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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ application challenges an office order (Memo. No. 1898 dated 20.8.1992) terminating the petitioner's service pursuant to a decision recorded in a meeting held on 22nd June (year partly redacted in the opinion).

The petitioner was initially engaged as a Class IV employee on daily wages (date partially redacted). Subsequently, by Memo No. 865 dated 6.4.1990 he was appointed on a temporary basis as a peon by the District Education Officer, Patna, and posted to Fauzdar Singh High School, Athmalgola. The petitioner was later deputed to the office of the District Education Officer and transferred to a nationalised high school at Paliganj in Patna district; he was again deputed to the District Education Officer's office.

By the impugned order of August 1992 the petitioner's service was terminated following the departmental meeting decision. The petitioner contended that because he had been appointed on a regular basis (or claimed regularisation), certain minutes (Clause 3) did not apply to him and he relied on prior service on daily wages (since 1983) as ground for regularisation.

The court record shows the petitioner challenged the termination by way of writ petition; the single-judge bench (S.B. Sinha, J., with I.P. Singh, J. concurring) heard arguments and delivered the decision dismissing the application without costs.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the petitioner's appointment (temporary/adhoc) complied with the Bihar Nationalised Secondary School (Service Conditions) Rules, 1983 (as amended) and related departmental circulars, and if not whether that appointment was a legal nullity.
  2. Whether principles of natural justice (audi alteram partem and related doctrines) were required to be observed before terminating the petitioner's service when the appointment itself is alleged to be illegal or in violation of statutory recruitment rules and Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
  3. Whether the petitioner was entitled to regularisation of service or a writ of mandamus directing regularisation, in view of his prior engagement and the statutory scheme governing appointments and regularisation.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner contended that he had been appointed on a regular basis (or should be treated as having been regularised) and that Clause 3 of the minutes of the meeting (Annexure-3) did not apply to him.
  • Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Ganesh Prasad Singh, argued that the procedures in the circulars issued by the Personnel and Administrative Department could not affect the petitioner adversely, and that because the petitioner had been working on daily wages since 1983 his services ought to be regularised.

