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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Judgment

Factual and Procedural Background

The three writ petitions were heard together because the petitioners' grievances were identical. Two petitions are identified as Writ Petitions Nos. 15184 of 1994 and 15313 of 1994; another petition is referenced as Writ Petition No. 13080 of 1995 in one paragraph and as Writ Petition No. 13083 of 1995 in another paragraph of the opinion. The petitioners, employed by the respondent Board (Khadi Board and its unit(s) are referred to in the text), worked on a daily-wage/casual basis in posts such as night watchman and khalasi at different times from the early 1980s to the 1990s. They alleged that they had put in continuous service exceeding 480 days in a period of 24 calendar months and sought quashing of an impugned circular dated 15 December 1993 issued by the first respondent, and consequential directions to absorb them as permanent employees from the date of completion of 480 days of service, with continuity of service, arrears of salary and attendant benefits.

The respondents filed counter-affidavits in the first two petitions asserting that the petitioners were engaged only as contingent casual workers, not selected by the Staff Selection Board, that no attendance register is maintained for such casuals (only muster-roll for wage preparation), and denying the petitioners' claim that they worked the requisite number of days. The Court heard counsel for both sides and addressed both the validity of the impugned circular and the petitioners' entitlement under the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 (the Act).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the impugned circular dated 15 December 1993 issued by the Board (instructing officers not to employ casual labourers for more than a specified number of days) is valid and sustainable in law.
  2. Whether petitioners who have worked in "continuous service" for 480 days within 24 calendar months in an industrial establishment are entitled to be made permanent under Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981.
  3. Whether mere denial in a counter-affidavit, without production of records or other material, is sufficient to rebut the petitioners' prima facie case that they had completed the requisite period of service under the Act.
  4. Whether a circular of the nature issued by the respondents constitutes an unfair labour practice as understood in the precedents cited.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The petitioners had been employed on daily-wage/casual basis and had completed more than 480 days of continuous service within a period of 24 calendar months and therefore satisfy the conditions of Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981.
  • The impugned circular of 15 December 1993 was issued to defeat the right of the petitioners to be regularised and is opposed to the provisions of the Act and to principles of labour welfare.
  • The petitioners filed typed details of the number of days worked and relied on the statutory provisions and supportive Supreme Court decisions (Surinder Singh v. CPWD; H.D. Singh v. RBI; Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare).

Respondents' Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The petitioners were engaged only as contingent casual workers, deployed "as and when there was work"; their engagement was temporary and not regular employment.
  • The petitioners were not selected by the Staff Selection Board and therefore cannot claim a regular appointment.
  • For such casuals, no attendance register is maintained (only muster-rolls for wage preparation), and the respondents denied that the petitioners had worked for more than 480 days within two years.
  • Because of disputed questions of fact, the petitioners should approach the authority/machinery provided under the Act rather than obtain relief by writ.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
H.D. Singh v. Reserve Bank of India, 1985 (2) L.L.N. 1037 Held that a confidential circular directing that certain workmen should not be engaged continuously but only on rotation is an unfair labour practice; employing workmen as casuals or badlis to deprive them of permanent status is unfair. The Court relied on the Supreme Court's characterization of a similar circular as unfair labour practice to conclude the impugned circular could not be sustained and supported the petitioners' challenge to the Board's circular.
Surinder Singh v. Engineer-in-Chief, Central Public Works Department, 1986 (1) L.L.N. 522 Condemned the practice of keeping employees on temporary daily wages without regularisation and enforced equal pay for equal work; public sector employers expected to act as model employers. The Court cited this decision to support the proposition that employers, especially public sector undertakings, should not retain employees as temporary/daily-rated workers when their work is of permanent nature and that regularisation and parity of pay are required.
Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare, 1996 (1) L.L.N. 475 Recognised that continuing badlis/casual/temporary workers for years to deprive them of permanent status can be inferred as an unfair labour practice; rejected the defence that regularisation would cause undue financial burden. The Court used this authority to support the inference that prolonged casual employment may indicate an intention to deprive workers of permanent status and to reject the argument that financial burden justified the practice.
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, 1984 (2) L.L.N. 60 Explained the wide jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226, analogous to Article 32 of the Constitution, and the duty to enforce statutory and legal rights of disadvantaged persons vigorously. The Court relied on this decision to justify exercising its writ jurisdiction directly (rather than remitting the matter to the Inspector under the Act) to protect statutory rights where respondents failed to produce material to rebut petitioners' claims.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a stepwise manner:

  1. Assessment of the impugned circular: The Court examined the circular issued by the respondent Board (instructing officers not to employ casual labourers for more than a specified number of days) and concluded that the circular demonstrated disregard for labour welfare legislation and could not be sustained.
  2. Applicability of the Act: The Court held there was no dispute that the respondent Board is an "industrial establishment" within the meaning of the Act (relying on S.2 sub-clauses and related provisions). Once applicability was established, Section 3 of the Act automatically applied: any workman in continuous service for 480 days within 24 calendar months must be made permanent.
  3. Interpretation of "continuous service": The Court set out Section 3(2) and the explanatory clauses, explaining that periods of interruption for authorised reasons (sickness, authorised leave, accident, legal strike, lockout, lay-off up to three months with a substitute employed, etc.) are to be counted for computing continuous service.
  4. Evaluation of evidentiary record: The petitioners had asserted completion of 480 days and filed details in typed papers. The respondents filed counter-affidavits containing mostly bald denials and did not place documentary records or muster-rolls before the Court when the rule nisi was served. The Court observed that when served with rule nisi respondents are expected to produce records; absent any such material, mere denial could not displace the petitioners' prima facie case.
  5. Reliance on precedents: The Court applied Supreme Court authorities (H.D. Singh; Surinder Singh; Chief Conservator v. Kondhare) to the effect that similar circulars and prolonged casualisation amount to unfair labour practices and public employers must regularise employees where statutory conditions are met. The Court also cited Bandhua Mukti Morcha to support its exercise of writ jurisdiction in enforcement of statutory rights without remitting the parties to administrative inspectors in circumstances where respondents failed to discharge their evidentiary burden.
  6. Decision on appropriate forum: Although the Act provides for Inspectors and a procedure for representation and rectification of registers, the Court declined to remit the petitioners to the Inspector because the respondents had not discharged their obligation to produce material and the Court was satisfied on the available record to accept the petitioners' particulars.

Holding and Implications

Holding: All three writ petitions are allowed. The impugned circular could not be sustained and the petitioners were entitled to the relief claimed under Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981.

Direct consequences and orders given in the opinion (as recorded):

  • The three writ petitions relating to the named petitioners were allowed with costs.
  • Counsel fee awarded: Rs. 1,000.
  • Writ Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 23165 of 1994, 20980 of 1994 and 2225 of 1995 were dismissed (as recorded in the judgment).

Implications (as discussed or implied in the opinion):

  • The Court reaffirmed that social legislation such as the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 must be fully implemented by Central and State Governments and their organisations/undertakings.
  • The issuance of internal circulars designed to prevent casual labourers from attaining permanency may amount to unfair labour practice and cannot be sustained where statutory conditions for permanency are met.
  • The decision reflects the Court's readiness to enforce statutory rights under Article 226, including accepting petitioners' particulars where the employer/respondent fails to produce countervailing records when put to strict proof.

Note: This summary is confined strictly to the findings, legal reasoning, arguments, authorities cited and orders as they appear in the provided judgment text. No information beyond the text has been added or inferred.

    A. Palanivel And Others v. Tamil Nadu Khadi And Village Industries Board And Others

    JUDGMENT

    1. The grievance of all the three petitioners are one and the same, hence all the three writ petitions may be disposed of by a common order.

    2. In Writ Petitions Nos. 15184 of 1994 and 15313 of 1994, the petitioners have approached this Court to quash the circular of the first respondent, dated December 15, 1993, and consequently direct the respondents to absorb the petitioners in service as permanent employees from the date of completion of 480 days of service, in the year 1990 with continuity of service, arrears of salary and all other attendant benefits.

