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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision challenges the Trial Court's order dated 14th August 1995, which allowed the plaintiff's application under Section 176 of the Contract Act for custody of hypothecated goods and issuance of a warrant of possession. The plaintiff (non-applicant) had filed Civil Suit No. 35-A/90 on 19th June 1990 against the applicants for recovery of a loan amounting to Rs. 26,64,071.25 with interest, and sought decree for sale of mortgaged and hypothecated property. The applicants included members of a partnership firm and an individual alleged to be jointly liable. The suit involved multiple loans and credit facilities secured by equitable mortgage of immovable property and hypothecation/pledge of movable goods including machinery, steel, ingots, billets, and other stocks.

The plaintiff sought attachment before judgment and appointment of a receiver, which were refused by earlier orders of the Court. Subsequently, the plaintiff moved an application under Section 176 of the Contract Act, leading to the impugned order allowing custody and possession of hypothecated goods.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the provisions of Section 176 of the Contract Act apply to hypothecated goods and authorize the plaintiff to obtain custody and possession of such goods.
  2. Whether the application under Section 176 of the Contract Act was barred by limitation.
  3. Whether the list of hypothecated goods included immovable property, and if so, whether the order allowing possession was legally valid.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The application under Section 176 of the Contract Act cannot be enforced in respect of hypothecated goods.
  • The application was barred by limitation as it was filed beyond the permissible period.
  • The list submitted by the plaintiff included immovable property, which cannot be hypothecated or pledged, rendering the order invalid.

Non-Applicant's Arguments

  • The application under Section 176 of the Contract Act is maintainable and the order of the Trial Court should be upheld.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jiwan Das v. Sahu Sarju Prasad, AIR 1945 All. 299 Right of pledgee under Section 176 of the Contract Act to enforce pledge by possession and sale of goods through Court. The Court relied on this precedent to hold that the right to enforce pledge under Section 176 is independent of limitation for filing suit, as the property is in the Court's possession.
Central Bank of India v. Santosh Kumar Awasthy, 1980 J.L.J 480 Clarification of rights under Section 176 of the Contract Act regarding pledge and sale of pledged goods. The Court referenced this case to support the principle that Section 176 confers rights to retain and sell pledged goods after reasonable notice.
Haridas Mundra v. National Grandlays Bank, AIR 1963 Cal. 132 Related to rights of pledgee and enforcement of pledge. Cited as supporting authority for the principles under Section 176 of the Contract Act.
Bank of Chittoor v. Narysimhulu, AIR 1966 AP 163 Enforcement of pledge rights by pledgee under Contract Act. Used to reinforce the legal framework for enforcement of pledge and hypothecation.
Punjab National Bank v. Smt. Nirmala Devi Pramar (First Appeal No. 135/86, decided 7.9.1996) Equivalence of pledge and hypothecation regarding constructive possession and rights of the pledgee/hypothecatee. The Court agreed with this judgment holding no distinction between pledge and hypothecation for application of Section 176 of the Contract Act.
Bank of Baroda, Ahmedabad v. Rabari Bachubhai Hirabhai, AIR 1987 Gujarat 1 Definition and legal effect of hypothecation as pledge without physical transfer but with right to sell upon default. The Court cited this to support that hypothecation is akin to pledge and falls under Section 176 of the Contract Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the nature of the loans and agreements, noting that the plaintiff had equitable mortgages on immovable property and hypothecation/pledge agreements on movable goods including machinery and stocks. It was held that the suits related to loans granted on various dates were within limitation except possibly the earliest loan, but limitation could not be decided at this stage due to lack of documents.

Relying on the precedent of Jiwan Das v. Sahu Sarju Prasad, the Court held that Section 176 of the Contract Act confers rights on a pledgee to retain and sell pledged goods through the Court, and the question of limitation for an application under this section does not arise when the goods are in the Court's possession in a suit for recovery.

