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  • West Bengal Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969. Sub-section (2) of S. 15
  • Art. 19.3. Section 15, Sub-sec. (2) of the industrial Disputes Act
  • WEST BENGAL PAYMENT OF SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE ACT 1969
  • enacted.6. Section 12(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • S. 15, Sub-sec. (2) of the amended Industrial Disputes Act
  • S. 15, Sub-sec. (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT 1947
  • S. 10(4), Industrial Disputes Act, the Industrial
  • S. 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
  • S. 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
  • S. 15(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Industrial Disputes Act, 1980.
  • rule 427 read with rules 416
  • Co-operative Societies Act.
  • section of S. 15, Sub-sec. (2)
  • section, S. 15, Sub-sec. (2)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • West Bengal Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969. Sub-section (2) of S. 15
  • Art. 19.3. Section 15, Sub-sec. (2) of the industrial Disputes Act
  • WEST BENGAL PAYMENT OF SUBSISTENCE ALLOWANCE ACT 1969
  • enacted.6. Section 12(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • S. 15, Sub-sec. (2) of the amended Industrial Disputes Act
  • S. 15, Sub-sec. (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT 1947
  • S. 10(4), Industrial Disputes Act, the Industrial
  • S. 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
  • S. 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947,
  • S. 15(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act
  • Industrial Disputes Act, 1980.
  • rule 427 read with rules 416
  • Co-operative Societies Act.
  • section of S. 15, Sub-sec. (2)
  • section, S. 15, Sub-sec. (2)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Petitioner 1 is a cooperative society which took over and ran the Calcutta unit of Ganges Printing Ink Factory under leave and licence granted and renewed by this Court. Respondent 3 (Sushil Kumar Giri) was a former employee of the company and later employed by the society on a temporary basis for a maximum of 12 months, by a letter dated 30 November 1978. The society terminated respondent 3's service by letter dated 3 October 1981 on the ground that the post was abolished and its duties were being discharged by other officers.

Respondent 3 raised an industrial dispute and, by order dated 6 September 1982, the Government of West Bengal referred the dispute to the Seventh Industrial Tribunal (respondent 1) to adjudicate whether the termination was justified and what relief, if any, respondent 3 was entitled to. Written statements and evidence were exchanged. On 16 June 1983 respondent 3 sought production of certain documents; the Tribunal ordered production on 29 July 1983. That order was set aside by this Court by an order of Justice P.C. Borooah on 27 September 1983 directing the Tribunal to hear the parties after passing a speaking order.

Respondent 3 then applied under S.15(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act (application dated 7 September 1983) for interim relief (subsistence allowance). The Tribunal granted interim relief on 7 November 1983 directing payment of 50% of salary (Rs. 510 per month) from the date of the application, subject to the employee furnishing an affidavit undertaking to return amounts if the proceedings terminated against him. The Tribunal treated the sixty-day time limit in S.15(2) as directory.

The Tribunal later dismissed an application to review/alter that interim order by order dated 30 November 1983 and maintained its earlier order of 7 November 1983. The petitioners approached this Court under Article 226 challenging the Tribunal's orders and also seeking declarations regarding the validity and effect of S.15(2) (including a claim that S.15(2) is ultra vires or that the sixty-day period is mandatory), and injunctive relief restraining respondents from giving effect to the impugned orders.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether S.15, Sub-section (2) of the amended Industrial Disputes Act is ultra vires the Constitution.
  2. Whether the sixty-day period prescribed in S.15(2) is mandatory (so as to oust jurisdiction if an application for interim relief is filed after sixty days) or directory (allowing the Tribunal discretion to entertain a belated application in appropriate cases).
  3. Whether the Tribunal's interim order (directing 50% salary as subsistence allowance from the date of the application, subject to an affidavit undertaking) should be interfered with by this Court under Article 226.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • S.15(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is ultra vires the Constitution (contest of validity of the amended provision).
  • The sixty-day period in S.15(2) is mandatory; an application for interim relief filed after that period is not maintainable and the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain respondent 3's application made about one year after the reference.
  • The amended S.15(2) gives discretionary and uncanalised power to the Tribunal without guidelines, violating Article 14.
  • The provision directing payment of interim relief without considering the employer's financial position and without adequate safeguards imposes unreasonable restrictions on the employers' right to carry on business and thus violates Article 19.
  • Respondent 3 was not a "workman" but employed in managerial/administrative capacity; the termination was due to abolition of post; respondent 3 had no right to the post; therefore the reference and interim relief were not maintainable.
  • The Tribunal exceeded its powers (including alleged impermissible review of its own order) and the orders should be set aside; the Court was also urged to reject the production/application that led to the interim relief.

