1. The appellant is the defendant. The respondent-bank laid the suit to recover the suit amount of Rs. 20,000/- principal and interest accrued thereon, totalling to Rs. 36,000-68 ps. The case of the respondent is that the appellant had deposited July 20, 1974 his documents of title and also executed the pomissory rote Ex. A1 of the even date, received a sum of Rs. 20,000/- agreeing to pay interest at 4% in excess of the R.B.I rate of interest prevailing at that time. He did not pay the amount. He deposited the title deeds by way of equitable mortgage. Therefore, the suit was laid for recovery of the amount under order 34 Rule 1 CPC. The appellant resisted the suit on three grounds: Firstly, it is contended that the suit is barred by limitation. Secondly, it is contended that there is no creation of the mortgage as he did not hypothecate his properties. It is only certified copy. Therefore, it is not a creation of mortgage by deposit of title deeds. It is thirdly contended that the rate of interest is usurious. The trial Court framed three issues which are held against the appellant, and the suit is decreed. Thus this appeal.
2. Sri Manga Chary, the learned counsel for the appellant contended that admittedly there is nothing in writing that the appellant had deposited the documents title with an intention to create equitable mortgage. He contends that the certified copy of the partition deed is not a title deed.
3. Therefore, it cannot be construed to be an equitable mortgage. I express my inability to accede to this contention. Section 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act provides that “Where a person in any of the following towns…and in any other town which the State Government concerned may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf, delivers to a creditor or his agent documents of title to immoveable property, with intent to create a security thereon, the transaction is called a mortgage by deposit of title deeds.” The question is whether the deposit of the certified copy of the partition deed is a creation of equitable mortgage by deposit of title deeds. Though the appellant had denied, the Court below has found on the facts and circumstances of the case that it is incredible to believe the appellant's case that he did not deposit the certified copy of the partition deed. A coparcener acquires a right in a coparcenary property on a partition deed if it is duly executed and registered. For a Hindu Mitakshara coparcenary, it is not absolutely necessary that the partition deed is registered, It is now well-settled that even the loans drawn by the coparcener in settlement of the claims of pre-existing rights to avoid future litigations are sufficient to create a title in the coparcenary property. The title is pre-existing right and not for the first time acquired under the document. But once it is deduced into writing, under Sec. 17 of the Registration Act, it is a compulsorily registerable document under Sec. 47 thereof. From that date, the coparcener acquires right, title and interest in the property acquired on the partition with his coparceners. Section 61 of the Evidence Act provides that the contents of the document may be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence. The primary evidence means the document itself produced for the inspection of the Court. Section 63 provides that the secondary evidence means and includes the certified copies given under the provisions hereinafter provided. A certified copy obtained from the Registrar of the original partition deed duly registered is the contents of the original and, therefore, they substitute the place of the original document, envisaged under Sec. 62 of the Evidence Act. When the appellant has produced the certified copy, obviously he induced the officers to believe that the original has been lost and requested the officers to accept the certified copy thereof as document of title. Under these circumstances, I hold that the certified copy of the partition deed is the secondary evidence as envisaged under Sec. 63 of the Evidence Act and, therefore, it can be acted upon.
4. The next question is whether the appellant has deposited the document with an intention to create it as an equitable mortgage. Mortgage by deposit of title deeds in English law, is called equitable mortgage. Equity requires that deposit of document of title without more or without writing or without words of mouth will create an equity charging upon the property referred to in the document. The requirements for deposit are:— (1) the existence of a debt; (2) deposit of the title deeds; (3) intention that the deeds shall be security for the debt. It is not in dispute that the appellant obtained loan on July 20, 1974 and executed the promissory note Ex. A1 and also the documents of title, Ex. A-4, enclosing the non-encumbrance certificate and the certificate of the village officers, Exs. A-8 and A-9. The question then is whether there is an intention to deposit the title deeds. It is no doubt true that the appellant had not signed in the register maintained by the bank, but in Ex. A-5, security register maintained by the bank in the regular course of business, endorsement has been made that on July 20, 1974 the documents of title have been deposited by the appellant with them and obtained loan thereon. It is not necessary that he should sign on the document. What is required is deposit of the title deeds with the bank. When the documents are in the custody of the bank, the necessary and inescapable inference that could be drawn is that the appellant had deposited his documents of title, namely, Ex. A-5, partition deed, as security for realisation of the debt obtained from the bank. Whether the appellant has intended to deposit documents as a security is an inferential fact, which is to be found from the facts and circumstances in this case. Admittedly, he obtained a no-encumbrance certificate under Ex. A-8, dated July 1, 1974 and a Certificate issued by village officer under Ex. A-9 dated July 15, 1974 to the effect that he is the owner of the property to an extent of Ac. 5.60 cents and they indicate that he intended to create those documents as security. Thus considered, I hold that the appellant has deposited the partition deed, Ex. A-4 as a security for the realisation of the debt. Accordingly, it is an equitable mortgage within the meaning of Sec. 58(f) of the T.P Act.
5. The next question is whether the appellant is liable to pay interest at 12% with quarterly rests. Section 3 of the Usurious Loans Act, 1918 (Act No. 10 of 1918) provides that notwithstanding anything in the Usury Laws Repeal Act, 1855, where, in any suit to which this Act applies, whether beard ex-pane or otherwise, the Court has reason to believe that the interest is excessive….the Court may exercise all or any of the following powers, namely, to reopen the transaction, take an account between the parties, and relieve the debtor of all liability in respect of any excessive interest. The Madras Amendment Act (Act 8 of 37) introduced a proviso in its application to Sec. 3 wherein a presumption has been drawn that any interest charged with compound rate shall be presumed to be usurious in the case of loans granted to an agriculturist. Therefore, when 12% interest with quarterly rests has been charged and the appellant admittedly is an agriculturist and the loan was advanced as a crop loan, by operation of the proviso, the rale of interst must be deemed to be excessive. The question then is whether the transaction is liable to reopen and whether the appellant is entitled to be relieved of the usury. Sri Tiivikrama Rao, learned counsel for the appellant has contended that by operation of Sec. 21-A of the recent amendment of the Banking Regulations Act, the loans covered under the provisions of the Act are excluded and that, therefore, the appellant is not entitled to the benefit. I am unable to agree, The agriculturists have been treated as a separate class even by the Reserve Bank of India for the purpose of loans and recovery of loans from them. Therefore, when the legislature is aware of the existence of the previous law and no specific time has been fixed to repeal the existing law as regards the applicability of the later Act and when the statute treated the agriculturists to be a separate class, as regards agriculturists are concerned, it is the special law that is applicable to the agriculturists and that, therefore, the Court is entitled to reopen the transactions and if it finds that the rate of interest is excessive, that has to be relieved. This Court in A.S 32/81 dated September 22, 1987 has held that charging interest with regard to the agriculturists at 12% with yearly rests is a reasonable rate of interest. Accordingly, the decree of the Court below is modified and the appellant is liable to pay interest at 12% with yearly rests.
6. The appeal is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated above and the decree of the Court below is set aside and there shall be a decree accordingly. The interest shall be till the date of decree and thereafter 6% interest under Sec. 34 of CPC till date of realisation. No costs.