Bhaskaran, C.J:— These appeals are between the same parties; and the question at issue is identical in all of them. They were, therefore, heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.
2. The appellant, who is an employer of an establishment under the Minimum Wages Act (XI of 1948), for short, the Act, filed the writ petitions for the issue of a writ of prohibition, prohibiting, the first respondent, the Authority appointed under S. 20(1) of the Act, from proceeding further in the respective cases. The cases with respect to which the writ of prohibition was sought were filed by the Assistant Labour Officer and the Inspector under the Act (the third respondent) under S. 20(1), of the Act for recovery of the difference between the minimum wages notified under the Act and the wages paid to the workmen for the relevant period. The writ petitions having been dismissed by the learned Single Judge by the common judgment, dated 31 March 1986, these writ appeals have been preferred.
3. A perusal of the judgment appealed against indicates that various grounds were raised before the learned Single Judge; and the learned Judge found them all untenable. All the same, the learned Judge directed the cases to be withdrawn from the file of the first respondent and to transfer them to the Deputy Commissioner of Labour under the Act at Eluru for disposal. Before us, Sri A. Krishnamurthy, the learned counsel for the appellant, urged only one point; and that related to the jurisdiction of the Authority appointed under Sub-sec. (1) S. 20 of the Act to entertain and dispose of the cases, contending that it was only where there was dispute in regard to the rate of wages payable under the Act, not where the dispute was confined to the quantum of payment, that the jurisdiction of the Authority was attracted. We may now notice Sub-secs. (1), (2) and (3) of S. 20 of the Act.
“20. Claims.— (1) The appropriate Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint any Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation or any officer of the Central Government exercising functions as a Labour Commissioner for any region, or any officer of the State Government not below the rank of Labour Commissioner or any other officer with experience as a Judge of a Civil Court or as a stipendiary Magistrate to be the authority to hear and decide for any specified area all claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages or in respect of the payment of remuneration for days of rest or for work done on such days under Cl. (b) or Cl. (c) of Sub-sec. (1) of S. 13 or the wages at the overtime rate under S. 14 to employees employed or paid in that area.
(2) Where an employee has any claim of the nature referred to in Sub-sec. (1) the employee himself, or any legal practitioner of any official of a registered trade union authorised in writing to act on his behalf, or any Inspector, or any person acting with the permission of the Authority appointed under Sub-sec. (1), may apply to such Authority for direction under Sub-sec. (3):
Provided that any application shall be presented within six months from the date on which the minimum wages or other amount became payable:
Provided further that any application may be admitted after the said period of six months when the applicant satisfies the authority that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period.
(3) When any application under Sub-sec. (2) is entertained, the authority shall hear the applicant and the employer, or give an opportunity of being heard, and after such further inquiry, if any, as it may consider necessary, may, without prejudice to any other penalty to which the employer may be liable under this Act, direct;
(i) in the case of a claim arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages, the payment to the employee of the amount by which the minimum wages payable to him exceed the amount actually paid, together with the payment of such compensation as the authority may think fit, not exceeding ten times the amount of such excess;
(ii) in any other case, the payment of the amount due to the employee together with the payment of such compensation as the authority may think fit not exceeding ten rupees, and the authority may direct payment of such compensation in cases where the excess or the amount due is paid by the employer to the employee before the disposal of the application.”
In terms of Sub-sec. (1) of S. 20 of the Act, the power of the authority appointed is to hear and decide all claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages. On a plain reading of this provision, it would be unreasonable to take the stand that the jurisdiction of the authority is confined to the rates of wages in dispute, or that it does not extend to the quantum of wages paid. In our view, it would be unreasonable to give a restrictive meaning giving emphasis to the expression “rates of wages” alone without, at the same time, noticing the significance of the expression “payment.” The power conferred on the authority is to hear and dispose of all claims arising out of payment of less than the minimum rates of wages. There is no warrant for interpreting the scope of the expressions used as restricted to rates of wages, when the real emphasis is on payment of less than the minimum rates of wages. The provisions of Sub-sec. (3) of the section also clearly indicate that when any application under Sub-sec. (2) is entertained, the authority has both the power and duty to direct payment to the employee of the amount by which the minimum wages payable to him exceeded, the amount actually paid. In this case, the application made by the third respondent, Labour Inspector, to the first respondent (the Authority under the Act) shows that whereas as per G.O Ms. No. 467, dated 7 July 1982, the minimum rates of wages to the scheduled employment, viz., tobacco manufactory, had been fixed at Rs. 10.12 per day, what was effectively paid to the employees ranged from Rs. 7 to Rs. 8. The contention of the appellant that assuming that a portion of the amount paid to the employees was taken back from them, after the payment was made at the rates of minimum wages notified, claims for recovery of that portion of wages would not be amenable to the jurisdiction of the Authority under the Act could not be countenanced. The context in which the expression “payment” is used in Sub-sec. (1) indicates clearly that it means effective payment, not a show of payment; not to give it with one hand and to take it back by the other. The allegation is that the employer was resorting to an ingenious device of paying less than the minimum wages by showing less number of days in the muster-rolls than the number of days on which the workmen actually worked. We have absolutely no doubt in our mind that the Authority appointed under S. 20(1) of the Act has the power to entertain such claims presented by a workman, a union or an Inspector as provided in Sub-sec. (2) of that section and direct payment of the balance amount, if any, due to the workman, as determined by that Authority under Sub-sec. (3) of that section.
