Nainar Sundaram, J.:— The prayer in the writ petition runs as follows:
“For the reasons mentioned in the accompanying affidavit, it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to issue appropriate writs, orders or directions as the case may be and in particular issue a writ in the nature of declaration, declaring that the settlement, dated 26 June, 1981, entered by the second respondent management with respondents 3 and 4 unions in the presence of the first respondent is not a settlement under S. 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act and it is not binding on the petitioner-union and the 68 workers mentioned in the annexure to the settlement,
(ii) award costs and render justice.”
2. In order to appreciate the grievance of the petitioner with regard to the settlement referred to in the prayer in the writ petition, hereinafter referred to as the impugned settlement, we feel obliged to have a copy of the settlement annexed to this order. The attack on the settlement referred to in the prayer in the writ petition gets projected in the following manner by Miss K. Vaigai, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. The first respondent purported to conciliate an industrial dispute raised by the fourth respondent by its demands on 13 March, 1981. For the conciliation, the first respondent issued a notice on 17 March, 1981 to the petitioner calling upon it to offer its remarks on the demands raised by the fourth respondent. The petitioner offered its remarks. The first respondent by letter, dated 16 April, 1981, called upon not only the petitioner but as well as six more unions, who represented the body of workmen of the second respondent for a discussion on 24 April, 1981 over the demands raised by the fourth respondent. On 24 April, 1981, the first respondent recorded a statement from the secretary of the petitioner. Thereafter the petitioner was kept in the dark and kept out of the picture with reference to the conciliation. Ultimately, it transpired that the impugned settlement under S. 12(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act, has been arrived at between the second respondent on the one hand and respondents 3 and 4 on the other in the course of the conciliation before the first respondent. Learned counsel for the petitioner would complain that the first respondent did not conform to the provisions of S. 12 of the Act, in that he did not permit the parties, namely, the petitioner and the body of workmen whose cause it represented and who would be affected and bound by the settlement to participate in the conciliation, and in the process of arriving at any settlement, which must be fair, equitable and reasonable to all concerned. Learned counsel for the petitioner points out that by the terms of the impugned settlement, the benefit of continuity of service has been denied to the sixty-eight workmen, who are members of the petitioner and this exclusion could not have the stamps of fairness, equitableness and reasonableness to the entire body of workmen of the second respondent. Learned counsel for the petitioner would also complain that there is no indication anywhere at all that the first respondent satisfied himself about the fairness, equitableness and reasonableness of the settlement before he approved of it and gave his seal to it.
3. As against this, Sri M.R Narayanaswami, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent, would submit that the sixty-eight workmen whom the petitioner represents, earlier preferred claim petitions to the Labour Court on the basis that there was a lay-off and they wanted compensation on that basis and the matter came up to this Court by way of a batch of writ petitions and the pronouncement of this Court is reported in Pudukottah Textiles, Ltd. v. A. Ganapathi, Additional Labour Court, Madras [1979 — II L.L.N 567], and this Court remitted the matter back to the Labour Court for the purpose of finding out as to whether it was a case of closure or lay-off or anything else and pursuant to the order of remittal, the Labour Court has rendered a finding that it was a case of closure, and further the sixty-eight workmen were awarded closure compensation by the Labour Courts by order, dated 12 September, 1980. Learned counsel for the second respondent would submit that the sixty-eight workmen having obtained a decision at the hands of the Labour Court that it was a case of closure and further having obtained closure compensation in the said proceeding, cannot insist for continuity of service, and hence their exclusion from the benefit of continuity of service as per the terms of the impugned settlement is perfectly justifiable, and in any event, this is a matter, which should be appropriately adjudicated upon only by way of an industrial dispute and this Court in writ jurisdiction shall not indulge in examining and resolving the dispute on complicated questions of fact as involved in the present one.
