1. By means of the present petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution the petitioners have sought to challenge the order dt. 9-7-1979 passed by the Prescribed Authority purporting to cancel the lease of the petitioners granted on 5-11-1977 in respect of the surplus land in pursuance of the procedure prescribed under S. 27(3) of the U.P Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1961 (for short the Act) as amended by U.P Act No. 35 of 1970).
2. The facts, in brief, are that Kr. Mohan Swarup, father of Respondents 3 to 6, was the holder of the holding which was declared as surplus land by the order of the Prescribed Authority (sic) order of the learned Additional District Judge passed in pursuance of the provisions of S. 5 of the Act after notice under S. 10(2) of the Act has been issued to him. The aforesaid Kr. Mohan Swarup filed Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4590 of 1977 (Kr. Mohan Swarup v. The Additional District Judge, Bareilly) which was in substance dismissed by order dt. 27-4-1977 passed by Hon'ble MP. Mehrotra, J. But the observation was made and the Prescribed Authority was directed that as far as possible the choice indicated by the tenure-holder of the holding to retain certain plots (Annexure ‘4’ to the writ petition) may be given effect to. But much before that on 5-11-1977 lease was granted to the petitioner 1 (Annex. ‘3’) and on the same date lease was granted in respect of different plots to Respondent 9 (Annex. ‘2’) and similarly to other tenure-holders, the other petitioners. After the order of this Court in the aforesaid writ petition, to which the petitioners were not parties, the land allotted to the petitioners has been declared surplus and retained by the tenure-holder in pursuance of the choice indicated and no proceedings were held for cancellation of these leases executed in favour of the petitioners within the period prescribed under S. 27(4) of the Act. The present petition has been filed to challenge the order of the prescribed Authority having the effect on the petitioners' leases. The learned counsel for the petitioners urged that the leases were granted under S. 27(3) of the Act and their cancellation was possible in view of the procedure under S. 27(4) of the Act by the Commissioner only and by no other authority and there was no other procedure prescribed. Further once the leases were granted and the petitioners entered into possession in pursuance of the offer made by the State Government or its agency, and altered their position by entering into possession, invested the amount and cultivated the same and paid the rent, the principle of promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel was applicable and even the State agency was bound to accept the leases. Reliance was placed on Lochan v. District Magistrate/Collector, Bareilly, 1979 All WC 482 and Motilal Padampal Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P; (1979) 2 SCC 409 : AIR 1979 SC 621 : (1979 All LJ 368).
3. The learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, urged that a single petition on behalf of all the petitioners was not maintainable and that the petitioners' leases have been correctly cancelled and the petitioners could have filed an appeal or availed of any other remedy and no ground for interference under Art. 226 of the Constitution was made out. Reliance was placed on Umesh Chandra v. K.U Mandi Samiti, 1983 All WC 881 : (AIR 1984 All 46) (FB).
4. The moot points for consideration are as to where the leases in favour of the petitioners granted much before the order of this Court dt. 27-4-1979 (Annexure ‘4’ to the writ petition) to which the petitioners were not parties, could be cancelled without following the procedure prescribed under S. 27(3) of the Act and whether the principle of promissory estoppel and equitable estoppel was applicable under the facts and whether the single petition was maintainable.
5. I would like to dispose of the objection whether single petition was maintainable. Suffice it to say that the Full Bench of this Court in Umesh Chandra v. K.U Mandi Samiti, (AIR 1984 All 46) (supra) has held that a single petition by more than one person is maintainable where the right or relief arises from the same act or transaction and there is a common question of law and facts and the petitioners are jointly interested in the cause or causes of action. In the instant case, the petitioners were granted leases on the same date and their leases are sought to be cancelled by the same order of the Prescribed Authority. In the instant case all the petitioners were aggrieved by the same cause of action and the order, hence the single writ petition was maintainable.
