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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (S.C. Dharmadhikari, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The Writ Petition under Article 226 was filed by an association (Petitioner No.1) of Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Nav-Buddhist and Other Backward Class officers (registered as a society and under the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950), represented by Mr. R.S. Mane, seeking (inter alia) quashing of an IDBI circular dated 31 July 2009 that revised/harmonized leave rules and reduced sick leave from 540 days to 360 days, and directions to reinstate or compensate the cancelled 180 days of sick leave.

The 1st Respondent is Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI Bank Ltd.), a banking company in which the Union of India holds more than 51% of shares and which the Court treated as a "State" for Article 12 purposes. The petitioner challenged the bank's circular as arbitrary, discriminatory and contrary to section 5 of the Industrial Development Bank (Transfer of Undertaking and Repeal) Act, 2003.

Procedurally, the matter had been the subject of earlier civil litigation: a Civil Suit (Regular Civil Suit No. 296 of 2009) was dismissed by the Civil Judge for want of jurisdiction; an appeal was allowed by the District Judge; the Bank filed a civil revision in this Court where it was observed that the suit is maintainable; subsequently, a decision of the District Judge, Satara (Regular Civil Appeal No. 92 of 2015) delivered on 6 January 2017 dismissed that appeal with costs (confirming the trial Court's dismissal). This writ petition was heard on merits in the present opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the IDBI circular dated 31 July 2009 (harmonizing leave rules and reducing sick leave from 540 to 360 days) is arbitrary, discriminatory or illegal and liable to be quashed.
  2. Whether the reduction/cancellation of 180 days of accumulated sick leave infringes any pre-existing legal, statutory or contractual right of the officers such that a writ of mandamus should issue.
  3. Whether Section 5(1) of the Industrial Development Bank (Transfer of Undertaking and Repeal) Act, 2003 protects pre-existing terms and conditions (including leave entitlements) in perpetuity, or only for a limited period such that the bank could lawfully revise terms.
  4. Whether doctrines of promissory estoppel or legitimate expectation (and reliance on section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act) can be invoked to prevent the bank from revising/harmonizing sick leave.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The Circular of 31 July 2009 unilaterally reduced sick leave from 540 days to 360 days, arbitrarily cancelling accumulated 180 days, which deprived officers of a legitimate right and amounted to punishment.
  • The Circular was discriminatory and contrary to section 5 of the IDBI Repeal Act, 2003.
  • Principles of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation, and section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act, support enforcement of the pre-existing leave entitlements.
  • The Association had made representations to the bank and to authorities (Ministry of Finance, Reserve Bank of India) seeking withdrawal or abeyance of the Circular; the Ministry and other authorities were said to have raised concerns initially.
  • Prayer for quashing the Circular and for reinstatement/monetary compensation for affected (including retired/resigned) officers.

Respondent’s (IDBI Bank’s) Arguments

  • There is no vested or pre-existing legal right to a particular leave package; the Circular merely revises and harmonizes leave rules and does not abolish sick leave.
  • The harmonization was approved by the Bank's Board (meeting held on 23 May 2009) and implemented as part of necessary restructuring following conversion into a commercial bank post the 2003 Act.
  • Section 5(1) of the IDBI Repeal Act provides protection only for a limited period (six months) to those opting not to join the new company, and does not perpetually freeze terms and conditions of service.
  • Sick leave is conditional and subject to limits; the readjusted cap of 360 days was adopted with Board approval and is not arbitrary or discriminatory.
  • Earlier civil litigation on the subject was adjudicated (trial Court dismissal confirmed by later order), supporting the bank’s position that civil remedies were and are available.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sethi Auto Service Station v. Delhi Development Authority (2009) 1 SCC 180 Amplification of the doctrine of legitimate expectation (as authority on scope of legitimate expectation). The Court noted the precedent but found the factual prerequisites for legitimate expectation were not satisfied in the present case and therefore the doctrine could not be invoked to invalidate the bank's action.
Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation v. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Ltd. (2013) 5 SCC 470 Set out preconditions and tests for issuance of writ of mandamus (discretionary nature, need for existing legal right/duty, equitable considerations). The Court applied the tests reiterated in this decision to conclude that the petitioner had not established a pre-existing legal right or other prerequisites for mandamus; thus mandamus could not be issued.
Pratima Chowdhury v. Kalpana Mukherjee (2014) 4 SCC 196 Clarification of elements of estoppel (section 115 Indian Evidence Act) — factual representation, reliance, change of position, and inequity of reverting. The Court observed that the necessary preconditions for estoppel were not made out on the facts; hence promissory estoppel did not operate to prevent the bank's revision.
Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation (1993) 3 SCC 499 Principles concerning legitimate expectation and limits where State action is in public interest; court's role not to usurp authority's discretion. The Court relied on these principles to emphasize that legitimate expectation has limited operation where public policy and public interest decisions are concerned, and therefore the petitioner could not succeed on that ground.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a focused, stepwise analysis:

  1. Mandamus prerequisites: The Court reiterated (via Rajasthan State) that issuance of mandamus is discretionary and requires an existing legal right or an existing duty; it cannot create rights. The petitioner failed to demonstrate a pre-existing legal right entitling them to the relief of mandamus.
  2. Nature and content of the Circular: The Court examined the Circular dated 31 July 2009 and its Appendices in full. It observed that the Circular was issued following Board approval (23 May 2009) and set out a revised, harmonized regime of various leaves applicable to all officers of the bank, effective 1 August 2009. The circular provided specific conditions for sick leave (e.g., 30 days half-pay per completed year, maximum 360 days during service, eligibility conditions, production of medical certificates, etc.).
  3. Characterization of the action: Reading the Circular as a whole, the Court held that the Bank exercised its Board power to harmonize and revise leave rules; the petitioner’s selective reading produced a misleading impression of unilateral reduction. The Court found no evidence that the Board lacked authority to adopt or implement such a harmonization exercise.
  4. Scope of Section 5(1) IDBI Repeal Act: The Court interpreted section 5(1) of the 2003 Repeal Act as providing temporary protection (six months) to employees who opted not to continue with the new company; it did not amount to a perpetual bar on altering terms and conditions after conversion. Thus reliance on s.5(1) to claim indefeasible leave rights was unfounded.
  5. Promissory estoppel / legitimate expectation: Applying the tests set out in Pratima and Sethi and other authorities, the Court found that the petitioner did not show the necessary factual representation, reliance and change of position required for estoppel, nor did the circumstances warrant invoking legitimate expectation against a public authority where discretionary policy decisions are involved. The Court also noted that the Ministry of Finance ultimately supported the Bank’s stand and placed no contrary material before the Court.
  6. Representative character and pleadings: The Court noted that the petitioner was one association representing a subset of officers (a small fraction of officers affected), and the pleadings and representations were vague and did not pinpoint a concrete pre-existing right affected by the Circular.
  7. Other procedural matters: The Court observed that information/appeal under the Right to Information Act had been pursued by others, and that the bank had furnished requisite particulars. The Court also reviewed the earlier civil proceedings and outcomes as relevant background.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Writ Petition dismissed. The Court dismissed the writ petition for lack of merit and for failure to establish any pre-existing legal right entitling the petitioner to a writ of mandamus. The dismissal was made without any order as to costs (as recorded in the opinion).

Direct consequences and implications:

  • The IDBI circular revising and harmonizing leave rules (including the cap of 360 days for sick leave) remains unquashed by this Court according to the decision rendered in this opinion.
  • The petitioner did not succeed in establishing promissory estoppel, legitimate expectation, or a statutory/contractual right under section 5(1) of the IDBI Repeal Act that would prevent the bank from restructuring leave entitlements.
  • The Court applied and relied upon established precedent and principles (as cited) rather than laying down new legal propositions; it assessed the case on the basis of existing tests for mandamus, estoppel and legitimate expectation.
Petition dismissed.

This summary is confined to the materials and findings expressly contained in the provided opinion and does not infer facts or arguments beyond what the opinion records.

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    All India Idbi Sc, St, Nav Buddhist And Obc, Officers' Welfare Association v. Idbi Bank Ltd. .

