Venkataswami, J.:— When the writ appeals which are directed against the interim orders passed in Writ Petition No. 13874 of 1991 came up for final disposal, after advancing arguments for some time, learned counsel on both sides desired and agreed for the disposal of the writ petition itself, by us, alongwith the writ appeals, and that is how the writ petition is also before us.
2. We will take up the writ petition first for disposal.
3. The petitioner, aggrieved by proceedings of the respondent, dated 31 July 1991, in and by which the respondent has removed the petitioner from service, has filed the said writ petition.
4. Brief facts leading to the filing of the writ petition are the following:
The petitioner joined in the respondent-bank as a clerk on 17 October 1970. He was promoted as supervisor on 19 July 1991 (sic). He was further promoted as selection hrade supervisor with effect from 1 January 1980. While he was discharging the functions of selection grade supervisor, he was placed under suspension by an order, dated 21 February 1983, with effect from 18 January 1983. This was followed by a chargememo on 29 September 1983, making allegations relating to the period 1978–79, The sum and substance of the charges is given in the affidavit are, temporary misappropriation of funds amounting to Rs. 2592-03 and negligence in duty. A domestic enquiry was followed, as a result of which, he was dismissed from service by order, dated 28 December 1987. It appears that he has raised an industrial dispute regarding his non-employment, in Industrial Dispute No. 391 of 1988, on the file of Second Additional Labour Court, Madras. It is also seen from the affidavit that criminal prosecution was launched against the petitioner on the same set of charges for which domestic enquiry was held. Ultimately, the petitioner was acquitted of the charges framed in the criminal case, namely, C.C No. 129 of 1985, on the file of the First Class Magistrate, Thiruvallur, by judgment, dated 24 January 1989. On the basis of the acquittal, he made a representation on 13 February 1989, for reinstatement, which was rejected by the then Special Officer, by order, dated 21 February 1989. Subsequent to that, elections to co-operative institutions were held in August 1990 and elected body came into existence in October 1990. Again, the petitioner made representation on 19 October 1990 to the President of the respondent-bank, requesting for reinstatement. In the representation, he has expressed his willingness to withdraw Industrial Dispute No. 391 of 1988. It is stated that factually the application to withdraw Industrial Dispute No. 391 of 1988 was filed before the Second Additional Labour Court, but on account of non-availability of the Presiding Officer, that application was not posted and disposed of. For no fault of the petitioner, the application to withdraw Industrial Dispute No. 391 of 1988 was kept pending. On the basis of the representation, the President of the bank, after getting opinion as regards the advisability of preferring an appeal/revision against the acquittal, from the Assistant Public Prosecutor, and after ascertaining that there was no case to file appeal/revision against the acquittal, reinstatement was ordered on condition that the balance of wages after adjusting the subsistence allowance for the period of suspension would be paid, and the period from the date of dismissal till reinstatement would be treated as leave en loss of pay. Accepting the condition, the petitioner reported to duty on 31 October 1990 and filed an application also for withdrawing Industrial Dispute No. 391 of 1988. From 31 October 1990, till the date of the impugned order, the petitioner continued to be in service. Again, the elected body was superseded and a Special Officer was appointed on 28 July 1991 and he took charge on 29 July 1991. Immediately after taking charge, the Special Officer passed the impugned order, terminating the services of the petitioner, without affording any opportunity to the petitioner to put forward the his case. Aggrieved by that, the present writ-petition is filed.
5. No counter-affidavit is filed.
6. Sri N.G.R Prasad, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the impugned order is liable to be dismissed on the simple ground of violation of the principles of natural justice inasmuch as the petitioner was not given any opportunity to put forward his case. He also submitted that the petitioner accepted the conditions, namely, to treat the period from the date of dismissal till the date of reinstatement as leave on loss of pay and to withdraw Industrial Dispute No. 391 of 1988, challenging the domestic enquiry. He also submitted that there is nothing to suggest as mentioned in the impugned order that the respondent has taken any steps to further prosecute the criminal case by filing appeal/revision against the acquittal. The impugned order is, therefore, liable to be set aside.
