AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974)
  • Section 3 of the 1982 Act
  • Sections 341, 294(b), 323, 384 and 506 Part II IPC
  • Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Cyber Law Offenders, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Sand Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Slum-Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982)
  • Section 3(1) read with Section 3(2) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Cyber Law Offenders, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Sand Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Slum-Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982
  • Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Public Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act, 1992
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974)
  • Section 3 of the 1982 Act
  • Sections 341, 294(b), 323, 384 and 506 Part II IPC
  • Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Cyber Law Offenders, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Sand Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Slum-Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982)
  • Section 3(1) read with Section 3(2) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Cyber Law Offenders, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Sand Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Slum-Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982
  • Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Public Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act, 1992
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Commissioner of Police, Greater Chennai, passed Detention Order No. 1227.BCDFGISSSV/2015 dated 4-12-2015 against Murugan (26 years) under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(2) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, 1982 (“1982 Act”). Murugan’s mother filed HCP No. 117 of 2016 before the Madras High Court challenging the order on the ground that certain documents supplied to the detenu were illegible and that the Judge’s name was wrongly recorded in the remand orders. The High Court rejected the petition. The mother then approached the Supreme Court by special leave, advancing additional grounds against the validity of the detention order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the detention order was void for not specifying the exact period of detention.
  2. Whether failure to promptly inform the detenu’s next friend/family member vitiated the detention.
  3. Whether reliance on an unsigned confessional statement tainted the detaining authority’s subjective satisfaction.
  4. Whether supply of an illegible copy of the FIR in Crime No. 598 of 2015 denied the detenu an effective opportunity to make a representation.
  5. Whether non-supply of Government Order (G.O.(D) No. 189 dated 18-10-2015) delegating detention powers to the Commissioner invalidated the order.
  6. Whether detention can be sustained when principally based on a solitary “ground case”.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The detention order does not state a definite period and is therefore vitiated.
  • No evidence exists of timely intimation to the detenu’s family, violating the safeguards laid down in D.K. Basu.
  • The detaining authority wrongly relied on an unsigned confessional statement, impermissibly influencing subjective satisfaction.
  • The FIR in Crime No. 598/2015 supplied to the detenu is illegible, defeating his constitutional right to make an effective representation.
  • Failure to furnish the Government Order dated 18-10-2015, referred to in the detention order, is fatal.
  • The detention is based on only one case; the Act targets habitual offenders.

State’s (Respondents’) Arguments

  • The grounds of detention explicitly state that the order will initially operate for 12 days and, upon confirmation, up to 12 months, satisfying statutory requirements.
  • Intimation of detention was sent to the detenu’s brother by registered post on 6-12-2015 and over telephone; postal receipts are on record, amounting to substantial compliance.
  • The unsigned confession is not the sole basis; the detaining authority relied on multiple serious offences and the detenu’s conduct.
  • The impugned FIR is only a “referred to” document, not a document relied upon for subjective satisfaction; illegibility therefore causes no prejudice.
  • G.O.(D) No. 189 merely delegates power to the Commissioner; it is not a relied-upon document and need not be supplied.
  • The grounds of detention include several past cases and the detenu’s attempt to escape custody, negating the “single case” argument.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
D.K. Basu v. State of W.B., (1997) 1 SCC 416 Duty of police to notify family of arrest within 8–12 hours. Court held the precedent chiefly concerns criminal investigation arrests; registered post plus telephone intimation constitutes substantial compliance in preventive-detention context.
Shanmugam v. State of T.N., 2013 SCC OnLine Mad 2598 Preference for e-post over telephone to prove family intimation. Distinguished; present case involved registered post and telephone, which the Court accepted as adequate.
Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh v. B.K. Jha, (1987) 2 SCC 22 Procedural safeguards in preventive detention must be strictly complied with. Court agreed with the principle but found no violation because the disputed FIR was only “referred to”.
State of T.N. v. Abdullah Kadher Batcha, (2009) 1 SCC 333 Non-supply of relied-upon documents is fatal; “referred to” documents stand on a different footing. Applied to hold that the illegible FIR did not prejudice the detenu as it was merely referred to.
Senthamilselvi v. State of T.N., (2006) 5 SCC 676 (citing Powanammal v. State of T.N., (1999) 2 SCC 413) Distinction between relied-upon and merely referred documents. Re-affirmed; failure to furnish a merely referred document does not vitiate detention absent proven prejudice.
R. Kalavathi v. State of T.N., (2006) 6 SCC 14 Preventive detention aims at habitual offenders; solitary incident may be insufficient. Court rejected petitioner’s reliance, noting multiple pending cases and the detenu’s conduct provided sufficient material.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Period of detention: The grounds expressly state an initial period of 12 days, and subsequent government confirmation orders extend detention up to 12 months, satisfying the 1982 Act.