    3. In Writ Petition No. 13080 of 1995 the petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer to issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to absorb the petitioner as a permanent employee from the date of completion of 480 days of service, in the year 1984 with continuity of service, arrears of salary and all other attendant benefits.

    4. In Writ Petition No. 15184 of 1994, it is the case of the petitioner that he joined the service of the first respondent-Board as night watchman on daily-wage basis in October 1986. According to him, his father was a night watchman employed by the Board for three years before he passed away on November 6, 1986. When his father was hospitalised, the petitioner was employed to do his work. In the year 1991, he was asked to work as a khalasi during the day. The present wage of the petitioner is Rs. 43 per day. On alternate Sundays he used to work as a day watchman and do the work of day watchman alternatively on National Holidays also. It is further contended that attendance register is maintained but he was not allowed to sign in the same. His attendance is marked by one of the supervisors of the second respondent unit. His wages are paid from the contingent funds on the basis of his attendance that is marked each day. He worked for more than 240 days for the last five years. He has also filed details of the number of days worked by him in the typed set of documents. Inasmuch as the petitioner had worked for more than 240 days. There is no justification in continuing service on daily wage basis. The impugned circular of the Board, dated December 15, 1993, has been issued only to defeat the petitioner's right. Having employed the petitioner for more than 240 days in a year it is incumbent upon the respondent to regularise his services as per the provisions of Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status of Workmen) Act, 1981. With these averments he prayed for necessary relief as stated above.

    5. In Writ Petition No. 15313 of 1994, it is the case of the petitioner that he was employed at the second respondent unit of the Khadi Board. He joined the service in August 1988 as day watchman, but from February 1991 he also worked as khalasi. The petitioner's present wage is Rs. 43 per day. On alternate Sundays he used to work as a day watchman. The petitioner had completed more than 240 days for the last five years. He has also filed the details of number of days worked by him in the typed set of documents. The impugned circular is opposed to all canons of justice. The respondent Board is an industrial establishment under the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981. He is entitled to permanency from the date of completion of 480 days of service. According to the petitioner he has completed the same even in the year 1990. By virtue of the impugned circular in the writ petition, the second respondent has not regularised his service, hence he has approached this Court for necessary relief.

    6. In Writ Petition No. 13083 of 1995, according to the petitioner he joined the service of the Board as khalasi on daily wage basis on September 24, 1982. On August 7, 1987, he was appointed as a night watchman on daily-wage basis. Again he was asked to work, as khalasi on June 25, 1990. From the year 1990, he was working as khalasi till this date. The present wage is Rs. 43 per day. He has also filed the details of number of days worked by him in the typed set of papers. It is further contended that his work is of a permanent nature. As per the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981, he is entitled to permanency from the date of completion of 480 days of service. He has completed the same even in the year 1984 itself. The petitioner made several representations from 1991 to 1995. Since there was no response from the respondents he has approached this Court with a direction to absorb him as a permanent employee from the date of completion of 480 days of service in the year 1984.

    7. In Writ Petitions Nos. 15184 and 15313 of 1994 the respondents have filed a counter-affidavit. The main defence stated by them is briefly stated hereunder:

    The present petition itself is not maintainable, since the eligibility and entitlement of the petitioners are disputed. It is further submitted that the petitioners were engaged as contingent casual workers by the Assistant Director concerned on daily-wage basis, whenever there is work. The petitioners were engaged as a temporary casual labourer to work as and when there was work, it is not a regular work. The petitioners were not selected by the Staff Selection Board after their name being sponsored from the Employment Exchange. Therefore they cannot claim any regular appointment. For such casuals there is no attendance register maintained. Only the muster-roll is maintained to prepare the wage bill for the attended days of work. They also denied the statement that petitioners have worked for more than 480 days within a period of two years. It is also contended that the petitioners are not entitled for the benefits of Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981. With these averments they prayed for dismissal of all the writ petitions.

    8. In the light of the above pleadings, I have heard Ms R. Vaigai for the petitioners and Sri P.M Baskaran for respondents.

