R.B Lal, J.:— By this writ petition, the allottee petitioner prays for quashing the judgment and order of the revisional authority (District Judge, Allahabad) dated 20-4-1982.
2. The facts giving rise to the writ petition are these: House no. 33-A, (old), 67 (new), Mahatma Gandhi Road, Allahabad is owned by S.S Mukerji, respondent no. 2. Sri S. K: Dongre, Advocate, husband of Smt. Yamuna Dongre, respondent no. 1, was a tenant of this house for the last over 40-years. He died on 11-11-1979 leaving his wife Smt. Yamuna Dongre as his heir and legal representative and the tenancy of the house devolved on her. One R.K Tewari made an application under the provisions of Section 12(1)(a) of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, (briefly the Act), in February, 1980 to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad for allotment of the said house in his favour on the ground that after the death of Sri Dongre his widow had substantially removed her effects from the house and there was deemed vacancy of the building. The Rent Control Inspector submitted a report dated 19-5-1980 (Annexure I to the writ petition) saying that he had found the house locked. The present petitioner also made an application for allotment on 10-7-1980. The landlord filed an affidavit dated 15-7-1980 (Annexure 3 to the writ petition) Smt. Dongre filed an affidavit on 8-12-1980 (Annexure 8 to the writ petition) saying that she was in occupation of the house. The Rent Control Inspector made a second inspection of the house and submitted a report dated 29-1-1981 (Annexure 10 to the writ petition). In this report he gave details and dimensions of the accommodation of the house and also said that its look indicated that it had not been used for a long time. Since this report did not say any thing about substantial removal of effects which is an essential ingredient of Section 12(1)(a), the Rent Control and Eviction Officer called for another report. The Rent Control Inspector submitted report dated 16-2-1981 (Annexure 12 to the writ petition) and mentioned the articles found in the house in question. No objection was filed to this report of the Inspector on behalf of Smt. Dongre. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer declared vacancy of the house on 20-2-1981. Thereafter, Smt. Dongre filed a review application under Section 16(5) of the Act, on 3-4-1981. The review application was rejected on 12-8-1981 (Annexure 17 to the writ petition) and allotment order was passed in favour of the present petitioner on 15th October, 1981. It appears that the landlord had also made an application for release of the house in his favour under Section 16(i)(b) of the Act. That application was also rejected by the same order. The order dated 15-10-1981 is Annexure 18 to the writ petition. Smt. Dongre filed rent revision no. 610 of 1981 in the court of the District Judge, Allahabad. The learned District Judge held that Smt. Dongre had not substantially removed her effects from the premises. He, therefore, allowed the revision and set aside the order of allotment in favour of the present petitioner.
3. The allottee has challenged the order of the learned District Judge by this writ petition. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties.
4. In the revision filed by Smt. Dongre, the learned District Judge could adjudge the legality and correctness of the finding on the question of vacancy on the grounds mentioned in Section 18 of the Act. He could not reconsider the finding and reappraise the evidence on the ground that it is a findings on a jurisdictional fact. A jurisdictional fact is a fact which is collateral to the actual matter which a tribunal or authority is empowered to decide or determine. A question or matter which is an integral part of the issue which the tribunal has been authorised to decide, is not a collateral or jurisdictional fact. Under the District Magistrate has been authorised to pass an order of allotment or release under Section 16. As an integral part of the proceedings the District Magistrate has to decide whether an accommodation is vacant. The notification of determination of vacancy is a step-in-aid to the passing of an order of allotment or release. It is one facet of the issue which the District Magistrate has been authorised to decide, namely, allotment or release of the accommodation. A decision on the question whether a building or accommodation is vacant or otherwise, is not a decision on a collateral or jurisdictional fact. Hence, the legal position that a finding on a jurisdictional fact is amenable to reconsideration on certiorari or revision on its merits, cannot be utilised. (See Hari Swarup v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Allahabad, 1983 ALJ 112, (D.B) : 1982 (1) Alld. Rent Cases 809 (D.B).
5. The learned District Judge did not proceed to adjudge the validity of the finding on the question of vacancy on the grounds mentioned in Section 18; he embarked on a reconsideration of the finding on a reappraisal of the evidence on the record, as if he was dealing with an appeal. This was clearly beyond the scope of his powers under Section 18 and impermissible under law. He could have interfered with the finding of vacancy recorded by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer only if he had found that the said officer had committed some error of jurisdiction as laid down in grounds in Section 18(1) of the Act. The judgment of the learned District Judge does not show that he had found such an error in the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. There is not a whisper about such an error in the judgment. The impugned order passed by the learned District Judge on a reappraisal of the evidence was, therefore, without jurisdiction and suffers from a grave error of law. The impugned order deserves to be quashed on this ground alone.
6. The impugned order of the learned District Judge suffers from another grave error of law apparent on the face of the record and deserves to be quashed on that score. The main question for determination was whether the tenant (Smt. Dongre) had substantially removed her effects from the premises. Third report of the Rent Control Inspector dated 16-2-1981 was the most important piece of evidence on this point. In this report, the details of the effects found in the premises in question were given in these words. The first big room contained a big broken table, two unserviceable chairs and an old, torn, empty, suit case which was lying on the floor. The second room contained only some broken dibbas (containers) which were lying in a corner along with refuge. The third room contained remnants of a small rack and two small circular tables of cane which-were in worn out condition. The fourth room was said to be the kitchen, but it did not have any provisions or instruments for preparing food. The exact words used were:
“Usmen bhojan ityadi uplabdha hone ki koyi samagri athawa saman nahin praptahuwa.”
7. In the bathroom the tap was not in a running condition. The learned District Judge wholly misread this report and wrongly observed that furniture of the tenant was present in the premises. Even Smt. Dongre was not prepared to rely on this report to contend that her effects were present in the premises. The stand taken up by her in the counter affidavit and during arguments was that the report dated 16-2-1981 was something different and at some later stage a false report (Annexure 12) was inserted in the record. It is not possible to accept this belated stand. This point was not agitated before the revisional court. Some references of the report in the revisional court judgment indicate that the report (Annexure 12) was the orignal report. The learned District Judge did not consider the facts and circumstances which clearly emerged from the report dated 16-2-1981. The finding recorded by the learned District Judge is contrary to the material on the record and is based on no evidence. Such a finding of fact has been held to suffer from error of law apparent on the face of the record.
8. The Supreme Court has held that au error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, howsoever grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or it erroneously admitted any inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. See Syed Yakoob v. Radlia Krishna, AIR 1964 SC 477. In Mukunda v. Bangstdhar, (1980) 4 SCC 336 : AIR 1980 SC 1524 the Supreme Court observed thus:—
“It is true that a finding based on evidence, or purely surmises and conjectures, or which is manifestly against the basic principles of natural justice, may be said to suffer from an error of law.”
9. In Mata Prasad v. Diwakar, AIR 1964 Alld. 228 a learned Single Judge of this Court observed that a finding of fact in the absence of any evidence whatsoever in support of it, is by itself an error of law. Such an error of law becomes graver where the evidence in existence is to the contrary. Such an error amounts to an error apparent on the face of the record on which a writ petition can be allowed.
10. For the above reasons as well, the finding recorded by the learned District Judge and the impugned order based on it deserve to be quashed.
11. In my opinion, the revision should go back to the learned District Judge for a fresh decision according to law after considering the material on the record. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the learned District Judge dated 20-4-1981 are quashed. The revision is sent back to the leaned District Judge, Allahabad for disposal according to law at an early date after giving an opportunity of being heard to the parties. In the circumstances of this case the parties shall bear their own costs.
12. Petition allowed.