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Structured Summary of the Opinion (K.N. Seth, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

These petitions, heard together because they raise identical questions, challenge the validity of a State Government notification dated 24 July 1981 issued under S.3(1) and S.4(1) of the U.P. Entertainments and Betting Tax Act, 1979 (the Act). The petitioners operate premises containing video game machines. Entry to the premises is free, but individuals must insert coins to operate the machines and play the games.

The petitioners contend that video games are highly computerized tests of skill, intelligence and reflexes and do not amount to “entertainment” or “amusement” within the meaning of the Act; consequently, no entertainment tax should be leviable. The respondents assert that video games constitute “entertainment” under the Act, that payment to use the machines is a payment for admission to entertainment, and therefore the impugned notification prescribing entertainment tax for video games is valid.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether video games constitute "entertainment" within the meaning of the U.P. Entertainments and Betting Tax Act, 1979 (including definitions of "entertainment", "admission to an entertainment" and "payment for admission").
  2. Whether the payment required to operate a video game machine (coin insertion) amounts to "payment for admission" to an entertainment under the Act and thus attracts entertainment tax.
  3. Whether the State Government's notification dated 24 July 1981 prescribing entertainment tax for video games is valid.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • Video game machines are highly computerized devices meant to test skill, endurance, strategy and intelligence; a player faces a computerized mind rather than a performance designed to amuse an audience.
  • The game is an exercise of mind and skill and is not intended to provide "amusement" or "entertainment" as those terms are used in the Act.
  • There is no admission fee for entry to the premises; therefore the notification imposing entertainment tax is not applicable.
  • Implicitly, the petitioners suggested that the definition clauses should be read restrictively (relying on case law) so that "include" should be read as "means" in this context.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Video games fall within the Act's definition of "entertainment" because they provide pleasure and amusement to the player and to onlookers to some extent.
  • Although entry to the parlour may be free, payment to operate the video machine is the primary condition for obtaining admission to entertainment; such payment is therefore "payment for admission" under the Act.
  • The machine's electronic screen presents the performance of the player (and the computer opponent) that the player experiences and enjoys; that enjoyment constitutes entertainment.
  • Consequently, the provisions of the Act apply and the impugned notification is valid.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps (1899 A.C. 99) — Lord Watson Explains that the word "include" can in some contexts be equivalent to "mean and include" and thus operate as an exhaustive definition if the context requires it. The court quoted this passage to show the possible constructions of "include" but concluded that the context of the Act does not require reading "include" in a restrictive/exhaustive sense. Thus the court did not adopt a restrictive meaning here.
South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Association v. State of Gujarat ((1976) 4 SCC 601 : AIR 1977 SC 90) In that case the Supreme Court construed "includes" in a particular statutory explanation as operating restrictively (i.e., meaning "means") because of the context (entry to Minimum Wages Act schedule). The court considered the decision but distinguished it: it found the context of that case different and held that the reasoning there did not assist the petitioners. The court therefore rejected applying a restrictive meaning of "includes" to the definition clauses of the Act under review.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first examined the statutory scheme: S.3 is a charging provision empowering the State Government to levy entertainment tax on all payments for admission to any entertainment; S.2 defines "admission to an entertainment" to include admission to any place where the entertainment is held and defines "entertainment" (by clause (g)) to include any exhibition, performance, amusement, game, sport or race to which persons are admitted for payment. The definition of "payment for admission" specifically includes clause (iv) which covers "any payment ... connected with an entertainment, which a person is required to make ... as a condition of attending, or continuing to attend the entertainment."

The court emphasised that the statutory definitions are inclusive in character and generally require a broad interpretation. It acknowledged that "include" can sometimes be used restrictively in a particular context (citing Dilworth and the South Gujarat Roofing Tiles case), but concluded that the context of the Act does not indicate an intention to restrict or limit the meanings of "entertainment", "admission to an entertainment" or "payment for admission".

Applying that expansive interpretation, the court analyzed the nature of video games: although they involve skill, precision and competition with a computerized opponent, they also provide amusement and enjoyment to the participant and to onlookers to some degree. The court noted that admission to the premises may be free but that a payment is made to use the video machine — and the money charged for the use of the machine is an admission to entertainment and the payment by the user is a payment for admission (within clause (iv) of the definition).

The court further invoked ordinary dictionary meanings (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary and New International Dictionary) to show that "entertainment" and "amusement" encompass "occupying attention agreeably", "pleasurable occupation", "diversion of the attention", and similar concepts — meanings consistent with the experience of playing video games. The court rejected the petitioners' contention that entertainment must involve a public performance, a separate entertainer and a separate entertained audience; it observed that a person playing an instrument alone may equally derive entertainment and that a person who pays to use a video machine is both the entertainer and the entertained in that sense.