Respondent / Tribunal-related Positions (as reflected in the opinion)

  • Respondent 3 alleged termination was illegal, arbitrary and violative of principles of natural justice and sought reinstatement and arrears of wages.
  • The Tribunal held that S.15(2)'s sixty-day requirement was directory, not mandatory, and hence could entertain an application filed after sixty days in appropriate circumstances.
  • The Tribunal granted interim relief of 50% salary (Rs. 510) from the date of application subject to an affidavit undertaking that amounts would be refunded if the final decision went against the employee. The Tribunal balanced the need for interim relief with safeguards (undertaking; employer holding statutory dues like provident fund and gratuity on behalf of employee).
  • At this stage the High Court was not deciding whether respondent 3 was a “workman” or entitled to substantive relief; the narrow question was whether the Tribunal could entertain an application beyond sixty days.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Andheri Marol Kurla Bus Service v. State of Bombay [A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 841] Principle that conciliation proceedings do not end when the Conciliation Officer submits his report; they end when the report is received by the appropriate Government; timing provisions are procedural and do not necessarily terminate proceedings automatically. Used to illustrate that statutory time-limits in industrial-relations provisions may not automatically produce forfeiture and to support flexible interpretation of procedural time limits (context of S.12(6) and analogy to S.15(2)).
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava [AIR 1957 SC 912] Observation that the word "shall" in a statute is not invariably mandatory; context and purpose determine whether a provision is mandatory or directory. Applied as authority for the proposition that the use of "shall" in S.15(2) does not automatically render the sixty-day requirement mandatory; interpretation must consider purpose and consequences.
Muir Mills Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mills Mazdoor Union, Kanpur [A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 170] Principle that the Supreme Court can, under Article 136, interfere with tribunal decisions where a person has been dealt with arbitrarily or unfairly; Industrial Tribunals are tribunals within Art.136. Referred to explain the supervisory jurisdiction of higher courts over Industrial Tribunals and to justify judicial scrutiny where necessary; used contextually to describe when interference is appropriate.
Bihar State Superphosphate Factory, Sindri v. Singh (C.P) [1973 — I L.L.N. 70] Supreme Court modified interim awards by directing that amounts ordered to be paid to workmen could be drawn only on furnishing security to the satisfaction of the Tribunal, where employer disputed procedural fairness. Relied upon as precedent for conditioning interim payments (e.g., by requiring security or safeguards) where appropriate; supports the Court's acceptance of safeguards (affidavit undertaking/security) attached to interim relief.
Hukum Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India [(1976) 2 SCC 128 : A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 789] Principle that a power required to be exercised by a certain authority in a particular way should be exercised in that manner, especially where power is drastic; emphasizes requirement of observing statutory mode and principles of natural justice. Cited by petitioners for strict mode-of-exercise argument; Court distinguished the present statutory context, observing that S.15(2) does not expressly forbid entertaining applications after the period and thus the case did not mandate a mandatory construction here.
Hotel Imperial, New Delhi v. Hotel Workers' Union [A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 1342] Interim relief may be granted as incidental to the main question referred to a Tribunal under S.10(4); Tribunals have incidental powers to grant interim reliefs such as suspension/reinstatement consequences. Used to support the proposition that Tribunals possess power to grant interim reliefs as incidental to disputes referred, reinforcing the Tribunal's competence to consider subsistence allowance applications even where not separately referred.
Maheshwari (D.P) v. Delhi Administration [1984 — I L.L.N. 1] Principle that tribunals entrusted with labour disputes should, where delay would cause hardship, decide issues expeditiously and should not be kept at interlocutory stages by preliminary objections; high courts should not allow Art.226 to be used to delay substantive adjudication. Relied upon to underscore policy reasons for construing procedural time-limits flexibly so as not to frustrate substantive relief and to discourage interlocutory delay that harms claimants.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court confined its consideration in this proceeding to the specific question whether the Tribunal had power to entertain an application for interim relief under S.15(2) after the sixty-day period from the date of reference. The Court expressly refrained from deciding substantive issues (for example, whether respondent 3 is a "workman" or entitled to relief under S.15(2)).

