Lakshmikanta Jha, C.J:— This is an appeal by the defendants first party against the decision of the. Second Additional Subordinate Judge of Arrah decreeing the suit for partition of four specific plots fully set out in the plaint.
The defendants first party and the defendants second party are descendants of a common ancestor. The two branches of the family own in equal moieties certain land in village Shahpur, Pargana Behea, bearing tauzi no. 884 on the revenue roll of the Collectorate of Shahabad. The defendants second party, while in possession of the family property jointly with the defendants first party as tenants-in-common sold to the plaintiff (hereinafter to be referred to as the Corporation) their moiety interest in four specific plots, viz. 6095, 6181, 6144 and 6617, having a total area of 17.61 acres (28 bighas 2 kathas 10 dinars), being gairmazrua land of the village, arid, put the Corporation into possession thereof. The Corporation brought the present suit for partition by metes and bounds of these four, specific plots only. The trial court has decreed the suit. The objection of the defendants-appellants is that the defendants second, party are still in possession of certain other land jointly with them and, unless the entire family property is brought into hotchpot for division by the court, the present suit is not maintain able. The only question for our decision is whether the suit for a partial partition, as framed, is maintainable.
The general rule is that a property held in common by two or more co-owners cannot be partitioned, in fragments, and the Hindu law also does not favour partial partition, A property may be held in common by two or more persons either as joint tenants or tenants-in-common. The principle of joint tenancy is unknown to Hindu law except in the case of the joint property of an undivided Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, which under that law passes by survivorship [Jogeswar Narain Deo v. Ram Chund Dutt(1); Musammat Baku Rani v. Thakur Rajendra Baksh Singh(2)]. Among joint tenants there is community of interest and unity of possession without definition of shares, whereas among tenants-in-common the unity of title and the unity of possession are definitive. Partition or bibhaga, which according to the Mitakshara, is “the adjustment of diverse rights regarding property held collectively by assigning severally to individuals Particular portions of the aggregate,” may be sought by a joint tenant, a tenant-in-common or a purchaser of an interest of anyone of them. It is open to co-owners to effect a partition by private agreement, by arbitrators appointed by the parties, or in the last resort, by the court [Giria Bai v. Sadashiv Dhundiraj(3)]. There is nothing in law, however, to prohibit a partial partition, by private agreement, of property held in co-tenancy by the tenants-in-common [Satya, Kumar Banerjee v. Satya Kripal Banerjee(4), Upendra Nath Banerjee v. Umesh Chandra Banerjee(5). Lord Westbury in Appovier's case [Appovier v. Rama Subba Aiyan(6)] laid down the law as to a, partial partition of the coparcenary property in these words:—
“But when the members of an undivided family agree among themselves with regard to particular property, that it shall thenceforth be the subject of ownership, in certain defined shares, then the character of undivided property and joint enjoyment is taken away from the subject-matter so agreed fr be dealt with; and in the estate each member has, thenceforth a definite and certain share, which he may claim the right to receive and to enjoy, in] severalty, although the property itself has not been actually severed and divided.”
This principle was re-affirmed by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of K. Ramalinga Annavi v. Narayana Annavi and Mr. Ameer Ali, after quoting the above passage, said:—
“It will thus be seen that, under the Hindu law, it is open to the members of a joint family to make a division and a severance of interest in respect of a part of the joint estate whilst retaining their status as a joint family and holding the rest as the properties of a joint undivided family.”
Thus the Calcutta decisions already referred to are authority for the proposition that by a private agreement a partial partition of property held by two or more tenants-in-common is allowable while, the Privy Council decisions lay down that a partial division and severance of interest in respect of a part of the coparcenary property also, can be made by an agreement among the joint tenants themselves.
There is ample authority in Hindu law in support of the view taken by the Judicial Committee in Appovier's case. Vachaspati Mishra in Vivadachintamani, which is of paramount authority under the Mithila school of Hindu law, while laying down the rule of succession among re-united brothers, speaks of the possibility of partial division of interest and partial partition by metes and bounds of the coparcenary property. It may be well to quote the relevant passage from the Vivadachiritamani, which runs thus:—
“Some people have held the following view:— ‘In a case where after some portion of the joint property has been partitioned.—the parties become re-united,—if one of the re-united co-parceners dies, the proportion of his share in the unpartitioned portion also of the joint property has been determined by the aforesaid partial partition,—in accordance with the maxim of ‘the Rice in the Pot’ (where one grain is found to be soft and cooked, the whole lot is regarded to be soft and cooked); so that, on this understanding, the share of the disabled or dead person should also he definitely assigned and indicated: and the share thus assigned and indicated shall he taken by his Reunited uterine Brother:—and it is in reference to this that there is the exclusion laid down in the text (that this rule refers to cases where the man has no child).’
This view cannot be accepted. Because the previous partial partition cannot be taken as determining the proportion, of his share in the whole joint property; because that partition was related to him only because he was alive at that time. The determining and assigning of the share on his death, etc. however, could not be done without the ‘casting of lots’. Hence the effect of the previous partial partition can consist only either (a) in the contraction (limitation) of the initial combined proprietary right of all the co-sharers, or, (b) in the creation of the partial proprietary right of each individual co-sharer over the portions divided. So that (under this view) such a partition would give rise to such ideas in the minds of the co-sharers as ‘this has fallen to your lot not mine’, ‘this has fallen to my lot not yours’ and so forth; under the circumstances, if the ‘casting of lots’ is simultaneous, then the whole lot will have become divided; if it is gradual, then, how can the said maxim of the ‘Rice in the Pot’ be applicable,—the attendant circumstances being different with each case?”