Respondent / State's Arguments

This information was not available in the provided opinion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Odar Jha v. the State of Bihar, 1992 (1) PLJR 722 Viability/vires of the Bihar 1983 Rules (held intra vires). The court cited this Full Bench decision to note that the 1983 Rules are intra vires and therefore applied to appointments in nationalised schools.
Madan Giri v. Union of India (unreported, CWJC No. 2870 of 1980, disposed 23.1.1981) Principle that cancellation of appointment and termination stand on different footing; if an appointment is cancelled as irregular, principles of natural justice require opportunity to show cause (as stated in the division bench observation quoted). The court distinguished Madan Giri: it observed that in the present case the appointment was not merely irregular but illegal and a nullity; hence the Madan Giri rule requiring show-cause may not apply in the same way.
State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, JT 1992 (5) S.C. 179 Supreme Court guidance on regularisation of adhoc/temporary employees and framing/applicability of schemes for regularisation. The court noted Piara Singh and concluded that the decision, when applied to the facts here, militates against the petitioner's contention (no policy/scheme of Bihar enabling regularisation was shown and the petitioner's appointment contravened statutory rules).
Raj Kishore Kumar Sinha v. State of Bihar, 1992 (2) PLJR 625 The opinion noted the Full Bench did not decide larger questions and did not assign reasons; related to natural justice question where no formal order of termination existed. The judgment was mentioned but the court observed it did not resolve the larger principle; the provided text does not further detail any distinct application beyond that observation.
Teja Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1992 (2) PLJR 568 Decision holding that principles of natural justice need not be applied when appointment was made in violation of statutory provisions. The court relied on this decision as supporting the proposition that natural justice may not be required where the appointment is contrary to statute.
M.L. Gupta v. Instrumentality Ltd., 1992 (1) PLJR Regularisation cannot be directed where it would violate Articles 14 and 16; appointments made without following mandatory recruitment rules are nullities. The court relied extensively on this decision to support the proposition that the court cannot regularise services that would contravene Articles 14/16 or recruitment rules; it used M.L. Gupta to frame its analysis on nullity and non-entitlement to regularisation.
Union of India v. Tulsi Ram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 : AIR 1985 SC 1416 Principles of natural justice have deep roots; the Court held natural justice may be part of Article 14's guarantee and that statutory provisions may exclude application of natural justice. Quoted to explain the origin, constitutional status and possible exclusion/modification of natural justice principles; used to show that natural justice can be excluded by statute or necessary implication.
Union of India v. J.N. Sinha, (1970) 2 SCC 458 : AIR 1971 SC 40 Where a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes natural justice, the court cannot read them into the provision; applicability depends on express words, nature and purpose of power. Relied upon to emphasize that the applicability of natural justice depends on the statutory scheme and the nature of power conferred.
R.S. Das v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 593 (1986 Supp SCC 617) This authority is cited in the context of natural justice jurisprudence. The opinion cites R.S. Das among other Supreme Court decisions on natural justice; the provided text does not specify a narrower application beyond that general citation.
Maharashtra State Board of Secondary & Higher Secondary Education v. K.S. Gandhi, (1991) 2 SCC 716 Applicability of natural justice and whether omission to record reasons vitiates an order depends on facts, nature of inquiry, effect on rights and attendant circumstances. Used to demonstrate that natural justice is not a rigid formula and its applicability depends on the circumstances of each case.
National Institute of Mental Health & Neuro Sciences v. K.K. Raman, 1992 S.C. 1806 Where there is no statutory requirement to record reasons for selection/non-selection, the authority may not be obliged to record reasons and natural justice may not apply. Cited to show that in some selection contexts natural justice and recording reasons may not be mandatory.
Suresh Chandra Verma v. The Chancellor, Nagpur University, (1990) 4 SCC 55 When services terminated because of change in law (not for misconduct), audi alteram partem need not be observed. Used to support the proposition that termination based on change in law or legal position may not require hearing of individuals.
Baikuntha Nath Das v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada, (1992) 2 SCC 299 Before orders of compulsory retirement, principles of natural justice are not necessarily required; compulsory retirement is not a punishment or stigma. Cited as an example where natural justice (audi) is not required in the context of compulsory retirement; used to illustrate exceptions to audi.
Bijay Bharti v. State of Bihar, 1983 PLJR 530 (Full Bench) Where an appointment is found to be void, the order may be a declaration of non-appointment rather than a termination; in such cases natural justice might not be required. Quotations from Bijay Bharti were used to show that a declaration that an appointment never existed may not require natural justice protections.
P. Unnikrishna v. State of Kerala Discussed in Bijay Bharti: facts where petitioner was ineligible and declaration of no appointment held; natural justice not required in such facts. Referenced within the Bijay Bharti discussion; the present opinion uses the Bijay Bharti analysis which draws on P. Unnikrishna.
U.P. Junior Doctors Action Committee v. Dr. B. Sheetal Namlwani, 1991 S.C. 909 Principles of natural justice not required where candidate obtained admission on the basis of forged certificate. Cited to illustrate instances where natural justice need not apply due to the nullity of a qualification or appointment.
S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan, (1980) 4 SCC 379 : AIR 1981 SC 136 Failure to observe natural justice may be irrelevant where observance would have made no difference; courts avoid issuing futile writs. Relied upon for the proposition that courts need not grant relief if a hearing would have been futile given admitted facts.
Ex. Capt. K. Balasubraminian v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1991) 2 SCC 708 Orders invalid under rules conferring no right to claim rights based on those invalid orders; thus no entitlement to hearing based on invalid orders. Cited for the proposition that where prior orders were invalid and contrary to rules, no right accrues and hence no question of affording hearing arises.
Ram Krishna Verma v. State of U.P., (1992) 2 SCC 620 A party may forfeit right to natural justice if undue advantage is sought via protraction of proceedings that nullify the objective. Referenced to show that procedural manipulation may disentitle a party to natural justice protection.
Pramod Kumar v. The State of Bihar, 1988 PLJR 923 Issuance of writ of certiorari is discretionary; High Court may refuse to quash an order if quashing would revive another illegal order or be inequitable. Used to stress the discretionary nature of certiorari and that courts may refuse relief even where illegality is shown, if equitable considerations or public interest disfavour interference.
Gudde Venkaleshwara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 628 Listed among authorities on discretionary writ jurisdiction. Cited in the context of discretionary exercise of writ jurisdiction; the provided text does not specify a distinct application beyond that.
Abdul Majid v. The State Transport Appellate Authority, Bihar, AIR 1960 Patna 333 Listed among authorities on discretionary writ jurisdiction. Cited as part of authorities establishing the discretionary nature of writ remedies; specific application not further detailed in the text.
Devendra Pd. Gupta v. The State of Bihar, 1977 PLJR 576 Listed among authorities on discretionary exercise of writ jurisdiction. Cited in support of the discretionary nature of writ relief; no further specific application provided in the opinion extract.
Hari Prasad Mandal v. Additional Collector, 1978 PLJR 636 Listed among authorities on discretionary writ jurisdiction. Cited to support the court's exposition on discretionary remedies; the opinion does not elaborate more in the provided text.
Banwari Lal Newatia v. Under Secy. to Govt. of India, (1982 BLT 311) and (1988) 1 SCC 40 Listed as an authority on discretionary jurisdiction of High Courts. Referenced among authorities to support discretionary nature of writ relief; the opinion itself does not further specify detailed application here.
Jai Bharat Co. v. Central Coal Fields Ltd., 1988 BLT (rep) Authority cited for refusal to interfere where inequitable or against public interest. Referred to as supporting the proposition that the High Court may refuse interference if inequitable or contrary to public interest.
State of Mysore v. S.V. Narayanappa, (1967) 1 SCR 128 Earlier Supreme Court authority on regularisation and recruitment principles (mentioned as part of historical authorities). Cited as part of the Supreme Court's earlier pronouncements that define 'regular' and 'regularisation'; used in the court's historical review of the law on regularisation.
R.N. Nanjudappa v. T. Thimmiah, (1972) 2 SCR 799 Holds that appointments in infraction of rules or Constitution are nullities; regularisation is not a mode of recruitment. Used by the court to support the view that regularisation cannot validate appointments which are in violation of recruitment rules or Articles 14/16.
B.N. Nagarjan v. State of Karnataka, (1979) 4 SCC 507 : AIR 1979 SC 1676 Regularisation does not connote permanence; regularisation cannot be used to override recruitment modes. Cited to reinforce the principle that regularisation cannot be treated as a method of recruitment that bypasses rules.
Mahender Ram v. Dy. Commissioner, Palamau, 1989 BLT 27 One of several state-court authorities considered in M.L. Gupta review of regularisation jurisprudence. Cited among local precedents considered in the court's review; no specific separate application described in the provided text.
Satish Kumar v. The State of Bihar, 1990 (1) PLJR 219 State-court authority considered in the context of regularisation jurisprudence. Listed among cases considered in the M.L. Gupta analysis; the opinion does not provide a separate detailed application in the text excerpt.
Udai Kumar Sharma v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, 1989 PLJR 952 One of several state-level authorities cited in the survey of law on regularisation. Referenced among other authorities considered in the court's review of regularisation principles; the immediate application in the present opinion is not elaborated further in the text.
Dijendra Singh v. State of Sikkim, 1990 Labour & Industrial Cases 43 Listed among precedents on regularisation/appointments. The opinion lists this case among those taken into account in the broader review; no separate application is described in the provided text.
Rakesh Ranjan Verma v. State of Bihar, 1991 (1) PLJR 398 Listed among authorities on regularisation and recruitment rules. Referenced in the court's survey of cases dealing with regularisation; the provided opinion does not state a more specific application for this case.
Jain Jaiyendra Kumar Singh v. The Bihar State Electricity Board, 1991 (1) PLJR 406 Listed among state-court precedents on recruitment/regularisation. Included in the court's catalogue of authorities considered; the opinion extract does not specify an independent application of this authority.
Lalan Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (L.P.A. 66/90 (R)), disposed 18.9.1990 Listed among state decisions relevant to regularisation. Mentioned as part of the body of local authorities considered in reviewing the law; the text does not provide further application detail.
Satyanarayan Sharma v. National Mineral Development Corporation Ltd., (1990) 4 SCC 163 : AIR 1990 SC 2054 Supreme Court authority considered in the context of appointments and related reliefs. Cited as one of the higher court authorities reviewed in the court's discussion on regularisation and recruitment.
Nand Kishore Raut v. The State of Bihar, 1991 BBCJ 139 : 1991 (2) PLJR 42 (Full Bench) Full Bench decision referenced among authorities on appointment/regularisation issues. Listed among authorities taken into consideration; the text does not state a particular application beyond inclusion in the survey.
Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union v. Delhi Administration (1992 (1) Judgment Today 394) Critique of indiscriminate regularisation and its pernicious consequences; concerns about circumventing employment exchange and rules. Quoted at length to underline the public interest and systemic objections to routine or indiscriminate regularisation of casual/adhoc workers.
Karanataka State Private Colleges Stop-Gap Lecturers Association v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 2 SCC 29 Ad hoc appointments as a problematic “backdoor” route that can be unfair and bypass rules; courts should be reluctant to grant indulgence. Used to reinforce the court's view that adhoc/stop-gap appointments can be an abuse and national policies favor regular recruitment procedures.
State of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar, (1992) 1 SCC 489 High Court's powers are limited compared to Supreme Court's Article 142 power; decisions are precedential only if they decide a question of law with reasons. Quoted to show limits on High Court remedial powers and to observe that decisions without reasons may be weak precedents for regularisation relief; court relied on its dictum to discount some earlier temporary regularisation orders lacking reasons.
Sandeep Kumar v. State of U.P., 1992 S.C. 713 Project-specific/temp nature of employment may preclude regularisation where no permanent need exists. Cited to illustrate that regularisation is inappropriate where the job is inherently temporary or project-specific.
Director, Institute of Management Development, U.P. v. Pushpa Srivastava (Smt.), 1992 S.C. 2070 Adhoc/contractual appointments for limited periods terminate on expiry; where no rule supports continuation, appointment ends at contract expiry. Used to show that where appointment is purely contractual/adhoc and for a limited period, continuation or regularisation cannot be presumed.
Jacob v. Kerala Water Authority, 1990 S.C. 2228 Cited in distinguishing appointment contexts; used in the jurisprudential review of adhoc/contractual appointments. Referenced in the discussion distinguishing types of appointments; the opinion uses it in the broader legal context but does not elaborate a specific point beyond that in the provided text.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeds in a structured manner grounded on the facts found in the record and established legal principles as evidenced by the cited authorities:

  1. Foundational facts and statutory framework:
    • The petitioner was appointed in 1990 by the District Education Officer to a Class IV post in a nationalised school without following mandatory procedures: no advertisement, no notification to employment exchange and non-observance of the statutory recruitment rules applicable to nationalised schools (the Bihar Nationalised Secondary School (Service Conditions) Rules, 1983, as amended in 1988).
    • The court specifically noted that appointments to Class IV posts under the 1983 Rules are to be made by a Committee (Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 8) and that the appointing authority, under the Rules, is the Headmaster of the concerned school, not the District Education Officer. Further, the rules required compliance with departmental circular letter No. 1466 dated 3.11.1980, which envisages district-level panels and procedures.
  2. Characterisation of the appointment:
    • Given the departures from the statutory procedure and the fact that the appointing authority lacked the jurisdiction contemplated by the Rules, the court characterised the petitioner's appointment as illegal and "a nullity" rather than merely irregular. The court emphasised that where an appointment is a nullity (i.e., made in violation of recruitment rules or Article 16 or by a person without jurisdiction), the appointee does not derive a legal right to hold the post.
  3. Applicability of principles of natural justice:
    • The court reviewed authorities on natural justice and its constitutional status (e.g., Tulsi Ram Patel) and noted that natural justice may be excluded or modified by statute or necessary implication (e.g., Union of India v. J.N. Sinha).
    • The court distinguished cases where natural justice ought to be observed (termination for misconduct or demerits) from situations where the appointment itself is a nullity. The court observed that in cases of nullity, principles of natural justice might not be attracted because the person does not hold a legal right to the post (citing Bijay Bharti, Madan Giri and other authorities).
    • The court also accepted established exceptions and flexibilities in natural justice jurisprudence — e.g., where hearing would be futile, where termination flows from change in law, or where the appointment/conferral of a right was absolutely invalid.
  4. Regularisation and constitutional limits:
    • The court analysed Supreme Court authorities (including R.N. Nanjudappa, B.N. Nagarjan and M.L. Gupta) establishing that regularisation is not itself a mode of recruitment and cannot be used to circumvent recruitment rules or Articles 14 and 16.
    • In absence of a statutory provision or a state policy/scheme enabling regularisation consistent with reservation policy and Articles 14/16, permanent absorption of casual or adhoc employees is impermissible. The court found no policy decision of the State of Bihar on regularisation was shown in the record.
  5. Discretionary nature of writ relief and public interest considerations:
    • The court reiterated that issuance of certiorari and other writs is discretionary and may be refused if quashing an illegal order would revive another illegal order or be inequitable or contrary to public interest (Pramod Kumar and other authorities).
    • The court noted systemic consequences of indiscriminate regularisation (citing Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union) and expressed judicial caution about directing regularisation where doing so would contravene rules or promote unfairness.
  6. Application to the present case and conclusion:
    • Applying the foregoing principles to the facts, the court concluded that the petitioner's appointment was made contrary to mandatory statutory procedures and by an authority not empowered under the 1983 Rules; consequently, it was a nullity and the petitioner had not acquired any legal right to continued employment.
    • Because the petitioner had not derived any legal entitlement to the post, the court held he was not entitled to the relief of writ of mandamus for regularisation. The court further found that the Supreme Court's decision in Piara Singh did not aid the petitioner on these facts.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ application is dismissed.

The court specifically ordered dismissal of the application "but without any order as to costs." The immediate consequence is that the termination order (Memo. No. 1898 dated 20.8.1992) stands and the petitioner is not entitled to mandamus for regularisation on the facts and law before the court.

Broader implications:

  • The decision reinforces the principle that appointments made in violation of mandatory statutory recruitment rules or by persons lacking jurisdiction are nullities and generally do not attract natural justice protections that would convert or preserve the appointment.
  • The court underscored established limits on regularisation: regularisation is not a mode of recruitment and cannot be used to cure violations of Articles 14/16 or statutory recruitment rules in the absence of a lawful statutory or policy basis.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down any novel legal principle beyond applying existing authorities; it applies established precedents to the facts and does not announce a new precedent or scheme for regularisation.

No further orders were made; the dismissal is without costs. I.P. Singh, J. concurred.