On this combined statutory and ordinary-language analysis, the court concluded that video games fall within the ambit of "entertainment" under the Act and that the payment required to operate the machines is a payment for admission connected with entertainment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petitions are dismissed with costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The court held that entertainment tax under the U.P. Entertainments and Betting Tax Act, 1979 is leviable on payments made for using video game machines; the impugned notification dated 24 July 1981 prescribing the rate of entertainment tax for video games is valid as applied to the petitioners.
  • Broader implications: The opinion treats the Act's definitional words (such as "entertainment", "admission to an entertainment" and "payment for admission") as inclusive and to be interpreted broadly to encompass new forms of entertainment arising from technological development. The court distinguished earlier authority that had read "includes" restrictively and did not follow that approach here.

No statement was made in the opinion that it was laying down a novel binding precedent beyond resolving these petitions; the decision's immediate effect is to uphold the tax assessment and the notification as against the petitioners.

Disposition: Petitions dismissed.

    Gopal Krishna Agarwal v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others

    K.N Seth, J.:— These petitions may be disposed of by a common judgment as identical questions are involved in them.

    2. The petitioners have installed Video Game Mechines. There is no admission fee or restrictions on the admission of an individual to the premises where these machines are installed. An individual who desires to play these games has to insert coins in the machine which makes them operational. According to the petitioners the Video Machines are highly computerised and are meant for playing different types of games involving skill, endurance, strategy and intelligence. An individual who plays the game is pitched against a camputerised mind and the game offers test of the intensity, intelligence and reflex of human mind as against computerised mind. According to the petitioner the game is not meant for, nor does provide any ‘amusement’ or ‘entertainment’. In short, Video Game is an exercise of mind and skill in which a player can test himself, derive satisfaction from his own performance and improve his own skill. It is not an entertainment by witnessing a performance or entertainment by audio visual presentation or exhibition. Neither the player entertains the onlookers nor himself. The stand taken by the petitioners is that there being no admission fee to the ‘entertainment’ within the meaning of the U.P Entertainments and Betting Tax Act, 1979, (hereinafter referred to as the Act), the notification dated 24th July, 1981 issued by the State Government in exercise of the powers under sub-sec. (1) of S. 3 and sub-sec. (1) of S. 4 of the Act as amended by the U.P Entertainments and Betting Ordinance.

    3. The stand taken by the respondents is that the Video Games is an entertainment within the meaning of the Act and the provisions of the Act are attracted. The Video Machines are the latest developments of the computerised technology of Electronic Science wherein human skill is put to operate against a computerised mind and action and re-action of each is visible on the screen of the machine. The player who operated the machine derives both pleasure and amusement by playing the game. The admission to the parlour may be free but admission to the Video Machine to play the game is on payment which is the primary condition to obtain admission to entertainment. The pleasure of playing Video Game is derived from exclusive performance of the individual on the screen of Video Machine which can only be operated on payment. It can be viewed and enjoyed by the player himself on the specially devised electronic screen of the Machines. The Video Games may involve skill but they also provide amusement and entertainment to the player. It has been asserted that the provisions of the Act are attracted to the Video Games and the impugned notification dated 24th of July, 1981 prescribing the entertainment tax is valid.

    4. S. 3 of the Act is the charging section. It empowers the State Government to levy entertainment tax on all payments for admission to any entertainment at rates notified from time to time. S. 2 defines the expression ‘admission to an entertainment’ to include admission to any place in which the entertainment is held. By cl. (g) of S. 2 the word ‘entertainment’ is defined to include any exhibition, performance, amusement, game, sport or race (including horse race) to which persons are admitted for payment and in the case of cinematograph exhibitions, includes exhibition of news-reels, documentaries, cartoons, advertisement shorts or slides, whether before or during the exhibition of a feature film or separately. The expression ‘payment for admission’ includes, as defined in clause (1)—

    “(i) to (iii)…………………….

    (iv) any payment, by whatever name called for any purpose whatsoever, connected with an entertainment, which a person is required to make in any form as a condition of attending, or continuing to attend the entertainment, either in addition to the payment, if any, for admission to the entertainment or without any such payment for admission;

    (v)………………………

    5. It is clear from S. 3 of the Act and the definition of words and expressions referred to above that entertainment tax is levied and paid on all payments for admission to an entertainment which expression includes the admission to any place where the entertainment is being held. The payment may be for any performance connected with the entertainment which a person is required to make as a condition of attending or continuing to attend the entertainment. The admission to the premises where the entertainment is provided for may be free but if payment is made for admission to entertainment it will attract the provisions of the Act.

    6. The word ‘entertainment’ as defined in the Act includes any exhibition, performance, amusement, game, sport or race to which persons are admitted for payment. The definition of the expressions ‘admission to entertainment’, ‘entertainment’ and ‘payment for admission’ are inclusive in character. They have to be given a wider interpretation. It is true that the rule that the word ‘include’ should be read as word of extension is not an inflexible rule. Its interpretation should be with reference to the context. Though ‘include’ is generally used in interpretation clauses as a word of enlargement in some case, the context may suggest a different intention. The use of the word ‘includes’ in the restrictive sense is not unknown.