But if a partition is sought through the intervention of the court, the general rule is that the, entire joint property owned by the co-owners, whether as joint tenants or tenants-in-common, must be brought into hotchpot for division by the court [Haridas Sanyal v. Pran Nath Sanyal; Jogendranath Mukherji v. Jugobundhu Mukherji; Rajendra Kumar Bose v. Brojandra Kumar Bose; Mukunda Lal Chakrabarty v. Jogesh Chandra Chakrabarty; Hari Narayan Brahme v. Ganpairav Daji; Sitaram Vinayak Hasabnis v. Narayan Shankarrao Hasabnis and Pothuru Sreeramulu Chetti v. Duvvuru Subbarami Reddy(7)]; but this rule is subject to certain qualifications, as, for instance, where different portions of the joint property lie in different jurisdictions, or where a portion is not available for actual partition as being in the possession of a mortgagee, or if the property is situated outside British India, or the portion excluded is impartible, or the property excluded is held jointly with strangers who have no interest in the property sought to be partitioned [Hari Narayan Brahme v. Ganpatrav Daji, Ramacharya v. Anantacharya(8), Balaram Bhaskarji v. Ramchandra Bhaskarji(9), Purushottam v. Atmaram Janardan(10), Rajendra Kumar Bose v. Brojendra Kumar Bose]. These qualifications, it may be observed, are based partly on rules of procedure, partly on rules of convenience and partly on rules of justice and equity.
The ordinary rule applicable to suits for coparcenary property is that when a suit for partition is between coparceners it should embrace the whole family property subject to the exceptions already stated. If, however, a suit for partition is by a transferee who has purchased from a tenant-in-common a definite share in the common-land, such a suit cannot be defeated simply on the ground that it does not embrace properties of which the co-sharers are in joint possession but in which the alienee has got no interest at all. But there is a conflict of judicial opinion as to whether a purchaser of an undivided interest in the coparcenary property from a coparcener without the consent of other coparceners can sue for partition of that property alone in which he has an interest as a purchaser or whether his remedy is to sue for a general partition. Mookerjee, J. has succinctly put the divergent views on this point in Rajendra's case thus:—
“In such a contingency, two conflicting opinions have been maintained; on the one hand, it is urged that the purchaser is in precisely the same position as his transferor; on the other hand, it is said that the transfer really effects a severance, and the only joint property held in common by the transferee and the co-sharers of his transferor is what forms the subject-matter of the conveyance. The first alternative is supported by the decisions in Iburamsa v. Thiru, Parbati v. Ainuddeen, Shiv v. Virappa, Maharaja of Bobbili v. Venkata, Padala v. Vetha. The second alternative is favoured in Chundernath v. Hur Narain, Mukunda v. Lahuraux, Barahi v. Debkamini, Hemadri v. Ramani, Uma Sundari v. Binode Lal, Subba v. Annatha, Harmandas v. Vallavdas, Kailash v. Nityananda, Hari v. Venkata, Chinun v. Kalimuthu, Hem Chandra v. Hemanta Kumar, Ramtaran v. Hari Charan, Sris v. Mahima, Dhulabhai v. Lala(11).”
The second alternative seems to be in consonance with the rules of justice, equity and convenience and is not inconsistent with the decision of the Judicial Committee in Deendyal's case(12).
It is no doubt true that a tract held in common by two or more persons cannot be partitioned by fragments and a suit for a partition should always embrace the whole tract held jointly by the co-owners. But it is equally a well established rule of law that the plaint in a suit for partition must embrace only such property in which the plaintiff has community of interest and unity of possession. If any property in which the plaintiff is not interested, but the defendants alone are interested, is brought into hotchpot, the suit would fail on the simple ground that the plaintiff has no cause of action in respect of such property. Such a suit cannot, strictly speaking, be said to be a suit for partial partition.
The class of cases of which Purushottam's case(13) is a type, in which a partial partition has been allowed on the ground that the property excluded is held in partnership by the joint family along with strangers who have no interest in the family partition, among the sharers, seems to be based on this principle.
Conflict, however, arises when a partition is sought in respect of a coparcenary property in which a stranger has acquired interest by a purchase. It may be observed that according to the Banaras school, of Hindu Law a coparcener has no power to convey any interest in the coparcenary property by a voluntary convevance, whereas according to the Bombay and the Madras school of Hindu Law such an alienation is permissible. It is now firmly established, since Sadabart's case that according to the Banaras school of Hindu Law as administered in Bengal and Bihar, a coparcener has no power, without the consent of other coparceners, to alienate, even for value, a portion of the family property under a voluntary conveyance, except for legal necessity, family benefit or discharge of an antecedent debt. Such a sale is liable to be set aside wholly. But the right, title and interest of a, coparcener under the Banaras school can be sold by a court, and on such a sale the purchaser acquires a, right in the point family property [Girdharee Lall v. Kantoo Lall, Brij Narain v. Mangla Prasad].
If was laid down in Hurdey Narain's case [Baboo Hurdey Narain Sahu v. Pundit Baboo Rooder Perkash Misser] that “the interest which is purchased is not…………the share at that time in the property, but it is the right which the father, the debtor, would have to a partition, and what would come to him upon the partition being made.” In this connection the following propositions of law have been laid down by the Judicial Committee in Deendyal's case [Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh]:
(1) “It is settled law that the right, title and interest of one co-sharer in a joint estate may be attached and sold in execution to satisfy his personal debt; and that the purchaser under such an execution stands in the shoes of the judgment-debtor, and acquires the right as against the other co-sharers to compel a partition.”
(2) “Although a member of a joint family cannot incumber his share in joint property without the consent, express or implied, of his co-partners, the purchaser of it at an execution sale nevertheless acquires a lien upon it to the extent of his debtor's share and interest.” (At page 254).
(3) “But however nice the distinction between the rights of a purchaser under a voluntary conveyance and those of a purchaser under an execution sale may be it is clear that a distinction may, and in some cases, does, exist between them. It is sufficient to instance the seizure and sale of a share in a trading partnership at the suit of a separate creditor of one of the partners. The partner could not himself have sold his share so as to introduce a stranger into the firm without the consent of his co-partners, but the purchaser at the execution sale acquires the interest sold, with the right to have the partnership accounts taken in order to ascertain and realise its value. It seems to their Lordships that the same principle may and ought to be applied to shares in a joint and undivided Hindu estate; and that it may be so applied without unduly interfering with the peculiar status and rights of the coparceners in such an estate, if the right of the purchaser at the execution sale be limited to that of compelling the partition which his debtor might have compelled, had he been so minded before the alienation of his share took place” (At page 255).
According to the Bombay and the Madras school of the Mitakshara law, as already stated, a coparcener may sell for value, even by a private treaty, his undivided interest in coparcenary property without the consent of other coparceners. There is, according to these two schools, no difference between voluntary and involuntary alienations, but the Privy Council has in Deendayal's case emphasised that a distinction may, and in some cases, does, exist between them.