    9. Miss R. Vaigai learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, relying on the provisions of Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of Permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981 (hereinafter called as the Act), more particularly with reference to S. 3 of the said Act submitted that the impugned circular cannot be sustained. She further submitted that inasmuch as all the three petitioners have worked for more than 480 days in a period of 24 calendar months, they satisfy the conditions prescribed in S. 3 of the said Act, hence all the three petitioners have to be absorbed in service as a permanent employee from the date of completion of 480 days. In support of her contentions, she very much relied on:

    (i) Surinder Singh v. Engineer-in-Chief Central Public Works Department [1986 (1) L.L.N 522];

    (ii) H.D Singh v. Reserve Bank of India [1985 (2) L.L.N 1037]; and

    (iii) Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare [1996 (1) L.L.N 475].

    10. On the other hand Sri P.M Baskaran learned counsel appearing for the respondents, in all the cases submitted that none of the petitioners have satisfied the minimum days as contemplated under S. 3 of the said Act. He further submitted that in view of the disputed question of facts the petitioners have to approach only the authority/machinery provided under the Act. In those circumstances, he prayed for dismissal of all the three writ petitions.

    11. I have carefully considered the rival submissions.

    12. In order to appreciate the argument of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, I shall first refer to the circular issued by the respondent-Board instructing their officers not to employ casual labourer for more than 200 days. For the abovesaid fact, it is useful to extract the same as under:

    (Vernacular matter is omitted ….. Ed.)

    13. The mere reading of the above said circular shows that the respondents have no respect or regard to the labour welfare legislation. According to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners the circular itself is opposed to the provisions of the Act referred to above. Before considering the fact that whether the petitioners have completed 480 days in a period of 24 calender months in an industrial establishment, I shall first consider the validity of the impugned circular.

    14. There is no dispute that as per S. 2, Sub-sec.(3), Sub-cl.(e) the respondents Board is an industrial establishment. Since the respondents Board is an establishment as per Sub-cl.(6) of S. 2 of the Tamil Nadu Shops and Establishments Act, 1947, there is no dispute that the respondents Board is an industrial establishment as defined under S. 2 Sub-cl.(iii) of the Act. As a matter of fact the above position has not been disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. If the above position is clear then S. 3 of the Act automatically attracts. Section 3 says:

    “3. Conferment of permanent status to workmen.—(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force every workman who is in continuous service for a period of four hundred and eight days in a period of twenty-four calendar months in an industrial establishment shall be made permanent.

    (2) A workman shall be said to be in continuous service for a period if he is, for that period, in uninterrupted service, including service which may be interrupted on account of sickness or authorised leave or an accident or a strike, which is not illegal, or a lockout or on account of non-employment of discharge of such workman for a period which does not exceed three months and during which period a substitute has been employed in his place by the employer, or a cessation of work which is not due to any fault on the part of the workman.

    Explanation I — (For the purposes of computing the continuous service referred to in Sub-secs. (1) and (2), a workman shall be deemed to be in continuous service during the days on which)—

    (i) he has been laid off under an agreement or as permitted by Standing Orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 (Central Act XX of 1946), or under any other law applicable to the industrial establishment

    (ii) he has been on leave with full wages, earned in the previous years;

    (iii) he has been absent due to temporary disablement caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment; and

    (iv) in the case of a female, she has been on maternity leave; so, however, that the total period of such maternity leave does not exceed twelve weeks.

    (Explanation II.— For the purposes of this section, law includes any award, agreement settlement, instrument or contract of service whether made before or after the commencement of this Act.)”