    S.C Dharmadhikari, J.:— By this Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India the Petitioner is seeking the following two reliefs—

    “(b) That this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct by Writ of Mandamus/any other Appropriate Writ/Order/Direction, directing the Respondent No. 1 and 2 to quash and set aside the Circular IDBI Bank/2009-10/118.HR/HR-30 dated July 31, 2009 relating to reduction of Sick Leave from 540 days to 360 days, the order of arbitrarily cancellation of accumulated sick leave of 180 days and direct the Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 to reinstate/credit the cancelled Sick Leave of 180 days in the Leave Accounts of the adversely affected Officers with retrospective effect.

    (c) That this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to direct by Writ of Mandamus/any other Appropriate Writ/Order/Direction, directing the Respondent No. 1 and 2 to compensate the cancelled Sick Leave of 180 days by granting monetary benefits to the adversely affected retired/resigned Officers with all the consequential benefits as applicable to all of them with retrospective effect.”

    2. Petitioner No. 1 is an Association of the Scheduled Caste, Scheduled Tribe, Nav-Buddhist and Other Backward Class Officers. The Petitioner association was registered as a Society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 and equally the Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950. Mr. R.S Mane is the Vice President of this Petitioner Association and duly authorized to file the Writ Petition.

    3. 1st Respondent before us is the Industrial Development Bank of India (“IDBI” for short). It is claimed that it is “Other Public Sector Bank” registered under the Indian Companies Act, 1956. The Union of India through its Ministry of Finance holds more than 51% shares in 1 Respondent Bank. Thus, there is all pervasive control and supervision of Union of India over the affairs of 1 Respondent Bank. It is a “State” within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. The IDBI bank performs a public function. Even when it recruits, appoints and deals with its employees particularly of the officer grade, it performs a duty. That is a public duty. In such circumstances, all the Respondents are amenable to the writ jurisdiction of this Court.

    4. The Writ Petition projects the grievance of this Association particularly of reduction of the duration of sick leave from the initial 540 days to 360 days. The reduction by 180 days is termed as unilateral, wholly arbitrary and equally illegal.

    5. The Petitioner refers to a Circular issued by IDBI on harmonization of leave rules.

    6. Inviting our attention to this Circular dated 31 July, 2009, copy of which is at Annexure-A to the Writ Petition page 20 of the paper book, it is urged that the Petitioner is aggrieved and dissatisfied only with the decision of the bank in revising and harmonizing sick leave.

    7. The Association requested the bank to withdraw this Circular to the extent duly indicated therein by its Communication dated 11th and 16 September, 2009.

    8. It is submitted that 1 Respondent Bank addressed a letter dated 3rd October, 2009 advising the Petitioner that the Board of IDBI Bank Ltd at its meeting held on 23 May, 2009 had approved certain changes to the leave rules, as applicable to the officers of e-IDBI in terms of relevant provisions of Officers Service Rules, 2006 and it is that decision which has been circulated by two Circulars dated 31 luly, 2009 and 29 August, 2009. The modified rules have already been implemented by the Bank. That is why it cannot accede or accept the Petitioner's request. The All India IDBI Officers' Association's letter dated 5 September, 2009 is relied upon to submit that the minutes in respect of the above issues which were discussed at the meeting held on 23 May, 2009 have not been confirmed by the Board at its subsequent meetings held on 15 July, 2009 and August 28, 2009.

    9. The Petitioner took up the matter of this alleged arbitrary cancellation/reduction of the sick leave with several authorities, bodies and personalities including the then Chairman of the National Commission for Scheduled Caste, the Union of India, Ministry of Finance and the Reserve Bank of India. It is submitted that the Petitioner's representation to the competent authorities and referred to in paragraph 15 of the Petition eventually met with some success.

    10. While alleging that the cancellation of the accumulated sick leave by 180 days deprives the officers of their legitimate rights and is in the nature of punishment, the impugned circular is discriminatory and causes great harm and prejudice to the members of the Petitioner and other officers, additionally, it is urged that the Circulars contravene section-5 of the Industrial Development Bank (Transfer of Undertaking and Repeal) Act, 2003.

