maximum period for which a licence for the exhibition of a cinematograph show in a non-permanent building may be granted it may not be possible for any one to suggest that the rule fixing that period was beyond the competence of the rule making authority. But if the rule making authority proceeds further and makes a rule that once a licence for the exhibition of cinematograph shows in a non-permanent building constructed with inflammable materials is granted, it cannot have force for a period exceeding four months and that no further application shall be made or entertained during the same year for the grant of another such licence, it is clear that what the rule making authority would be doing in effect would be to impose fetters on the duties of the licensing authority which were not imposed by the Legislature and to compel such authority to abdicate its statutory duties and functions which it has to perform under sec. 5 of the Act.

    Now under section 5 of the Act, the licensing authority is prohibited from granting a licence unless it is satisfied that the rules made under the Act have been complied with and adequate precautions for the safety of the public have been taken. If all the rules made by the State Government other than the impugned rule have been complied with and precautions for the safety of the public attending the exhibitions have all been taken, it would not be open to the licensing authority to refuse a licence, even if the application is for permission to exhibit cinematograph shows in a tent such as the one owned by the Petitioner in this case. It may be that a licence granted on such application will, as provided by the relevant rules, be in force only for four months on each occasion. But the moment that period of four months expires, there is nothing in the Act preventing such exhibitor from making another application for the grant of such licence or for its renewal, and if such application is presented the only conditions to be complied with by the applicant would be those specified in clauses (a) and (b) of section 5, viz., compliance with the rules and arrangements for the safety of the persons attending the exhibitions. If those two conditions are satisfied and complied with, it would not be open to the licensing authority under the Act to refuse to consider the applications merely on the ground that an application for the very same purpose once made during the year, had been granted.

    It is thus abundantly plain that there is nothing in the Act preventing a person exhibiting cinematograph shows in a non-permanent building like a tent from making successive applications for a licence to exhibit his shows in such places. The Act contains no prohibition against applications being made more than once during the same year and does not clothe the licensing authority with power to refuse to entertain or consider the applications merely on the ground that he had, during the same year, been once granted a licence for that purpose.

    The question is whether the State Government could take away a right which a person undoubtedly possessed under the provisions of the Act to make successive applications in the same year for a licence to exhibit his cinematograph shows in a non-permanent building by making a rule for that purpose. If, as I understand it, the new 67th rule would in effect deprive the Petitioner of the right to make such successive applications, which in my opinion would be clearly permissible under the Act and take away from the licensing authority the power which the Act confers on it, to consider and grant such successive applications, a rule which is thus clearly in excess of the power under which the rule making authority makes its rules and is also clearly repugnant to such statute is ultra vires and unenforceable. That rule is open to the objection that it brings about the deprivation of a right created by the Act. It is also open to the criticism that it brings about a compulsory abdication on the part of the licensing authority of the statutory duties imposed on it by the Act.

    It is well established law that a rule made in excess of the statutory power authorising it, or which is repugnant to the statute under which it is made or to the general principles of law, is an invalid and unenforceable rule. It seems to me that the impugned rule in this case suffers from both first and second infirmities.

    The view that I have taken in this case receives support from two English Cases. In R. v. Rotherham Licensing JJ. Exparte Chapman the question was whether a rule made by the licensing justices under the Licensing (Consolidation) Act, 1910 was an invalid rule. What the licensing justices in that case did was to decide upon a general rule that the number of occasional licences granted to the same promoters should not exceed two in any one year commencing on April 1 and ending on March 31 and that an interval of at least three months should elapse between the granting of any two such licences. It was held that the rule involved the abdication of the justices' duty impartially to consider upon the particular facts the merits of each individual application, provided in advance the opportunity of declining jurisdiction in a particular case, and was calculated to clog and to fetter the performance of that duty and was therefore invalid. On page 713 of the report Lord Hewart L, C.J observed:—

    “To return to the substance of this matter, which I think, can be fairly disengaged from the mass of words in which the substance had come to be contained or concealed it is quite obvious, to my mind, that these justices, no doubt under a sense of duty, and under the belief that they were faithfully performing their duty, did prescribe for themselves something, whether it be called a rule or whether it be called a principle, which was to define for the future the limits within which alone applications for an occasional licence would be granted. They appear to have come to the contusion that, where an application was made with reference to a particular organisation, they were entitled to say before hand, and to say in a stereotyped formula. There shall be no more than two in any one year, and with regard to those two themselves, there shall be an interval of 3 months at least between one and the other”. It may well be that justices of discretion and experience might prescribe for themselves a general rule of that nature as a counsel of perfection, intending and being able, to apply an unfettered discretion to the consideration of the merits of each particular case. The rule itself, however, or the principle, if that word be preferred, seems plainly designed to prevent the application of an unfettered judgment to the individual case, and to prescribe in advance a hard and fast rule, save in exceptional circumstances a phrase to which the Licensing Act itself in this connection is a stranger and so exclude any more than two applications with reference to what is called the same organisation in the course of 12 months. That seems to me to be an abdication of the duty of the justices impartially 10 consider upon the particular facts the merits of each individual application. No doubt the justices came to the conclusion that there were too many applications of the kind. No doubt they came to the conclusion that they should regard with a jealous and careful eye all applications of the kind. Nevertheless, it is one thing to have that opinion and it is another thing to lay down a rule or principle that two applications must end the matter for the period of a year, so far as any particular body is concerned. It seems to me that is providing, and providing in advance, the opportunity of declining jurisdiction in a particular case, not applying ostensibly to each particular case an impartial mind, and merely providing for the application of a rigid formula.”