    15. The reading of S. 3 Sub-cl.(i) clearly shows that notwithstanding anything contained in any law every workman who is in continuous service for a period of 480 days in a period twenty-four calendar months in an industrial establishment shall be made permanent. Sub-clause (ii) explains “continuous service.” In order to claim benefit under Ss. 3(i) and 3(ii), the petitioner in all the three cases after specifically asserting that they have completed 480 days in a period of 24 calendar months. They also filed the details regarding the same in the typed set of papers. Though the respondents have filed a counter-affidavit in the first two cases except solitary averment denying the statmenet of the petitioners they have not placed any other material to substantiate their defence. It is needless to mention that when rule nisi is served on the respondents they are expected to place all the records, materials in support of their case before this Court. If the respondents are having enough or valid materials to disprove the case of the petitioners nothing prevented them from bringing the records before this Court in order to prove their prima facie case. In the absence of any material in the form of records or documents, I am unable to reject the case of the petitioner simply on the basis of mere denial in the counter-affidavit.

    16. Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the circular similar to the impugned order issued by the Reserve Bank of India in a decision in H.D Singh v. Reserve Bank of India [1985 (2) L.L.N 1037] (vide supra). In the case before the Supreme Court, the Reserve Bank of India has issued similar circular as in our case. Their Lordships after perusing the circular has concluded thus, in Para 13, at page 1042:

    “The confidential circular directing the officers that workmen like the appellant should not be engaged continuously but should, as far as possible, be offered work on rotation basis and the case that the appellant is a badli worker, have to be characterised as unfair labour practice. The Fifth Schedule to the Industrial Disputes Act contained a list of unfair labour practices as defined in S. 2(ra). Item (10) reads as follows:

    ‘To employ workmen as ‘badlis,’ casuals or temporaries and to continue them as such for years, with the object of depriving them of the status and privileges of permanent workmen. “We have no option but to observe that the bank, in this case, has indulged in methods amounting to unfair labour practice. The plea that the appellant was a badli worker also has to fail.’”

    17. In Surinder Singh v. Engineer-in-Chief, Central Public Works Department [1986 (1) L.L.N 522] (vide supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has condemned the practice of Government and public sector undertakings keeping many employees in service on a temporary daily wages without their services being regularised. The following observation of their Lordships is also relevant and the same is extracted hereunder, in Para. 19, at page 523:

    “.. The Central Government, the State Governments and likewise, all public sector undertakings are expected to function like model and enlightened employers and arguments such as those which were advanced before us that the principles of equal pay for equal work is an abstract doctrine which cannot be enforced in a Court of law should ill come from the mouths of the State and State undertakings …. We allow both the writ petitions and direct the respondents, as in Nehru Yuvak Kendras case to pay to the petitioners and all other daily-rated employees to pay the same salary and allowances as are paid to regular and permanent employees with effect from the date when they were respectively employed…”

    18. In Chief Conservator of Forests v. Jagannath Maruti Kondhare [1996 (1) L.L.N 475] (vide supra), in a similar circumstance the conclusion and direction of the Apex Court is hereby extracted, in Para. 22, at page 480:

    “We have given our due thought to the aforesaid rival contentions and, according to us, the object of the State Act, inter alia, being prevention of certain unfair labour practices, the same would be thwarted or get frustrated if such a burden is placed on a workman which he cannot reasonably, discharge. In our opinion it would be permissible on facts of a particular case to draw the inference mentioned in the second part of the item, if badlis, casuals or temporaries are continued as such for years. We further state that the present was such a case inasmuch as from the materials on record we are satisfied that the 25 workmen who went to the Industrial Court of Pune (and 15 to the Industrial Court, Ahmednagar) had been kept as casuals for long years with the primary object of depriving them of the status of permanent employees inasmuch as giving of this status would have required the employer to pay the workmen at a rate higher than the one fixed under the Minimum Wages Act. We can think of no other possible object as, it may sbe remembered, that the Pachgaon Parwati Scheme was intended to cater to the recreational and educational aspirations also of the populace, which are not ephemeral objects, but par excellence permanent. We would say the same about environment-pollution-care work of Ahmednagar, whose need is on the increase because of increase in pollution. Permanency is thus writ large on the face of both the types of work. If even in such projects, persons are kept in jobs on casual basis for years the object manifests itself; no scrutiny is required. We, therefore, answer the second question also against the appellants.”