    11. There are written submissions also handed in on the earlier occasion. In addition thereto, Mr. Suryavanshi appearing for the Petitioner would submit that the Petitioner is restricting the challenge to the above mentioned revision or harmonization in sick leave resulting in its reduction by 180 days. He would invite our attention to the affidavit-in-reply and the stand of the bank particularly enunciated therein that this Circular and on the point or subject of rationalization seeks to only affect those whose interests are being protected allegedly by some Association like the Petitioner. It is pointed out that the rationalization inter alia of sick leave and other leave was approved by the competent authority, namely, Board of the Respondent Bank. Prior to conversion and revision of the terms and conditions of service, 1163 employees were belonging to erstwhile IDBI, to which even Mr. Mane belongs and some of whom would have been affected by the rationalization of sick leave. The representation by 205 officers (Annexure-B to the Writ Petition) espouses the cause of merely 17.6% of 1163 officers for whom the provisions of rationalization of sick leave as contained in the circular would apply. Presently, there are more than 13000 officers and 205 purportedly disgruntled officers forming a minuscule percentage of the total officers strength of the bank has projected this cause but 35 out of 205 officers have retired by April, 2013 and out of these officers, only 11 officers have made a representation to 1 Respondent Bank. That is how, the Petitioner's advocate would submit that this stand is contrary to the record. In that regard, he has taken us through the written submissions and filed in addition to the pleadings of the Petitioner. In that, it is submitted that the stand of the IDBI is incorrect. The Petitioner Association has taken up the cause and in the written submissions it is submitted that the Bank took up this cause with the authorities. The authorities have sympathetically considered the same. Reliance is placed upon the correspondence in this regard and carried out from time to time. It is submitted that on 8 July, 2009 the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Finance, Government of India (Department of Financial Services) addressed a letter to Shri Yogesh Aggarwal, the Chairman of 1 Respondent Bank. It is submitted that during the course of presentation made by the team and the Chairman on 30 June, 2009, on the functioning of IDBI, including harmonization and proposed restructuring of compensation and benefit structure for officers and workmen staff of the Bank, the contents of the circular were reiterated. It was unambiguously pointed out that such restructuring at this juncture, would have wide and grave ramifications, apart from affecting the ongoing negotiations on the IXth Bipartite Settlement between the Indian Banks' Association and United Forum of Bank Unions relating to the pay revision of the employees of the Public Sector Banks. That is how it was advised that the Circular be kept in abeyance. Then, reliance is placed upon a further Communication dated 10 July, 2009 and particularly paragraph 5 thereof, which records the view of the Ministry of Finance, Government of India that confirmation of the minutes of the 50 Board Meeting held on 22nd May, 2009 relating to Item Nos. 33, 34 and 35 may be kept in abeyance, till the matter is resolved. The matter was also taken up with the then Minister of Finance, Government of India and reliance is placed upon further Communication dated 19 August, 2009 copy of which is at page 157 as also at page No. 159 of the paper book, where the then Minister of State of Finance had addressed the letter to the member of Parliament Shri Anant G. Geete that the decisions of the Board of IDBI's Directors relating to harmonized and restructured compensation package and as also harmonization of terms and conditions of service of officers and workmen staff in the bank has been deferred. Thus, this decision was not implemented and that would demonstrate as to how the Government of India and the Reserve Bank was also of the considered view that the above Circular adversely affects the working conditions of the officers of the bank. For this reason, it is submitted that on the oral and written arguments of the Petitioner, the reliefs as prayed be granted.

    12. On a specific query from the Court as to what preexisting legal right is sought to be enforced by the Petitioner and what public duty is performed by the bank, insofar as the subject decision is concerned, reliance is placed on the principles of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation emerging from several judicial precedents and section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act. It is submitted that in the decision in the case of Sethi Auto Service Station v. Delhi Development Authority, reported in 2008 MhLJ Online (S.C) 22 : (2009) 1 SCC 180, the legitimate expectation and doctrine in that regard has been amplified.