    The same principle was affirmed in R. v. Torquay Licensing Justices, Ex parte Brockman. What the licensing justices did in that case was to announce at the annual general licensing meeting that in future they would only grant a full licence in place of a restricted or table licence in very exceptional circumstances. When an applicant who held a restricted licence for a residential hotel was refused the licence which he wanted, he moved for an order of mandamus on the ground that the justices had pre-determined the issue by laying down a general rule. The principle that the licensing justices were bound to hear and consider the application made for the licence for which an application had been made which was enunciated in R. v. Rotherham Licensing JJ.(2) was affirmed by the learned Judges, but the mandamus which was sought was refused on the ground that the application had been in fact, and indeed, considered by the licensing justices and decided on its merits. On page 659 of the report after referring to R. v. Rotherham Licensing JJ., this is what Lord Goddard, C.J observed:—

    “It appears to us that the justices in that case took into account an entirely irrelevant consideration. In the present case, in our opinion, no fault can be found with the justices determining that as a general rule they would look with disfavour on persons who had come before them and obtained a restricted licence subsequently applying for a full licence and would consider that in such a case there was a very considerable onus thrown on the applicant. We think that is well within their powers, but when an application is made in respect of premises which have hitherto held a restricted licence for one without conditions, the justices are bound to hear it and to consider whether, or the facts of the particular case, there is enough to take it out of the general rule which they have laid down. That is what we think the justices did in the present case. We think they meant to decide that they were not prepared to alter in the particular case before them the general line of policy which they had laid down in this class of case. For these reasons in our opinion, the application fails and should be dismissed with costs.”

    The principle which clearly emerges in these two decisions is that under the provisions of the Hyderabad Cinemas (Regulation) Act, the licensing authority is bound to entertain and consider an application for licence for the exhibition of cinematograph shows in non-permanent buildings even if they were made of inflammable materials and even if such application was made more than once during the same year and by the same person to whom a licence had been previously granted. That duty to consider such applications being one imposed by the statute, cannot be refused to be exercised even if the State Government made a rule under Section 9 prohibiting the grant of a licence more than once during the same year in respect of such exhibitions and each application when made, has to be entertained and disposed of on its own merits, the grant of a licence previously during the same year being an utterly irrelevant and immaterial consideration. If the new rule made by the State Government contained an interdict against the exercise of that duty imposed by the law made by the Legislature, it is liable to be struck down as being repugnant to the law under which the rule is made.

    But the learned Government Pleader attempted to distinguish the two English Cases to which I have referred on the ground that there was an abdication in those two cases by the licensing authorities as a result of a principle which the authorities themselves invented, whereas what had been done in the present case was that the authority which was competent to make a rule under Section 9 had made a rule in the exercise of the authority conferred on it. It does not appear to me that the learned Government Pleader can overcome the principle enunciated in those cases in that way. Although in those two cases there was a voluntary abdication on the part of the licensing authorities and therefore such abdication was not permissible, the abdication in the case before us, although not voluntary, was one which was forced upon the licensing authority by the State Government by a rule made by it. Whatever might be the source of the abdication, there was such abdication, and it seems to me that the abdication so brought about cannot be defended on the ground that it was not an abdication on the part of the licensing authority but was an abdication the cause of which was an incompetent rule made by the rule making authority. If a licensing authority cannot voluntarily abdicate the performance of its statutory duties, it is equally clear that the rule making authority cannot also bring about such abdication by a rule made for that purpose. If a rule is made in that way it would be clearly beyond the power of the rule making authority and therefore invalid.

    But it was urged by the learned Government Pleader that what the State Government did in this case was merely to regulate the cinematograph exhibitions for securing public safety and therefore the rule was one which properly fell within the ambit of Section 9(2)(b) of the Act. It is true that clause provides for the rules being made for that purpose by the State Government.