6. The next point is that the petitioners were granted leases in pursuance of the procedure contemplated by S. 27(3) of the Act after following the procedure and the preference as specified under S. 198 of the U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. The procedure has been specified for cancellation of such leases under S. 27(4) of the Act and in that event the application was maintainable. Before the Commissioner who can initiate proceedings either on the application made to him or he can also take action suo motu and at the best in view of S. 27(6) of the Act within five years such application could have been filed. But no such application was filed within that period hence the leases granted to the petitioners could not be cancelled by an order to which the petitioners were not parties nor any notice was given to them for cancellation of the leases. In Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 4598 of 1977 in pursuance of which a direction was made to the Prescribed Authority to consider the choice indicated by the holder of the holdings the petitioners were not made parties nor were heard. The maxim ‘Audi Alteram Partem’ also means that no order can be passed affecting the rights of any person without hearing the other side (i.e the persons affected). (See also Lochan v. District Magistrate/collector, Bareilly (1979 All WC 482) (Supra)). In the” instant case the petitioners were neither made parties nor given any opportunity for being heard nor they were actually heard. The impugned order cannot, accordingly, be sustained.
7. There is yet another aspect of the: matter. The petitioners did not occupy or start cultivating the land out of their own volition. Offer was made to them by the State Agency to obtain land on lease, as the land was declared surplus under the provisions of the U.P Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act. The petitioners accepted the offer, in pursuance thereof the leases were granted in favour of the petitioners. The petitioners have changed their position, paid premium, invested amount, started cultivation and paid rent etc. Now the State Agency without informing the petitioners, without making them parties, without hearing them, cannot go back from the offer made to the petitioners to obtain the land in dispute on lease. In case no offer would have been made by the State Agency and the petitioners would have occupied the land out of their own willingness, the matter would have been different. I am of the view that the principle of promissory estoppel or equitable estoppel is applicable.
8. It is better to consider the principles of promissory estoppels. Lord Denning has suggested that where there is a deliberate promise which is intended to affect legal relations, it would be inequitable to hold that promisor is not bound when the promisee has acted on the promises. It is also implicit in modem cases where principle has been developed. (See Central London Property Trust Ltd. v. High Trees House Limited, (1956) 1 All ER 256, Ledingham v. Bermejo Estancia Co. Ltd., (1947) 1 All ER 749. In Howell v. Falsmouth Boat Construction Co. Ltd., 1951 AC 837 it has also been held that a Government Department or its Agency was also bound by the promissory estoppel. (See also Robertson v. Ministry of Pansions, (1948) 2 AER 767 : (1949) 1 KB 227). In Union of India v. Anglo Afghan Agencies, AIR 1968 SC 718 it has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that even the Courts shall have power to compel performance of obligation imposed by a particular scheme upon departmental authorities. It could not be said that the executives release the Government from honouring its solemn promises relying on which the citizens have acted to their detriment. Under the constitutional set up no person may be deprived of his right and property except in due course and by authority of law; if a member of the executive seeks to deprive a citizen of his right otherwise than in exercise of power derived from law,……….the common law or the statute the courts will be compelled and indeed would be bound to protect the rights of the citizens. The view taken by their Lordships of the Supreme Court is self explicit and makes no exception. In the instant case I am constrained to hold that the State Government or its Agency was bound by the principles of the promissory estoppel or the equitable estoppels.
9. It is accordingly evident that the principle of promissory estoppel was applicable against the State Government or its Agency and the Government was equally liable. I am of the view that there may be certain cases where Government or its Agency need not be held to be bound by the principle of promissory estoppel but in that event in case the State Government wants to desist (from) the liability, it will have to disclose to the courts what are the subsequent grievances on account of which the Government claimed to be exempted from the liability and it would be for the Courts to decide and to enforce equitably the liability against the Government. In the instant case no exception has been claimed nor any circumstances have been indicated on behalf of the State as to why the principles of promissory estoppel may not be made applicable against it. It is accordingly clear that the State Government and its Agency cannot be permitted to resile from the offers made to the petitioners and the acceptance made by the latter. The petitioners have been greatly handicapped and prejudiced by the impugned order having the effect of cancellation of the petitioners' leases without hearing them and without following the procedure prescribed by law. The impugned order cannot be accordingly sustained. In the result, the petition succeeds and it is allowed. The Order dt. 9-7-1979 (Annexure ‘5’ to the writ petition) is hereby quashed without any order as to costs.
10. Petition allowed.