Thus it follows that under the Banaras school of the Mitakshara law a purchaser under a voluntary conveyance of an undivided interest in the coparcenary property acquires no interest at all therein; therefore, he cannot sue for partition. A purchaser at a court sale of the right, title and interest of a coparcener in an undivided coparcenary property acquires an interest therein and, if he has already got possession, a suit for partition lies by him or against him by other coparceners. If, however, he has not got possession or has lost possession at the instance of a coparcener, his only remedy is to seek a partition and to be put in possession after such partition [Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh, Baboo Hurdey Narain Sahu v. Pandit Baboo Rooder Perkash Misser, Deendayal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh, Medni Prasad Singh v. Nand Keshwar Prasad Singh].
From Deendyal's case it follows that the purchaser at a court-sale stands in the shoes of his judgment-debtor and he acquires a lien to the extent of his debtor's share and interest in the property so purchased by him and thereby he acquires a right to compel the partition which his debtor might have compelled had he been so minded before the alienation of his share took place.
It is thus clear that the purchaser acquires an equitable right to claim a partition in respect of the property purchased by him. Therefore, if the purchases his debtor's interest in the entire coparcenary property he can claim allotment of a share equivalent to such interest in the entire coparcenary property and this can be done only by a general partition.
But if he has purchased his debtor's share and interest in any specific item of the coparcenary property, he can, in my opinion, compel partition only of such item for allotment of his separate share corresponding to the interest of his debtor at the date of the suit in such property without claiming a general partition, because the purchaser has by the court-sale acquired unity of title only in a specific item of the coparcenary property. In such a case a partial partition is allowable on the ratio of Deendyal's case. If a partial division of the coparcenary property is possible by private agreement, as laid down in Appovier's case, there is no reason why in equity the purchaser at a court sale should be compelled to seek a general partition and thereby unduly interfere with the peculiar status and rights of the coparceners when he is interested only in specific item of the coparcenary property.
A coparcener, it may be observed, has a legal right to claim partition, whereas a purchaser has only an equitable right to partition. The moment a purchaser acquires an interest in the coparcenary property the transfer really affects a severance of joint status ill respect of the property transferred and he becomes a tenant-in-common in respect of such property with his vendor and his coparceners [Mahabalaya v. Timaya], and as such it cannot be said that, as he stands in the shoes of his vendor, he must seek partition of the entire joint family estate. In my opinion, when the Privy Council in Deendyal's case held that the purchaser stands in the shoes of his judgment-debtor (or the transferor), their Lordships intended to lay down the rule that he stands in the shoes of his transferor only in respect of the coparcenary property purchased by him upon which he acquires a lien to the extent of his transferor's share and interest therein, because to that extent he becomes a tenant-in-common. This view gets support from the Vyavahara Mayukha, which is one of the leading authorities of the Bombay school-Nilakantha, the author of Mayukha, defines partition thus:
“Even when there is a total failure of common property, a partition may also then be made, by the mere declaration, I am separate from thee for, a partition merely indicates a state of the mind. Transactions relating to partition are only declaratory of this mental state”. (Setlur's translation of the Vyavahara Mayukha, page 66). On this definition of the Mayukha it follows that when a coparcener transfers an interest in a coparcenary property he indicates a particular state of his mind, viz., that he has effected a severance of jointness in respect of the property alienated by him; therefore, to the extent of the property so alienated the transferee becomes a tenant-in-common with his vendor and the other members of the joint family. The view of West and Pinhey, JJ. in the case of Mahabalaya v. Timaya, of Benson and Sundara Aiyar, JJ. in V. Subba Row v. Annathanarayana Aiyar and of Westropp, C.J and West, J. in Udaram Sitaram v. Ranu Panduji seems to follow from the Mayukha definition of partition.
But the contrary view of the Bombay High Court is that where a stranger has acquired an interest in a coparcenary property his remedy lies in seeking a general partition [Shivmurteppa v. Virappa].] In this case the plaintiff was a purchaser at a court-sale of one moiety interest of one of the coparceners in a certain warehouse. He brought a suit for the partition of only the warehouse, claiming one moiety interest therein and impleaded his judgment-debtor and the other members of his joint family as defendants who objected to a partial partition and desired a general partition. It was held by Parsons, J. that, where the members of the family themselves desire a general partition, that prayer cannot be refused. Ranade, J. in the same case observed as follows:—
“The purchaser of a coparcener's share can take no higher right than his vendor possesses and that is not a right to a certain share in each particular property, but a joint right with other coparceners to the ownership of the whole with an incidental right to obtain a partition.”
He further observed:—
“When a coparcener himself, or the purchaser who obtains his rights, brings the suit, no suit for a partial partition of any single property can lie, and that the partition must be general.”
A converse case is illustrated by the case of Hanmandas Ramdayal v. Valabhdas Shankardas. In this case the defendant no. 5 was the father of the plaintiff. They constituted an undivided Hindu family. Defendants nos. 6 and 7 obtained a money decree against the father and in execution of the decree defendants: nos. 1 to 4 became purchasers at the court-sale of two of the properties belonging to the joint family. The plaintiff, who was the minor son of the 5th defendant, thereupon brought a suit against his father and the decree-holders as well as the auction purchasers for a declaration that the plaintiff's half share in the two properties did not pass to the auction-purchasers and for possession of his half share on equitable partition. It was found in this case that the son's interest did not pass to the purchasers at the court-sale, and on this finding their Lordships held, relying upon the case of Subramanya Chettyar v. Padmanabha Chettyar and Ram Charon v. Ajudhia Prasad, (1) that when a coparcener was suing an auction-purchaser it was not a valid objection to the suit that the coparcener claimed only at partial partition; (2) that the auction-purchasers should be allowed to file a suit against the plaintiff for a general partition of the entire family properties.
The case of a purchaser of an interest in a particular item of the coparcenary property is illustrated by the case of Ishrappa Ganap Hedge v. Krishna Putta Shankar Hedge. In this case a Hindu coparcener sold his interest in the particular item of property belonging to a joint family. A suit was brought by the vendee for partition of the specific property. It was held that such a suit cannot lie. His remedy will be to sue for a general partition Coyajee, J. observed as follows:—
“A purchaser of their unascertained share cannot insist upon the possession of any definite piece of property. The remedy of the purchaser lies in a suit to have that share and interest ascertained by instituting a suit for general partition in which the whole of the joint family property should be included, and all necessary parties joined.”
