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  • Industrial Disputes Act by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1971,
  • S. 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter called the Act)
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citation codes
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  • Industrial Disputes Act by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1971,
  • S. 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter called the Act)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, Thiru M. Balakrishnan, was employed for about 13 years as an assistant cashier in the second respondent, Dindigul Co-operative Wholesale Stores Ltd. He was placed under suspension by order dated 26 March 1976. Charges were framed on 10 May 1976 and, by an order dated 6 December 1976, he was dismissed from service with retrospective effect from the date of suspension (27 March 1976). The petitioner raised an industrial dispute under Section 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act (the Act). After conciliation failed, the appropriate Government (the first respondent) by order dated 21 October 1978 declined to refer the dispute for adjudication, recording reasons that the management had given the worker a fair opportunity during the enquiry and that the worker failed to avail the opportunity and prove his case. The petitioner filed this writ petition (seeking certiorari and mandamus) to quash the Government order and to direct reconsideration.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appropriate Government, in declining to make a reference under Section 10 read with Section 12(5) of the Industrial Disputes Act in a case covered by Section 2-A, may record reasons that effectively amount to an adjudication of disputed questions of fact and law.
  2. Whether the insertion of Sections 2-A and 11-A of the Act restricts the Government's discretion to decline referral in individual dismissal cases and, if so, to what extent.
  3. Whether the reasons given by the Government in the impugned order (that a fair domestic inquiry was held and the worker failed to prove his case) were sufficient and legally permissible grounds to refuse a reference for adjudication.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The reasons recorded by the Government amounted to an adjudication of the dispute and an improper arrogation of the jurisdiction vested in the Labour Court/Tribunal — a function that is not permissible for the Government.
  • In light of Sections 2-A and 11-A of the Act, the Government's power to decline reference in dismissal cases is significantly curtailed, and the Government should not refuse a reference on grounds that go to the merits which are for the Tribunal to decide.

Respondent / Management's Arguments

  • The management relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court in V. Veerarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu (1985 — I L.L.N 123). The opinion records that the management relied on that authority, which dealt with the scope of Sections 2-A and 11-A and the Government's power; the judgment observed that the relevance of that decision depended on its particular facts.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 1617 Held that the appropriate Government may make a prima facie examination of merits when deciding whether to refer a dispute under S.10 read with S.12(5); however, the Government should not reach a final decision on questions of law or disputed facts which are for the Tribunal. The court used this decision to explain the historical scope of the Government's power to refuse reference (prima facie examination allowed), but noted that the position must be considered in the light of later statutory insertions (Ss. 2-A and 11-A).
Workmen of Syndicate Bank, Madras v. Government of India, 1985 — I L.L.N 589 It is impermissible for the Government to refuse to make a reference merely because a domestic inquiry has found charges proved; that would allow managements to evade adjudication even where inquiry findings might be unreasonable, perverse, mala fide or the penalty disproportionate. The court relied on this authority to support the principle that S.2-A/11-A protect the workman's right to adjudication and that the Government cannot routinely refuse references on the sole basis that a domestic inquiry held charges proved.
Ram Avtar Sharma v. State of Haryana, 1985 — II L.L.N 280 Held that where the Government's reasons for refusal show it has effectively adjudicated (e.g., by concluding inquiry was valid, unbiased and punishment commensurate), such refusal is improper because these questions must be examined by the Tribunal; S.11-A empowers the Tribunal to examine both nature of enquiry and adequacy of punishment. The court cited and followed this reasoning to conclude that the Government's recorded satisfaction on the correctness of the enquiry and punishment would amount to inadmissible adjudication, making the order liable to be set aside.
Srikantha Rao v. State of Karnataka, 1986 — I L.L.N 862 Followed the Workmen of Syndicate Bank decision where a Government order declining reference (for like reasons) was set aside. The court cited this High Court decision as an instance where a similar order declining reference on the basis that the domestic enquiry was legal and fair was set aside, supporting interference in the present case.
V. Veerarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 1985 — I L.L.N 123 (Division Bench) Dealt with the scope of Ss. 2-A and 11-A of the Act (specific principles not restated in detail in the opinion). The management relied on this decision. The court observed that this authority did not assist the management in the present case because that decision turned on its particular facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by identifying and applying the relevant statutory framework and precedents stated in the opinion.