The Court rejected the argument that Section 176 applies only to pledge and not hypothecation, citing a recent judgment (Punjab National Bank v. Smt. Nirmala Devi Pramar) and the decision of the Gujarat High Court in Bank of Baroda v. Rabari Bachubhai Hirabhai, which equated hypothecation with pledge for the purpose of constructive possession and enforcement rights.

Regarding the contention that some hypothecated goods were immovable as they were attached to earth, the Court noted that the issue was not raised before the Trial Court and could not be entertained in the revision. The Court referred to the definition of "goods" under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, which includes movable property attached to the earth if agreed to be severed before sale. The Court concluded that the nature of the property and agreement would determine whether the goods are movable or immovable, but this factual dispute was not suitable for resolution on revision.

Accordingly, the revision was dismissed with costs.

Holding and Implications

The revision petition is dismissed.

The direct effect of this decision is that the Trial Court's order allowing the plaintiff's application under Section 176 of the Contract Act for custody and possession of hypothecated goods stands confirmed. The Court did not set any new precedent but reaffirmed established principles regarding the equivalence of pledge and hypothecation for enforcement under Section 176, and the non-applicability of limitation to such applications when goods are in Court's possession during recovery suits. The factual disputes concerning the nature of the hypothecated goods remain to be decided by the Trial Court.

    Tara Rerolling Mills v. Punjab National Bank

    S.G Pandey, J.:— This revision is directed against the order dated 14th of August, 1995, whereby the Trial Court has allowed the application of the non-applicant/plaintiff under Section 176 of the Contract Act for custody of the hypothecated goods and issuance of warrant of possession for that purpose.

    2. The facts of this case are that on or about 19.6.1990 the non-applicant/plaintiff filed a Civil Suit No. 35-A/90 against the applicants for recovery of loan and prayed for a decree of Rs. 26,64,071.25 jointly and severally. It also claimed interest on that arhount as per Clause-II of the prayer clause. The plaintiff/Bank further prayed for sale of mortgaged property as provided by Order XXXIV, Rules 4 and 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, against the applicant Nos. 1 to 5. Further prayer of the plaintiff/Bank was that the Trial Court should pass a decree for sale of movable property hypothecated with the Bank so that the decretal amount may be recovered. Further prayer was that so far as Rs. 7,52,189.were concerned, it be held that the applicant No. 6 would be jointly and severally liable to pay that amount and a decree be passed in accordance with Clause V of the prayer clause, mentioned in the plaint. The claim of the non-applicant/plaintiff was that the applicant Nos. 2 to 5 are the members of the partnership firm registered under the Indian Partnership Act, as M/s. Tara Rerolling Mills, Rajnandgaon. It was further pleaded that the applicant No. 6 is also responsible alongwith other applicants for the sum mentioned in Clause V of the prayer clause as per pleading in paragraph 16 of the plaint. The non-applicant asserted that the applicant Nos. 1 to 5 obtained a term loan on 23.2.1987 for purchase of plant and machinery for rolling mills and for construction of building, amount to Rs. 6.30 lacs. The conditions of term loan have been reproduced by the non-applicant in paragraph 3 of the plaint, which show that the Bank was authorised to create equitable mortgage of land, plant and machinery of the factory, embedded to the ground and hypothecation of the machinery and other movable assets of the factory. It was further pleaded in the same paragraph that there was also a facility of cash-credit upto the hypothecation limit. Under this facility a cash credit could be granted to the applicants at the hypothecation limit of Rs. 5,00,000/-. The Condition No. (b) of cash credit on hypothecation limit, provides that there shall be hypothecation of steel, ingots, billets, finished stocks, M.S scrap and goods in process etc. There was also provision for equitable mortgage of immovable property. It is alleged that the applicants accepted the terms in respect of loan as well as cash credit loan as mentioned above and the initial agreement was entered on 23.2.1987 for a loan of Rs. 6.30 lacs. As per the agreement dated 23.2.1987, the applicants deposited certain documents mentioned in paragraph 4 for creating an equitable mortgage of the property and hypothecated certain goods. However, in paragraph 5 of the plaint it is alleged that the applicants started availing the facility of each credit hypothecation limit of Rs. 5 lacs from 16.7.1987 and for this purpose, an agreement was entered into for hypothecation of steel in-gots, billets, finished stocks, M.S scrap and goods in process.