In the case of Bhau Laxman Dhor v. Budha Manahu Dhor the case law on the point was reviewed by Fawcett, J. and the following propositions were laid down:—
“(1) A stranger-purchaser of the undivided share of a coparcener in a joint Hindu family, if out of possession should not be given joint possession with the other coparceners, but should be left to his remedy of a suit for partition: Balaji Anant Rajadiksha v. Ganesh Janardan Kamati, Pandu Vithoji v. Goma Ramji, Ishmppa v. Krishna.
(2) On the other hand, a coparcener, who has been excluded, may obtain joint possession with such a purchaser, who has obtained possession of the joint family property: Bhiku v. Puttu and the prior rulings there cited.
(3) The purchaser in possession need not be ejected in a suit for recovery of possession brought by an excluded coparcener, but can be declared to be entitled to hold (pending a partition) as a tenant-in-common with the other coparceners: Babaji Lakshman v. Vasudev Vinayak, Kalapa bin Girmallapa v. Venkatesh Vihayak, Dugappa Shetti v. Venkatramnaya cf. Balaji v. Ganesh.”
The case of Bhau Laxman Dhor v. Budha Manaku Dhori has been, considered in the case of Bai Sherantibai v. Janardan R. Warick, but Beaumont, C.J did not think it necessary to decide whether the view of Fawcett, J. in that case was right or wrong. On a review of the case law His Lordship has stated the Hindu law as administered in the Bombay Presidency under the Mayukh school in these words:—
“It is, in my opinion, clearly established that a purchaser from a member of a Hindu joint family does not acquire a right to be considered himself a member of the joint family in place of the vendor, or a right to have joint possession of the family property, in place of the vendor, nor, of course, does he acquire any right to possession of any specific part of the property, that being a right which the vendor himself did not possess. The only right which the purchaser has in such a case is a right to sue for partition and procure to be allotted to himself the share which would have gone to his vendor”.
In the case of Sitaram Vinayak Hasabnis v. Narayan Shankarrao Hasabnis the rule of law laid down in the case of Shivmurteppa v. Virappa was held not to apply to a suit for partition of the property held in common by tenants-in-common. Macklin, J. in this case observed as follows:—
“The ordinary rule applicable to suits for coparcenary property is that when a suit for partition is between coparceners it should embrace the whole family property, and a member of a joint family suing his coparceners for the partition of joint family property is bound to bring into hotchpot all the property that may be in his own possession in order that there may be a complete and final partition. The rule is subject to exceptions arising out of convenience and from other causes. But it applies primarily to coparcenary property. The parties in this case are not coparceners but tenants-in-common; and in our view, that may well make a substantial difference in the applicability of the rule. In theory no coparcener has a share in any particular property, because each coparcener is an owner, of all the family property; and this is the real basis for the rule as to the partition of coparcenary property. But there is no such basis for the application of the rule to property which is held in common”.
Thus, according to the Bombay High Court, a distinction has been made between a suit by a coparcener or the alienee of a coparcener in respect of coparcenary property on the one hand and a suit by a tenant-in-common for partition of the common property on the other. In the former case the whole of the coparcenary property must be brought into hotchpot subject to certain qualifications.
The rulings of the Bombay High Court, which I have discussed above, establish the following propositions:—
(1) The purchaser of a coparcener's share acquires a joint right with other coparceners in the ownership of the whole with an incidental right to obtain a partition and as such no suit for a partial partition of any single property can lie.
(2) A tenant-in-common can claim a partial partition.
(3) A stranger cannot be placed in joint possession of joint Hindu family property.
(4) A stranger purchaser if out of possession should not be given joint possession with the other coparceners but should be left to his remedy of a suit for partition.
(5) A coparcener who has been excluded by a stranger purchaser of the undivided share of a coparcener may obtain joint possession with such a purchaser who has obtained possession of the joint family property.
(6) The purchaser in possession if not a stranger but a relation is not liable to be ejected in a suit for recovery of possession brought by an excluded coparcener but can be declared to be entitled to hold pending a partition as a tenant-in-common with the other coparceners.
According to the Mitakshara law as administered in the Madras Presidency, an alienation by a Coparcener does not put an end to the coparcenary; whether he alienates the whole or part of his interest in the family property he will continue to be an undivided member with rights of survivorship between himself and the others in respect of all the family property [Aiyyagari v. Aiyyagari, Maharaja of Bobbili v. Venkataramanjulu, Venkatarayudi v. Sivaramakrishnayya, Lakshmanan Chettiar v. Srinivasaiengar, Suryanarayanamurthy v. Veeraraju]. The view taken by the Madras High Court is that the purchaser from a coparcener is not a tenant-in-common with the coparceners in the family and that he is not entitled to joint possession [Kandasamy Udayan v. Velayutha Udayan]. The view of the Madras High Court has been succinctly put by Bakewell, J. in Manjaya Mudali v. Shanmuga Mudali thus:—
“It has been clearly laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council that the purchaser of the interest, of a co-sharer in a joint family estate under a sale in execution of a decree, or under a voluntary sale in the Madras Presidency, stands in the shoes of the co-sharer, and acquires the right as against the other co-sharers to compel a partition [Deendyal Lal v. Jugdeep Narain Singh] the interest which is purchased is not the share at that time in the property, but is the right which the alienor would have, to a partition, and what would come to him upon the partition being made; Hardi Narain Sahu v. Ruder Prakash Misser.”
In the case of Pakkiri Kanni v. Haji Mahammad Manjoor Sahib, which was a suit for partition of common land, the rule laid down in the case of Manjya Mudali v. Shanmuga Mudali was not applied and it was held that a suit for partition of common properties is not liable to be dismissed on the ground that the suit did not include all the common properties available for partition.
According to the Madras school, the purchaser from a coparcener does not become a tenant-in-common, as held by West, J. and Pinhey, J., in the case of Mahabalaya v. Timaya. But both the Bombay and the Madras High Courts are agreed that the case of a tenant-in-common or a purchaser from him does not stand on the same footing as the case of a purchaser of an interest in a coparcenary property and a partial partition may be at his instance.