  1. Statutory framework: The court set out Section 12(5) (which requires the Government to record reasons where it declines reference), Section 12(4) (conciliation failure report), Section 10 (power to refer disputes), Section 2-A (which deems individual dismissal/termination disputes to be industrial disputes) and Section 11-A (which empowers Labour Courts/Tribunals to give appropriate relief including reinstatement or lesser punishment, relying only on materials on record).
  2. Historical position and prima facie inquiry: The court recalled the Supreme Court's decision in Bombay Union of Journalists to explain that the Government may make a prima facie examination of the merits when deciding whether to refer a dispute; however, the Government must not attempt final adjudication on disputed questions of fact or law.
  3. Effect of Ss. 2-A and 11-A: The court emphasized that insertion of S.2-A and S.11-A reduced the Government's discretion in dismissal cases: "normally" a dismissal/discharge/termination case falling under S.2-A should be referred for adjudication. The role of the Government in such cases is therefore more restricted than in other categories of disputes.
  4. Exceptional circumstances allowing refusal: The court acknowledged that the Government may refuse reference in exceptional cases — examples given in the opinion include claims that are patently frivolous, highly belated, where the claim's impact on employer-employee relations is likely to be adverse, or where refusal is necessary to promote industrial peace. These are described as relating to larger regional interests, not to mere merits (questions of law or fact).
  5. Application to the present facts: The impugned Government order stated only that the management had given the worker a fair opportunity during the enquiry and that the worker failed to avail himself of that opportunity and to prove his case. The court found that such a reason does not amount to an exceptional circumstance described above and, more importantly, that recording satisfaction on the adequacy and fairness of the domestic inquiry and the sufficiency of evidence effectively constitutes an adjudication on the merits — a function reserved for the Tribunal under S.11-A.
  6. Conclusion of analysis: Because the Government's reasons in the order were confined to the merits of the enquiry (and did not rely on any of the exceptional public/industrial peace considerations), the order declining reference was not in accordance with law. The court therefore held the order to be unlawful and subject to quashing.

Holding and Implications

The writ petition is allowed; the impugned Government order dated 21 October 1978 declining to refer the dispute is set aside, and the matter is remanded to the first respondent for fresh disposal on merits in accordance with law.

Direct consequences for the parties (as stated in the opinion):

  • The Government order declining reference is quashed and the matter is remitted to the Government for reconsideration.
  • The first respondent is directed to decide afresh whether to refer the dispute within two months from the date of the judgment.
  • There will be no order as to costs.

Broader legal implications (as reflected in the opinion):

  • The judgment reiterates that Sections 2-A and 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act substantially restrict the Government's discretion to refuse reference in dismissal/discharge/termination cases; normally such cases should be referred for adjudication unless exceptional circumstances exist.
  • The Government must not record reasons that amount to adjudication on the merits (e.g., conclusively determining the fairness of a domestic inquiry or adequacy of punishment), because those matters fall within the exclusive domain of the Labour Court/Tribunal.

The opinion does not state that it is establishing a novel legal principle beyond applying and following earlier authorities; it applies existing precedents to the facts and remits the matter for fresh consideration.

    Balakrishnan (N.) v. Government Of Tamil Nadu (By Secretary, Labour And Employment Department, Madras, And Another.

    1. This is a petition for the issue of a certiora-rified mandamus calling for the records of the Government of Tamil Nadu in G._0. Ms. No. 1270, Labour and Employment Department, dated 21 October, 1978, quash the same and direct its reconsideration. By that Government order, the first respondent refused to refer an industrial dispute relating to the non-employment of the petitioner.

