Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Civil Rev. No. 107 of 1968 against the decree and judgment of Shri Baij Nath Mishra, III Addl. Civil Judge, Varanasi, dated October 25, 1967

Judges

K.B Asthana, J.

Acts

SECTION 31 SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT
U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Opinion Summary — K.B. Asthana, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs, alleging they were co-Bhumidhars of certain plots of land, filed a suit in the Munsif's Court contending that the second set of defendants, in collusion with the first defendant, executed a sale-deed dated 8 September 1964 in respect of some Bhumidhari plots. The plaintiffs claimed the sale was illusory (no consideration paid and no delivery of possession) and that the transaction threatened their enjoyment of joint possession; they sought cancellation of the 8 September 1964 sale-deed and a permanent injunction against interference with their joint possession.

Defendants contested the suit, denied plaintiffs' rights and title, and argued that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiffs in effect sought a declaration of rights in Bhumidhari land and that such matters fell within the Revenue Court's jurisdiction. On these pleadings the lower court framed a preliminary issue: "Has this court no jurisdiction to try the suit?"

The learned Munshi (trial court) by order dated 1 August 1967 held that Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act barred the suit from Civil Court and directed the plaint to be returned for presentation before the Revenue Court. The plaintiffs' appeal against that order to the lower appellate court was dismissed, and the plaintiffs then filed the present revision application contesting the legality and propriety of the order returning the plaint.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit or whether Section 331 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act barred the Civil Court's jurisdiction so that the plaint must be returned to the Revenue Court.
Whether reliefs sought by the plaintiffs — specifically cancellation of the registered sale-deed (under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act) and a permanent injunction — could be granted by a Revenue Court or were exclusively within the power of a Civil Court to award.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

The cause of action is the wrongful execution of the sale-deed dated 8 September 1964 and the subsequent threats and attempts to interfere with the plaintiffs' enjoyment of joint possession; the Revenue Court could not grant the reliefs claimed.
Under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act the plaintiffs had reasonable apprehension of serious injury if the sale-deed remained outstanding; they were entitled to have the registered instrument adjudged void and cancelled and the registrar's copy marked accordingly.
The reliefs sought (cancellation of a registered written instrument and an injunction) are equitable reliefs which, on the pleaded cause of action, cannot be granted by the Revenue Court; therefore the Civil Court had jurisdiction.
Reliance was placed on the Full Bench decision in Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shankar to support the plaintiffs' position.

Defendants' Arguments

The plaint should be examined for its pith and substance; the plaintiffs have framed the plaint to conceal the real cause of action and thereby to avoid the jurisdiction of the Revenue Court.
Since the plaintiffs were not parties to the sale-deed, they could obtain a declaration of their joint rights in the disputed land without first having the sale-deed cancelled; thus the Revenue Court could grant effective relief and Civil Court jurisdiction was excluded.
The defendants relied upon Mewa v. Baldeo (Division Bench) and other decisions (including Baiju v. Shambhu Saran; Ram Kuer v. Iqbal Narain Singh; Ram Sewak Lal v. Bashisht) to support the proposition that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction in such matters and that the plaint was a façade.
They sought to distinguish Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shankar on the basis that that Full Bench dealt with a plaintiff who was a party to the sale-deed (voidable), whereas in the instant case the sale was alleged to be void and the plaintiffs were not parties to it.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shankar (Full Bench)	Held (as described in the opinion) that where a plaintiff was a party to a sale-deed relating to agricultural land and sought cancellation of that (voidable) transaction, it was necessary to have the sale-deed cancelled in Civil Court before approaching the Revenue Court; such a suit lies in Civil Court and not in Revenue Court.	The Court considered this Full Bench decision as relevant but distinguished its facts from the instant case; the opinion explains the Full Bench's reasoning and notes its applicability where plaintiff is party to a sale-deed that is voidable.
Mewa v. Baldeo (Division Bench)	Cited by defendants for the proposition that a plaintiff not being party to the sale-deed could seek a declaration of rights without cancelling the deed and that such relief could properly be sought in Revenue Court.	The opinion records that defendants emphasized this decision (and that it was said to have been approved by the Full Bench in Ram Awalamb), but the Court found the facts and pleadings in the present suit to be such that the Civil Court retained jurisdiction.
Baiju v. Shambhu Saran	The opinion records this case as cited by counsel; the specific rule or holding relied upon is not detailed in the provided text.	Cited by defendants in support of their jurisdictional contention; the Court's summary does not state how this case was applied on the facts.
Ram Kuer v. Iqbal Narain Singh	The opinion records this case as cited by counsel; the specific rule or holding relied upon is not detailed in the provided text.	Cited by defendants; no detailed account of its application to the present facts is provided in the opinion excerpt.
Ram Sewak Lal v. Bashisht	The opinion records this case as cited by counsel; the specific rule or holding relied upon is not detailed in the provided text.	Cited by defendants; the opinion does not elaborate on its application in the present matter.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded step-by-step as follows:

Examination of the plaint and pleadings: The court read the plaint (summarised in the opinion) and concluded that the averments plainly disclosed a cause of action grounded on the execution of the sale-deed and subsequent threats/interference, and that there was no camouflage or concealment of the true cause of action requiring any piercing of the plaint.
Legal character of the relief sought: The court analysed Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, noting that it permits cancellation of instruments in writing where the circumstances of the section are made out and that this remedy is an equitable and special remedy which results in cancellation of the registrar's copy. The court specifically observed that Section 31 applies to instruments which are void as well as those which are voidable.
Division of jurisdiction between Civil and Revenue Courts: The court accepted the conceded position of the defendants' counsel that a Revenue Court cannot grant cancellation under Section 31 or the equitable relief of injunction sought by the plaintiffs. From that concession the court reasoned that when a plaint shows a cause of action on which cancellation of a written instrument may be claimed, the civil jurisdiction cannot be ousted: the Civil Court must retain jurisdiction because the relief sought is within its exclusive competence.
On precedent and opposing submissions: The court considered the authorities relied upon by both sides. It accepted that Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shankar dealt with a different factual matrix (plaintiff-party to sale-deed, voidable transaction) and that the Full Bench's conclusion in that context was sound. However, the court rejected the defendants' broader submission that whenever cancellation of a sale-deed is unnecessary (because the instrument can be ignored) the plaint must be treated as a façade to oust Civil Court jurisdiction. The court regarded that approach as unfounded and amounting to suspicion without justification.
Discretion and plaintiffs' choice of remedy: The court emphasised that it is for the plaintiff to choose the form of relief he seeks; the possibility that a sale-deed could be ignored in law does not deprive the Civil Court of jurisdiction to grant cancellation under Section 31, nor justify returning the plaint to the Revenue Court. The court warned that refusing cancellation merely because a deed is void (and could be ignored) would render Section 31 illusory.
Ultimately, applying these legal principles to the facts and the pleadings, the court concluded that the lower courts erred in law by returning the plaint and thereby refusing to exercise jurisdiction that the Civil Court legitimately possessed.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the instant suit was properly filed in the Civil Court and that the court below erred in law in returning the plaint for presentation before the Revenue Court.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The Civil Court retains jurisdiction to entertain the plaintiffs' suit insofar as the plaintiffs seek cancellation of the registered sale-deed under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act and ancillary reliefs such as injunction; the prior orders returning the plaint to the Revenue Court were erroneous.
Broader legal implication: The opinion emphasises that a plaintiff's election to seek cancellation of a registered instrument under Section 31 is a valid choice and will not, for that reason, render the plaint a mere façade to be displaced to Revenue jurisdiction. The court rejected a rule that would mechanically pierce such plaints on the sole ground that the instrument could legally be ignored.
The opinion does not assert the setting of a novel precedent beyond applying and distinguishing prior authorities; it confines itself to the direct question of jurisdiction on the facts before it.

Show full summary ...

Batasar v. Udit Narain Upadhyaya

K.B Asthana, J.:— This is an application in revision by the plaintiffs questioning the legality and propriety of an order passed by the court below affirming the decision of the trial court on the jurisdictional issue arising in the suit holding that the suit was not cognizable by Civil Court and directing the plaint to be returned for presentation before the Revenue Court.