The view of the Bombay and the Madras High Courts now clearly is that, at the suit of a coparcener or an alienee of an interest in the coparcenary property, partition must be sought of the entire coparcenary property. There is no text of the Hindu law in support of this view and the decision of the Privy Council in Deendyal's case is just to the contrary. It may, however, be supported on the doctrine of stare decisis.
The Allahabad High Court has consistently taken the view that a suit by a member of a joint family or by the purchaser of a portion of the family property is competent, and he can institute a suit for partition of any item of the common property in which other members of the family are not interested and that such a suit cannot be defeated on the ground that the suit does not include a claim for partition of other property in which other members of the family who have no interest in the property in suit are also interested. In the case of Lachmi Narain v. Janki Das the suit was by a member of one branch of the joint family in respect of a portion of the family property in which the plaintiff and the defendant alone were interested. Objection was taken that the suit was not maintainable on the ground that it was a suit for partition of a portion only of the joint family property. Their Lordships, relying upon the decision of Purushottam v. Atmaram Janardan, held that the suit would not be treated as a suit for partial partition. In the case of Ram Mohan Lal v. Mul Chand it was held that it is competent to the purchaser of property belonging to a joint Hindu family to have, if he so desires, a, portion only of the property which he has purchased partitioned; he is not bound to include in his suit for partition the whole of the property which he has purchased. The same view, was adopted in the case of Ram Charan v. Ajudhia Prasad. It was, however, a case in which a non-alienating coparcener sued the purchaser for partition of the alienated property only without bringing a suit for a general partition.
There is, however, divergence of judicial opinion in the Calcutta High Court.
Garth, C.J in the case of Parbati Churn Deb v. Ain-ud-deen held that a partition cannot be enforced of a part of the estate held by the defendants. The facts in this case are shortly these: M held 12 annas and A held 4 annas interest in a certain mauza. The defendants in the suit had obtained patni of the 4 annas interest of A and the plaintiff had obtained from M a mukarrari of a small portion of 12 annas interest. The plaintiff sued only the defendants who were patnidars of the 4 annas interest for partition and division of his small share. In this connection Garth, C.J observed, “first, that a partition of this kind, cannot legally be enforced without the zamindars being made parties to the suit, and secondly, that a partition cannot be enforced of a part of the estate held by the defendant. The correctness of the decision in this case was doubted in the case of Matilal Den Sarkar v. Kamakshya Charan Dey Sarkar where Suhrawardy, J. observes:—
“I am not quite sure whether the observation made by Garth, C.J in that case (I.L.R 7 Calcutta, 577) can be held to be good law now.”
In the case of Tarinicharan Chakrabarti v. Debendralal De Nasim Ali, J. held that the purchaser of a small portion of the joint family property from one of the co-owners is entitled under, the law to get a partition only of the land purchased by him. He observed as follows:—
“The ordinary rule is that a suit for partition must embrace all joint properties owned by the parties thereto. But there is also the complementary rule that a suit for partition cannot include properties, in which each of the parties does not claim an interest.”
It may be observed here that none of the Calcutta cases to which I have referred in this case has considered any case of a transferee of a coparcener's interest governed by the Banaras school of Hindu law, nor was any decision of the Calcutta High Court on this point brought to our notice. But the view taken by Nasim Ali, J. in the above case has been followed in this Court in the case of Delosingh v. Jagdip Singh* and it has been held that a stranger purchaser of a small portion of the joint family property is entitled under the law to get a partition only of the land purchased by him, and that in such a case a suit for partial partition will lie. In my opinion, the view taken in the case of Delosingh v. Jagdip Singh* seems to be, in consonance with the decision of the Privy Council in Deendval's case, and we see no reason to differ from the view taken by the division bench in the above case.
According to the decisions of all the High Courts, a suit for partial partition by a purchaser from a tenant-in-common is maintainable. Therefore, there is no difficulty whatsoever so far as the present suit is concerned, because the plaintiff is admittedly a purchaser of one moiety interest in the specific portions of some plots of land held by its vendor as tenant-in-common with the defendant first party. I am accordingly of the opinion that there is no substance in the contention of the appellant and the appeal ought to be dismissed. I would affirm the judgment of the trial Court and dismiss the appeal with costs.
Reuben, J.:— I have had the advantage of reading the judgment prepared by my lord the Chief Justice. As the question is of some importance. I would like to state my reasons for agreeing with him.
The decree has been assailed on two grounds, firstly, that the defendants first and second parties are a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara-law and, therefore, the plaintiff Corporation did not acquire any interest under the transaction in question, and, secondly, that, even if there is a division in status and the defendants first and second parties are holding as tenants-in-common, the suit is not maintainable unless the entire family property is brought into hotchpot.
The first point is a question of fact and does not appear to have been raised in the Court below. It is urged that it arises on the plaint itself; reliance being placed for this contention on paragraph 4 of the plaint, which speaks of the suit lands as being “in joint possession of the two branches” of the family. The contention ignores the words which immediately follow, “as tenants-in-common”. These words make it clear what the plaintiff Corporation meant when it spoke of “joint” possession.
The second point involves a question of law of some difficulty. Mr. Ragho Saran Lal on behalf of the appellants placed great reliance on Rajendra Kumar Bose v. Brojendra Kumar Base in which the principles governing a suit for the partition of family property were set out at some length by Mokherjee, J. The case related to a partition between two brothers governed by the Dayabhaga school, each entitled in equal shares to the property in suit and many other properties. Their lordships upheld the objection that the entire family property must be included. According to Mookherji, J. the general rule is that all the properties held in cotenancy must be included but there are exceptions among others a suit in which the portion excluded is held jointly with strangers who have no interest in the family partition that is to say the converse of the case with which we are concerned. His Lordship mentions further that there is a difference of opinion as to whether an alienee from a co-sharer is entitled to institute a suit for the partition of the property he is interested in, on the one hand, it has been held that the purchaser is in precisely the same position as his transferor on the other hand, it is stated that the transfer really effects a severance and only joint property held in common by the transferee and the co-sharers of his transferor is what forms the subject-matter of the conveyance. His Lordship concludes by observing that the exceptions noted by him must not be taken, to have frittered away the fundamental rule that a partition-suit should embrace all the joint property, a rule founded on sound and weighty reasons, the ignoring of which would inevitably result in multiplicity of litigation, a rule further which ensures a just partition, giving due consideration to equities arising between the co-sharers. It is clear that his Lordship does not express his opinion either way on the question at issue, in this case. If anything, his judgment shows that the weight of authorities is against the view which Mr. Ragho Saran Lall is contending for, but solution is to be looked for in an examination of authorities to ascertain the principles and not in a numerical counting of decisions.