    Sitaram Thakur v. The State Of Bihar And Others

    S.B Sinha, J.:—This writ application directed against the office order contained Memo. No. 1898 dated 20.8.1992 whereby terms of a decision held in the meeting ??? June of 1992, the services of the ??? had been terminated.

    2. The fact of the matter lies in a very ??? compass.

    3. The petitioner was engaged as a IVth ??? employee on daily wages in March, ???. He, thereafter was appointed on a ??? basis as a peon by the District Education Officer, Patna in terms of Memo No. 865 ??? 7.4.1990 and was posted in Fauzdar ??? High School, Athmalgola.

    4. The petitioner was later on deputed to office of the District Education Officer, ???. He thereafter was transferred to a Nationalised High school situated at Paliganj ??? district of Patna. He was again deputed ??? office of the District Education Officer, ???.

    5. By reason of the impugned order dated August 1992 the service of the petitioner been terminated pursuant to the decision ??? in the meeting of the officers of the cation Department held on 22nd of June, ???. The said order is contained in Annexure-6 to the writ application.

    6. According to the petitioner, he having ??? appointed on a regular basis, Clause 3 of minutes of the meeting as contained in Annexure-3 thereto has no application in his case.

    7. Mr. Ganesh Prasad Singh, learned ??? appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the procedures laid down he circulars issued by the Personnel and ministrative Department cannot have any ??? whatsoever and in any event as the petitioner had been working on daily wages ??? 1983, the petitioner's services have to be regularised.

    8. From a persual of the offer of appointed issued to the petitioner by reason of ??? No. 865 dated 6.4.1990 as contained in Annexure-1 to the writ application, it appears the petitioner was appointed on a teary basis by the District Education Officer in Fauzdar Singh High School Athmalgola.

    9. The petitioner was, therefore, evidently appointed in Nationalised High School by the District Education Officer. It is also evident that prior to the said appointment, neither any advertisement was issued nor the employment exchange was notified. Further as would be noticed hereinbefore, even the provisions of statutory rules were not followed.

    10. The State of Bihar in exercise of its power conferred upon it under the Bihar Non-Government Secondary School (Taking Over of Management and Control) Act has framed rules known as Bihar Nationalised Secondary School (Service Conditions) Rules, 1983. The said 1983 rules were amended in the year 1988. The aforementioned 1983 rules inter alia provide for the procedure of appointment of teaching and non-teaching staff in the nationalised schools.

    11. The vires of the said 1983 Rules was considered by a Full Bench of this court in Ram Odar Jha v. the State of Bihar reported in 1992 (1) PLJR 722 and it has been held therein that the said rules are intra-vires.

    12. Mr. Ganesh Prasad Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has relied upon an unreported decision of this court in Madan Giri v. Union of India in CWJC No. 2870 of 1980 disposed of on 23rd Janurary, 1981 and a recent decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Piara Singh reported in JT 1992 (5) S.C 179.

    13. The learned counsel further submitted that in any event in the facts and circumstances of the case the principles of natural justice have to be complied with.

    14. The appointment of the petitioner thus being governed by the statutory rules, the provisions thereof could not have been totally ignored by the authorities of the State of Bihar in the matter of his appointment.

    15. In terms of the aforementioned Rules, appointment to a Class IV posts has to be made by a Committee as is evident from Sub-Rule (2) of Rule 8 thereof. The said rules further provide that while making appointment of Class IV employees, the procedures laid down in circular latter No. 1466 dated 3.11.1980 issued by the Personnel and Administrative Department in the matter of appointment has to be followed, in terms whereof inter alia a panel has to be prepared at the district level upon following the procedures laid down therein. The appointing authority in terms of the aforementioned Rules is the Headmaster of the concerned School and not the District Education Officer. There cannot therefore be any doubt that the petitioner's appointment being wholly illegal, he did not derive any legal right to continue in the said posts.

    16. In Madan Giri's case (Supra) a division Bench of this court observed:

    “I must point out that an order of cancellation stands on a footing different from that of an order of termination of service. And, it is well settled that if an order of appointment is cancelled on the ground that the appointment was irregular, the principles of natural justice have to be complied with by giving the persons, whose appointment is being cancelled, an opportunity of showing cause against the said order.”

    17. Evidently, therefore, in that case the appointment of the petitioner thereof was sought to be cancelled on the ground that the same was irregular. However, In this case, as noticed hereinbefore, the appointment of the petitioner is not only illegal but the same is a nullity having been made in violation of the provisions of the statutory rules and by a person who had no jurisdiction in this regard.

    18. In Raj Kishore Kumar Sinha v. State of Bihar reported in 1992 (2) PLJR 625 upon which also a strong reliance has been placed by Mr. Singh, the Full Bench did not decide any question whatsoever. No reasons has also been assigned by Full Bench nor did it consider the effect of various other Supreme Court decisions.

    19. In that case the Full Bench itself ???.

    “It is not necessary for us to go into larger issue as to whether the principle natural justice would apply where the in appointment has been made in violation Article 16 of the Constitution of India the simple reason that in the present ??? now there has been no formal order of mination of service.”

    20. It is relevant to note that recently N. Jha, J. speaking for the division bench Teja Prasad v. Sate of Bihar reported 1992 (2) PLJR 568 has held that the principal of natural justice are not required to be ??? plied with when the appointment had ??? made in violation of the provisions of statute, although His Lordship was a part the Full Bench in Rajkishore Sinha's case.

    21. In M.L Gupta v. Instrumentality Ltd. reported in 1992 (1) PLJR upon taking into consideration ??? decision of the Supreme Court and this a it has been held:

    “Article 16 of the Constitution of in provides that all citizens of India are ??? titled to get equal opportunity for puropose of obtaining employment in ??? Service.

    In order to fulfill such a condition, it necessary to consider the case of all citizen who are eligible to be appointed. For the purpose, it is not only necessary to call ??? the names from the Employment Exchange but the same in some cases also ??? due advertisement of posts in newspaper by notifying the vacancies and the ??? qualifications therefor so that all ??? candidates may apply for their appointment in the said posts.

    22. It was further observed:

    “From the descisions of the Supreme Court as also of this court, as referred hereinbefore, it will thus be evident that a appointment which was made be a ??? having no authority to do so or the appointments which have been made without for lowing the mandatory provisions of the Recruitment Rules and Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, such appointment should be held to be a nullity. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, this court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction cannot direct regularisation of the services of the employees when the same would be violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.”