    13. On the other hand, Mr. Talsania, learned Senior Counsel appearing for 1 Respondent Bank, consistent with its stand in the affidavit-in-reply would submit that there is no merit in the Writ Petition. There is no vested right in the Association or its members and they cannot insist that they must enjoy a certain leave package. Eventually, service conditions as are now relied upon particularly on the subject of sick leave, would indicate that the sick leave is intact. It has not been abolished or withdrawn. The Circular only revises and harmonizes general leaves, one of which is sick leave. As far as this decision is concerned, the aggrieved person had already filed a Civil Suit in a Civil Court. The Civil Judge, Junior Division dismissed the Suit (Regular Civil Suit No. 296 of 2009) on 5 October, 2009 for want of jurisdiction in the Civil Court. Thereafter, an Appeal No. 180 of 2009 was preferred in the Court of District Judge, Satara. That Appeal was allowed on 14 November, 2009. Against the decision of the District Judge, 1 Respondent Bank filed Civil Revision Application No. 200 of 2010 in this Court and on 5 October, 2011 this Court observed that Civil Suit is maintainable. At the relevant time, the Civil Suit was pending but later on as instructed, Mr. Talsania brings to our notice a judgment delivered on 6 January, 2017 by the District Judge, Satara in Regular Civil Appeal No. 92 of 2015. The said Appeal was dismissed with costs. It is submitted that the trial Court's dismissal of the Suit is thus confirmed.

    14. Apart therefrom, it is submitted that there is nothing in the Writ Petition which would demonstrate that there is any pre-existing legal right and which is sought to be enforced by seeking a writ of mandamus. That is the condition which must be satisfied before any writ of mandamus is issued. Secondly, the Bank has explained as to how, post the Act of 2003, it was necessary to restructure the affairs of the Bank. There was a conversion of the erstwhile IDBI into a Commercial Bank, it became imperative that the terms and conditions of service of the employees of IDBI bank should be in consonance with the organizational objectives and business model. In a dynamic business environment, there had to be changes brought about including harmonization and revision so also structuring of the service conditions. It is in these circumstances that it was advised that the Bank undertakes a broad consultative process and thereafter arrive at an informed and rational decision. It is in these circumstances the bank submits that prior to conversion into a commercial bank and subsequent merger of two other commercial banking entities having varied set of terms and conditions of service as also pay and allowances, the employees of IDBI bank Limited had different terms and conditions than what are prevailing now. The then rules of sick leave provided for availing of sick leave not exceeding 18 months at half pay on production of a medical certificate during the entire period of service of an employee. Accordingly, certain employees were having their sick leave account equivalent to 18 months at half pay. It is in these circumstances that the bank decided to take decision as contained in the Circular. Mr. Talsania would submit that the prevailing leave of 540 days at half pay now post rationalization has been readjusted and revised cap of 360 days. As such the readjustment cap to 360 days was done with the approval of the Board and the Circular was issued as per the practice. There is nothing unilateral and/or arbitrary. The IDBI was earlier governed by the Act of Parliament, namely, the Industrial Development Bank of India Act, 1964. That was repealed on IDBI converting into a banking company in 2004, through Industrial Development Bank (Transfer of Undertaking and Repeal) Act, 2003. In terms of section 5(1) of the IDBI Repeal Act, IDBI does not intend to perpetually protect the terms and conditions of service of employees as the provision is designed to be effective to only six months, essentially to protect those employees who opt not to continue in the service of the new entity namely, IDBI Bank Ltd. The IDBI Repeal Act does not create a static situation and is not intended to perpetually freeze the terms and conditions of contract of employment including the remuneration structure in an ever changing, vibrant and dynamic market environment. Mr. Talsania therefore submits that paragraph 6.5 at page 100 of the affidavit-in-reply cannot be read in isolation but must be read together with the preceding and subsequent paragraphs which would indicate that there is absolutely no discrimination. No terms and conditions including pay leave etc have been altered to the detriment and prejudice of the officers. Sick leave is a conditional right. That is not earned by the officer but it is accumulated for a period of service rendered by the employee with the bank subject to limit specified with the approval of the Board. It is in such circumstances that Mr. Talsania would submit that there is no legal, statutory or contractual right which has been infringed Hence, the Writ Petition be dismissed.

    15. With the assistance of both the advocates, we have perused the bulky record namely, the Petition, its Annexures, the affidavits filed in reply, rejoinder, surrejoinder, sursurrejoinder so also written submissions.

