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    Bibi Wahidunnisa v. Babu Deep Narain Prasad

    Chamier, C.J:— This is an appeal by the Defendant in a suit for a partition against a preliminary decree passed on May 29th, 1913. The appeal was filed on July 3rd, 1913. A final decree was made in the case on September 27th, 1913, despite the objection of the Appellant, that the final decree should not be made until her appeal had been disposed of. A preliminary objection has been taken to the hearing of this appeal to the effect that this appeal cannot proceed inasmuch as a final decree has now been passed in the case and no appeal has been filed against that decree. In my opinion the preliminary objection should be overruled. I adhere to the decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Kanhaiya Lal v. Tirbeni Sahai in which I took part. Further I consider that it has been shown that there is a strong current of authority in the Calcutta High Court in favour of the view that an appeal of this kind can be heard although a final decree has been passed in the case, and no appeal has been filed against that decree: I would refer to the decisions in Ram Nath Singh v. Basanta Narain Singh, Nistarini Debi v. Rai Mohan Biswas, Abdul Jalil v. Amar Chand Paul and Atul Chandra Singha v. Kunja Behari Singha. In all those cases the appeal against the preliminary decree was filed before the final decree had been made. They are therefore on all fours with the present case. The view taken in those cases is in accordance with the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in the case cited above and with the view taken by the Madras High Court in Lakshmi v. Maru Devi. Our attention has been drawn to the decisions in Khirodamoyi Dasi v. Adhar Chandra Ghose and Sadhu Charan Dutta v. Hara Nath Dutta. In both those cases the final decree had been passed before the appeal against the preliminary decree was filed. They are therefore distinguishable from the present case. For the same reason we may distinguish from the present case the cases of Bulwant Singh Ram Chandra v. Sakharam Mancharam and Dattatraya Ramchandra Savale v. Ajmuddin Fakhruddin decided by the Bombay High Court. On these grounds therefore I am of opinion that this preliminary objection should be overruled.

    Sharfuddin, J.:— Under the Civil Procedure Code a decree may be appealed against. It is therefore clear that so long as a decree retains its force as such it can be appealed against. I understand that a preliminary decree in a partition suit has existence independent of the final decree and the final decree really is dependent upon and subordinate to the preliminary decree. In my opinion a preliminary decree retains its force as such even after the passing of the final decree. A preliminary decree is not extinct after the passing of the final decree and the final decree instead of extinguishing a preliminary decree gives effect to it. Agreeing with the observations of His Lordship the Chief Justice I am also of opinion that the objection should be overruled.

    Atkinson, J.:— I entirely agree with the views expressed by the Chief Justice.

    Kingsford, J.:— I entirely agree with the views expressed by the Chief Justice.

    Judgment on the merits:—

    Chamier, C.J:— The Respondent claims to be entitled by purchase from two persons named Kamaluddin Ahmad and Rafiqunnessa to a 15¼ annas share out of a mehal in Mouza Bobil bearing tauzi No. 3841. The Defendant-Appellant is the owner of the remaining nine pies share in the mehal. She resisted this suit for partition of the mehal on the ground that on June 1st, 1888, when the different members of the family divided up the family property they agreed to allow Mouza Bobil to remain unpartitioned until certain suits which had been brought by third persons in respect of a village allotted to the present Appellant had been disposed of. It appears however that notwithstanding the agreement contained in the ekrarnama of June 1st, 1888, the present Appellant claimed partition of Mouza Bobil. Kamaluddin, one of the persons through whom the present Respondent claims, objected that the village should not be partitioned and he relied upon the ekrarnama of June 1st, 1888. His objection was overruled and partition was effected and two mehals were formed in the village. The Appellant in her written statement in the present case alleged that the suits referred to in the ekrarnama were still pending. Whether this is so or not we think that she cannot resist the suit on that ground. She herself in conjunction with her relative Azizunnessa claimed partition of this very village in 1894 and she cannot now resist the claim of the purchaser from Kamaluddin. In my opinion the partition to be effected in this case will not affect in any way any right which the Appellant may have under the ekrarnama of June 1st, 1888. I would dismiss this appeal with costs.

    Sharfuddin, J.:— I agree.

    A.K.R
    Appeal dismissed.

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    Bibi Wahidunnisa v. Babu Deep Narain Prasad
    (Jun 26, 1916)