    23. The principle of natural justice as is well known is based upon two basic principles viz. Audi Alteram Partem and Nemo Debito ??? Judex in Propriea Causa. The principles of natural justice have been developed by the ??? court from time to time adding new concepts therein. In some decisions the Apex court has gone to the extent of holding that ??? principles of natural justice are embodied ??? Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

    24. In Union of India v. Tulsi Ram ???, reported in (1985) 3 SCC 398 : AIR 1985 S.C 1416, the Supreme Court of India held:

    “Principles of natural justice are not creation of Articles 14 of the Constitution of India but merely they are constitutional guardian. The principles of natural justice can be traced their ancestry to ancient civilizations and long past history.”

    25. The Supreme Court in that case ??? the history of the principles of natural ??? in paragraph 72 to 80 of the judgment and thereafter, discussed various principles ??? therein in paragraphs 81 to 83 thereof.

    The Supreme Court held:

    “The principles of natural justice have thus come to be recognised as being a part of the guarantee contained in Article 14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation given by this court to the concept of equality which is the subject matter of that Article.” Shortly, put the syallogism runs thus: violation of a rule of natural justice results in arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination, where discrimination is the result of State action, it is a violation of Article 14. Article 14 however is not the sole repository of the priciples of natural justice. What it does is to guarantee that any law or State action violating them will be struck down. The principles of natural justice, however apply not only to legislation and State action but also where any tribunal, authority or body of men, not coming within the definition of “State” in Article 12, is charged with the duty of deciding a matter. In such a case, the principle of natural justice required that it must decide such matter fairly and impartially.”

    26. In Tulsi Ram Patel's case (Supra) the Supreme Court thereafter held that a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication may exclude application of the principle of natural justice. The Supreme Court therefore, concluded that the principle of natural justice not only can be modified but also it can be excluded.

    27. In Union of India v. J.N Sinha reported in (1970) 2 SCC 458 : AIR 1971 S.C 40 it has been held:

    “But if on the other hand, a statutory provision either specifically or by necessary implication excludes the application of any or all the rules of principle of natural justice then the court cannot ignore the mandate of the legislature or the statutory authority and read into the concerned provision the principles of natural justice. Whether the exercise of power conferred should be made in accordance with any of the principles of natural justice or not depends upon the express words of the provision conferring the power, the nature of the power conferred, the purpose for which it is conferred, and the effect of exercise of that power.”

    28. Reference in this connection may also be made to R.S Das v. Union of India reported in 1986 Supp SCC 617 : AIR 1987 S.C 593.

    29. Further, it is well known that there are certain exceptions to the principles of natural justice.

    30. In case of Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. K.S Gandhi reported in (1991) 2 SCC 716 it has been held:

    “From this perspective, the question is whether omission to record reasons vitiates the impugned order or is in violation of the principles of natural justice. The omnipresence and omniscience (SIC) of the principles of natural justice acts as deter-rance to arrive at arbitrary decision in flagrant infraction of fair play. But the applicability of the principles of natural justice is not a rule of thumb or a strait-jacket formula as an abstract proposition of law. It depends on the facts of the case, nature of the inquiry and the effect of the order-decision on the rights of the person and attendant circumstances.”

    31. In National Institute of Mental Health and Neuro Sciences v. K.K Raman reported in 1992 S.C 1806 it has been held that for selection or non-selection of a person in absence of a statutory requirement, the authority is under no legal obligation to recod reason in support of its decision and even the principles of natural justice have no application in such a case.

    32. The Supreme Court in the case Dr. Suresh Chandra Verma v. The Chancellor, Nagpur University reported in (1990) 4 SCC 55 held as follows:

    “When, therefore, the services of the appellants are to be terminated in view of the change in the position of law and not on account of the demerits of misdemeanour of individual candidates, it is not necessary to hear the individulas before their services are terminated. The rule of audi alteram partem does not apply in such cases and, therefore, there is no breach of the principles of natural justice. In the result, we are of the view that there is no merit in this case. The appeal, therefore, stands dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, however, there will be no order as to costs.”

    33. It is, therefore clear that in a case where the services of the employee is terminated owing to any misdemeanour on his part or his demerits, the principles of natural justice are required to be complied with.

    34. Recently, the Supreme court in Baikuntha Nath Das v. Chief District Medical Officer, Baripada reported in (1992) 2 SCC 299 has held that before passing the order of ??? retirement principles of natural justice are not required to be complied with nor ??? adverse remarks against the concerned employee are required to be communicated. The Supreme Court held:

    “Before parting with the case, we must refer to an agreement urged by Sri R.K Garg. He stressed what is called, the ??? concept of Article 14 as adumbrated ??? Maneka Gandhi and submitted on that any and every arbitrary action is open to judicial scrutiny. The general principle evolved in the said decision is not in issue here. We are concerned mainly with the question whether a facet of principle of natural justice audi alteram partem — is attracted in the case of compulsory retirement. In other words the question is whether acting upon undisclosed material is a ground for quashing the order of compulsory retirement Since we have held that the nature of the function is not quasi-judicial in nature and because the action has to be taken on the subjective satisfaction of the Government there is no room for importing the said facts of natural justice in such a case, more particularly when an order of compulsory retirement, is not a punishment nor does it involve any stigma.”

    35. In Bijay Bharti v. State of Bihar reported in 1983 PLJR 530 a Full Bench of this court held:

    “Before considering the argument that the right of some of the petitioners to future appointment has been affected, it would be proper to consider as to what is the effect of saying that the appointment is irregular. Reference in this connection may be made to two cases decided by Mathew J. as a Judge of the Kerala High Court, the first case is that of P. Unnikrishna v. State of Kerala (15). There on facts it was found that the petitioner was ineligible for being appointed to the service. The impugned order was, therefore, held to mean that it was a termination of an appointment which was itself void. In O.P No. 973 of 1968 the same learned Judge pointed out the order in question only declared that the petitioner was not validly appointed to the post and that he should be reverted. The learned Judge observed:

    “It was not an order cancelling a valid or even a voidable order; it was merely a declaration that there has been no appointment of the petitioner to the post. In the circumstances I do not think that natural justice required that the petitioner should have been given an opportunity of being heard by the 1st to the 2nd respondent. I also do not think that in the circumstances there was any manifest injustice so that interference under Article 260 required.”