Key steps and points in the Court's reasoning:

  1. Construction of S.15(2): The Court examined the text of S.15(2) which requires the Tribunal, upon hearing parties, to determine within sixty days from the date of reference the quantum of interim relief, if any. The Court noted that although the word "shall" is used, the section does not provide any penal or disabling consequence for failure to determine the matter within sixty days.
  2. Directory vs. Mandatory: Because S.15(2) contains no penal consequence for non-compliance with the sixty-day period, the Court concluded that the statute is directory rather than mandatory. The Court relied on the established principle (citing State of U.P. v. Srivastava) that the context and purpose determine whether "shall" imposes a mandatory duty.
  3. Legislative purpose and social context: The Court emphasized that the Industrial Disputes Act is social legislation aimed at prompt investigation and settlement of disputes for social justice. A rigid, literal construction that would bar relief where delay occurred for reasons beyond an employee's control would frustrate the statute's purpose.
  4. Practical considerations and examples: The Court observed that the sixty-day clock runs from the date of reference and in practice the period may expire before notices reach parties or where there are genuine reasons (illness, accident, delays not attributable to the employee) for late presentation. A mandatory construction would preclude relief in such cases and defeat the Act's objectives.
  5. Tribunal's discretion and safeguards: The Court recognized the Tribunal's discretion to entertain and grant or refuse belated applications in proper cases after considering facts — including employer's and employee's financial positions, prospects of success, delay in adjudication, and availability of safeguards. The Court noted that tribunals historically had power to order interim reliefs even before the amendment and that S.15(2) did not oust that jurisdiction.
  6. Reliance on precedents and analogies: The Court drew on authorities about interpretation of procedural time limits, the power of tribunals to grant interim relief (e.g., Hotel Imperial), and judicial supervisory powers (Muir Mills) to frame its reasoning that a directory interpretation is appropriate and consistent with prior decisions.
  7. Limited scope of the decision: The Court limited its declaration to the construction of S.15(2) (directory not mandatory) and held that under appropriate facts the Tribunal may entertain an application filed beyond sixty days. It did not decide other constitutional challenges to the full amendment Act, which were pending in other proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court held that S.15, Sub-section (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is directory and not mandatory, and therefore the Industrial Tribunal has power to entertain an application for interim relief filed beyond the period of sixty days from the date of reference in proper cases.

Direct implications (as stated in the opinion):

  • The application before this Court was disposed of on the stated basis (i.e., S.15(2) is directory and the Tribunal's order need not be disturbed on that ground).
  • The Court declined to hold S.15(2) ultra vires; it explicitly stated that S.15(2) is not ultra vires.
  • The Court did not interfere with the Tribunal's decision granting interim relief (it left the Tribunal's order intact).
  • There was a stay of operation of the Court's order for seven days from the date of the judgment.

Scope and limits: The Court expressly limited its decision to the construction of S.15(2) (directory character) and did not decide the broader constitutional challenge to the entire amendment Act, nor the merits on whether respondent 3 is a "workman" or entitled to substantive relief.

This summary is derived exclusively from the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts beyond those contained in the text.

    Ganges Printing Ink Factor/Employees Industrial Co-Operative Societies, Ltd., And Another v. Seventh Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, And Others

    1. This application had been taken out under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India by Ganges Printing Ink Employees Industrial Co-operative Society, Ltd., and another for issuance of a rule of mandamus commanding respondent 1, the Seventh Industrial Tribunal to act in accordance with law, recall and/or cancel the impugned orders, dated 7 and 30 November and 2 December, 1983, and all proceedings relating thereto and also for a declaration that S. 15, Sub-sec. (2) of the amended Industrial Disputes Act was ultra vires and/or in the alternative for a declaration that the time period prescribed under S. 15(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was mandatory and no interim relief could be granted if an application was made beyond the period as prescribed under the Act including an order of injunction restraining the respondents from giving effect or further effect to the said impugned orders.

    2. Petitioner 1 is a co-operative society registered under the Co-operative Societies Act. Ganges Printing Ink Factory, Ltd., had four factories at Bombay, Madras, Delhi and West Bengal. Due to bad management the production of the company declined and suffered huge financial losses. The Bengal suit as a result was completely closed down. Upon an application for winding up, this Court appointed the official liquidator to take charge of the entire asset of the company in West Bengal. The employees of the Calcutta factory formed a co-operative society and made an application before this Court for necessary reliefs to run the said factory in Calcutta and by order, dated 18 September, 1978, this Court granted the necessary leave and licence to the said society for running the Calcutta unit for a period of one year which was renewable subject to sanction of Court, which leave and licence had been renewed from time to time and at present the said members of the co-operative society are running the factory at Calcutta. Respondent 3, Sushil Kumar Giri, was a former employee of the company and he was appointed in the service of the society for a total pay of Rs. 1,038 and he was designated as an m-charge of raw materials stores by letter, dated 30 November, 1978. In the said appointment letter it was made clear that such appointment was on a temporary basis for a maximum period of 12 months and at the end of the 12 months such appointment could be terminated by giving one month's notice by either side. Due to difficult financial position and in view of the fact that the post which was given to respondent 3 was no longer necessary in the interest of the society inasmuch as the Page: 112duties assigned to the said post could be effectively discharged by the assistant manager of the society, hence the service of the said respondent 3 was dispensed with. In view of that the society by letter, dated 3 October, 1981, discharged respondent 3 from service. The respondent was directed to collect his admissible legal dues which he failed to comply with. It was the case of the petitioner that inasmuch as the post was abolished hence it was necessary to terminate the service of respondent 3. No new incumbent had been engaged in the said post but the work assigned to the said post is now being carried out by a former director of the society. In spite of that the respondent raised an industrial dispute questioning the validity of such discharge. By an order, dated 6 September, 1982, respondent 2, Government of West Bengal, referred an industrial dispute to respondent 1 the Seventh Industrial Tribunal, for adjudication of the issue:

    “Whether the termination of service of Sri Sushil Kumar Giri was justified and to what relief if any respondent 3 was entitled to.”

    The written statements were filed by both the parties. In the written statement of the employee according to the petitioner baseless, irrelevant allegations have been made contending that the termination was illegal, arbitrary and violative of the principles of natural justice and he prayed for reinstatement with arrears of wages. The petitioners in their written statement not only emphatically denied such allegations but also stated that the said Sushil Kumar Giri was not a workman but he was employed in the managerial and administrative capacity drawing a salary of Rs. 1,000 per month. They contended that such reference was not maintainable inasmuch as the termination was due to the abolition of the post to which the incumbent had no right. Hence it was not penal in nature. Respondent 3 was not a workman. Hence the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction over the matter. A perliminary issue was raised but respondent 1 held that the preliminary issue would be tried along with the hearing of the main issue on merits. Thereafter the documents were filed by both the parties and depositions on behalf of the petitioner commenced. At that juncture respondent 3 made, according to the petitioner, a belated application, dated 16 June, 1983, for production of certain documents. The petitioner opposed such application on the ground that those documents were immaterial and irrelevant documents, more so the application by respondent 3 had not been made in accordance with the rules, but by order, dated 29 July, 1983, an order was passed allowing the petition filed by respondent 3 thereby directing the petitioner to produce the documents. Being aggrieved by the said order the petitioner moved under the writ jurisdiction of this Court and obtained an order from Justice Sri P.C Borooah on 27 September, 1983, whereunder the said impugned order, dated 29 July, 1983, was set aside and the learned Judge directed the Tribunal to hear both the parties after passing a speaking order. Thereafter, respondent 3 moved an application under S. 15(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act before the Tribunal for necessary orders on 7 September, 1983. The petitioner contended that such application was not maintainable inasmuch as the Tribunal according to the petitioner could give such interim relief within sixty days of the reference and since respondent 3 application was filed after a period of one year the application should be rejected in limine. The petitioner further apprehended that in the event the proceedings terminated in favour of the petitioner then it would not be possible for the petitioners to recover the money from respondent 3. In spite of that the Tribunal allowed the application filed by respondent 3, directed the company to pay 50 per cent of the salary, that is, Rs. 510 per month with effect from the date of the application with a further stipulation that the employee should give the undertaking supported by an affidavit that the amount so received by way of interim relief should be returned to the employer in the event the proceedings being decided against the employee. The Tribunal further held that the time limit of sixty days imposed by the statute in the amended S. 15, Sub-sec. (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was directory in nature and not mandatory as a result the application could be filed after a period of 60 days and such application was maintainable. The employee was dissatisfied Page: 113with such order inasmuch as the Tribunal did not allow the interim relief retrospectively from the date of the termination and inasmuch as the Tribunal directed the employee to affirm an affidavit giving the undertaking as indicated earlier. Therefore, the petitioner contended that the Tribunal has no power to review its own order except on the ground of some clerical error or some mistake apparent on the face of the record. The said application was dismissed by the Tribunal by an order, dated 30 November, 1983, and thereby maintained its earlier order, dated 7 November, 1983, which directed the petitioner to pay 50 per cent of the salary month by month with effect from 7 September, 1983, subject to the condition of affirming an affidavit by the employee concerned. The validity of the entire Industrial Disputes Act, 1980, including the amended S. 15, Sub-sec. (2) of the Act has been challenged before this High Court at Calcutta in Matter No. 1378 of 1983. The said matter had not yet been heard and finally decided. It was the case of the petitioners that S. 15, Sub-sec. (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act did not give any guideline as to how and in what case such interim relief would be granted as such conferred discretionary and uncanalised power to the Tribunal as result it was violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. The petitioner further contended that the amended section of S. 15, Sub-sec. (2) directing payment of interim relief to the workmen without considering the facts of the case, the financial position of the employer, and without securing the said money paid by the employee, tantamounts to putting unreasonable restrictions on the employers' right to carry on the trade and business. Hence such unreasonable restriction was violative of the constitutional guarantee given under Art. 19.