Family intimation: Registered-post notice dated 6-12-2015 sent to the brother, corroborated by postal receipts, and telephone intimation together amount to substantial compliance. D.K. Basu applies primarily to investigative arrests; even so, its object is met.

Unsigned confession: An unsigned confession may be inadmissible in trial but is only one of several materials considered. The subjective satisfaction also relied on the ground FIR (Crime No. 2348/2015), other pending cases, and the detenu’s attempted escape. Courts are slow to interfere with such satisfaction.

Illegible FIR (Crime No. 598/2015): The FIR is not the ground case but only a referenced document; its partial illegibility, absent any contemporaneous grievance or prejudice, does not invalidate detention.

Non-supply of G.O.(D) No. 189: The G.O. merely delegates statutory power to the Commissioner; it played no role in forming subjective satisfaction and therefore need not be supplied under Article 22(5).

“Single case” argument: Although Crime No. 2348/2015 is the principal ground case, the detaining authority considered other serious offences and conduct, satisfying the requirement that detention address continuing danger to public order.

Holding and Implications

Petition Dismissed. The Supreme Court upheld the detention order and declined to interfere with the Madras High Court’s decision.

Immediate effect: Murugan’s preventive detention continues for the statutorily permitted period. Broader implications: The Court re-affirmed that (a) supply of documents is mandatory only for materials actually relied upon, not those merely referred to; (b) reasonable modes of family intimation, such as registered post, satisfy procedural safeguards in preventive detention.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    E. Subbulakshmi v. State Of Tamil Nadu Through Secretary To Government And Others

    A.M Khanwilkar, J.— The detenu's mother filed a writ petition in the High Court of Judicature at Madras bearing HCP No. 117 of 2016 challenging Detention Order No. 1227.BCDFGISSSV/2015 dated 4-12-2015. The principal contention pursued before the High Court was that the typed set of booklet furnished along with the impugned detention order to the detenu was illegible, in particular, the copy of the FIR in respect of Crime No. 598 of 2015 dated 18-3-2015. The High Court negatived 2016 SCC OnLine Mad 10091 the said contention on the finding that the detenu did not make any representation to the appropriate authority nor brought the said fact to the notice of the authority concerned. Further, no such plea was taken in the writ petition. Another contention raised before the High Court that the name of the Judge has not been correctly mentioned in the remand orders supplied to the detenu, has also been rejected by the High Court on the finding that the same can be no ground to quash the detention order. No other contention was pursued before the High Court.

    2. In the present special leave petition the petitioner has raised different grounds to challenge the impugned detention order. In the special leave petition and the application for urging additional grounds, the following points have been urged, which were reiterated during the course of arguments:

    (i) The detention order does not mention the specific period for which the same would operate and, therefore, it is vitiated.
    (ii) There is no record to indicate that the next friend/family member of the detenu was informed about the factum of detention at the earliest opportunity.
    (iii) The satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority is inter alia on the basis of a confessional statement which, however, does not bear the signature of the detenu and, therefore, could not have been relied upon. This has impacted the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority.
    (iv) Copy of the FIR furnished to the detenu (at pp. 79-80 of the SLP paper book) is illegible and as a result of which the detenu was denied of an opportunity to make effective representation.
    (v) The impugned detention order refers to the Government Order dated 18-10-2015 but copy of that document has not been furnished to the detenu, which is fatal to the continued detention of the detenu.

    3. Taking the first point urged before us, the same deserves to be stated to be rejected. Inasmuch as the detention order has been issued by the Commissioner of Police in exercise of powers under Section 3(1) read with Section 3(2) of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Cyber Law Offenders, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Sand Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Slum-Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (for short “the 1982 Act”). The grounds of detention served on the detenu expressly mention that the detention order shall remain in force for 12 days in the first instance. The proposal for confirmation of detention order was considered by the appropriate authority (Deputy Secretary to the Government vide order dated 15-12-2015 read with the order passed by the Deputy Secretary to the Government vide order dated 29-2-2016). That makes it amply clear that the detention period would continue up to 12 months. The initial detention order, upon confirmation thereof, would remain in force for a period of 12 months. Thus understood, the ground urged by the petitioner to challenge the detention of her son Murugan s/o Esakkimuthu Thevar is devoid of merit.