2. The plaintiffs filed the suit in the court of the Munsif on the allegation that they were co-Bhumidhars of certain plots of land along with the defendants second and third sets; that the defendants second set in collusion with the first defendant executed a sale-deed on September 8, 1964 of some of the Bhumidhari plots; that the said sale, was an illusory transaction as neither any con-isideration passed nor possession was ever delivered to the first defendant; that the transaction was intended to create trouble and difficulty for the plaintiffs; that the first defendant and his subsequent transferees, the defendants fourth set, on the strength of the said sale deed were threatening to take possession and attempted to take away the crops sown by the plaintiffs; that there has never been any division of the Bhumidhari holdings and the defendants second set were not legally competent to transfer specific plots of the Bhumidhari land in favour of the first defendants; that the cause of action for the suit arose on September 8, 1964 when the sale-deed was executed and on occasions when the first defendant and the defendants fourth set threatened to interfere with the plaintiff's enjoyment of joint possession of the land in dispute. The relief claimed in the suit was for cancellation of the sale-deed dated September 8, 1964 and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with the peaceful enjoyment of the plaintiffs of their joint possession. The suit was mainly contested by the first defendant and the defendants fourth set who filed separate written statements. Besides traversing and controverting all the allegations made in the plaint both sets of defendants denied the right and titles of the plaintiffs in the land in suit. It was further pleaded, by the first defendant that in effect what the plaintiffs wanted was a declaration of their rights in Bhumidhari land-, hence the Civil Court had no jurisdiction. While the defendants fourth set further pleaded that in the guise of claiming a relief of permanent injunction what the plaintiffs wanted was a declaration of their title in the disputed land, hence the Civil Court had no jurisdiction.

3. On the above pleadings of the parties a preliminary issue was framed by the court below to the effect:

“Has this court no jurisdiction to try the suit?”

4. The learned Munshi by his order dated August 1, 1967 held that Section 331 of the U.P.Z.A and L.R Act barred the suit from being entertained by the Civil Court as the plaintiffs in effect wanted a declaration of their title which could always be given to them by the Revenue Court if they succeeded in showing that the sale-deed was void, thus it was not necessary for them to have it cancelled before obtaining the relief. The plaint was directed to be returned to the plaintiffs for presentation to the proper court.

5. An appeal by the plaintiffs against the order of the learned Munsif proved futile. The learned Judge of the lower appellate court endorsed the view taken by the learned Munsif and dismissed the appeal.

6. I have heard Sri R.N Singh, holding the brief of Sri Ram Surat Singh for the plaintiffs, applicants and Sri Sankatha Rai, learned counsel for the defendants, opposite parties.

7. On behalf of the plaintiffs it was urged that the view taken by the courts below was pulpably erroneous as the suit was on a cause of action on the basis of which no relief could be granted by the Revenue Court. It was submitted that the cause of action pleaded in the plaint was the wrongful execution of the sale-deed dated September 8, 1964 and the subsequent acts of threats and attempted aggression by the first defendant and the defendants fourth set on the strength of the said sale-deed thus the Revenue Courts could neither grant any relief for cancellation of the said sale-deed nor for injunction restraining the defendants from their wrongful acts. The learned counsel contended that under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act the plaintiffs, as the allegations in the plaint showed, had reasonable apprehension that if the said sale-deed was left out standing it would cause them serious injury therefore they were within their rights to have the said sale-deed adjudged void and then asking for an order from the court to have it delivered up and cancelled so that a copy of the decree could be sent to the officer in whose office the instrument was registered and such official would then note on the copy of the instrument contained in his books the fact of its cancellation. It was also contended that the Revenue Court could not grant relief to the plaintiff for injunction. As I understand the argument put-forward on behalf of the plaintiffs applicants by their learned counsel was that on the cause of action pleaded in the plaint the appropriate reliefs which could be claimed were in the nature of equitable reliefs of cancellation of a written instrument which was registered and for injunction and such reliefs on the cause of action pleaded could not be granted by the Revenue Court. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel on a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shankar (1).

8. In reply Sri Sankatha Rai, learn-ed counsel for the defendant opposite parties, submitted that the Court ought to find out the pith and the substance of the plaint and a cursory readying of the plaint would make it clear that the plaintiffs had set up a facade and so framed the plaint as to conceal the real cause of action and the reliefs which could legally be claimed thereon. It was strenuously urged that the plaintiffs themselves not being parties to the sale-deed dated September 8, 1964 could claim the necessary reliefs of declaration of their joint rights in the disputed lands even without getting it cancelled as on their own showing on the allegations in the plaint the sale transaction being void deserved to be ignored. In this connection learned counsel referred to a Division Bench decision of this Court in the case of Mewa v. Baldeo (2). The learned counsel tried to distinguish the decision of the Full Bench in the case of Ram Awalamb v. Jata Shankar () on the ground that the learned Judges there were considering a case of a plaintiff who himself was a party to a sale-deed relating to agricul-tural lands of which he sought cancellation, the transaction thus being voidable, and not void it was necessary for the plaintiff to have the sale deed cancelled; before approaching the Revenue Courts for the appropriate relief of declaration for possession and in those circumstances the Full Bench was right in holding that such a suit would only lie in a Civil Court and not in Revenue Court. Learned counsel further referred to the cases of Baiju v. Shambhu Saran (3), Ram Kuer v. Iqbal Narain Singh (4) and Ram Sewak Lal v. Bashisht (5). Much emphasis was laid by Sri Sankatha Rai on the case of Mewa v. Baldeo (supra) which according to him was approved by the Full Bench in Ram Awalamb's case ().