    3. Section 15, Sub-sec. (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act provides as follows:

    “Where an industrial dispute has been referred to a Labour Court, or tribunal it shall—

    (a) after tiling of statement and taking of evidence, give day-to-day hearing and give its award, other determination or decision in the manner specified in S. 17-B without any delay;

    (b) upon hearing the parties to the dispute, determine, within period of sixty days, from the date of reference under Sub-sec. (1) of S. 10 or within such period as specified in the order of reference under Sub-sec. (1) of S. 10, the quantum of interim relief admissible, |if any:

    Provided that the quantum of interim relief relating to discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination of services of workmen shall be equivalent to subsistence allowance as may be admissible under the West Bengal Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969.”

    4. The said new section, S. 15, Sub-sec. (2) empowers the Tribunal to determine the quantum of interim relief within sixty days, if any, and in the case of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment on termination of service such relief should be equal to the amount as prescribed by the West Bengal Payment of Subsistence Allowance Act, 1969. Sub-section (2) of S. 15 provides that it shall be the duty of the Tribunal to determine within a period of sixty days from the date of the reference to the quantum of interim relief admissible if any. No penal provision had been made in the said section that no such application shall be entertained if made beyond the period of sixty days, although the expression “shall” had been used, but in view of not providing any penal consequence for failure to take out an application within a period of sixty days from the date of reference, appear to be directory and not mandatory. The object of introducing the said section in the Act itself indicate that the Legislature was desirous of disposing of labour dispute without any delay. As provided under S. 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act reference was made on 6 September, 1982, but the application for interim relief was made in September, 1983. The petitioner offered a sum of Rs. 5,000 as terminal benefits to respondent 3 who for reason best known to him refused Page: 114to accept the same. Hence, the petitioner contended that even without accepting the terminal benefits if the workmen could have survived since his discharge in October, 1981 there was no justifiable reason for granting a relief on his belated application. He was not in genuine financial hardship. The section provided that sixty days to be counted from the date of the reference and not from the date of the receipt of the notice; hence to hold that the section was mandatory would defeat application in genuine cases for subsistence allowance by way of interim relief, for example, in cases where such notices reached beyond the period of sixty days or in such extreme cases where the order of reference also did not reach the Tribunal in time but belatedly which would curtail the period as provided in S. 15, Sub-sec. (2) without any fault on the part of the employee to hold that the Tribunal being the creature of statute and its power being circumscribed by the statute it could not exercise any discretion, not vested in it by letter by entertaining the application after the period of sixty days would defeat the whole purpose for which such section was inserted. A prayer for interim relief can be granted only after considering the financial position of the employer and the employee, the nature of the case, the prospect of the success of the workmen, the delay of the adjudication proceedings and so many other factors before Tribunal could pass such an order for an interim relief, not that as a matter of right every workman is entitled to such relief even beyond the period of sixty days as provided in the said section but considering the facts and circumstances of the case would the Tribunal be debarred from allowing an application filed beyond sixty days if in the background of the facts and circumstances of the case it justified not only its entertainment by the Tribunal but also passing an order in favour of the workman? It is true that S. 15, Sub-sec. (2) did not lay any guideline as to how and when such interim relief had to be granted but even prior to the enactment of the said section the Tribunal had power in a proper befitting case to grant such interim relief. In the instant case apart from the affidavit giving an undertaking to reimburse the employer in the event the proceedings terminated in favour of the employer, the employer held money on behalf of respondent 3 by way of provident fund, gratuity and other benefits. The Tribunal under the section had been given jurisdiction to consider the application and the prayer for interim relief and after hearing the parties to the dispute and considering the submissions on behalf of the parties had been given power to allow or to refuse such prayer for interim relief. A deserving person in a proper case should receive the benefit of the provision. To give such a strict construction to the section would defeat the purpose for which it was enacted.

    5. This Court at this stage is not going into the merits and/or deciding whether respondent 3 is a “workman” and as to whether he is entitled to get any benefit under S. 15, Sub-sec. (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act but the question for determination before this Court at this stage is whether the Tribunal had power to entertain such an application for interim relief beyond the period of sixty days from the date of the reference. In its order the learned Judge observed that from the experience by presiding over the Tribunal the learned Judge was of the view that in very many cases the period of sixty days expired long before the service of the notice upon the parties. Apart from that on a genuine case like sudden illness, accident, or for reasons beyond the control of the workmen, the workmen may be delayed in presenting their petition within a period of sixty days. The Tribunal has ample discretion to exercise such a relief in a proper case. Similarly, the Tribunal has been given discretion to act judiciously and the parties to refuse such a prayer in a proper case if such application was filed beyond the period of sixty days. Such exercise of power which amounts to perverse order which could not be supported by any reasonable man would naturally be interfered with and set aside. But to hold that the Tribunal would not have any power at all to entertain an application beyond the period of sixty days from the date of the reference would defeat the whole purpose for which such section has been enacted.