In Srimati Padmamani Dasi v. Srimati Jagadamba Dasi, Phear, J. was concerned with a partition suit between two sisters governed by the Dayabhaga school of law and entitled to equal shares in real properties situated partly in and partly out of Calcutta. One of them sued for the, partition of all the movable and immovable property situate in Calcutta. The maintainability of the suit being challenged, his Lordship, on an examination of certain authorities, observed that he could find nothing to make him think that the plaintiff must necessarily bring a suit, if he brought a suit at all, for the partition of the whole joint property. Clearly, his Lordship observed, if the parties themselves have already effected a partition, it would not be in the power of a plaintiff to ask that the partition should be undone, simply in order that the whole estate might be divided de novo. Therefore his Lordship inferred, a plaintiff is entitled to confine his suit to that particular part of the property which he is desirous of having divided, and in a suit so brought, it would be open to the other parties to show that part of the property ought not to be divided or cannot be divided, without taking into consideration the rest of the property, and dividing, it also.
In Pandurang Anandrav v. Bhaskar Shadashiv Bhaskar as purchaser of one coparcener's share-in certain properties of a joint Hindu family sued in respect of that property. Their Lordships held that he could not succeed in the suit as framed, that coparcener's share was not in any particular part of joint family estate but in the estate as a whole and could only be ascertained by taking a general account and making a distribution in accordance with its result.
In Udardm Sitaram v. Ranu Panduji which also related to joint family-property Westropp, C.J and West, J., observed:
“The sale (judicial or private), mortgage; or ether alienation of a share in the undivided family property of Hindu family, though in this Presidency conferring a right upon the mortgagee or purchaser, and working a severance so far as to render the mortgagee or purchaser a tenant in common with the parceners other than he whose share has been thus alienated, cannot be regularly and completely enforced by giving possession, except through the medium of partition, which may be effected either amicably with the other parceners, or by a duly constituted suit for a partition of the whole of the family property, to which suit all of the co-parceners should be made parties: Sadasew v. Bapuji, Jiwan v. Gunnoo, Narayan Babaji v. Nana Monohar, Manu Chapter IX P1. 47; Trimbak Dixit v. Narayan Dixit. Where a share in the undivided ancestral estate of a Hindu family is mortgaged or sold, either by the parcener himself, or by way of execution, the mortgagee or purchaser takes such share subject to such prior charges or incumbrances as may affect the family estate, or as may affect that particular share. If the mortgage or sale be of a special portion only of the family property, it may not always be possible, consistently with prior existing rights, for the Court, making the partition, to give possession of that portion to the mortgagee or purchaser. But generally it would be possible to do so, either wholly or partially, and therefore, it without doing injustice either to prior incumbrancers or coparceners, such possession can, on partition, be given, it would be the duty of the Court making the partition, to endeavour to give effect to the mortgage or sale, and so to marshal the family property amongst the coparceners as to allot that portion of the family estate, or so much thereof as may be just to the mortgagee or purchaser.”
In Chundernath Nundy v. Hur Narain Deb, the plaintiff who claimed a twelve-anna share in certain land, defined by metes and bounds, sued the defendant, whom he alleged to be the owner of the remaining four-anna share for partition. The defence was that there were other parties interested, who were not joined as parties, and that there were other lands in joint possession of which the plaintiff sought no partition. It appeared that the plaintiff disclaimed possession over and ownership of those other lands and only asked for the partition of the lands which, according to him, he held jointly with the defendant. In these circumstances, their Lordships held that the suit was maintainable, and Tottenham, J., observed:
“the fact noticed by the lower Courts that the plaintiff's share in the estate exists only in a portion of it, and not in all the lands comprised in it, seems to me to afford no reason why he should be barred from obtaining a partition of his share such as it is”.
The plaintiff in that case seems to have been in a position very similar to that of the present plaintiff corporation inasmuch as the plaintiff corporation and the defendants first party are tenants-in-common in this portion of the property while the defendants first party and the defendants second party remain tenants-in-common of the remainder of the property.
In Venkatrama v. Mira Labai which relates to a suit for partition brought by a transferee of a coparcener's share in particular property, it was held that the suit must include all the family properties. The principle is thus stated by their Lordships:
“The purchaser of a coparcener's share can take no higher right than his vendor possesses and that is not a right to a certain share in each particular item of the family property, but a joint right with the other coparceners to the ownership and enjoyment of each individual item with an incidental right to obtain a partition of the whole family property and, have his share therein made over to him after due provision for the family debts and liabilities. The judgment in Pandurang Anandrap v. Bhaskar Shadashiv points out the course to be taken by a purchaser of a share in part of the family property. He must file, a partition suit against the other members of the family for the ascertainment of the share of his vendor and for the allotment to himself of his vendor's share in the particular portion in which he is interested; and we think that the rights of such a purchaser are not extended by section 44 of the Transfer of Property Act. That section only gives him the transferor's right to joint possession or other common or part enjoyment of the property and to enforce a partition of the same, and the transferor's right is not a right to enforce partition of a particular portion of the property; and even if section 44 would, otherwise enlarge the right of the purchaser, such an effect is precluded by section 2, clause (d), which declares that nothing in the chapter which contains that section shall affect any rule of Hindu Law.”
Undoubtedly, their Lordships observed, this rule may work hardship by throwing on the purchaser of a coparcener's share in some small portion of a large family estate the burden of a partition suit to ascertain the vendor's share in the whole estate, but those who deal with persons having a very limited power of alienation must take the consequence. The suit, I may observe, related to an undivided share in the property of a joint Hindu family governed, by the Mitakshara law. Different considerations apply to such a transfer in the case of a divided family.
