Roe, J.:— The plaintiff in this case was Mt. Uma Kumari the widow of Ghina Singh, who died some thirty years ago, leaving as his sole estate 5 gandas share of Meraripur. On 28th March, 1903, the widow was desirous of accelerating succession to the reversioners. The first reversioner on that date was a barren daughter named Daro Kumari and the second reversioners were the two grandsons of the deceased's daughter, Harbans and Raghubans. In the deed of gift by which the estate was passed on to the reversioners, it is set forth that one-third of the estate shall go to the daughter Daro Kumari and two-thirds of the estate to the two grandsons, and that the maintenance of the widow-should be paid Rs. 5 a month by the daughter and Rs. 10 a month by the grandsons. For less than one year the maintenance was paid by the two grandsons, the daughter never troubled, to pay it at all, and on 7th July, 1908, Harbans Singh, Raghubans being dead, sold the property which had been given to him by the plaintiff for the sum of Rs. 8,750 to the appellant before us, Raghunath Prasad Singh.
2. The plaintiff brought this, suit for a declaration that her maintenance allowance of Rs. 10 a month was a charge upon the property sold by Harbans Singh to Raghunath Prasad Singh and that Harbans and Raghunath were jointly and severally liable for the whole arrears of maintenance since the date of the last payment, which was Pous 1311. The lower Courts decreed the suit and against the final decree Raghunath Prosad Singh appeals and puts forward as his main grounds, first, that there was no charge upon the property at all, secondly, that if there was a charge, he had no notice of it, and thirdly, that even if he had notice of it, under Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act it was required to be shown that the property was transferred with the intention of defeating the plaintiff's rights. Upon the first point I have no doubt at all that maintenance is a charge upon the property in who sover's hands it may have come. This is a principle of Hindu law doubt whether the section of the Transfer of Property Act referred to was designed to defeat a standing principle of Hindu Law—that the widow must be maintained from the property. The acceleration by the widow, of the reversionary right has always been held to be a pious act by the widow and it cannot be said that such a pious act would affect her right to maintenance after the transfer of her interest to the reversioners. Where property comes directly into the hands of sons and brothers the maintenance of the widow is a charge thereon, and if it comes into their hands not directly but by a virtuous action on the part of the widow, still the principle remains that it is chargeable for maintenance.
3. The claim to maintenance, as I understand it, is not based upon the contract. The clause in the deed of gift setting forth the amount of maintenance and the manner in which it was made, are not the origin of the charge upon the property. It is a mere arrangement fixing the amount to which the widow is legally entitled as her maintenance charge and an arrangement for the payment of that charge by the first reversioner and the second reversioner separately. Upon the second point the evidence was sufficient to satisfy the Court below that the parties had notice of the charge. It is not possible for us to go behind a specific finding of fact on this point. Upon the third point I am of opinion that it is not necessary to remand the case for a specific finding upon the question of the intention of the parties in the transfer of this property to the appellant. The parties must be taken to intend the natural result of their actions, and Harbans must have known that Raghunath would not willingly pay Rs. 10 a month to the widow and from Harban's subsequent conduct it is apparent that he had no intention at the time of taking the property of ever paying this sum. Harbans himself had defaulted for some five years previous to the transfer. There can be no doubt whatever that the transfer was made with the intention of defeating the claim of the widow for maintenance. Even, therefore, if Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act was meant to touch the principle of Hindu law that a widow's right to maintenance is a charge upon the property, I should hold that the conditions precedent to the application of that section had been fulfilled in the present case. I would, therefore, dismiss this appeal with costs. We are asked to note that the widow is now dead and that it may be a question which the appellant will contest in execution whether her right to sue not being a surviving right, the decree obtained by her can be executed by the heir to her estate and by the assignee of that heir.
4. This point was raised at so late a stage that the other side had no notice of it. I think we should content ourselves by saying that the decree which has been made in favour of the widow by the lower Courts will not be disturbed and that it is open to the appellant, if he so desires, to contest the rights of either the respondent or her assignee to enforce it.
5. Chapman, J.:— I agree.
V.S/R.K
6. Appeal dismissed.