7. Sri R. Srinivasan, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the writ petition against co-operative societies is not maintainable as per the Full Bench judgment of this Court, and the writ petition is also not maintainable on the other ground that Industrial Dispute No. 391 of 1988 is still pending. However, he is not in a position to [say whether any steps are taken to further prosecute the criminal case against the petitioner by preferring any appeal/revision against the acquittal. He fairly admitted that the impugned order of dismissal without observing the principles of natural justice, is of course, not sustainable.
8. In reply, Sri N.G.R Prasad submitted that if any impugned order is passed against the principles of natural justice, this Court's jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India is not taken away, notwithstanding the availability of alternative remedy of otherwise. In support of that, he placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in C. Marianandam v. Government of Tamil Nadu [1989 - I L.L.N 728]. He also submitted that the question whether a writ lies against the co-operative society or not, need not detain us, as the impugned order is admittedly, one passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. Therefore, applying the ratio laid down in the above judgment, the impugned order will have to be set aside. He also submitted that it is not the fault of the petitioner for not passing any orders on the application filed by him to withdraw Industrial Dispute No. 391 of 1988 as the petitioner has done his part of the work, but, for want of Presiding Officer, no order had been passed on that petition.
9. We have considered the rival submissions.
10. As pointed out earlier, it is not in dispute that the impugned order was passed without giving any opportunity to the petitioner and, therefore, it is in violation of the principles of natural justice Srinivasan J., in 1989 — I L.L.N 728 (vide supra), after referring to a Supreme Court judgment while answering a point regarding the maintainability of a writ petition, has observed as follows, in Para. 11, at page 733:
“Before dealing with the third contention put forward by learned counsel for the third respondent, it is necessary to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court on the scope of Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. In Rohtas Industries, Ltd. v. Rohtas Industries Staff Union [1976 - I L.L.N 165], the Court held that Art. 226 of the Constitution of India was wide enough to affect even a private individual. The relevant portion of the judgment is in the following terms, in Para. 10, at page 169:
‘The expansive and extraordinary power of the High Courts under Art. 226 is as wide as the amplitude of the language used indicates and so can affect any person-even a private individual — and be available for any (other) purpose even one for which another remedy may exist. The amendment to Art. 226 in 1963, inserting Art. 226 (IA) reiterates the targets of the writ power as inclusive of any person by the expressive reference to ‘the residence of such person.’ But it is one thing to affirm the jurisdiction, another to authorise its free exercise like a bull in a china shop. This Court has spelt out wise and clear restraints on the use of this extraordinary remedy and High Courts will not go beyond those wholesome inhibitions except where the monst rosity of the situation or other exceptional circumstances cry for timely judicial interdict or mandate. The mentor of law is justice and a potent drug should be judiciously administered. Speaking in cfitical retrospect and portentous prospect, the writ power has, by and large, been the people's sentinel on the quivive and to cut back on or liquidate that power may cast a peril to human rights. We hold that the award here is not beyond the legal reach of Art. 226, although this power must be kept in severely judicious leash.’
In my view, the monstrosity of the situation in the present case would undoubtedly warrant the issue of writ to the third respondent even if it is a private institution. On the admitted facts of the case, it is seen that the services of the headmaster of the school are terminated on a very serious change of misbehaviour with a lady teacher and other charges without giving an opportunity to him to deny the same. It is a shocking state of affair that the management of an educational institution should throw to the winds the elementary principles of natural justice in dealing with its headmaster, who is at the helm of affairs on the academic side. This is a case in which the Court should exercise its prerogative power and would be failing in its duty if it chooses to remain a mute witness to the situation on the ground that the third respondent is not a statutory authority.”
In this case we do not find any difficulty in applying the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court as referred to above, as, admittedly, the impugned order was passed without observing the principles of natural justice. Therefore, on that simple ground, we are inclined to allow the writ petition, and accordingly, the impugned order of the respondent, dated 31 July 1991, is quashed. The writ petition is allowed. No costs.
11. In view of the disposal of the writ petition finally, no orders need be passed in the writ appeals which are filed against the interim orders only.
12. In the result, the writ petition is allowed. The writ appeals are dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs both in the writ petition and writ appeals.