4. We would have been inclined to examine this line of thinking, put forth by the learned counsel for the second respondent, but for certain features, which show beyond doubt that the first respondent did not discharge his functions as he is enjoined to do, as per the provisions of S. 12 of the Act. The first respondent did rightly conceive the idea that for the conciliation over the demands raised by the fourth respondent, the petitioner-union should have audience and roust have its say. The first respondent did call upon the petitioner to offer its remarks. The petitioner did offer its remarks. Again on 16 April, 1981, there was a call by the first respondent on all the unions, including the petitioner-union to be present for a discussion on 24 April, 1981. The petitioner-union was present for the discussion on 24 April, 1981, and the secretary of the petitioner did make a statement, in that statement, there was an insistence for implementation of the order of the Labour Court in the claim petitions, but, that statement did not stop there and that statement further prayed for other claims also and it did not abandon or waive the claim for continuity of service for the sixty-eight workmen. After 24 April, 1981, the petitioner was not put on notice of the further prosecution of the conciliation proceedings. Admittedly, there were two notices issued for further prosecution of the conciliation proceedings; one on 11 June, 1981 and the other on 20 June, 1981. All these features are evident from the files produced by the learned Government Advocate appearing for the first respondent. We could not understand as to what factors weighed with the first respondent to forget the petitioner with reference to the further prosecution of the conciliation proceedings. There is no counter-affidavit sworn to by the first respondent explaining or offering any position or stand of his. Certainly, he is not supposed to have pre-judged the issue with reference to the demands raised and adjudged that the sixty-eight workmen are dot entitled to continuity of service. As to how far the sixty-eight workmen, whom the petitioner-union represented and represents, should lose the benefit of continuity of service on account of the order of the Labour Court in the claim petitions, is in the adjudicatory field and the first respondent cannot enter into it. His foremost duty as a Conciliation Officer is to investigate into the claims of all the parties and he must endeavour his best to induce the parties to come to a settlement, fair, equitable and reasonable to all concerted. He must see to it that no discrimination comes in between one section of workmen and another, irrespective of their affiliasion to union or unions. So much confidence is being reposed in the Conciliation Officer by the provisions of the Act. In the matter of conciliation and bringing about a settlement, fair, equitable and reasonable, he cannot abdicate his functions and duties cast upon him in this behalf and that would amount to betrayal of that confidence. The solemn significance annexed to his functions, could be well understood, when we find that a settlement arrived at in the course of conciliation proceedings is treated at par with the awards made by the adjudicatory authorities, which will be binding on the entire body of workmen and not only on those parties thereto. The first respondent should have seen to it that the settlement does not bring about any discrimination amongst workmen, irrespective of their affiliation to unions and their strength. In other words; he must endeavour to bring about a fair and amicable settlement, meeting out equal treatment to all the workmen. In Balmer Lawrie Workers Union, Bombay v. Balmer Lawrie and Co., Ltd. [1985—I L.L.N 564], while construing S. 20(2) of the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971, to find out as to whether a representative union could discriminate between its members and other workmen of the undertaking, who are not its members, the Supreme Court observed as follows in Para. 25, at page 576:
“… However, when a settlement is reached in a proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act in which a representative union has appeared, the same is to be binding on all the workmen of the undertaking. This would mean that neither the representative union nor the employer can discriminate between members of the representative union and other workmen who are not members. Both the benefits, addvntages, disadvantages or liabilities arising out of settlement in any proceeding under the Industrial Disputes Act to which a representative union is a party shall be equally applicable to each workman in the undertaking. There shall not be the slightest trace of discrimination between members and non-members both as regards the advantages and also as regards obligations and liabilities. Any other view of S. 20(2)(b) would render it unconstitutional and invalid as being violative of Art. 14. Equal treatment of members and non-members is implicit in the section and by its interpretation we only make it explicit.”
It could be complained by the petitioner that the above norm stands violated by the terms of the impugned settlement. The factual features of the present case disclose that the first respondent lost sight of the presence of the petitioner and the body of workmen it represented after a particular stage in the course of the conciliation proceedings and proceeded to countenance a settlement, which as, by its terms, denied continuity of service to the sixty-eight workmen, whose cause the petitioner represented. Nothing is indicated and disclosed before us as to why the first respondent chose to exclude the petitioner from further participation in the conciliation proceedings and hearing the petitioner on the question of entering into a settlement and the terms of the setttlement being fair, equitable and reasonable. The first respondent has not discharged his fuactions as per the mandates of S. 12 of the Act and it could be legitimately complained that he abdicated his functions and duties cast upon him by the statute, before he gave his approval and stamp to the impugned settlement. We should not be understood, by any of our above observations, to have expressed any opinion on the merits of the claims of the sixty-eight workmen whose cause the petitioner represents, for continuity of service. Only on the ground that there was a failure on the part of the first respondent to discharge his statutory functions and duties, when he conciliated over the dispute and gave his approval and stamp to the impugned settlement, arrived at in the course of such conciliation, we are obliged to interfere in writ powers.
5. Accordingly, this writ petition is allowed in the following terms:
(1) The impugned settlement is being set aside as not having been arrived at in due compliance with the provisions of S. 12 of the Act.
(2) The first respondent is directed to prosecute the conciliation proceedings, already commenced by him, to its culmination one way or the other with expedition, the outer limit being six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order, in accordance with law and if there should be any move for settlement by anyone of the parties, he shall adhere to the norms and conditions governing the arrival of the same as set out in S. 12 of the Act as well as exemplified by pronouncements, of Courts for countenancing such a settlement and giving his approval and seal to the same.
There will be no order as to costs in the writ petition.
ANNEXURE
TO THE ORDER, DATED 25 AUGUST, 1989, IN WRIT PETITION NO. 10389 OF 1981.