Barahi Debi v. Debkamini Debi relates to the property of a family governed by the Bengal school of Hindu Law consisting of two brothers. Their Lordships held that the purchaser of the share of one brother in particular property could sue the other brother for partition of that property. They repelled the contention that the suit was not maintainable with the observation that to give effect to the objection would practically amount to a refusal to allow the purchaser of such a share to obtain separate possession of it at all; and this would not only be inequitable, but would greatly diminish the value of the property held in this way.
In Purushottam v. Atmaram Janardan, the plaintiffs and the first six defendants (as members of the Parashare family) were the joint owners of a certain vritti called Parashare Vritti. They also owned jointly with another family, namely, the Kandve family, a Certain other vritti called the Kandve-Parashare Vritti. In 1881, the plaintiffs (as members of the Parashare family) sued the first six defendants (also Parashares) for partition of the Parashare Vritti along with the other joint family property, obtained a decree, and recovered their share. The plaintiffs subsequently brought another suit against defendants 1 to 6 and the members of the Kandve family for a partition of the Kandve-Parashare Vritti. The contention of defendants nos. 1 to 6 that the suit was barred as against them inasmuch as the claim now made ought to have been included in the earlier suit was repelled by the High Court. Ranade, J. pointed out that, among the exceptions to the rule that a partition suit shall embrace all the joint family properties is the class of cases where, as in the case before him, the properties are held in partnership by the joint family along with strangers, who have no interest in the family partition among the sharers, and who could not, therefore, be made parties in the family partition suit. He pointed out that the cause of action in the two suits was different in the earlier suit being the plaintiff's relationship in the family of the Parashares and in the later suit the partnership between the Parashares and the Kandves. Parsons, J., further pointed out that the subject-matter of the two suits was different. He observed:
“If the cause of action is founded on a refusal on the part of the defendants to divide, then the refusal in each case is that of different persons owning different rights. If it is founded on the right to claim a partition of what is joint, then the subject-matter is different, for the joint property of A and B is not the joint property of A, B and C. Joint family property is the property owned by one family (familia) jointly among its own members, and the decision in Ukha v. Daga was passed in reference to such property only. Property which is held jointly by several families is not the joint family property of each of those families so that it would be compulsory upon each of them, in suing its own member for a partition of their family property, to include it in that suit, or else not be allowed afterwards to sue for its share therein.”
If the two lots of property are regarded as separate from each other and a member of the joint family can sue for partition in respect of one lot, it must equally be open to the stranger interested in the other lot to sue for partition in respect of that lot alone.
These two learned Judges in another case Murar Rao v. Sitaram, dealing with a suit, in which the purchaser of an eight pies share in certain property belonging to a joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law sued for his share in that property, made an observation which is very apt in the present case:
“We see no reason why, when a purchaser wants to have the share in a family estate that he has bought divided off and given to him., the members of the family should be forced into a partition of the whole family estate.”
The case of Srimati Padmamani Dasi (supra), was followed by Banerji and Richards, JJ. in Ram Mohan Lal v. Mul Chand, in which the purchaser of the share of some coparceners in two shops belonging to a joint Hindu family sued for partition of his share in one of these shops. It appeared that the purchase was with the knowledge and consent of the other members. Their Lordships repelled the contention that the suit was not maintainable unless both the shops were brought into hotchpot. They pointed out that the case was not one by a member of a joint Hindu family seeking partition of a portion of the joint family property, the plaintiff admittedly not being a member of the joint family. In their Lordships' opinion, it was an ordinary case of “joint ownership” of property, and there was nothing to preclude one of the “joint owners” of several items of property from seeking a partition of one of such items of property. Their Lordships, thus, drew a distinction between property belonging to a joint Hindu family and “property held jointly” by such a family—it would, perhaps be more accurate to describe the latter as property held in common tenancy, since the shares of the co-sharers were defined and the rule of survivorship would not apply.
Uma Sundri Devi v. Benode Lall Pakrashi related to a suit for the partition of the plaintiff's two-anna share in mauza Goalbari, which appertained to Dehi Saratal rotate consisting of ninety-eight mauzas the property of a joint Hindu family governed by the Dayabhaga school. The plaintiff claimed the share transferee from a member of the family. Following the case of Barahi Debi (supra), their Lordships held that the suit lay. In reply to an objection that, owing to the peculiar position of defendants nos. 9 to 12, they would be injuriously affected by this partition, their Lordships said:
“If the defendants have this special interest in this village and if any further partition would jeopardize their interest, it is open to them as parties interested to compel their co-sharers to divide the whole estate or the four villages which they referred to above, and to give them on their allotment the actual tenements they held in village Golabari.”
In Harikristna Chowdary v. Venkata Lakshmi Narayana, the plaintiffs sued for partition of a one-fifth share in two Ullages purchased by their father in execution of a decree against the fifth defendant. The suit villages and some other immovable property had been kept undivided for convenience of enjoyment in a partition of the joint Hindu family of which the fifth defendant was then a member and, subsequent to the partition, the divided members held this property as tenants-in-common. Their Lordships held that the plaintiffs were entitled to maintain the suit without bringing into hotchpot the remainder of the undivided property.
In Manjaya v. Shanmuga, the suit for partition was brought by a transferee of the share of a coparcener in particular items of joint family property. Their Lordships referred to Appovier v. Ram Subba Auyal, Deendyal v. Jugdeep Narain, Suraj Bunsi Koer v. Sheo Persad Singh and Hardi Narain Sahu v. Ruder Perkash Misser and pointed out that, according to the true notion of an undivided family in Hindi law, no individual member of that family, whilst it remains undivided, can predicate of the joint and undivided, property that he has a certain definite share. By purchasing his interest, the purchaser does not become a member of the joint family, nor does he acquire a definite share in the property in question and become a tenant-in-common in respect of it. What he acquires is his vendor's right of compelling a partition. His remedy, therefore, is by means of a suit for partition and it must relate to the entire family property. This decision was approved and followed in Maharaja of Bobbili v. Venkataramanjulu Naidu, where their Lordships held that, as the purchaser of an undivided share of a coparcener is not a tenant-in-common with the other coparceners, he is not entitled to mesne profits in respect of his share for the period between the date of his purchase and the date of his suit for partition.