    4. Reverting to the second point, even the same deserves to be rejected, inasmuch as the respondents have filed reply-affidavit and asserted that after the detention order was executed and the detenu was taken into custody, intimation in that behalf was sent to his brother Venkatesh by registered post on 6-12-2015. The postal receipt in that behalf is also placed on record. The fact so asserted has not been countered by the petitioner. The intimation sent to the detenu's brother and the memo in that behalf is marked as Annexure R-2. Thus, it is not a case of no intimation given to the next friend/family member of the detenu at the earliest opportunity.

    5. The petitioner placed reliance on the decision of this Court in D.K Basu v. State of W.B (1997) 1 SCC 416, in particular para 35 enunciating the procedure to be adopted in all cases of arrest or detention. In clause (4) of the said paragraph it is predicated that the time, place of arrest and venue of custody of an arrestee must be notified by the police where the next friend or relative of the arrestee lives outside the district or town through the Legal Aid Organisation in the district and the police station of the area concerned telegraphically within a period of 8 to 12 hours after the arrest. We find force in the submission of the learned counsel for the respondent that the procedure about arrest of a person and sending intimation dealt with by the Supreme Court is essentially in respect of arrest of a criminal and to interrogate him during the investigation. In any case, in the absence of telegraphic service available, as of now, intimation sent to the family member of the detenu by registered post in addition to the telephonic intimation must be considered as substantial compliance of the requirement.

    6. The counsel for the petitioner, however, has placed reliance on the decision of the High Court of Madras in Shanmugam v. State of T.N (2013) 4 MLJ (Cri) 1, 2013 SCC OnLine Mad 2598 In that case the stand taken by the authority was that intimation was given to the next friend of the detenu over cellphone/landline phone. The Court opined that it is difficult to ascertain the correctness of that position and intimation by landline telephone/cellphone must be eschewed. The Court observed that even if no telegraphic service was available, in such a situation it would be appropriate to send intimation by e-post as introduced by the Department of Posts, Government of India with effect from 30-1-2004. That suggestion has been given in para 25 of the judgment. The fact remains that in the present case intimation was given to the family member of the detenu by registered post as well as on telephone. As observed earlier, substantial compliance of giving information to the family member of the detenu has been done. Hence, the argument under consideration need not be examined any further.

    7. The third ground urged by the petitioner is about the reliance placed on alleged confessional statement given by the detenu during the investigation of the ground case. The fact that no signature of the detenu has been noted on the said confessional statement, it would at best be a ground to discard that document in a criminal trial being inadmissible in evidence. That by itself is not sufficient to question the subjective satisfaction reached by the detaining authority. What is also required to be considered is: whether the said voluntary confessional statement was the sole basis to arrive at the subjective satisfaction. On a fair reading of the grounds of detention, we must hold that the said confessional statement is not the solitary document or circumstance considered by the detaining authority. The grounds of detention have referred to the FIR in Crime No. 2348 of 2015 under Sections 341, 294(b), 323, 384 and 506 Part II IPC read with Section 4 of the Tamil Nadu Public Property (Prevention of Damage and Loss) Act, 1992; and the background in which the said case was registered including the seriousness of the offence. Reliance has been placed on the fact that during the investigation of the case, the Assistant Commissioner of Police was informed that the detenu who was absconding in the ground case, was apprehended in connection with another crime. After taking orders of the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Thiru N. Elangovan, Inspector of Police, Law and Order, J4 Kotturpuram Police Station arrested the detenu on 2-11-2015 at 2130 hrs. After his arrest he was brought to Chennai. On 30-11-2015 at 1330 hrs. while police party along with the accused were returning to Chennai, opposite to Central Polytechnic the detenu informed that he wanted to attend to nature's call. When he was permitted to go, he pushed the police and jumped a locked gate and tried to escape from the police custody. In his attempt to flee, he fell down on his knee and sustained injuries. The police party after chasing him once again arrested him. They took him to a nearby Government Royapettah Hospital for treatment as outpatient. The detenu was later on handed over to the Inspector of Police, J4 Kottupuram Police Station, who in turn recorded the alleged voluntary confessional statement. The grounds of detention also advert to the fact that the detenu was arrested in connection with other serious offences under Sections 294(b), 341, 323, 336, 397 and 506 Part II IPC but was released on bail. The detaining authority has recorded his subjective satisfaction that the detenu is likely to be released on bail even in connection with the ground case where he was on remand till 17-12-2015; and if released on bail, he may indulge in similar prejudicial activities affecting the maintenance of public order. Suffice it to observe that the alleged confessional statement is not the sole basis for forming subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. The detaining authority has considered all aspects of the matter and taking totality of circumstances into account, deemed it necessary to detain the detenu in exercise of powers under Section 3 of the 1982 Act. Further, the fact that the alleged confessional statement does not bear the signature of the detenu will be of no avail, for doubting the subjective satisfaction recorded by the detaining authority. It is well settled that the Court must be loath to question the subjective satisfaction reached by the detaining authority. Hence, even this contention also does not commend to us.