    3. It was further stated in the plaint that at the request of the applicant-firm a cash credit pledge limit of Rs. 2.5 lacs, upon pledge of blocks of ingots, slabs, angles, rods and channels etc., was granted. The applicants availed these facilities regarding the pledge of goods and an agreement upon pledge of goods, to the extent of Rs. 2.50 lacs was granted on 9.5.1988 It was further alleged that besides the aforesaid cash credit facility another loan of inland letter of credit was granted to the applicant-firm to the extent of Rs. 7.50 lacs on 5.9.1988 (sic). There was also a hypothecation clause in this system of loan.

    4. Pursuant to the suit of the non-applicant, it sought to get an order for attachment before judgment and made a prayer for appointment of a receiver. However, by the order passed by this Court dated 1.4.1992 in M.A No. 341 of 1991, a Division Bench of this Court confirmed the order of the Trial Court and refused to grant the prayer. Subsequently, a learned single Judge of this Court, by order dated 6.12.1993 in C.R No. 278 of 1992 had confirmed the order of the Court-below rejecting an application filed by the non-applicant under Order 39, Rules 6, 7 and 10 of the C.P.C Thereafter, the non-applicant moved the application under Section 176 of the C.P.C

    5. The learned Counsel for the applicant, in this revision, challenged the order of the Trial Court on the following grounds:—

    That the application made by the non-applicant regarding hypothecation of goods cannot be enforced on the ground that the provisions of Section 176 of the C.P.C attracted to the goods hypothecated. It was urged that the application can also not be enforced on the ground that the application was made beyond the period of limitation. Thirdly, it was also argued that the list submitted by the non-applicant was in respect of immovable property and for this reason also the impugned order was bad in the eyes of law.

    6. The Counsel for the non-applicant opposed the application and supported the order of the Court below.

    7. The first thing that has to be remembered here is that the suit in respect of term loan, as well as cash-credit loan for the goods hypothecated and also goods pledged, was barred from the hypothecation of goods as well as creating of pledge of goods. The applicants have also created an equitable mortgage in respect of the immovable properties. It is true that there is an agreement dated 23.2.1987 in respect of the term loan.

    8. In paragraph 3 of the plaint condition for grant of term loan of Rs. 6.30 lacs are reproduced. The condition No. (c) shows that apart from equitable mortgage, there was condition for hypothecation of machineries and other movable goods of the factory. According to agreement dated 23.2.1987, there was equitable mortgage of immovable property detailed in paragraph 4 and also certain goods were hypothecated. The non-applicant further pleaded that there was an agreement dated 16.7.1987 in respect of loan under open credit system with hypothecation limit of Rs. 5 lacs. This agreement involved hypothecation of steel ingots, billets, finished stocks, M.S scrap and goods in process. This agreement was renewed on 9.5.1988 Another argument of cash credit pledge limit of Rs. 2.50 lacs was entered on 9.5.1988 The goods pledged was stock of ingots, cutting rods, channels etc. There was another loan of Rs. 7.50 lacs under category of inland letter credit which was sanctioned on 5.9.1988 (sic). Thus, the suits for recovery of loan dated 16.7.1987, 9.5.1988 and 5.9.1988 would not be barred under Article 19 of the Limitation Act as they were filed within three years of grant of loan. So far as the loan advanced on 23.2.1987 is concerned, the suit would be barred on 19.6.1990 provided the benefit of Sections 18 or 19 read with Section 20 of Limitation Act was not available to the non-applicant. There are allegations in the plaint in paragraph 11 that the applicant No. 5 executed a deed of guarantee on 9.5.1988 in respect of all loans in sums of Rs. 21.30 lacs. This document may involve question of ‘acknowledgement of liability by a surety’. The legal effect of this document will depend upon its terms in case other applicants had not signed the document. Since the applicants have raised the point of limitation for the first time before this Court, it is not possible to decide this mixed question of law and facts at this stage. That document has not been filed and, therefore, on the basis of plaint alone it is not possible to determine the question of limitation. Further allegations in paragraph 12 do show that there are allegations regarding extension of security of term loan in respect of equitable mortgage to cover all other loans from time-to-time. In absence of relevant documents, this Court cannot decide the questions involved in this revision. However, the applicants are free to agitate this point when proper issue is framed by the Trial Court for determination of limitation.