    16. Upon perusal of all these materials, we are of the considered view that there is no merit in the Writ Petition. The Petitioner has not been able to demonstrate any preexisting legal right and which would enable it to seek a writ of mandamus for the enforcement of the same. As is well settled, a writ of mandamus is not issued for the mere asking. It is a writ and one of the prerogative writ which can be issued in this Court's extraordinary, equitable and discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a recent decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India delivered in the case of Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation v. Diamond and Gem Development Corporation Limited, reported in 2013 MhLJ Online (S.C) 33 : (2013) 5 SCC 470 : AIR 2013 SC 1241, the preconditions for issuance of such a writ are set out. The relevant paragraphs of this judgment read thus:—

    “14. It is evident from the above, that generally the Court should not exercise its writ jurisdiction to enforce the contractual obligation. The primary purpose of a writ of mandamus, is to protect and establish rights and to impose a corresponding imperative duty existing in law. It is designed to promote justice (ex debito justiceiae). The grant or refusal of the writ is at the discretion of the Court. The writ cannot be granted unless it is established that there is an existing legal right of the applicant, or an existing duty of the respondent. Thus, the writ does not He to create or to establish a legal right, but to enforce one that is already established. While dealing with a writ petition, the Court must exercise discretion, taking into consideration a wide variety of circumstances, inter-alia, the facts of the case, the exigency that warrants such exercise of discretion, the consequences of grant or refusal of the writ, and the nature and extent of injury that is likely to ensue by such grant or refusal.

    15. Hence, discretion must be exercised by the Court on grounds of public policy, public interest and public good. The writ is equitable in nature and thus, its issuance is governed by equitable principles. Refusal of relief must be for reasons which would lead to injustice. The prime consideration for the issuance of the said writ is, whether or not substantial justice will be promoted. Furthermore, while granting such a writ, the Court must make every effort to ensure from the averments of the writ petition, whether there exist proper pleadings. In order to maintain the writ of mandamus, the first and foremost requirement is that the petition must not be frivolous, and must be filed in good faith. Additionally, the applicant must make a demand which is clear, plain and unambiguous. It must be made to an officer having the requisite authority to perform the act demanded. Furthermore, the authority against whom mandamus is issued, should have rejected the demand earlier. Therefore, a demand and its subsequent refusal, either by words, or by conduct, are necessary to satisfy the Court that the opposite party is determined to ignore the demand of the applicant with respect to the enforcement of his legal right. However, a demand may not be necessary when the same is manifest from the facts of the case, that is, when it is an empty formality, or when it is obvious that the opposite party would not consider the demand.”

    17. These are not tests evolved for the first time. The conditions and the tests were always there and have been merely reiterated in this decision. We have seen that the Circular dated 31 July, 2009, copy of which is Exhibit-A to the Writ Petition is issued by the bank after a meeting was held on 23 May, 2009. It is a Circular issued and internally to the Heads of Verticals, Departments/Regional and Branch Heads, Director of the JN IDBI Staff College of the IDBI Bank Limited. The Circular states that the Board of Directors at its meeting held on 23 May, 2009 has approved certain changes to the leave rules as applicable to the officers of e-IDBI in terms of the relevant provisions of Officers Service Rules, 2006. The modified service rules shall be uniformly applicable to all officers of IDBI bank including the officers of e-IBL and e-UWB, effective from August 1, 2009. The types of leave enumerated in paragraph 2 of this Circular were revised and harmonized. The Circular is not challenged, the authority and power of the Board to meet and take a decision is not challenged, that the bank's power to issue such Circulars and therefore they can be issued and amended or substituted from time to time also is not challenged. Pertinently, this is not a entire union or association of officers before us. It is All India Industrial Development Bank of India Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribes and Nav-Buddhist as also Other Backward Class Officer's Welfare Association through its Vice President Mr. Mane which is before us. There is therefore enough material on record for us to conclude that it is only one of the group of officials and organizing themselves as above which is seeking to challenge this Circular. Though paragraph 2 of this Circular is read and insofar as it concerns leave, what we must read also is that the revised and harmonized categories of leave were applicable to all officers of bank and effective from August 1, 2009. From 10 August, 2009, the officers can apply for modified leave, through the Absence Management System. Consequent to the approval of the revised and harmonized type of leave by the board of the bank, the extent and types of leave and leave rules applicable to above officers earlier stood abolished. The details of the revised rules are at Appendix-I to this Circular. The process to be followed by the officers/supervisors and LRKs for the types of leave indicated in paragraph 2, is furnished at Appendix-II to this Circular. The issues relating to migration of leaves as per the revised rules and course of action to be followed, is furnished at Appendix-III. The entire procedure is set out and what is evident from the Appendix and particularly in relation to sick leave is that an officer shall be eligible for 30 days of half pay sick leave for each completed year of service, subject to a maximum of 360 days during the entire service period. The officers will be eligible for sick leave on half pay only after completion of one year of service. Availment of sick leave is for a minimum of four days. If sufficient casual leave balance is not available, less than four days of sick leave can be availed. On completion of three years of service, an officer will be eligible for sick leave on full pay. Sick leave on full pay means an officer would get salary on full pay on double debit of the number of days of sick leave availed. The sick leave can be availed of only on production of medical certificate, acceptable to the bank. The bank reserves its right to require, an officer desiring to resume duty on expiry of sick leave, to produce medical fitness certificate indicating that the officer is fit to resume duty. Sick leave can be combined with ordinary leave. The officer is not allowed to apply for sick leave while serving a notice period.