    6. Section 12(6) of the Industrial Disputes Act provides that a report under Page: 115that section shall be submitted after the completion of the conciliation proceedings within sixty days from the commencement of the conciliation proceedings or within such a shorter period as may be fixed by the appropriate Government. Provided that subject to the approval of the Conciliation Officer the time for submission of the report may be extended not exceeding six months as may be agreed upon in writing by all the parties to the dispute. Not exceeding six months had been inserted by the amended Industrial Disputes Act, 1980. In West Bengal, the report of the Conciliation Officer has to be submitted to the appropriate Government within sixty days, which period may be extended as agreed in writing by the parties but not exceeding six months. In the case of Andheri Marol Kurla Bus Service v. State of Bombay [A.I.R 1959 S.C 841], it was held:

    “The conciliation proceedings, therefore, do not end when the report under S. 12(6) is made by the Conciliation Officer but when that report is received by the appropriate Government. The contention that the conciliation proceedings should be held to terminate when the Conciliation Officer is required under S. 12(6) of the Act to submit his report is not supported by the provisions of the Act.

    No doubt, S. 12 contemplates that the report should be made and the proceedings closed within a fortnight and if proceedings are not closed but are carried on, or if the Conciliation Officer does not make his report within 14 days he may be guilty of a breach of duty but in law the proceedings do not automatically come to an end after 14 days but only terminate as provided in S. 20(2)(b) of the Act.”

    7. In considering whether such provision under S. 15, Sub-sec. (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act was mandatory or directory reference was made to the case in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava [AIR 1957 SC 912], where it was held:

    “The use of the word ‘shall’ in a statute, though generally taken in a mandatory sense, does not necessarily mean that in every case it shall have that effect that is to say, that unless the words of the statute are punctiliously followed, the proceeding or the outcome of the proceeding, would be invalid. On the other hand, it is not always correct to say that where the word ‘may’ has been used, the statute is only permissible or directory in the sense that non-compliance with those provisions will not render the proceeding invalid.”

    8. Where the validity of a particular provision in an Act would render it invalid would depend largely on the construction of the statutory provision itself considering the intention for which such provision was enacted. The Industrial Disputes Act being a social legislation, particular provision in an Act should not be given such a strict construction which would totally defeat the interest of a bona fide claimant. The preamble of the Act provides:

    “The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is primarily an Act to make provisions for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. The legislation is calculated to ensure social justice to both employers and employees and advance the progress of industry by bringing about the existence of harmony and cordial relationship between the two parts of industry.”

    9. In the preamble the social objective for investigation and settlement of industrial dispute is provided. The social justice cannot be a one way traffic but must be impartial and balanced. To give such a balanced interpretation to the particular provision in the Act the Tribunal's hands should not be fettered by construing such provision as mandatory.

    10. In the case Muir Mills Co. Ltd. v. Suti Mills Mazdoor Union, Kanpur, Kanpur [A.I.R 1955 S.C 170], it was held:

    “We may before concluding refer to an argument, which was addressed to us by Sri Isaacs, the learned counsel for the respondent, that this Court under Art. 136 should not interfere with the decisions of the Tribunals set up by the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The contention can Page: 116be shortly answered by referring to our decision in Bharat Bank, Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of Bharat Bank, Ltd., Delhi [A.I.R 1950 S.C 188], where we held that the Industrial Tribunal was Tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136 and further that Art. 136 has vested in this Court exceptional and overriding power to interfere where it reaches the conclusion that a person has been dealt with arbitrarily or that a Court or Tribunal within the territory of India has not given a fair deal to a litigant.”

    11. In the case Bihar State Superphosphate Factory, Sindri v. Singh (C.P) [1973 — I L.L.N 70], it was held:

    “Pending adjudication of the complaints filed under S. 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, an interim award was made by the Tribunal on the applications by the workmen concerned directing the employer to pay them half wages. In a special leave appeal to the Supreme Court the employer claimed that the interim award was made without giving him an opportunity to place his objections. The employer also disputed the endorsements contained in the order sheet of the Tribunal stating that the employer was represented by his agent on the concerned dates.