    But it should be remembered that the rules which may be so made have to be made for two purposes. One of those purposes is to carry into effect the provisions of the Act. That, is what sub-section (1) of Section 9 expressly provides. If, as I have mentioned, the purpose of the Act is to permit the exhibition of cinematograph shows even in non-permanent buildings constructed with inflammable materials, that purpose is not carried into effect by the new rule since what it does, is, to altogether forbid such exhibitions for a period of eight months in a year, if the exhibitions are made in such non-permanent buildings.

    Secondly, it cannot be said that the new rule ‘Regulates’ cinematograph exhibitions. It would not be possible for any one to suggest that, if the State Government prohibited the exhibition of cinematograph shows for a period of eight months in a year, it regulated the cinematograph exhibitions.

    The word ‘regulation’ when it occurs in a statute, has to be interpreted having regard to the context in which that word occurs. And when that word occurs in a licensing legislation such as Hyderabad Cinemas (Regulation) Act it is not possible to interpret that word so as also to confer power to prohibit the performance of the thing which can be done under a licence. The word ‘regulation’ is distinct from ‘prohibition’ or ‘prevention’ and unless there is anything in the statute justifying such interpretation, the word ‘regulation’ cannot be equated with prohibition or prevention. The very expression ‘regulation’ connotes continued existence of the thing to be regulated, and if as the State Government has done in this case, a person who has once exhibited his shows in a non-permanent building for four months has no right to exhibit such shows during the remaining eight months, no one can suggest that during those eight months when the exhibitor cannot exhibit his shows at all, the State Government is regulating the exhibition of cinematograph shows by that person who is altogether prevented or prohibited from making any such exhibition during that period. If he is permitted during that period also to make his exhibition, what the State Government has, is, the power to make a rule regulating that exhibition, provided the exhibition is continued and going on, and if it altogether stops such exhibition, what the Government does is not to regulate it but to prohibit it or stop it.

    That, that is how the expression ‘regulation’ has to be interpreted is what was pointed out in Municipal Corporation of the City of Toronto v. Virago. At page 93 of the report Lord Davey observed:—

    “No doubt the regulation and governance of a trade may involve the imposition of restrictions on its exercise both as to time and to a certain extent as to place where such restrictions are in the opinion of the public authority necessary to prevent a nuisance or for the maintenance of order. But their Lordships think there is marked distinction to be drawn between the prohibition or prevention of a trade and the regulation or governance of it, and indeed a power to regulate and govern seems to imply the continued existence of that which is to be regulated or governed.”

    In Attorney-General for Ontario v. Attorney-General for the Dominion. Lord Watson said this at page 363 of the report:—

    “A power to regulate, naturally, if not necessarily, assumes, unless it is enlarged by the context, the conservation of the thing which is to be made the subject of regulation.”

    It cannot therefore be said that when the Government made the impugned rule, it made it for the regulation of the cinematograph exhibitions; on the contrary it made it not for the purpose of regulating the exhibition, but for stopping the exhibition and cannot therefore be regarded as a rule properly made under Section 9(2)(b) of the Act.

    The impugned rule was attempted to be defended under the provisions of Section 5(2) of the Act. That sub-section reads:—

    “Subject to the foregoing provisions of this section and to the control of the Government, the licensing authority may grant licences under this Act to such persons as that authority thinks fit and on such terms and conditions and subject to such restrictions as it may determine.”

    It was urged that since the licensing authority's power exercisable under Section 5(1) was subject to the control of the Government, it was open to the Government to control the exercise of that power by making under Section 9 a rule like the new rule which is assailed in this case.

    I do not understand the expression ‘control’ occurring in sub-section 2 as conferring any such unbridled power on the State Government. The expression ‘control’ is an expression of wide and ambiguous import and I do not understand that expression as meaning anything other than ‘regulation’. It appears to me that the regulation for which sub-section (2) of Section 5 provides is no other than the regulation for the purpose of which a rule may be made under section 9(2)(b). It may be that the expression ‘Control’ occurring in Section 5(2) also connotes that it is permissible to the Government to give, or refuse to give assent to any particular course proposed to be adopted by the licensing authority in a particular case.

    Whatever may be the real ambit of the control which may be exercised by this sub-section, on which I abstain from expressing any opinion in this case, I am clear in my mind that power does not include a power to make a rule prohibiting the grant of a licence more than once to a person who applies for licence to exhibit his cinematograph shows in a non-permanent building.

    In my opinion, even if the impugned rule can be considered to be one within the competence of the State Government and as one made under Section 9(2)(b), it was not a rule designed for securing public safety for which purpose alone a rule can be made under that clause.

    Nothing is clearer from paragraph 3 of the counter-affidavit produced on behalf of the State than that the actual intention on the part of the rule making authority when it made it, was to compel the exhibitors to construct permanent buildings in the place of non-permanent buildings like tents and other places in which they were exhibiting their shows. If such compulsion is the object of the rule, that rule can hardly be claimed to have been made for the purpose of ensuring public safety.