    18. Thus, a one sided projection and without reading the circular in its entirety particularly as above would definitely give an impression that the bank has in the garb of revision and harmonization of various leaves unilaterally reduced the leave period. However, nothing has been done beyond harmonizing and revising it but in the above manner. Therefore, if this Circular and the Appendices are all read together, it would mean that there is a power vesting in the Board to organize and manage so also administer the affairs of the bank and additionally to revise and harmonize the leaves. It is pertinent to note that several types of leaves availed of, have been harmonized and revised. The Petitioner only picks up for challenging the decision to revise and harmonize the sick leave. Even the decision in relation thereto has not been demonstrated to be affecting the interests of the employees/officers adversely. In the representation dated 11 September, 2009 requesting withdrawal of the Circular, it is vaguely stated that the two Circulars adversely affect the established service conditions of the officers of e-IDBI by way of reduction, withdrawal and cancellation of existing facilities relating to various types of leave including violation of statues etc which are detrimental to the officer's interest. Further, this has resulted into causing pecuniary loss, mental torture, harassment, indiscrimination and injustice to all. This is a vague assertion. If the pleadings in the Writ Petition are properly perused, this is not a grievance of all the officers. It is only a group of officials and organized on the above lines and members of the Petitioner who are aggrieved by this decision. Even when they make a representation they are unable to spell out a particular legal right vesting in them which has been adversely affected. In such circumstances, we do not think that the Petitioner's counsel can successfully urge that the bank's decision is arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the mandate of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. In matters of public employment, the right guaranteed by Article 16(1) is of a fair, just and equitable treatment. We have perused the subsequent letter of 5 September, 2009, as well. The All India IDBI Officers' Association, through its General Secretary complained to the bank that the various Circulars on the subject of terms and conditions of service and issued by the bank, are not acceptable to the officers and they requested to withdraw the same. The Officers' association was aware, as of 5 September, 2009, that the Board Meeting was convened on 23 May, 2009 but its Minutes have not been confirmed by the Board at subsequent meeting held on 15 July, 2009 and 28 August, 2009. IDBI Officer's Association and which is claiming to be an All India Association prayed for withdrawal of the Circulars in their entirety. However, they have not pursued their grievances as allegedly projected in this letter. Further, on 3 October, 2009, the President of the Petitioner association was informed by the bank that the modified rules have already been implemented. Therefore, the bank cannot accede to the request of the Petitioner to withdraw the Circular.

    19. Then, there was an Appeal which was stated to have been preferred under section 19(1) of the Right to Information Act, 2005. We need not pursue this part for we have substantial material on record to indicate that the necessary and requisite particulars and information as a whole, was provided by the bank.

