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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • V.G Oak, C.J
  • B. Dayal, J.
Acts
  • REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1951
  • Rule 5, Rules of Court read with clause (10) of Letters Patent of Allahabad High Court.8.
  • Rule 5, Rules of Court. Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules
  • Central Act No. 47 of 1966. The Amending Act
  • rules of the Civil Procedure Code apply.9.
  • Rule 5, Rules of Court and clause (10)
  • rules of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • Rule 5, Rules of Court.21.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • V.G Oak, C.J
  • B. Dayal, J.
Acts
  • REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE ACT 1951
  • Rule 5, Rules of Court read with clause (10) of Letters Patent of Allahabad High Court.8.
  • Rule 5, Rules of Court. Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules
  • Central Act No. 47 of 1966. The Amending Act
  • rules of the Civil Procedure Code apply.9.
  • Rule 5, Rules of Court and clause (10)
  • rules of the Civil Procedure Code.
  • Rule 5, Rules of Court.21.
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This Special Appeal arises from an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Shri Siaram was returned as a member of the U.P. Legislative Assembly from a constituency. Shri Nathuram filed an election petition challenging Shri Siaram's election. While the election petition remained pending before a learned single Judge of the High Court, Shri Nathuram applied for permission to inspect certain election papers. Shri Siaram opposed that application. The learned single Judge overruled the objection and partly allowed the application on 18-7-1967, permitting inspection of some election papers. Shri Siaram filed the present Special Appeal against that interlocutory order dated 18-7-1967.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Special Appeal to the High Court (a Bench) is maintainable against an interlocutory order passed by a single Judge during the trial of an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951.
  2. Whether the impugned interlocutory order permitting inspection of election papers amounts to a "judgment" within the meaning of Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules of Court (and clause (10) of the Letters Patent of the Allahabad High Court) so as to make the appeal maintainable under that provision.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Shri Siaram — represented by Mr. V.K.S. Chaudhry)

  • Although the Representation of the People Act does not expressly provide for appeals from interlocutory orders, the normal procedure for appeals from single-judge decisions under Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules of Court (following clause (10) of the Letters Patent) should be assumed to continue.
  • Reliance on precedents holding that when an appeal is given to an ordinary court, the ordinary procedural incidents (including appeals and Civil Procedure Code rules) attach — cited authorities included Secretary of State v. Rama Rao and Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin, among others — to support the contention that interlocutory appeals to an appellate Bench should be maintainable in the usual way.

Respondent / Petitioner (Shri Nathuram — represented by Mr. M.A. Ansari)

The opinion records that the application for inspection was opposed by Shri Siaram and that Mr. M.A. Ansari appeared for the petitioner-respondent on the preliminary question, but it does not contain a detailed account of the respondent's legal arguments in opposition to the appellant's contentions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Secretary of State v. Rama Rao, A.I.R. 1916 P.C. 21 Where an appeal is preferred to a District Court against a decision under a statute, the District Court is treated as an ordinary court and the ordinary procedural rules (Civil Procedure Code) apply to orders and decrees. The appellant relied on this to argue that ordinary appellate procedure should govern. The Court observed that such authorities would have been of assistance had this been an ordinary property right dispute, but distinguished them for election matters which are statutory and subject to special legislative scheme.
Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin, A.I.R. 1934 P.C. 81 When a right of appeal is given to an ordinary court, the procedure, orders and decrees of that court will be governed by ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code. Relied upon by the appellant to support the continuity of ordinary procedural incidents. The Court again distinguished the context of election petitions as governed by special statutory provisions.
Hem Singh v. Basant Das Provisions specifying that appeals are to be heard by a Division Court and not by a single Judge do not necessarily indicate special jurisdiction; ordinary rules regarding appeals may apply. Cited for the proposition that ordinary appellate incidents can attach; the Court treated this as inapplicable to election petition proceedings that are statutorily governed.
Durga Charan v. Markande Misir When a question is referred to an established Court "without more", it imports that the ordinary incidents of that Court's procedure (including general rights of appeal) attach. Cited to support the argument for ordinary appellate incidents; the Court distinguished the case on the ground that election disputes are subject to specific statutory procedure and limitations.
N.P. Ponnuswami v. The Returning Officer, Namakkal The right to vote or stand as a candidate is not a civil right in the ordinary sense but is a creature of statute and must be subject to the limitations imposed by the statute governing elections. The Court used this principle to emphasise that election-related rights are statutory and cannot be treated as ordinary civil rights for procedural purposes.
K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 687 An election contest is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the common law; the court possesses no common law power in such matters. Applied to reinforce the proposition that general/common-law or ordinary procedural presumptions do not automatically apply to election petition trials governed by the Act.
Standard Glass Beads Factory v. Shri Dhar, A.I.R. 1960 All. 692 Under clause (10) of the Letters Patent, "judgment" includes final, preliminary and interlocutory judgments; an interlocutory order that finally determines the right of a party to specific relief may amount to a judgment and be appealable. The Court accepted the general principle but found it inapplicable: the impugned order permitting inspection did not finally determine substantial rights (it did not dispose of the petition), so it did not amount to a "judgment" for the purposes of Chapter VIII, Rule 5.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed the maintainability of the Special Appeal in two sequential questions:

  1. First, whether interlocutory orders made by a single Judge during trial of an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 are appealable to an appellate Bench of the High Court. The Court examined the statutory scheme: Chapter IV-A (appeals) of the Act and specifically Section 116-A (as amended by Central Act No. 47 of 1966). Section 116-A confers an appeal to the Supreme Court on any question from every order made by the High Court under Sections 98 or 99. The impugned order, however, was an interlocutory order and not one under Sections 98 or 99. Section 116-A does not expressly provide for appeals from interlocutory orders.
  2. The appellant relied on Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules of Court (reflecting clause (10) of the Letters Patent), and several precedents holding that where jurisdiction is given to an ordinary court ordinary procedural incidents attach. The Court reviewed those authorities but distinguished them on the ground that election disputes are statutory in nature and subject to the special procedural and substantive regime established by the Representation of the People Act and by Article 329 of the Constitution.
  3. The Court emphasised constitutional and statutory context: Article 329(b) restricts how elections may be called into question, and precedents (N.P. Ponnuswami; K. Kamaraja Nadar) show that electoral rights and contests are creatures of statute and not ordinary civil rights or common law proceedings. The Court found that Chapter III (trial) and Chapter IV-A (appeals) of the Act form exhaustive code-like provisions governing election petitions and appeals.
  4. The Court relied on Sections 86(6) and 86(7) of the Act (trial continuance day to day “so far as is practicable” and an endeavour to conclude trial within six months) to highlight the legislative intention to secure swift disposal of election petitions. Allowing interlocutory appeals to an appellate Bench (with attendant stay applications) would frustrate these expeditious trial provisions and could make compliance with the six-month objective impracticable.
  5. Concluding on the first question, the Court held that permitting such interlocutory appeals would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme and the legislative aim of prompt trial; therefore no appeal lies to the appellate Bench of the High Court from interlocutory orders passed during the trial of an election petition under the Act.
  6. Second, the Court considered whether the impugned order could nevertheless be treated as a "judgment" under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 (clause (10) Letters Patent) so as to make the appeal maintainable. The Court acknowledged the principle in Standard Glass Beads Factory that some interlocutory orders may amount to judgments where they finally decide substantial rights. The Court then examined the facts: the order permitted inspection of election papers, which are not the appellant's property but were in custody of the authorities/court. Granting inspection would not, in the Court's view, affect any substantial rights of the appellant or be equivalent to allowing the election petition. Because the impugned order did not finally determine substantial rights, it did not amount to a "judgment" for Rule 5 purposes.
  7. On both grounds — (a) interlocutory appeals in election trials are not contemplated by the Act's appeal provisions and would frustrate the statutory scheme, and (b) the impugned order is not a "judgment" as it does not decide substantial rights — the Court concluded the appeal was not maintainable.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The Special Appeal is not maintainable and is dismissed. The Court's formal disposition is recorded as: Appeal dismissed.

Implications (as stated or directly deducible from the opinion's reasoning):

  • The statutory regime established by the Representation of the People Act, 1951 — including Sections 86 and 116-A and the amendments — governs trial and appeals in election petitions; interlocutory orders made by a single Judge during the trial of an election petition are not appealable to an appellate Bench of the High Court under the Act.
  • The Court emphasised the legislative aim of expeditious trial (continuance day to day where practicable and endeavour to conclude within six months). Allowing interlocutory appeals and the typical stay applications accompanying them would frustrate that aim.
  • The impugned order permitting inspection of election papers did not decide substantial rights of the appellant and therefore did not constitute a "judgment" under Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules of Court (clause (10) of the Letters Patent). Consequently, the appeal could not be sustained on that basis either.
  • Direct effect: the appellant's request for stay (seeking to stay operation of the impugned order) and the Special Appeal were refused; the trial may proceed without interference from such interlocutory appeals to the appellate Bench of the High Court.
Appeal dismissed.
Show full summary ...

    Siaram v. Nathuram And Others

    V.G Oak, C.J and B. Dayal, J.:— This Special appeal arises out of an election petition. Shri Siaram was elected to the U.P Legislative Assembly from a certain constituency. Shri Nathuram has filed an election petition challenging Shri Siaram's election. The election petition is pending before a learned Judge of this Court.