    2. The petitioner was employed in the second respondent co-operative stores as assistant cashier for about 13 years. He was placed under suspension pending an enquiry by order, dated 26 March, 1976. Certain charges were framed against him on 10 May, 1976, and ultimately, on the ground that the charges have been proved, by an order, dated 6 December, 1976, he was dismissed from service with retrospective effect from the date of suspension, viz., 27 March, 1976. He raised an industrial dispute under S. 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter called the Act) and the matter was taken up for conciliation. On the Conciliation Officer sending a failure report and on a consideration of the same, the first respondent by order, dated 21 October, 1978, declined to refer the dispute for adjudication. The impugned order of the first respondent reads as follows:

    “The Government have examined the conciliation report of the Labour Officer II, Madurai, first read above, in regard to an industrial dispute raised by Thiru M. Balakrishnan against the management of Dindigul Co-operative Wholesale Stores, Ltd., Dindigul, Madurai District, over the issue of his non-employment and they pass the following orders:

    2. It is clear that the management had given a fair chance to the worker to defend his case during the enquiry but the worker had failed to avail the opportunity and to prove his case.

    3. Hence the Government consider that there is no case to refer the issue in dispute for adjudication”.

    3. Learned counsel for the petitioner con tended that the reasons given by the Government amounts to an adjudication of the dispute and arrogation of the jurisdiction vested in the Labour Court to itself, which is not permissible, and, therefore, the impugned order is illegal. Before, referring to the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner, it would be convenient to set out certain provisions in the Act. Section 12(5) of the Act reads as follows:

    “If, on a consideration of the report referred to in Sub-sec (4), the appropriate Government is satisfied that there is a case for reference to a Board, Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, it may make such a reference. Where the appropriate Government does not make such a reference, it shall record and communicate to the parties concerned its reasons therefor”.

    Section 12(4) of the Act relates to the conciliation failure report. Though S. 12(5) of the Act refers to the satisfaction of the Government that there is a case for reference, the actual reference is made only under S. 10 of the Act which states that where the appropriate Government is of opinion that an industrial dispute, exists or is apprehended, it may, at any time, by order in writing, refer the dispute to the appropriate Tribunal, The primary question to be considered is, therefore, as to whether there is an industrial, dispute within the meaning of S. 2(k) of the Act or an industrial dispute is apprehended.

    4. Referring to the scope of this power of the Government to refer prior to the insertion of Ss. 2-A and 11-A of the Act, with reference to the scope of S. 10 read with S. 12(5) of the Act, the Supreme Court in the decision in Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, [A.I.R 1964 S.C 1617] observed thus:

    “It is true that if the dispute in question raises questions of law, the appropriate Government should not purport to reach a final decision on the said questions of law, because that would normally lie within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal. Similarly, on disputed questions of fact, the appropriate Government cannot purport to reach final conclusions, for that again would be the province of the Industrial Tribunal. But it would not be possible to accept the plea that the appropriate Government is precluded from considering even prima facie the merits of the dispute when it decides the question as to whether its power to make a reference should be exercised under S. 10(1) read with S. 12(5) or not. If the claim made is patently frivolous, or is clearly belated, the appropriate Government may refuse to make a reference. Likewise, if the impact of the claim on the general relations between the employer and the employees in the region is likely to be adverse, the appropriate Government may take that into account in deciding whether a reference should be made or not. It must, therefore, be held that a prima facie examination of the merits cannot be said to be foreign to the enquiry which the appropriate Government is entitled to make in dealing with a dispute under S. 10(1), and so, the argument that the appropriate Government exceeded its jurisdiction in expressing its prima facie view on the nature of termination of services of appellants 2 and 3, cannot be accepted”.

    This was the view expressed in other decisions also in regard to the position prior to the insertion of Ss. 2-A and 11-A of the Act.

