1. The short facts leading to this writ petition which seeks to quash the award made by the Industrial Tribunal, Madras, in Industrial Dispute No. 41 of 1972, are as follows: On 24 January, 1969, an employee by name Thangavelu, whose cause is espoused by respondent 2, applied for a loan to the petitioner-back for a sum of Rs. 2,500 for the purchase of a scooter which was granted in his favour. Ultimately, he did not purchase the scooter as required under the conditions of the loan. Therefore, on 31 May, 1969, the petitioner-bank called upon the said employee to return the amount. It was not so returned. Therefore, by exhibit M3, dated 4 September, 1969, a chatgesheet was issued followed by another charge memorandum containing two charges one relating to non-utilization of the loan granted in favour of the employee for the purchase of a scooter and the other for insubordination in refusing to comply with the demand of the bank to return the amount of loan advanced in his favour.
2. An enquiry was conducted and by the report, exhibit M 6, dated 1 July, 1970, the enquiry officer found that the first charge had been proved. But concerning the second charge, he was of the view that the relationship was purely that of a creditor and debtor and the employee was exonerated from the charge. On these findings, exhibit W 5, dated 23 July, 1970, proposing a punishment relating to stoppage of increment of the employee was issued to the employee and he submitted his explanation on 28 August, 1970. By order, dated 16 September, 1970 (exhibit M 7), stoppage of increment for one year was ordered. I may at this stage state that the increment which was due on 1 April, 1970, was stopped by that order and it is further stated that the employee would draw his next increment only from 1 April, 1971. The matter was taken up in appeal to the concerned appellate authority and the appeal was dismissed. As a result of this, the order under exhibit M 7 referred to above, became final as between the parties. Notwithstanding that on 26 September, 1972, a reference was made to the Tribunal in the following terms:
“Whether the action of the management of the State Back of India in withholding the annual increment of Sri Thangavelu during the pendency of disciplinary proceedings against him is justified? If not, to what relief is the said Thangavelu entitled?”
This reference was taken up in Industrial Dispute No. 41 of 1972, and the Tribunal held that the withholding was not justified and answered the reference in favour of the employee. It is to quash this that the present writ petition has been preferred as stated above.
3. Sri M.R Narayanaswami, learned counsel for the petitioner, urges two contentions before me:
(1) The Tribunal failed to take note of the fact that there was no direct attack against the order, dated 16 September, 1970. Unless the same was got rid of by valid adjudication on dispute raised by the employee, that cannot be collaterally attacked.
(2) More than this above, the interpretation placed on Sastri award by the Tribunal shows an error of law apparent on the face of the record. It has construed as if the order, dated 16 September, 1970, was retrospective in character in so far as it affected the increment due to the employee on 1 April, 1970. This interpretation of the Sastri award is thoroughly incorrect.
4. These two contentions are met by Sri Janakiraman, the learned counsel for respondent 2, contending that where the Tribunal has interpreted the Sastri award in a particular manner, this Court exercising writ jurisdiction cannot interfere under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. Secondly, the employee would have been normally entitled to his increment on 1 April, 1970. But at that time disciplinary proceedings were merely pending. There was no concluded order imposing punishment which came to be passed only on 16 September, 1970, whereby the increment due as on 1 April, 1970, was sought to be withheld. This is retrospective in character and, therefore, no exception could be taken to the order of the Tribunal.
5. I have carefully gone through the award rendered by the Tribunal. To say the least, the interpretation placed by the Tribunal on the Sastri award seems to be unreasonable. The Sastri award reads as follows:
“Workmen should normally have the benefit of the annual increments as a matter of course, provided there is not a substantially good reason to deprive them of the same either because of their misconduct or gross inefficiency. The wage scale has to be so devised that it provides for the growing needs of the workmen and his family. Stoppage of increment, therefore, is more or less by way or punishment. The giving of increments should not be regarded as a matter of bounty at the sweet will and pleasure of the management. At the same time, the management should have the right to see that workmen keep up the normal standard of efficiency and not lapse into indifference and inefficiency because of the assured prospect of an incremental scale. We, therefore, direct that increment should normally be given and stoppage of increments by managements should be only by way of punishment for proved misconduct or gross inefficiency. As a working rule, if in the previous year there are three adverse remarks in the service register of the workman entered against him as a result of the management's enquiry into his conduct and after consideration of any explanation given by him, it may be taken as a prima facie case for stopping the increment at the next stage and for the next year. If an employee's increment is to be withheld it should only be done after a proper chargesheet has been framed against him and he has been given adequate opportunity to defend himself. The order in writing withholding the increment should also mention whether it will have the effect of postponing future increments.”
The quintessence of the award is, whimsically increment should not be denied to workers since they are legitimately entitled to the same. But it can be withheld on proved misconduct. If this is the proper scope of the award, then there is absolutely no difficulty in holding that the interpretation placed by the Tribunal manifests an error of law apparent on the face of the record.
6. The Tribunal holds:
“The order of punishment is dated, 16 September, 1970. What the management did from 1 April to 16 September, 1970, was to withhold the increment and thereafter to stop it by the order, dated 16 September, 1970 (exhibit M 7). In other words, the management had withheld the increment that fell due and payable to Sri Thangavelu as and from 1 April, 1970, even before he had an opportunity to defend himself. This is clearly in violation of the Sastri award.”
This is a totally incorrect way of approaching the matter. By the order, dated 16 September, 1970, what was purported to be done was that on proved misconduct the increment that was due on 1 April, 1970, was stopped. There is no question of the increment that was due from 1 April, 1970, being withheld, but that was subject to the punishment to be imposed. Once the employee is guilty of misconduct, as to from what date the increment has to be withheld is entirely within the discretion of the management. About it the Sastri award does not say anything at all. To characterise as if the order, dated 16 September, 1970, seeks to impose the withholding of the increment retrospectively, is, therefore, incorrect. If this be the correct position, there is no difficulty in rejecting argument of the learned counsel for the employee, for it merely involves an interpretation of the award and this Court cannot interfere under Art. 226.
7. As I observed above, by the order, dated 16 September, 1970, in view of the explanation of the employee not being satisfactory, stoppage of the increment was ordered for one year. As to when that could take effect, the management could well say that either from 1 April, 1970 or 1 April, 1971, as the case may be. If the interpretation placed by the Tribunal and as advanced by the employee has to be accepted, in a case where an employee is entitled to only one increment that can never be stopped. In view of my finding above, it is not necessary for me to go into the question whether the employee was entitled to attack the order, dated 16 September, 1970, notwithstanding the fact that it had attained finality in an indirect or collateral fashion. In the result, this writ petition will stand allowed and the award in Industrial Dispute No. 41 of 1972, is hereby quashed and the rule nisi is made absolute. However, there will be no order as to costs.