    2. Shri Nathuram applied to the Court for permission to inspect election papers. The application was opposed by Shri Siaram. The learned Judge overruled the objection. The application for inspection was partly allowed on 18-7-1967. The learned Judge decided to permit inspection of some of the election papers. The present Special Appeal by Shri Siaram is directed against the order of the learned single Judge, dated 18-7-1967.

    3. At the outset we considered the question whether the Special Appeal is maintainable. We heard Mr. V.K.S Chaudhry for the appellant and Mr. M.A Ansari for the petitioner respondent on this preliminary question.

    4. The election petition is being tried under the provisions of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (hereafter referred to as the Act). The Act was recently amended by Central Act No. 47 of 1966. The Amending Act has introduced important changes in the procedure relating to the trial of election petitions.

    5. Chapter IV-A of the Act deals with appeals. Sec. 116-A appearing in Chapter IVA provides for appeals to Supreme Court. Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 116-A states: “Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court on any question (whether of law or fact) from every order made by the High Court under Sec. 98 or Sec. 99.”

    6. In the present case we are not dealing with any decision under Sec. 98 or under Sec. 99 of the Act. The impugned order is an interlocutory order. The question arises whether such an interlocutory order is appealable to this Court. Sec. 116-A of the Act does not contain any express provision for appeals against interlocutory orders.

    7. Mr. Chaudhry, however, relies upon Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules of Court. Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules of Court lays down that an appeal shall lie to this Court from the judgment of one Judge of this Court. This provision follows clause (10) of Letters Patent of Allahabad High Court. The question for consideration is whether the present appeal is maintainable under Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules of Court read with clause (10) of Letters Patent of Allahabad High Court.

    8. Mr. Chaudhry urged that, although the Representation of the People Act, 1951 does not contain any provision for appeals from interlocutor orders, the normal procedure for such appeals should be assumed to continue. Reliance was placed on Secretary of State v. Rama Rao A.I.R 1916 P.C 21.. It was held in that case that where an appeal was preferred to the District Court against the decision of the Forest Settlement Officer under Sec. 10(2), the District Court is appealed to as one of the ordinary Courts of the country, with regard to whose procedure, orders and decrees, the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code apply.

    9. In Maung Ba Thaw v. Ma Pin A.I.R 1934 P.C 81. it was held that when a right of appeal is given to one of the ordinary courts of the country, the procedure, orders and decrees of that Court will be governed by the ordinary rules of the Civil Procedure Code. An appeal to Privy Council is therefore maintainable from the decision of the High Court under Sec. 75 from the order of the District Judge.

    10. In ‘Hem Singh v. Basant Das’3 it was held that the provision in the Gurdwaras Act that appeals from the tribunal are to be heard by a Division Court and not by single Judge does not indicate that the High Court in dealing with such matters would be exercising a special jurisdiction. The provisions of the Civil Procedure Code with reference to appeals to His Majesty apply to decrees of the High Court made under Sec. 34. Hence there was a right of appeal to the Privy Council from such decrees.

    11. In ‘Durga Charan v. Markande Misir’4 it was observed on page 234 that when a question is said to be referred to an established Court without more, it imports that the ordinary incidents of the procedure of that Court are to attach, and also that any general right of appeal from its decision likewise attaches.

    12. These decisions cited by Mr. Chaudhry would have been of considerable assistance to the appellant, had been dealing with ordinary property rights. But we must remember that the present Special Appeal arises out of an election dispute. Cl. (b) of Art. 329 of the Constitution states: “no election to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the legislature of a State shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such manner as may be provided for by or under any law made by the appropriate legislature.”

    13. In ‘N.P Ponnuswami v. The Returning Officer, Namakkal’5, their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed on page 71: “The right to vote or stand as a candidate for election is not a civil right but is a creature of statute or special law and must be subject to the limitation imposed by it.”

    14. Similarly in ‘K. Kamaraja Nadar v. Kunju Thevar A.I.R 1958 S.C 687., it was explained on page 693 that an election contest is not an action at law or a suit in equity but is a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the common law, and the court possesses no common law power.

    15. It may further be pointed out drat under Sec. 116-A of the Act an appeal lies to the Supreme Court from the final decision of a single Judge of the High Court under Sec. 98 or under Sec. 99. It would be a curious position if interlocutory orders are appealable to the High Court, while the final orders are appealable to the Supreme Court. Chapter III of the Act provides for trial of election petitions. Chapter IV-A provides for appeals. Chapter III is exhaustive as regards the trial of election petitions. Similarly, Chapter IV-A appears to be exhaustive on the subject of appeals.