    36. In U.P Junior Doctors Action Committee v. Dr. B. Sheetal Namlwani reported in 1991 S.C 909 : 1992 (2) PLJR 16 (SC), it has been held that principle of natural justice are not required to be complied with in a case where a candidate had secured admission on the basis of forged certificate.

    37. It has further been held by the Supreme Court that natural justice should be viewed in circumstantial flexibility ((1991) 4 SCC 584).

    38. It is also well known that the principle of natural justice need not be complied with when it would result in futility. It is also a settled law that an appointment made in violation of Article 16 of the Constitution of India or made by a person having no jurisdiction would be a nullity.

    39. The Supreme Court in a recent decision in Ex. Capt. K. Balasubraminian v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (1991) 2 SCC 708 has held.” … This High Court has, in our opinion rightly held that the direction contained in orders dated 16th June, 1976 and June, 15, 1977 were invalid being contrary to the provisions contained in rule 35 of the General Rules. Since the said orders were invalid the petitioner would not claim any right on the basis of said orders and therefore, no question of affording them an opportunity of hearing before passing the order dated 3rd March, 1980.”

    40. In Ram Krishna Verma v. State of U.P reported in (1992) 2 SCC 620, it has been held that a party would not be entitled to his right of natural justice if undue advantage is obtained by protracting a proceeding somehow and nullifying the objective.

    41. In S.L Kapoor v. Jagmohan ((1980) 4 SCC 379 : AIR 1981 S.C 136) it has been held that although non-observance of the principles of natural justice is itself prejudicial but in that case also it has been observed:

    “Linked with this question is the question whether the failure to observe natural justice does at all matter if the observance of natural justice would have made no difference, the admitted or indisputable facts speaking for themselves. Where on the admitted or indisputable facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penally is permissible, the court may not issue its writ to compel the observance of natural justice, not because it approved the non-observance of natural justice but because courts do not issue futile writs.”

    42. There is another aspect of the matter which also requires consideration. The issuance of writ of certiorari is a discretionary remedy. The court may not issue a writ only because it is lawful to do so. The High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction may refuse to exercise its jurisdiction quashing the illegal order, if it is found that thereby another illegal order shall revive. In such an event, the court may also quash both the orders.

    43. In Pramod Kumar v. The State of Bihar (1988 PLJR 923) it has been held as follows:

    “It is now settled by the various decisions of this court and the Supreme court of India that issuance of a writ of certiorari is a discretionary remedy. In this conection reference may be made to the case of Gudde Venkaleshwara Rao v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (AIR 1966 S.C 628); Abdul Majid v. The State Transport Appellate Authority, Bihar (AIR 1960 Patna 333); Devendra Pd. Gupta v. The State of Bihar (1977 BBCJ 543 : 1977 PLJR 576); Hari Prasad Mandal v. Additional Collector (1978 BBCJ 575 : 1978 PLJR 636); Banwari Lal Newatia v. Under Secy. to Govt. of India (1982 BLT 311) and (1988) 1 SCC 40. The aforementioned decisions are authorities for the proposition that writ jurisdiction of a High Court only provides for discretionary remedy and it would not be exercised for quashing an order which might give rise to another illegal order if substantial justice has been done to the parties.

    In this connection, reference may be made to recent decision of mine in the case of Jai Bharat Co. v. Central Coal Fields Ltd. reported in 1988 BLT (rep) at page 192 wherein it was held that a High Court would be justified in a given case to refuse to interfere with illegal order if it is inequitable so to do or if the same would be against public interest.”

    44. In my opinion, therefore, there cannot be any doubt that if the orders of promotion are illegal being violative of Article 16 of Constitution of India and/or the Recruitment Rules framed under a statute or Article 309 of the Constitution of India, the principles of natural justice need not be complied with inasmuch as in such an event the concerned employee had not derived any right to hold or continue in the said post. However, before doing so the foundational facts have to be found at by the Competent Authority. Reference in this connection may be made to Satyendra Prasad v. State of Bihar (1991 (2) PLJR 460), Kamal Kumar Sinha v. Indira Gandhi Institute of Medical Sciences (1990 (2) PLJR 465), M.L Gupta v. Instrumentality (1992 (1) PLJR 137), Union of India v. Tejram Parashramji Bombhate ((1991) 3 SCC 11 : AIR 1992 S.C 570).

    45. In the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner it appears that neither any reason has been assigned nor there is any discussion about the points at issue. If is also well known that a decision is not an authority on the point which was not convassed at the Bar. See Good Year Ltd. v. State of Harayana reported in (1990) 2 SCC 71.

    46. Yet recently the Supreme Court in State of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar reported in (1992) 1 SCC 489 held as follows:

    “A decision is available as a precedent only if it decides a question of law. The respondents are, therefore not entitled to rely upon an order of this court which directs a temporary employee to be regularised in his service without assigning reasons.”

    47. The question which now arises for consideration in this application is as to whether the services of the petitioner could have been ???.

    48. The learned counsel in this connection has relied upon a recent decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana and others etc. v. Piara Singh reported in JT 1992 (5) S.C 179.

    49. In M.L Gupta's case (Supra) I had the occasion to extensively deal with various decisions of the Supreme Court of India as also of this court. In that case it was noticed that the Supreme Court in its recent decisions did not take into consideration its earlier decisions which were binding upon it. It was held:

    “Unfortunately, however in none of the aforementioned cases, the Supreme Court considered its earlier binding precedents on the question of manner of regularisation, that is State Of Mysore v. S.V Narayanappa, (1967) 1 SCR 128 and R.N Nanjudappa v. T. Thimmiah reported in (1972) 2 SCR 799. The aforementioned judgments of the Supreme Court was followed by a three Judge bench of the Supreme Court in B.N Nagarjan v. State of Karnataka reported in (1979) 4 SCC 507 : AIR 1979 S.C 1676.

    In R.N Nanjudappa (supra), the Supreme Court held that if an appointment is made in infraction of the rules or if it is in violation of the provisions of the Constitution, such appointments being illegal, the same cannot be regularised. It was further held that ratification or regularisation is possible of an act which is within the power and province of the authority but there has been some-non-compliance with procedure or manner which does not go to the root of the appointment. It held: Regularisation cannot be said to be a mode of recruitment. To accede to such a proposition would be to introduce a new head of appointment in defiance of rules or it may have the effect of selling at naught the rules.”