4. Sri Krishnamurthy, placed reliance on two decisions: the Supreme Court decision in Town Municipal Council, Athani v. Labour Court, Hubli, [(1969) 1 SCC 873 : A.I.R 1969 S.C 1335] and a Full Bench decision of this Court in Anand Oil Industries v. Labour Court, Hyderabad, [1980 — II L.L.N 268]. These cases could be distinguished on facts. The question at issue before the Supreme Court was whether because an alternative remedy was alleged to have been available to the workmen under S. 20(1) of the Act, an application under S. 33C(2), Industrial Disputes Act, was barred. On the facts and in the circumstances of that case, the Supreme Court held that the application under S. 33C(2), Industrial Disputes Act, was maintainable. In Para. 6 of the judgment (at page 1340), Bhargava, J., who spoke for the Bench, has categorically stated as follows:
“The purpose of S. 20(1) seems to be to ensure that the rates prescribed under the Minimum Wages Act are complied with by the employer in making payments and, if any attempt is made to make payments at lower rates, the workmen are given the right to invoke the aid of the authority appointed under S. 20(1).”
Other observations made in that decision have to be read and understood in the context of this basic principle laid down in conformity with the intention of the Parliament as discernible from the expressions used, and the object and purpose sought to be achieved. A careful reading of this decision would go to show that it was not meant to lay down a principle that the Authority appointed under S. 20(1) of the Act, is devoid of power where the claim arose out of the alleged payment of less than minimum rates of wages fixed under the Act.
5. It is a well-settled principle that where a self-contained enactment like the Minimum Wages Act makes specific provision for the enforcement of the rights, that remedy could not be denied to the workmen for whose benefit it has been enacted, assuming that they had the choice to resort to alternate remedies available under S. 33C(2), Industrial Disputes Act, or S. 15(1), Payment of Wages Act. The decisions of the Supreme Court in Premier Automobiles, Ltd. v. Kamlakar Shantaram Wadke, [1976 — I L.L.N 1] and State of Punjab v. Labour Court, Jallandar, [1980 — I L.L.N 39], also lend support to our reasoning stated above. We have carefully gone through the Full Bench decision of this High Court cited before us. In that case also, the question whether the Authority appointed under S. 20(1), Minimum Wages Act, would have jurisdiction to entertain a claim of alleged payment of wages less than the rates fixed under the Act did not directly arise for consideration. The issue before the Court was whether an application under S. 33C(2), Industrial Disputes Act, could be entertained by the Labour Court, without directing the employee to have the claim first adjudicated by an Industrial Tribunal, in view of the fact that the amount had already been fixed under S. 10, Payment of Bonus Act, creating a statutory right in favour of the employee. In our opinion, the Full Bench decision also does not advance the case of the appellant.
6. This certainly is not a fit case for interference under Art. 226 of the Constitution.
7. The learned Judge has already directed the transfer of the case from the file of the first respondent, to the Authority under the Act at Eluru. Therefore, the appellant petitioner has no cause for apprehension that he would not get a just decision at the hands of the Authority. The matter is rather simple and need not be complicated. The issue is whether there was (effective) payment of wages to the workmen at the minimum rates of wages as fixed by the notification under the Act. If, on enquiry, the Authority finds that minimum wages fixed under the Act exceeded the payment made in effect, it shall certainly be open to the Authority to direct the payment of the balance amount as mandated under Sub-sec. (3) of the section. We also notice that the workmen or any union representing them has not been made a party to the writ petition or the writ appeal.
8. For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeals. No costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 150 in each.
9. Immediately after the judgment was pronounced, the counsel for the appellants made an oral request to leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.
10. We do not find any substantial question of law of general importance, or any question of law which, in our opinion requires to be settled by the Supreme Court, involved in this case. Hence, leave declined.