    20. A small contention was raised in regard to the interpretation of subsection (1) of section 5 of the Industrial Development Bank (Transfer of Undertaking and Repeal) Act, 2003. This is an Act to provide for transfer and vesting of the undertaking of the Industrial Development Bank of India and in the company to be formed and registered as a company under the Companies Act, 1956 to carry on banking business and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto and also to repeal the Industrial Development Bank of India Act, 1964. Therefore, this is a transfer of undertaking and Repeal Act. By Chapter II transfer and vesting of the undertaking of development bank meaning Industrial Development Bank of India established under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the IDBI Act, 1964 is provided. The Central Government may by a Notification appoint a date on which there will be a transfer to and vesting in the company of the whole of the undertaking of development bank. That is provided by section-3. The general effect of transfer and vesting of undertaking as set out in sections 4 and 5 would mean that the general effect of transfer and vesting of the undertaking, is provided by section-4, whereas in respect of officers and other employees of the development bank, section-5 is enacted. Sub-section (1) of section-5 says every officer or other employee of the development bank except a Director of the Board or the Chairman and Managing Director or any whole time Director serving in the employment immediately before the appointed day shall, insofar as such officer or other employee is employed in connection with the undertaking which has vested in the company by virtue of the subject Act, become on and from the appointed day, an officer or, as the case may be, the other employee of the company and he shall hold his office or service therein by same tenure, at the same remuneration, upon the same terms and conditions, with the same obligations and with the same rights and privileges as to leave etc and other benefits as he would have held under the development bank if its undertaking had not vested in the company and shall continue to do so until expiry of a period of six months from the appointed day, if such officer or other employee opts not to continue to be the officer or other employee of the company within such period. Therefore, such of those officers or other employee of the development bank opting not to continue to be the officer or other employee of the company would derive their benefits for six months from the appointed date and equally there is no guarantee that these service conditions can never be altered or revised. The sub-sections of section 5 would indicate as to how it would be open for the company to manage the affairs of the bank as it deems fit or proper so as to achieve the object and purpose of setting up the same.

    21. We do not see any reason for the Petitioner to rely upon language of Sub-section (1) of section-5. It does not mean and by any stretch of imagination that the terms and conditions of service as prevailing prior to this vesting and transfer of IDBI in a company remain and continue in the same form, despite the vesting in a company. The undertaking vests in different legal entity and if that different entity decides to operate on business principles so as to face other competitors in the market, then, it was open for it to take such decisions as it deems fit and proper. We do not think, therefore, that there is any prejudice caused or any right which is pre-established is violated. Therefore there is no question of any alteration in the terms and conditions, to the detriment of the officers of the bank.

    22. We do not see how in the above circumstances the principles of either legitimate expectation or promissory estoppel can be invoked. The tests for applicability of the same are salutary. They have been set out in several decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. Even if we refer to the decision relied upon and copy of which is annexed to the written submissions, what we find is, in that decision itself, Pratima Chowdhury v. Kalpana Mukherjee, reported in 2014 MhLJ Online (S.C) 53 : (2014) 4 SCC 196, the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarifies that rule of estoppel is a doctrine based on fairness. It postulates the exclusion of the truth of the matter. All for the sake of fairness. For section 115 to apply firstly one party should make a factual representation to the other and secondly the other should accept and rely upon the factual representation. Thirdly, having relied on the same, the second or other party should alter its position. The instant altering of position should be such that it would be inequitable to require him to revert back to the original position. Thus, for the principles to apply, certain preconditions and prerequisites have to be satisfied. We do not think that they are satisfied in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

    23. The concept of legitimate expectation has no role to play where the State's action is, as a public policy or in public interest unless the action taken amounts to an abuse of power. The Court cannot by invoking this doctrine usurp the discretion of the public authority which is empowered to take decisions under law and the Court is expected to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority a full range of choice which the legislature has presumed as intended. In the case of Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation, reported in (1993) 3 SCC 499, the legal principles have been set out and which are reiterated in Sethi Auto Service Station v. Delhi Development Authority, reported in (2009) 1 SCC 180. We are therefore of the view that the Petitioner cannot rely upon above principles. Equally, they cannot rely upon any correspondence and which is exchanged by some officer or association or its office bearers or some member of the Parliament with the Ministry of Finance. Whatever it might have to say earlier, the Ministry of Finance is before us. It has now supported the stand of 1 Respondent and has not placed any material contrary to it. In such circumstances, all the more we do not think that in writ jurisdiction, we can grant any relief to the Petitioner.

    24. As a result of the above discussion, the Writ Petition fails and is dismissed but without any order as to costs.

    Petition dismissed.
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