    16. Sec. 86 of the Act deals with trial of an election petition, Sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 86 states: “The trial of an election petition shall, so far as is practicable consistently with the interests of justice in respect of the trial, be continued from day to day until its conclusion, unless the High Court finds the adjournment of the trial beyond the following day to be necessary for reasons to be recorded.” Sub-sec. (7) of Sec. 86 states: “Every election petition shall be tried as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to conclude the trial within six months from the date on which the election petition is presented to the High Court for trial.” Formerly, election petitions were tried by Tribunals. Under the old Act, sub-sec. (6) of Sec. 90 provided that every election petition shall be tried as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made to conclude the trial within six months. That provision corresponds to the present sub-Sec. (7) of Sec. 86 of the Act. But it appears that under the previous plan there was no provision corresponding to the present sub-Sec. (6) of Sec. 86 of the Act. Sub-Secs. (6) and (7) of the present Sec. 86 are designed to ensure quick disposal of election petitions.

    17. Formerly, Sec. 116-A stood thus: “An appeal shall lie from every order made by a Tribunal under Sec. 98 or Sec. 99 to the High Court of the State in which the Tribunal is situated.” Although the Act provided for appeals from the final decisions of Election Tribunals, there was no provision for appeals from interlocutory orders passed by Election Tribunals. It would be rather strange that, in spite of the anxiety of Parliament to ensure quick disposal of election petitions, the law now provides for appeals from interlocutory orders, whereas there was no provision for appeals from interlocutory orders passed by Election Tribunals.

    18. The present appellant has presented before us an application for staying operation of the impugned order, dated 18-7-1967. If we entertain and admit this appeal, we shall probably have to agree to pass a stay order as requested by the appellant. If appeals of this kind are to be entertained by the appellate Bench of this Court, the appellate Bench will have to pass stay orders from time to time. If the appellate Bench passes stay orders in such Special Appeals, it will be almost impossible for the trial Judge to conclude the trial of the election petition within six months as required by sub-sec. (7) of Sec. 86 of the Act.

    19. To sum up: (1) The present appeal arises out of an election petition. (2) Appeals are provided by Sec. 116-A of the Act. This section does not provide for appeals from interlocutory orders. Chapter IV-A dealing with appeals appears to be exhaustive on the subject of appeals. (3) If appeals of this kind are entertained by this Court, the clear intention of the Legislature indicated in sub-secs. (6) and (7) of Sec. 86 of the Act will be defeated. In view of all these considerations, we have come to the conclusion that no appeal lies to this Court from an interlocutory order passed by a single Judge of this Court during the course of the trial of an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

    20. The next question for consideration is whether even if some interlocutory orders are appealable, the present appeal is maintainable under Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules of Court. Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules of Court provides for an appeal from a judgment of one Judge of this Court. The question therefore arises whether the impugned order amounts to a ‘judgment’ within the meaning of Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules of Court.

    21. This question came up for consideration in several cases before this Court. In ‘Standard Glass Beads Factory v. Shri Dhar A.I.R 1960 Alld. 692. it was held by a Full Bench of this Court that judgment in clause (10) of Letters Patent of Allahabad High Court includes a final judgment, a preliminary judgment and an interlocutory judgment, all of which expressions are used in the Letters Patent. The term ‘judgment’ does not necessarily exclude an order. An order of a single Judge of the High Court dismissing an appeal against an order granting a temporary injunction is an order which finally determines the right of a party to the specific temporary relief. The order is therefore appealable.

    22. In that case the impugned order finally disposed of the appeal which was pending before the single Judge of the High Court. That is not the position in the present case. The impugned order does not dispose of the election petition before the learned single Judge. The principle of the case of Standard Glass Beads Factory does not apply to the present case.

    23. Certain interlocutory orders may amount to judgments. An interlocutory order may amount to a judgment, if the order decides substantial rights of the parties. By the impugned order the learned single Judge merely permitted Shri Nathuram to inspect certain election papers. The election papers are not property belonging to the present appellant. Election papers were in the custody of the authorities. Apparently the election papers are now in the custody of the Court. If Shri Nathuram is permitted to inspect the election papers, no substantial rights of Shri Siaram are affected. It is not correct to say that to permit inspection of election papers is as good as allowing the election petition. Since no substantial rights of the parties are affected by the impugned order, the order does not amount to a ‘judgment’.

    24. Firstly, an interlocutory order passed by a single Judge of this Court trying an election petition under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 is not at all appealable to this Court. Secondly, the impugned order does not amount to a ‘judgment’ as contemplated by Chapter VIII, Rule 5, Rules of Court and clause (10) of Letters Patent of Allahabad High Court. For these reasons, the present appeal is not maintainable. We, therefore, dismiss it.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Siaram v. Nathuram And Others
    (Aug 3, 1967)