9. Having given my careful con-, sideration to the learned arguments at the Bar and having perused the decided cases of this Court, I think the instant suit, being based on a cause of action on which no relief could be granted by the Revenue Courts, was properly filed in the Civil Court and the court below erred in law in returning the plaint, thus refusing to exercise a jurisdiction vested in it. A reading of the plaint, the contents of which I have summarised above, will show that there is no camouflaging and the averments in it plainly show a cause of action on the basis of which the only reliefs which properly could be given were those prayed for in the plaint. I do not find that the plaint suffers from any such defect of concealment or of camouflage which requires to be pierced through to find out the real intention or the real cause of action. Under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act the plaintiff, if the circumstances mentioned in the said section are made out, is entitled to obtain the equitable relief of cancellation of the sale-deed which is a very special kind of relief as it entails the cancellation of the copy of the deed in the books of the Registrar. In its terminology Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act will also apply to instruments in writing which are void. In its application it is not limited only to instruments in writing which are voidable. Thus it is always open to a plaintiff to ask for cancellation of even a void instrument when he apprehends real danger or injury to his rights in case the impugned instrument is left outstanding and its copy is not cancelled in the books of the Registrar. It was conceded by the learned counsel for the defendants opposite parties that no such relief can ever be given by a Revenue Court and it is only a Civil Court which could grant a relief under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act. If that be so, then no question will ever arise, in my way of thinking, doubting the jurisdiction of the Civil Court when a plaint is presented before it showing a cause of action on the basis of which an instrument in writing can be cancelled. It will not make any difference even if the subject matter of the impugned instrument be the transfer of rights and interest in agricultural holdings. There is nothing in Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act which excludes out of its purview an instrument evidencing a transaction relating to agricultural land. At the same time there is nothing in the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act compelling the plaintiff to seek a declaration of rights under the provisions of that Act without taking recourse to the provisions of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act if a sale transaction relating to agricultural lands is void. It is for the plaintiff to decide whether for better protection of his interest he would prefer to have an instrument in writing void against him cancelled or to ignore it and proceed to seek other reliefs to secure his interests. I do not think under the scheme of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act a court would be justified in the exercise of its discretion to refuse the relief to a plaintiff merely for the reason that the instrument in writing sought to be cancelled being void against the plaintiff could always be ignored in the eye of law and a decree for its cancellation was not necessary. If that were so then the right conferred by Section 31 to have an instrument in writing void against the plaintiff cancelled will be rendered nugatory and illusory.

10. In my judgment the approach some times made in such cases that it being not necessary to have an instrument, in writing void against the plaintiffs cancelled by a suit, hence a plaint prima fade based on a cause of action for the cancellation of a void sale deed evidencing the transfer of rights and interests in agricultural holdings has to be pierced through in order to destroy the facade and throw it out as not being cognizable by civil court, is fallacious. Such an approach is not based on any sound foundation as it involves attributing a purposefulness on the part of the plaintiff of having filed an unnecessary suit in civil court as the relief for cancellation being uncalled for therefore, the plaint has to be pierced through and the institution of the plaint in civil court must be taken to be for a ulterior purpose, to avoid the jurisdiction of the revenue court. This amounts to acting on suspicion for which I find no justification either in fact or in law. It is entirely for the plaintiff to decide and determine what course he could adopt. It cannot be said that by filing a suit for cancellation of a void instrument; evidencing a transfer of right and interest in agricultural holdings the plaintiff, was doing some thing unnecessary. Whether such a suit would ultimately succeed and the court would exercise its discretion to grant the equitable relief of cancellation is wholly irrelevant for the purpose of jurisdiction of the court to entertain and try the suit. I am unable to agree with the submis-sion of the learned counsel for the opposite party that the plaintiff not being a party to the impugned sale transaction and it being not necessary for him to have it cancelled before obtaining any relief regarding the disputed holding, an intention must be attributed to him that he deliberately wanted to avoid the jurisdiction of the revenue courts.

Batasar v. Udit Narain Upadhyaya

Opinion Summary — K.B. Asthana, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs' Arguments

Defendants' Arguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Batasar v. Udit Narain Upadhyaya

Comments