    3. By Act 35 of 1965, with effect from 1 December, 1965, S. 2-A of the Act was introduced and that reads as follows:

    “2A. Dismissal, etc. of an individual workman to he deemed to be an industrial dispute.— -Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workman is a party to the dispute”.

    By Act 45 of 1971, with effect from 15 December, 1971, S. 11-A of the Act was introduced and that reads as follows:

    “Powers of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workman—Where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require:

    Provided that in any proceeding under this section, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter”.

    6. In the light of these provisions, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the ratio of the decision in Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, [A.I.R 1964 S.C 1617] (vide supra), in so far it held that both questions of law and fact, are within the province of the Industrial Tribunal to decide and the Government have no right to decide those questions and decline a reference will apply with greater force as Ss. 2-A and 11-A of the Act had further restricted the powers of the Government in declining a reference in cases falling under S. 2-A of the Act.

    7. As already stated, normally, the primary question that has to be decided is as to whether there is an industrial dispute or not. The decisions on this question may be with reference to the facts or with reference to the law. On those disputed questions of fact and law, the primary jurisdiction to decide is vested in the Tribunal and the Government's power to consider the same while referring or declining to refer the question is as stated in the passage extracted from the decision of the Supreme Court in Bombay Union of Journalists v. State of Bombay, [A.I.R 1964 S.C 1617] (vide supra) But, S. 2-A of the Act takes away most of the discretions of the Government in making a reference in respect of dismissal, discharge or termination of a workman. In view of the provisions under S. 2-A read with S. 11-A of the Act, normally, a case of dismissal, discharge, or termination of service of a workman falling under S. 2-A of the Act shall have to be referred for adjudication and the discretion vested in the Government in regard to the same is very little and not that much as those cases falling under other categories of disputes. In Workmen of Syndicate Bank, Madras v. Government of India, [1985—1 L.L.N 589], the Government have declined to make a reference on the ground that the charges of misconduct against the worker were proved during a duly constituted departmental enquiry and penalty was imposed on the worker after following the required procedure. In that case, the Supreme Court has held as follows in Para. 1, at page 590:

    “… It would not be right for the Government of India to refuse to make the reference on the ground that the charges of misconduct against the worker were proved during a duly constituted departmental enquiry and penalty was imposed on the worker after following the required procedure. If such a ground were permissible it would be the easiest thing for the management to avoid a reference to adjudication and to deprive the worker of the opportunity of having the dispute referred for adjudication even if the order holding the charges of misconduct proved was unreasonable or perverse or was actuated by mala fides or even if the penalty imposed on the worker was totally disproportionate to the offence said to have been proved. The management has simply to show that it has held a proper inquiry after complying with the requisite procedure and that would be enough to defeat the worker's claim for adjudication. Such a situation cannot be countenanced by law…”.

    8. The Supreme Court has again considered this question in detail in the decision reported in Ram Avtar Sharma. State of Haryana, [1985—II L.L.N 280]. In that case also the Government declined to refer the dispute stating that the Government does not consider it a case to be fit for reference for adjudication by the Tribunal as it has been learnt that the services of the workman were terminated only after charges against him were proved in a domestic enquiry. Holding that the rejection was improper and illegal, the Supreme Court observed in Para. 9, at page 284