A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court reasoned on similar lines in Hanmandas Ramdayal v. Valabhdas Shankardas, in which a co-parcener brought a partition suit against the transferees of the other coparcener, confining the suit to the particular property in question. Their Lordships permitted the decree for the recovery by the plaintiff by partition of his undivided share in the suit property to stand, but stayed the execution of the decree for a period of three months directing that, if during that period of three months the alienees filed a suit for general partition against the plaintiff, the stay of the decree should last until the disposal of the alienees' suit for partition, thus, giving the alienees an opportunity, if they so opted, to enforce the right which they acquired from their alienor to get the alienor's share determined by a partition of the entire family properties. This decision was followed in Ishrappa Ganap Hegde v. Krishna Putta Shankar Heade, relating to a suit for partition brought, by the purchaser of an interest of a Hindu coparcener in a particular item of the joint, family property, their Lordships holding that a suit confined to that particular property was not maintainable.
The distinction between suits relating to partition of common property and suits relating to partition of joint property was again drawn by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Pakkiri Kanni v. Haji Mahammad Manjoor Sahib. They held that a suit for partition of common property, not joint property, is not liable to dismissal on the ground that all the common property, in respect of which it might have been brought, has not been included. They added:
“It is, we may point out, always open to the defendant in such a case as the present, if he thinks himself prejudiced by the exclusion of any property, himself to bring a suit in respect of it and have it tried with the suit already pending.”
In Tarini Charan Chakarbutty v. Debendra Lal Dey, arising out of a suit for partition filed by the purchaser of the share in some property of a member of a Hindu family governed by the Dayabhaga school of Hindu law and confined to that property, Nasim Ali, J. repelled the contention that all the family property should have been included in the suit, observing that to give effect to the objection would be to affirm the principle that a plaintiff, can institute a suit for partition in respect of property in which he os not interested at all. He also relied on the complimentary rule that a suit for partition, cannot include properties in which each of the parties does not claim an interest. This decision was followed by a Division Bench of this court in Delosingh v. Jagdip Singh*, in which the plaintiff was the purchaser in an execution sale of the interest in a particular property of a coparcener of a joint Hindu family. Their Lordships held, following the principle enunciated by Phear, J. In Padmamani Dasi's case (supra), that the suit would lie and it was open to the other parties to show that part of the property ought not to be divided, or could, not fairly be divided, without, taking into consideration the rest of the property and dividing it also.
The question was also considered in Sitaram Vinayak Hasabnis v. Narayan Shankarrap Hasabnis, which relates to a partition suit brought by a member of a Hindu family which was holding the ancestral property as a tenancy-in-Common, the suit related only to a portion of the ancestral property. Their Lordships held that the suit lay, observing:
“But it (the rule that in a suit for partition the whole family property should be included) applies primarily to coparcenary property. The parties in this case are not coparceners but tenants-in-common; and, in our view, that may well make a substantial difference in the applicability of the rule. In theory no coparcener has a share in any particular property, because each coparcener is an owner of all the family property; and this is the real basis for the rule as to the partition of coparcenary property. But there is no such basis for the application of the rule to property which is held in common. Indeed there seems to be no logical basis for it at all in such a case. Special circumstances sometimes exist which make, it necessary or desirable to apply the rule to suits relating to land held in common; and this Bench decided one such case a fortnight ago in F.A no. 129 of 1940 (decided on the 29th July 1942) and required the plaintiff suing for partition to bring into hotchpot all the property which was in the plaintiff's possession. But no ground of convenience or equity was put forward in the written statement to this suit, and the objection seems to have been based on purely technical grounds and is more obstructive than genuine.”
The analysis made by me above shows that a distinction has been drawn between joint family property and property held in tenancy-in-common as regards the effect of a transfer of a co-owner's interest in a portion of the property. In the former case the transferee gets merely the right to have his share ascertained by partition. There is a conflict of decisions as to whether his suit for partition must relate to the whole of the joint family estate. The better view, in my opinion, is that it need not—the view taken in Delosingh v. Jagdip Singh*. This conclusion follows from the fact that the rule that a suit for partition must cover the entire property held jointly, or in common by the parties is not a rule of Hindu law or of statue law but is merely a rule of equity and convenience Iburamsa Rowthan v. Thirumalai. Muthuveera Theruvenkatasami V. Subba Row v. Annathanarayana Aiyar. As regards property held in common tenancy the courts are agreed that the purchaser can sue for partition of the particular property in respect of which he has acquired an interest. In both cases the interest acquired by the transferee is subject to the equities as between the transferring co-owner and the other co-owners: Uda Ram Sitaram v. Ranu Panduji and V. Subba Row v. Annathanarayana Aiyar, but in a suit filed by a transferee it is for the opposing co-sharers to raise and establish the existence of such equities. Srimati Padamani Dasi v. Srimati Jagadamba Dasi; Uma Sundari Devi v. Benode Lal Pakrashi, Pakkiri Kanni v. Haji Mohammad Manjoor Sahib, Sitaram Vinayak Hasabins v. Narayan Shankarrao Hasabins and Delosingh v. Jagdip Singh*. The maintainability of a partition suit relating to a portion only of the entire common property follows logically from the fact that it is open to the co-tenants or the coparceners, as the case may be, by agreement between themselves to partition a] portion of the common estate and leave the remainder in statu quo ente. The consent of all the co-owners being necessary it further follows that it should not be open to one co-owner, to the prejudice of the other co-owners, to effect a severance by transfer of his interest in a portion of the common estate. It is for this reason that the consideration of the equities between the co-owners is necessary. In the present case no equities have been pleaded.
Our attention has been drawn to a passage in paragraph 464 at page 565 of the 11th edition of Mayne's Hindu Law which is as follows:—
“Where a stranger to the family acquires a title to a portion of the family property, by purchase or under an execution, his remedy is by suit to compel his vendor to come to a partition, and so give him an absolute title. But he cannot demand a partition merely of the portion over which he has claim.”
I have discussed above the decisions which are cited as authorities for this proposition. The learned author seems to be referring to an alienee of an interest in a portion of joint family property. As regards this I have indicated that there is a, conflict of decisions and I have stated at length the reasons which led me to the view which I have expressed.
G.N.P
Appeal dismissed.