    In view of the delay that might be caused for a detailed investigation by calling for a report from the Tribunal and considering the fact that complaint filed under S. 33-A was still pending the Supreme Court modified the directions given in the interim awards by directing that the amounts ordered to be paid to the workmen could be drawn by them only on their furnishing security to the satisfaction of the Tribunal concerned.”

    12. It was further held by the learned Judges of the Supreme Court that normally the Court would proceed on the basis that the records made by the Court or Tribunal record what happened before it represented the correct facts unless there was any strong circumstance established which would indicate to the contrary:

    13. On behalf of the petitioner it was contended that when a power had been given to the Tribunal to be exercised in a certain way it must be exercised in that manner or not at all inasmuch as all other modes of purpose were necessarily forbidden. The power had been given in a drastic nature; under the circumstances it should be exercised in the mode provided otherwise it will be violative of the principles of natural justice. In that respect, the learned lawyer appearing on behalf of the petitioner relied upon the case in (1976) 2 SCC 128 : A.I.R 1976 S.C 789.

    14. In the case Hukum Chand Shyam Lal v. Union of India [(1976) 2 SCC 128 : A.I.R 1976 S.C 789], it was held:

    “Section 5(1) if properly construed, does not confer unguided and unbridled power on the Central Government/State Government/Specially Authorised Officer to take possession of any telegraph. Firstly, the occurrence of a public emergency is the sine qua non for the exercise of power under this section. As a preliminary step to the exercise of further jurisdiction under this section the Government or the authority concerned must record its satisfaction as to the existence of such an emergency. Further the existence of the emergency which is a pre-requisite for the exercise of power under this section must be a ‘public emergency’ and not any other kind of emergency. It is well settled that where a power is required to be exercised by a certain authority in a ascertain way it should be exercised in that manner or not at all, and all other modes of performance are necessarily forbidden. It is all the more necessary to observe this rule where power is of a drastic nature and its exercise in a mode other than the one provided, will be violative of the fundamental principles of natural justice. Now in the present case, if the telephones of the appellants were to be disconncted on the ground of misuse then they had to give, in consonance with the principles of natural justice, opportunity to the appellants to explain their conduct before taking action under rule 427 read with rules 416 and 421. Resort Page: 117to the wrong and more drastic course provided in rule 422, on a ground which was nor germane to an action under that rule vitiates the impugned order, particularly when it is manifest that in making the impugned order, the General Manager was influenced more by this ground and less, if at all, by the existence of ‘public emergency’ certified by the Delhi Administration.”

    There the learned Judges were concerned with the Telegraph Act and/or determination of the powers and the conditions to exercise of such power under public emergency. In that aspect of the matter such observation has been made by the learned Judges in Para. 18. The provision of S. 15, Sub-sec. (2) does not provide that the Tribunal will have to exercise such power within the period or not at all.

    15. The contention of the petitioner was that once having relied to make out an application for interim relief within the period of 60 days respondent 3 was debarred for all time to come to make such application for subsistence allowance, or to hold that the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction at all under no circumstances to entertain an application on proper facts which would justify the Tribunal from considering such application, would amount to nullifying the rights of the employees to get subsistence allowance during the course of the proceedings. In the case Hotel Imperial, New Delhi v. Hotel Workers' Union [A.I.R 1959 S.C 1342], it was stated:

    “The ordinary law of master and servant as to suspension can be and should be held to have been modified in view of the fundamental change introduced by S. 33 in that law and a term should be implied by Industrial Tribunals in the contract of employment that if the master has held a proper enquiry and come to the conclusion that the servant should be dismissed and in consequence suspends him pending the permission required under S. 33 he has the power to order such suspension, thus suspending the contract of employment temporarily, so that there is no obligation on him to pay wages and no obligation on the servant to work. The undisputed common law right of the master to dismiss his servant for proper cause has been subjected by S. 33 to a ban; and that in fairness must mean that, pending the removal of the said statutory ban, the master can after holding a proper enquiry temporarily terminate the relationship of master and servant by suspending his employee pending proceedings under S. 33. It follows, therefore, that if the Tribunal grants permission, the suspended contract would come to an end and there will be no further obligation to pay any wages after the date of suspension. If, on the other hand, the permission is refused, the suspension would be wrong and the workman would be entitled to all his wages from the date of suspension.

    Under S. 10(4), Industrial Disputes Act, the Industrial Tribunal has power to grant interim relief, where it is admissible, as a matter incidental to the main question referred to the Tribunal without itself being referred in express term. There can be no doubt that, for example, question of reinstatement and/or compensation is referred to a Tribunal for adjudication, the question of granting interim relief till the decision of the Tribunal with respect to the same matter would be a matter incidental thereto under S. 10(4) and need not be specifically referred in terms to the Tribunal.”