    “The assumption underlying the reasons assigned by the Government are that the enquiry was consistent with rules and the standing orders, that it was fair and just and that there was unbiased determination and the punishment was commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct. The last aspect has assumed considerable importance after the introduction of S. 11 A in the Industrial Disputes Act by the Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1971, with effect from 15 December, 1971. It confers powers on the Tribunal not only to examine the order of discharge or dismissal on merits as also to determine whether the punishment was commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct charged. In other words, S. 11-A confers power on the Tribunal or Labour Court to examine the case of the workman whose service has been terminated either by discharge or dismissal qualitatively in the matter of nature of enquiry and quantitatively in the matter of adequacy or otherwise of punishment. The workman questioned the legality and validity of the enquiry which aspect the Tribunal in a quasi-judicial determination was required to examine. A bare statement that a domestic enquiry was held in which charges were held to be proved, if it is considered sufficient for not exerting power of making a reference under S. 10(1), almost all cases of termination of services cannot go before the Tribunal. And it would render S. 2-A of the Act denuded of all its content and meaning. The reasons given by the Government would show that the Government examined the relevant papers of enquiry and the Government was satisfied that it was legally valid and that there was sufficient and adequate evidence to hold the charges proved. It would further appear that the Government, was satisfied that the enquiry was not biased against the workman and the punishment was commensurate with the gravity of the misconduct charged. All these relevant and vital aspects have to be examined by the Industrial Tribunal while adjudicating upon the reference made to it. In other words, the reasons given by the Government would amount to adjudication which is impermissible. That is the function of the Tribunal and the Government cannot arrogate to itself that function. Therefore, if the grounds on which or the reasons for which the Government has declined to make a reference under S. 10 are irrelevant, extraneous or not germane to the determination, it is well settled that the party aggrieved thereby would be entitled to move the Court for a writ of mandamns”.

    9. Though the decision of a single Judge of the Karnataka High Court reported in Srikantha Rao v. State of Karnataka, [1986 — I L.L.N 862] simply followed the decision of the Supreme Court reported in Workmen of Syndicate Bank, Madras v. Government of India, [1985 — I L.L.N 589] (vide supra) it is useful to cite that judgment because the order declining to refer in that case is similar to the order now in question. There also the impugned order stated that the Government considered that the demand dispute in question has no prima facie case for reference for adjudication, for the reason that the action of the management in dismissing the service of the workman is legal, proper and justified and that sufficient opportunity has been given and the principle of natural justice has been followed. Following the decision of the Supreme Court, the order was set aside in that case also.

    10. Learned counsel for the management relied on a Division Bench decision of this Court, to which I was a party, reported in V. Veerarajan v. Government of Tamil Nadu, [1985 — I L.L.N 123]. That decision also has dealt with the scope of Ss. 2-A and 11-A of the Act. It does not in any way help, the learned counsel for the management because ultimately the decision depended on the particular facts of that case.

    11. As I have stated earlier, even in a case falling under S. 2-A of the Act, the Government have a power to refuse to make a reference but the power is more restricted than in the case of an industrial dispute not falling under that section. The normal rule shall be to refer in all cases of dismissal, discharge or termination of service of workman falling under Ss. 2-A and 11-A of the Act. But, in appropriate cases of an exceptional nature, the Government may decline to make a reference. What are these exceptional cases or circumstances cannot be defined precisely and it will have to depend on the circumstances in each case. If the claim made by the worker is patently frivolous or is highly belated, or if the impact of the claim on the general relation between the employer and the employee in the region is likely to be adverse, or the declining or referring the dispute will put an end to the labour unrest or promote or establish an industrial peace, may be some of the reasons that may be taken into account while referring or refusing to refer. The reasons generally shall relate to the larger interest of labour or the establishment of an industrial peace in the region and not on mere merits of the case either on law or facts.

    12. In this particular case, no such exceptional circumstances are referred to in the order declining the reference except to state that the management had given a fair chance to the worker to defend his case during the enquiry but the worker had failed to avail the opportunity and prove his case. In fact, the Government order does not even refer whether the punishment given was disproportionate to the charges found proved and that itself would be enough to interfere with the impugned order. In the circumstances, I am of the view that the impugned order of the Government is not in accordance with law and accordingly I allow the writ petition and set aside the impugned order. The matter is remanded to the first respondent for fresh disposal on merits in accordance with law. However, there will be no order as to costs.

    13. The first respondent is directed to give its decision again whether dispute should be referred to or not within two months from this date.

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    Balakrishnan (N.) v. Government Of Tamil ...
    (Dec 10, 1986)