    Now there are many curious features of the impugned rule. What that rule forbids is the exhibition of a cinematograph exhibition in a non-permanent building for more than four months in a year in a particular place. The word ‘Place’ occurring in that rule is defined by the Explanation appearing below that rule. According to that Explanation, a place within which an exhibitor cannot exhibit his shows more than once in the same year is a place comprised in an area with a radius of five miles from the place where the exhibition is actually made.

    What the rule, therefore, forbids is that the same person should not exhibit his shows in the same place more than once in the same year. If that is what the rule provides, nothing prevents, after a person has once exhibited his shows in that way, another person from making an application under the Act for the grant of licence to him for the exhibition of his shows in a non-permanent building, and if a licence has to be granted to him if he complies with all the statutory requirements and he exhibits his shows during the maximum period of four months for which such licence can be granted, he becomes ineligible for renewal of that licence or for another licence. And during the remaining four months another man may come and apply for a licence to exhibit his shows in a non-permanent building made of inflammable materials and if his application is according to law the licensing authority cannot but grant him the licence.

    The result therefore, would be that, during all the twelve months of the year the members of the public would be attending the cinematograph exhibitions in a non-permanent building although it is constructed with inflammable materials. The only advantage which is secured by the impugned rule is that such exhibition is not made permissible by one and the same person but becomes permissible throughout the year, provided the exhibitors are different persons.

    Even if it is possible to suggest that a building constructed with inflammable materials is so dangerous to the members of the public that no exhibitor should be permitted to exhibit his shows in such building, it is clear that the impugned rule does not at all protect the members of the public against such dangers. The only danger against which the members of the public are protected is the danger of an inflammable building catching fire beyond the period of four months for which a licence is granted to a particular person during a year.

    The impugned rule does not eliminate altogether the danger from inflammable buildings. What it does is to perpetuate the danger, if any, merely changing the source of that danger every four months. It further makes it only possible for the licensing authority to distribute the licences during a particular year between at least three persons, and, that, is the only effect of the impugned rule. The consequences of such distribution would be that three different persons, could, throughout the year carry on their exhibitions in an inflammable building, which the same person is not entitled to do. A rule resulting in such consequences can hardly be described as one made for the purpose of ensuring public safety.

    In my opinion, rule 67 of the Hyderabad Cinematograph Rules, 1953, as it now stands after it replaced the old rule on November 19, 1960 was clearly beyond the competence of the rule making authority and is therefore ultra vires and unenforceable.

    The result of the conclusion reached by me is that it was not open to the licensing authority in this case to refuse to consider the application of the petitioner for the renewal of the licence. The order of the Government which was made in the appeal preferred by the Petitioner is also likewise unsustainable, since it rests entirely upon the rule which has now to be struck down as invalid. The orders of the licensing authority and the Government are accordingly quashed.

    But it is now no longer necessary for us to issue any direction to the licensing authority to consider the application presented by the Petitioner for renewal of his licence for 1960 since the period for which he applied for such renewal has since expired. It appears that under the provisions of the rule which has now been held by me to be invalid, the Petitioner was granted a licence for the year 1961 for a period of four months which expired on May 1, 1961. After the expiry of that period it was open to the Petitioner in the view that I have taken in this case, to make an application for the renewal of that licence. It is equally clear that if he had made such application it would have been disposed of by the licensing authority as one which was not maintainable. Mr. Venkataranga Iyengar appearing for the Petitioner is not able to tell us whether the Petitioner did make an application for such renewal. If he has made any such application the licensing authority, it is clear, must now consider that application and dispose of it on merits. If he has not made any such application, it would be open to the Petitioner to make one now and if it is so made the licensing authority will be bound to consider that application and dispose of it under the provisions of the Act according to law.

    It is therefore not necessary for us, in my opinion, in this case to make any other order now, than to merely declare that the 67th rule made by the State Government on November 19, 1960 is not a valid or enforceable rule and that it is ultra vires. It is so declared.

    It should also be pointed out that as a result of the pronouncement in this case that the impugned rule is an invalid and unenforceable rule, the old rule as it stood which cannot be said to have been properly repealed will continue to be in force and it is that rule that will hereafter govern applications like those presented by the Petitioner in this case.

    The Petitioner, if he has not made an application for the grant of renewal of his licence, may make the application for that purpose within one month from this date. The learned Government Pleader has no objection to our permitting him to continue to exhibit his cinematograph shows during that period as he has been doing till now, until he presents an application for that purpose. Such permission is accordingly granted.

    In the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.

    Kalagate, J.:— I agree.

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