    In Para. 21, it was stated:

    “After a dispute is referred to the Tribunal under S. 10 of the Act, it is enjoined on it by S. 15 to hold its proceeding expeditiously and on the conclusion thereof submit its award to the appropriate Government. An ‘award’ is defined in S. 2(b) of the Act as meaning

    ‘an interim or final determination by an Industrial Tribunal of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto.”

    Where an order referring an industrial dispute has been made specifying the points of dispute for adjudication, the Tribunal has to confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto [S. 10(4)]. Page: 118It is urged on behalf of the appellants that the Tribunals in these cases had to confine itself to adjudicating on the points referred and that as the question of interim relief was not referred to it, it could not adjudicate upon that. We are of opinion that there is no force in this argument, in view of the words ‘incidental thereto’ appearing in S. 10(4). There can be no doubt that if, for example, question of reinstatement and/or compensation is referred to a Tribunal for adjudication, the question of granting interim relief till the decision of the Tribunal with respect to the same matter would be a matter incidental thereto under S. 10(4) and need not be specifically referred in terms to the Tribunal. Thus interim relief where it is admissible can be granted as a matter incidental to the main question referred to the Tribunal without being itself referred in express terms.”

    16. In the case reported in Maheshwari (D.P) v. Delhi Administration [1984 — I L.L.N 1], where it was held, in Para. 1, at page 2:

    “… Tribunals,… entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardize industrial peace, should decide all issues in disputes at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill-afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Articles 226 and 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must, therefore, ask themselves whether such threshold part adjudications, is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences.

    Where the Labour Court while deciding the preliminary issue in a labour dispute had considered the entire evidence on record and recorded a positive finding that the delinquent employee, whose services were terminated, was discharging the duties of a clerical nature and was a workman within the meaning of S. 2(s) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, its finding being not merely an inference from the mere circumstance that the delinquent was not discharging supervisory duties, the High Court could not interfere with such finding in a petition under Art. 226.

    It was just the other day that we were bemoaning the unbecoming devices adopted by certain employers to avoid decision of industrial disputes on merits. We noticed how they would raise various preliminary objections, invite decision on those objections in the first instance, carry the matter to the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and to this Court under Art. 136 of the Constitution and delay a decision of the real dispute for years, sometimes for over a decade. Industrial peace, one presumes, hangs in the balance in the meanwhile. We have now before us a case where a dispute originating in 1969 and referred for adjudication by the Government to the Labour Court in 1970 is still at the stage of decision on a preliminary objection. There was a time when it was thought prudent and wise policy to decide preliminary issues first. But the time appears to have arrived for a reversal of that policy. We think it is better that Tribunals, particularly those entrusted with the task of adjudicating labour disputes where delay may lead to misery and jeopardise industrial peace, should decide all issues in dispute at the same time without trying some of them as preliminary issues. Nor should High Courts in the exercise of their jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution stop proceedings before a Tribunal so that a preliminary issue may be decided by them. Neither the jurisdiction of the Page: 119High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution nor the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136 may be allowed to be exploited by those who can well afford to wait to the detriment of those who can ill-afford to wait by dragging the latter from Court to Court for adjudication of peripheral issues, avoiding decision on issues more vital to them. Articles 226 and 136 are not meant to be used to break the resistance of workmen in this fashion. Tribunals and Courts who are requested to decide preliminary questions must, there-lore, ask themselves whether such threshold part-adjudications is really necessary and whether it will not lead to other woeful consequences. After all Tribunals like Industrial Tribunals are constituted to decide expeditiously special kinds of disputes and their jurisdiction to so decide is not to be stifled by all manner of preliminary objections and journeyings up and down. It is also worthwhile remembering that the nature of the jurisdiction under Art. 226 is supervisory and not appellate while that under Art. 136 is primarily supervisory but the Court may exercise all necessary appellate powers to do substantial justice. In the exercise of such jurisdiction neither the High Court nor this Court is required to be too astute to interfere with the exercise of jurisdiction by special Tribunals at interlocutory stages and on preliminary issues.”

    17. The entire amendment Act had been challenged in some other proceedings pending before this Court. The parties in the instant case only made their submissions with regard to the construction of S. 15, Sub-sec. (2). Under the circumstances, this Court only decides that point in this proceedings, by holding that the Tribunal has power, after considering the facts and circumstances of a particular case justifying the entertainment of an application under S. 15, Sub sec. (2) beyond the period of sixty days. Inasmuch as this Court is of the view that such provision is not mandatory but directory in nature. Hence the application is disposed of accordingly.

    18. This Court is of the view that S. 15(2) is not ultra vires. This Court does not think fit to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal.

    19. There will be a stay of operation of this order for seven days from date.

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