    (Underlining is mine for emphasis)

    The Supreme Court in that case negatived the contention that regularisation in employment is possible by taking recourse to Article 162 of the Constitution of India in the following words:

    “In the present case, the contention on behalf of the respondents that the regularisation was itself a mode of appointment under Article 162 of the Constitution is unsound. The Rules came into existence in the present case in 1964. The regularisation was made with effect from 1958. Therefore, the Rules became applicable. The regularisation in the present case was also bad because even without specific methods of recruitment appointments could be made only by selection or promotion or transfer from equivalent grade. The method of recruitment and qualification for each State Civil Service was to be set forth in the rules of recruitment of such service specially made in that behalf.”

    The Supreme Court held that Article 162 does not confer power to regularise nor does it confer power on the Government to make rules for recruitment or conditions of service. It was further held:

    “All that the public service commission did was to regularise the appointment to the post of the principal. The regularisation by the State of the appointment is with effect from 1958. This regularisation is bad for following reasons. First regularisation is not itself a mode of appointment. Secondly, the modes of appointments are direct recruitment or selection or promotion or appointing for reasons to be recorded in writing an officer holding a post of an equivalent grade by transfer from any other service of the State.

    In B.N Nagarjan v. State of Karnataka reported in (1979) 4 SCC 507 : AIR 1979 S.C 1676 it was held:

    It was argued that the regularisation of promotion gave it the colour of permanence and the appointments of the promotees as Assistant Engineers must therefore be deemed to have been made substantively right from the 1st November, 1956. The argument however is unacceptable to us for two reasons. Firstly, the words ‘regular’ or ‘regularisation’ do not connote permanence. They are terms calculationed to condone any procedural irregularities and are meant to cure only such defects as are attributable to the methodology followed in making the appointments. They cannot be construed so as to convey an idea of the nature of tenure of the appointments.

    (Underlining is mine for emphasis)

    In none of the cased referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner, the aforementioned authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court which have defined the term ‘regular’ and ‘regularisation’ were taken into consideration. The decisions of the Supreme Court, referred to on behalf of the petitioners, therefore, will have to be considered from that angle.

    Thus, regularisation of casual labourers do not mean that they can be permanently absorbed in the State service irrespective of the fact that there exists any vacancy or not.

    It has been held that respondent No. 1 is a State. It therefore, is bound to give equal opportunity of employment to all the candidates eligible therefore in terms of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. Permanent absorption of casual employees in the State service, in absence of any statutory provision or a policy decision, is thus, impermissible. In a given situation, it may be permissible for the Supreme Court to lay down a scheme or direct a scheme for permanent absorption of its employees be made by the State. Such a power exists in the Supreme Court by reason of Article 142 of the Constitution of India as it may pass a decree or order for giving complete justice to the parties and such decree or order would be binding upon the State.”

    50. In M.L Gupta's case this court also took into consideration the decision of this court in Mahender Ram v. Dy. Commissioner, Palamau reported in 1989 BLT 27, Satish Kumar v. The State of Bihar reported in 1990 (1) PLJR 219, Udai Kumar Sharma v. Registrar, Co-operative Societies reported in 1989 PLJR 952, Dijendra Singh v. State of Sikkim, reported in 1990 Labour and Industrial Cases 43, Rakesh Ranjan Verma v. State of Bihar reported in 1991 (1) PLJR 398, Jain Jaiyendra Kumar Singh v. The Bihar State Electricity Board reported in 1991 (1) PLJR 406, Lalan Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (L.P.A 66/90 (R)) disposed of on 18th September, 1990, Kamal Kumar Sinha v. Indira Gandhi Institute of Medical Science, Shaikhpura, Patna reported in 1991 (1) Bihar Law Judgments 129 : 1990 (2) PLJR 465, Satyanarayan Sharma v. National Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. reported in (1990) 4 SCC 163 : AIR 1990 S.C 2054, as also a Full Bench decision of this court in Nand Kishore Raut v. The State of Bihar reported in 1991 BBCJ 139 : 1991 (2) PLJR 42.

    51. Reference in this connection may also be made to Teja Prasad v. State of Bihar reported in 1992 (2) PLJR 568.

    52. Yet recently in Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union v. Delhi Administration, Delhi (1992 (1) Judgment Today 394), it has been observed:

    “We may take note of the pernicious consequences to which the direction of regularisation of workmen on the only ground that they have pul in works for 240 or more days, has been leading. Although there is Employment Exchange Act which requires recruitment on the basis of registration in Employment Exchange, it has become a common practice to ignore the employment exchange and the person regisered in the employment exchange, and to employ and get employed directly those who are either not registered or are lower in the long waiting list in the employment Register. The court can take judicial notice of the fact that such employment is sought and given directly for various illegal consideration including money. The employment is given for temporary periods with technical breaks to circumvent the relevant rules, and is continued for 240 or more days with a view to give the benefit of regularisation knowing the judicial trend that those who have completed 240 or more days are directed to be automatically regularised. A good deal of illegal employment market has developed resulting in a new source of corruption and frustration of those who are waiting at the Employment Exchange for years. Not all those who gain such back-door entry in the employment are in need of the particular jobs. Though already employed elsewhere, they join the job for better and secured prospects. That is why most of the cases which come to the courts are of employment in Government Departments, Public Undertaking or Agencies. Ultimately it is the people who bear the heavy burden of the surplus labour. The other equally injurious effect of indiscriminate regularisation has been that many of the agenices have stopped undertaking casual or temporary works though they are urgent and essential for fear that those who are employed on such works are required to be continued for 240 or more days have to be absorbed as regular employees although the works are time bound and there is no need of the workmen beyond the completion of the works undertaken. The public interests are thus jeopardised on both counts.”

    53. In Karanataka State Private Colleges Stop-Gap Lecturers Association v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 2 SCC 29, the Supreme Court again held:

    “Ad hoc appointments, a convenient way of entry usually from backdoor, at times even in disregard of rules and regulations, are comparatively recent innovation to the service jurisprudence. They are individual problems to begin with, become a family problem in court of law. It is unjust and unfair to those who are lesser fortunate in society with little or no approach even though better qualified more meritorious and well deserving. The infection is widespread in Govt. or semi-government departments or State financed institutions. It arises either because the appointing authority resorts to it deliberately as a favour or to accommodate someone or for any extraneous reason ignoring the regular procedure provided for recruitment as a pretext under emergency measure or to avoid loss of work etc. or the Rules or circulars issued by the department itself empower the authority to do so as a stop-gap arrangement. The former is an abuse of power. It is unpardonable. Even if it is found to have been resorted to as a genuine emergency measure the courts should be reluctant to grant indulgence. Latter gives rise to equities which have bothered courts every now and then.”