    9. The learned Counsel for the applicants, however, argued that the application for enforcement of the pledge or hypothecation agreement was itself filed on 12.9.1994, and, therefore, it is barred by time. This Court agrees with the decision in the case of Jiwan Das v. Sahu Sarju Prasad, reported in AIR 1945 All. 299 wherein it has been held that apart from filing the suit for recovery of loan on the basis of agreement, a pledgee had a right to enforce the remedy under Section 176 of the Contract Act through the Court. The suit on the basis of mortgage or pledge is in nature of an administration suit. For this reason, the Court had inherent jurisdiction to administer by sale or otherwise, the property which is in sesin in any suit. Therefore, the question of limitation regarding the application under Section 176 of the Contract Act would not arise in this case, as the property was in the sesin of the Court, in the suit filed by the non-applicant for recovery of the amount of loan, as already indicated earlier. Moreover, this point of limitation shall only arise in a suit filed under Section 176 of the Contract Act. In this case, the suit of the non-applicant was not filed under Section 176 of the Contract Act. It was filed for taking possession of the property of goods hypothecated or pledged through the Court. For this reason also the question of limitation regarding filing of the application under Section 176 of the Contract Act would not arise in this case. The decision of Allahabad High Court in the case of Jiwan Das v. Sarju Prasad, (supra), was referred to by this Court in a decision in the case of Central Bank of India v. Santosh Kumar Awasthy, reported in 1980 J.L.J 480. In this case, there was a further reference to the case of Haridas Mundra v. National Grandlays Bank, AIR 1963 Cal. 132 and Bank of Chittoor v. Narysimhulu, AIR 1966 AP 163. It was held by this Court at page 471 that:—

    “It is thus clear that Section 176 of the Contract Act confers upon a pledgee two rights, in the event of default on the part of the pledgor: (1) Right to file a suit for the recovery of the debt, or (2) for performance of the promise. In each case, he is entitled to retain the pledged goods as and by way of a collateral security. If the pledgee does not file a suit, he is given the right to sell the pledged goods. But before selling the goods, he must give to the pledgor a reasonable notice of sale. Here, the decree merely embodies the right of the pledgee to sell the pledged goods through Court…….”(Paragraph 8).

    10. The next point sought to be argued by the learned Counsel for the applicant is that, Section 176 of the Contract Act is confined to only pledge of goods and not to hypothecation. In this connection, recently, a judgment has been delivered by Hon'ble Shri R.S Garg, J. in the case of Punjab National Bank v. Smt. Nirmala Devi Pramar (First Appeal No. 135/86, decided on 7.9.1996) wherein His Lordship has exhaustively discussed the law on the point after considering the definition of ‘pledge’ under Section 172 of the Contract Act and a number of authorities on the point. It was held in the judgment of that case that in case of pledge as well as in case of hypothecation, the constructive possession is always with the Bank, the pledgee or the hypothecatee. So far as the hypothecation is concerned, the possession remains with the hypothecator but the hypothecate had right to get the possession of the hypothecated property and sell it for realisation of the debt secured by way of hypothecation. The learned Judge has summed up the discussion by holding in paragraph 34 of the judgment, that there is no distinction between pledge of the goods and hypothecation. The Division Bench of Gujarat High Court, consisting of A.M Ahmadi and Shah, JJ, considered the matter in the case of Bank of Baroda, Ahmedabad v. Rabari Bachubhai Hirabhai, reported in AIR 1987 Gujarat 1. A.M Ahmadi, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Division Bench, at page 3, paragraph 6 held that:

    “It is not necessary to multiply by quoting from various other dictionaries or decided cases as it is sufficiently clear from what we have stated earlier that when a property is hypothecated with a creditor, it is pledged as security or collateral for a debt without physical transfer thereof to the creditor. The title to the property does not pass to the creditor but the creditor has merely the right to sell the pawn upon default….”

    11. In view of this matter, there is no scope for argument that the goods which were hypothecated by the Bank, are not covered by Section 176 of the Contract Act. I respectfully, agree with the decision rendered by Hon'ble R.S Garg, J. in that aforesaid First Appeal; and hold that in principle, there can be no distinction between ‘hypothecation’ and ‘pledge’ for application of Section 176 of the Contract Act. Therefore, the contention of the learned Counsel for the applicants is not accepted.

    12. The third contention of the learned Counsel for the applicants is that in the application filed by the non-applicant, dated 2.9.1994, there is a list of machineries shown to be hypothecated which were attached to the earth and, therefore, they could not have been pledged or hypothecated. The property which could be pledged or hypothecated, could only be movable property and for this reason, the impugned order passed by the Court below is bad in the eyes of law. It is clear from the order of the Court below that the list filed by the non-applicant alongwith the application was not controverted by the applicants. No point was raised before the Trial Court regarding the fact if the properties sought to be recovered, were immovable or movable properties. The learned Trial Judge has held in paragraph 7 of its order that the bank has filed two documents dated 23.2.1987 and one document dated 9.5.1988 regarding hypothecation. It has not referred to any other document filed by the non-applicant. The applicants did not oppose this application. However, the question raised by the Counsel for the applicants cannot be accepted in abstract for the reason that no such point regarding the property in question was raised before the trial Judge. In a case of pledge or hypothecation, the creditor has right under the contract to recover the loan by selling the movable property as per the agreement. It is usual to secure a loan by entering into a contract whereby the immovable property is mortgaged. That transaction, of course, is governed by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. However, if there be any agreement for sale of properties under hypothecation of pledge, these will be merely goods as defined under the Sale of Goods Act. The definition of “goods” under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 is as follows:

    “goods” means every kind of movable property other than auctionable claims and money and includes stock and shares, growing crops, grass and things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale.”

    13. It would be clear from this definition that if there be any agreement to sever goods or things attached to or forming part of the land before sale, they will be covered by “goods”. The transaction of pledge or hypothecation implies that the creditor has right to sell the goods pledged or hypothecated. In such a contract, permitting sale of goods, the definition of “goods” would be attracted rather than the definition of “immovable property” under the Transfer of Property Act or General Clauses Act. Therefore, the answer to the question raised by the Counsel for the applicants would depend on the agreement. In case, in the agreement of hypothecation or pledge of goods it was agreed between the parties that before sale of these goods they will be uprooted from the earth, then it cannot be argued that merely because machineries are attached to the earth, they are in the nature of immovable properties. However, this point cannot be decided here for the reason that the non-applicant did not raise this point before the learned trial Judge so that it could be examined by him as a matter of fact regarding the nature of agreement of pledge or hypothecation. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court cannot allow the disputed question of facts to be raised in this revision. For all these reasons, the revision fails and is dismissed with costs.

    14. Revision dismissed.

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    Tara Rerolling Mills v. Punjab National Bank
    (Dec 2, 1996)