    19. Apart from the above observation, their Lordships negatived the contention that if the employees in that case are to be regularised and paid at the rate applicable to the permanent workmen there would be heavy financial involvement.

    20. In the light of the above legal position, and in the absence of any acceptable material except the bald denial in the counter-affidavit at the hands of the respondents, I am very much impressed with the arguments of the learned counsel appealing for the petitioner. Further social legislation like Tamil Nadu Industrial Establishments (Conferment of permanent Status to Workmen) Act, 1981, has to be fully implemented by the Central and State Government as well as their organisations and undertakings. As already stated there is no dispute with regard to applicability of the said Act in view of S. 2, Sub-cl. (3) Sub-cl. (e) of the Act. A workman who has put in continuous service of 480 days in a period of 24 calendar months should be conferred the permanent status in the Establishment. The Act provides that period of interruption in service due to sickness or authorised leave or accident or a legal strike, lockout, lay-off effected understanding orders or under an agreement, etc., should be included in computing in days on which the workman has worked in the establishment. If during a period of twenty-four calendar months, for a period which does not exceed three months a worker is not employed or discharged and in his place during such period a substitute is employed, such period should also be computed as days on which the workman has worked. Power is conferred on the State Government to apply the provisions of this Act, by notification, to any industrial establishment employing such number of workmen less than fifty as may be specified in the notification. Inspectors appointed under the Act have power to require any employer to supply or send any return or true copy of document or information relating to the provisions of the Act.

    21. Every employer is required to maintain in Tamil or in English a register of workmen in Form 1 prescribed under the rules and also compile and exhibit the list of workmen with relevant details for perusal by the workmen. Such list should also be sent to the Inspector within a fortnight from the close of each half-year with a declaration that it has been exhibited in the establishment for perusal by the workmen. The employer should send a half-yearly return in Form 2 at the end of each half-year. An employee who finds his name not entered in the list or finds that the entries have not been made correctly or finds that though entries regarding his service have been made correctly but he has not attested the entries in the register maintained by the employer, may make a representation to the Inspector concerned who, after examining the representation or after making enquiries may issue suitable directions to the employer for the rectification of the register of workmen or for the issue of orders conferring permanent status to the workman concerned.

    22. In the light of the above position and in the absence of any material placed by the respondents, I am not proposing to drag the petitioners to go before the authority (Inspector) constituted under the Act. Even after giving opportunity to the respondents to establish their case, they have not fulfilled their obligation except filing a counter-affidavit making a bald denial. Hence, in the interest of justice this Court constrained to accept the particulars furnished in the affidavit supported by information provided in the typed set of papers. The above view of mine is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India [1984 (2) L.L.N 60], which is extracted hereunder, in Para. 15, at pages 75 and 76:

    “We may point out that what we have said above in regard to the exercise of jurisdiction by the Supreme Court under Art. 32 must apply equally in relation to the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under Art. 226, for the latter jurisdiction is also a new constitutional jurisdiction and it is conferred in the same wide terms as the jurisdiction under Art. 32 and the same powers can and must, therefore, be exercised by the High Courts while exercising jurisdiction under Art. 226. In fact, the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Art. 226 is much wider, because the High Courts are required to exercise this jurisdiction not only for enforcement of a fundamental right but also for enforcement of any legal right and there are many rights conferred on the poor and the disadvantaged which are the creation of statute and they need to be enforced as urgently and vigorously as fundamental rights.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    I am satisfied that the petitioners are entitled to succeed in all the three cases. Further, in similar circular issued by Reserve Bank of India Apex Court in the above referred case, i.e, 1985 (2) L.L.N 1037 (vide supra), has held as “including in unfair labour practice.” Here also the respondents have indulged in methods amounting to unfair labour practice by issuing the impugned circular and so this cannot be countenanced.

    23. Under these circumstances, all the three writ petitions are allowed with costs. Counsel fee Rs. 1,000 Writ Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 23165 of 1994, 20980 and 2225 of 1995 are dismissed.

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    A. Palanivel And Others v. Tamil Nadu Khadi And Village Industries Board And Others
    (Jun 27, 1997)