    54. In State of Punjab v. Surinder Kumar reported in (1992) 1 SCC 489, it has been held:

    “There is still another reason way the High court cannot be equated with this court. The Constitution has, by Article 142, empowered the Supreme Court to make such orders as may be necessary “for doing complete justice in any case or matter pending before it”, which authority the High Court does not enjoy. The jurisdiction of the High Court, while dealing with a writ petition, is circumscribed by the limitations discussed and declared by the judicial decisions, and it cannot transgress the limits on the basis of whims or subjective sense of justice varying from Judge to Judge.”

    55. In Sandeep Kumar v. State of U.P reported in 1992 S.C 713 the Supreme Court held:

    “From the facts placed before us, it appears that the scheme under which the petitioners are working is of a very specific nature. There is no permanent need for the work and since it is a project for a particular purpose, it will not be possible to direct that the petitioner may be regularised in service.”

    56. The Supreme Court again reiterated its aforementioned view in Karnataka State Private College stop-gap Lecturers reported in J.T 1992 (1) S.C 373.

    57. In Piara Singh's case (Supra), the Supreme Court was considering the regularisation of Adhoc employees who were continuing for several years only pursuant to the aforementioned policy decision only a number of person who satisfy the conditions prescribed therein, the order issued by the aforementioned judgment were regularised. However, some employees although were not regularised they were allowed to continue and those employees approached the High Court. The High Court gave certain directions in the aforementioned writ applications.

    58. The Supreme Court in that case however upon consideration of the schemes framed by it in the matter of regularisation of service in its earlier decisions found that if the judgment of the High Court is implemented various problems would arise.

    59. The Supreme Court observed:

    “This is not a case, we must reiterate, where the Governments have failed to take any steps for regularisation of their adhoc employees working over the years. Every few years they have been issuing orders providing for regularisation. In such a case, there is no occasion for the court to issue any directions for regularising such employees more particularly when none of the conditions prescribed in the said orders can be said to be either unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory. The court cannot obviously help those who cannot get regularised under these orders for their failure to satisfy the condition prescribed therein. Issuing general declaration of indulgence is no part of our jurisdiction. In case of such persons we can only observe that it is for the respective Governments to consider the feasibility of giving them appropriate relief, particularly in cases where persons have been continuing over a long number of years, and were eligible and qualified on the date of their adhoc appointment and further whose record of service is satisfactory.”

    60. The Supreme Court thereafter proceeded to hold:

    “The normal rule, of course, is regular recruitment through the prescribed agency but exigencies of administration may sometimes call for an adhoc or temporary appointment to be made. In such a situation effort should always be to replace such an adhoc temporary employee by regularly selected employee as early as possible. Such a temporary employee may also compete along with others for such regular selection/appointment. If he gets selected, well and good, but if he does not, he must give way to the regularly selected candidate. The appointment of the regularly selected candidate cannot be withheld or kept in abeyance for the sake of such an adhoc/temporary employee.

    Secondly, an adhoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another adhoc or temporary employee; he must be replaced only by a regularly selected employee. This is necessary to avoid arbitrary action on the part of the appointing authority.

    Thirdly, even where an adhoc or temporary employment is necessitated on account of the exigencies of administration, he should ordinarily be drawn from the employment exchange unless it cannot brook delay in which case the pressing cause must be stated on the file. If no candidate is available or is not sponsored by the employment exchange, some appropriate method consistent, with the requirements of Article 16 should be followed. In other words, there must be a notice published in the appropriate manner calling for applications and all those who apply in response thereto should be considered fairly.

    An unqualified person ought to be appointed only when qualified persons are not available through the above processes.

    Of to any reason, an adhoc or temporary employee is continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must consider his case for regularisation provided he is eligible and qualified according to rules and his service record is satisfactory and his appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the State.

    The proper course would be that each State prepared scheme, if one is not already in vogue, for regularisation of such employees consistent with its reservation policy and if a scheme is already framed, the same may be made consistent with our observations herein so as to reduce avoidable litigation in this behalf. If and when such person is regularised he should be placed immediately below the last regularly appointed employee in that category, class or service, as the may be.”

    61. In Director, Director, Institute Of Management Development, U.P v. Pushpa Srivastava (Smt). reported in 1992 S.C 2070, the Supreme Court upon distinguishing the case of Jacob v. Kerala Water Authority (1990 S.C 2228) held:

    “In the instant case, there is no such rule. The appointment was purely adhoc and on a contractual basis for a limited period. Therefore, by expiry of the period of six months, the right to remain on the post comes to an end.

    62. It is therefore, clear that the Supreme Court itself held that even in the matter of appointment of adhoc and temporary employees, provisions of Articles 16 of the Constitution of India are required to be complied with.

    63. As noticed hereinbefore in that case the Supreme Court considered its earlier decisions with regard to regularisation of employees.

    64. There cannot be any doubt that in absence of statute or statutory rules, the State may formulate scheme and/or adopt policy decisions for regularisation of its adhoc employees if they had continued for a number of years subject to the criteria laid down therefor and reservation policy of the State.

    65. Such is not the position here.

    66. No policy decision of the State of Bihar in this regard has been brought to our notice. The petitioner has accepted his appointment in the year 1990 as a temporary employee without any demur whatsoever. As indicated hereinbefore in the year 1990 when the petitioner was appointed the 1983 Rules had already come into force and thus the petitioner could have been appointed only upon observance of the mandatory requirements thereof. The petitioner on his own showing was appointed without following the procedures laid down under the 1983 Rules or the provisions of Article 16.

    67. In this view of the matter, the decision of the Supreme Court in Piara Singh instead of advancing the case of the petitioner militates against his contention.

    68. As the petitioner has not derived any legal right to continue in service and thus he is not entitled to any writ of mandamus from this court as has been prayed by him. This application is, therefore, dismissed but without any order as to costs.

    I.P Singh, J.:—I agree.

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    Sitaram Thakur v. The State Of Bihar And Others
    (Dec 17, 1992)