    7. Lord Watson in Dilworth v. Commissioner of Stamps (1899 A.C 99) observed:—

    “But the word ‘include’ is susceptible of another construction, which may become imperative if the context of the Act is sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for the purposes of adding to the natural significance of the words or expressions defined. It may be equivalent to ‘mean and include’, and in that case it may afford an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions.”

    8. We do not find anything in the context in which the aforesaid words and expressions are used in the Act which may indicate that the word ‘include’ is used in the restrictive sense. Learned counsel for the petitioners sought to place reliance on South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufacturers Association v. State of Gujarat, (1976) 4 SCC 601) : ((1976) 4 SCC 601 : AIR 1977 SC 90) in support of his contention that the word ‘include’ in the definition clauses of the Act has been used in the sense of ‘means’ and is consequently restrictive. In our opinion the decision of that case is of no assistance to the petitioners. In that case the decision related to the Entry 22 added by Gujarat Government to Part I of the Schedule to the Minimum Wages Act, 1948. The Supreme Court observed (para 5)

    “Pottery is an expression of very wide import, embracing all objects made of clay and hardened by heat. If it had been the legislature's intention to bring within the entry all possible articles of pottery, it was quite unnecessary to add an explanation. We have found that the explanation could not possibly have been introduced to extend the meaning of potteries industry or the articles listed therein added ex abundanti cautela. It seems to us therefore that the legislature did not intend everything that the potteries industry turns out to be covered by the entry. What then could be the purpose of the explanation? The explanation says that for the purpose of Entry 22, potteries industry “includes” manufacture of the nine articles of pottery named therein. It seems to us that the word “includes” has been used here in the sense of ‘means’; this is the only construction that the word can bear in the context. In that sense it is not a word of extension, but limitation; it is exhaustive of the meaning which must be given to potteries industry for the purpose of Entry 22.”

    9. The context in which the word ‘includes’ has been used in the definition clauses of the Act does not indicate that the Legislature intended to put a restriction or a limitation on words like ‘entertainment’ or ‘admission to an entertainment’ or ‘payment for admission’. With the advance of civilization and scientific developments new forms of entertainments have come into existence. Video Games are probably the latest additions to the means of entertainment. These games require skill and precision as so many other games do. They are a source of amusement and enjoyment to these who participate in the games. Others who stand by and watch also derive some pleasure and amusement though not to the same degree. Admission to the premises where the Video Machines are installed may be free but payment is admittedly made if one wants to play the game. The money charged for use of the Video Machine is an admission to entertainment and the payment made by the person who uses the machine is the payment for admission. In any case it is a payment connected with entertainment which a person is required to make as a condition of attending the entertainment.

    10. Apart from the definition clauses of the Act to which reference has been made earlier, we find that even the dictionary meaning of the word ‘entertainment’ does not support the petitioners. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘entertainment’ as the action of occupying attention agreeably; that which affords interest or amusement. ‘Amusement’, which is included in the definition of the word ‘entertainment’, is defined in Oxford English Dictionary Volume I as pleasurable occupation, the attention or diversion of the mind or entertainment, recreation, relaxation, pleasurable action upon the mind of anything light and cheerful, pleasant excitement by anything and anything which lightly and pleasantly diverts the attention.

    11. Some of the meanings of the word ‘amusement’ as mentioned in the New International Dictionary are “diversion of the attention, distraction, pleasurable diversion, entertainment”.

    12. The learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the essential characteristics of entertainment are that there should be a public performance, there should be an entertainer and the entertained and the charge must be for admission of those who are entertained but the person who is entertained must not be part of the entertainment. We find no justification for these requirements. A person playing on the Piano or the Sitar in his room without any audience may derive entertainment or amusement as much, if not more as a person who may be a spectator to the public performance of an artist playing on the instrument. It is not at all necessary that there must be a public performance and there must be an entertainer and the entertained and the persons entertained should not be a part of the entertainment provided. A person who is required, to pay for the use of the Video Machine is himself the entertainer and the entertained as in the case of a person playing on the Piano or the Sitar. The pleasure or amusement which such a person derives is entertainment. The Legislature could not possibly contemplate or visualise every type of entertainment that may come into existence with the development of scientific knowledge and technology and it was for that purpose that the inclusive clause was introduced in the definition of various words and expressions used in the Act. In our opinion, entertainment tax for admission to Video Games falls within the ambit of the Act. The impugned notification specifying the rate of entertainment tax for Video Games is perfectly valid. In the result the petitions fail and are dismissed with costs.

    13. Petitions dismissed.

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    Gopal Krishna Agarwal v. State Of Uttar Pradesh And Others
    (Mar 4, 1982)