    8. The next argument pursued by the petitioner is that the copy of the FIR in Crime No. 598 of 2015 dated 18-3-2015, furnished to the detenu is illegible. Indeed, the said document is a photocopy of the original. The first page of the document, however, gives the necessary description of the offence. The facts which constituted that offence are noted on the second page. The second page of the document is somewhat illegible, being photostat copy. Significantly, Crime No. 598 of 2015 is not the ground case. The ground case is Crime No. 2348 of 2015. In that sense, the said FIR at best is a referred to document and not relied upon document. If so, it is not possible to hold that the continued detention of the detenu is vitiated.

    9. The counsel for the petitioner, however, placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Abdul Latif Abdul Wahab Sheikh v. B.K Jha (1987) 2 SCC 22, in particular, on the dictum in para 5 thereof. In that case, the Court was dealing with the efficacy of procedural requirement and compliances thereof. The Court noted that the procedural requirements are the only safeguards available to a detenu since the Court is not expected to go behind the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. It went on to observe that the procedural requirements are, therefore, to be strictly complied with if any value is to be attached to the liberty of the subject and the constitutional rights guaranteed to him in that regard. There can be no quarrel with this proposition. The question is, whether the FIR in Crime No. 598 of 2015 furnished to the detenu is a relied upon document or only a referred to document by the detaining authority for arriving at his subjective satisfaction. If it is a relied upon document, the issue must be answered in favour of the petitioner. As aforesaid, we find that the subject FIR is only a referred to document in the grounds of detention.

    10. Reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner on State of T.N v. Abdullah Kadher Batcha (2009) 1 SCC 333. In para 7, the Court observed thus:

    “7. The court has a duty to see whether the non-supply of any document is in any way prejudicial to the case of the detenu. The High Court has not examined as to how the non-supply of the documents called for had any effect on the detenu and/or whether the non-supply was prejudicial to the detenu. Merely because copies of some documents have (sic not) been supplied they cannot by any stretch of imagination be called as relied upon documents. While examining whether non-supply of a document would prejudice a detenu, the court has to examine whether the detenu would be deprived of making an effective representation in the absence of a document. Primarily, the copies which form the ground for detention are to be supplied and non-supply thereof would prejudice the detenu. But documents which are merely referred to for the purpose of narration of facts in that sense cannot be termed to be documents without the supply of which the detenu is prejudiced.”

    11. Reliance was also placed on the decision in Senthamilselvi v. State of T.N (2006) 5 SCC 676 In para 7 of this decision, the Court observed thus:

    “7. There is also no substance in the plea that the confessional statement of the co-accused was relied upon, but the copy thereof was not supplied. The grounds of detention merely refer to the confession by the co-accused. That does not form foundation for the detention. On the other hand it appears that the detenu himself made a confession and that was the main factor on which the order of detention was founded. There is distinction between a relied upon document and a document which has been referred to without being relied upon. The distinction has been noticed by this Court in Powanammal v. State of T.N (1999) 2 SCC 413, SCC at p. 417, para 9. It was observed as follows:
    ‘9. However, this Court has maintained a distinction between a document which has been relied upon by the detaining authority in the grounds of detention and a document which finds a mere reference in the grounds of detention. Whereas the non-supply of a copy of the document relied upon in the grounds of detention has been held to be fatal to continued detention, the detenu need not show that any prejudice is caused to him. This is because the non-supply of such a document would amount to denial of the right of being communicated the grounds and of being afforded the opportunity of making an effective representation against the order. But it would not be so where the document merely finds a reference in the order of detention or among the grounds thereof. In such a case, the detenu's complaint of non-supply of document has to be supported by prejudice caused to him in making an effective representation. What applies to a document would equally apply to furnishing a translated copy of the document in the language known to and understood by the detenu, should the document be in a different language.’”

    12. We fail to understand as to how these decisions will be of any avail to the petitioner in the backdrop of the findings recorded above that the copy of FIR furnished to the detenu in respect of Crime No. 598 of 2015 is only a referred to document. In the present case, no grievance about the illegible copy was ever made by the detenu to any authority. Strikingly, the detenu has not made any representation to any authority much less to assert that the said document is a relied upon document and furnishing of illegible copy was fatal. As a result, this argument also deserves to be stated to be rejected.

    13. That takes us to the last ground urged before us about the non-supply of Government Order dated 18-10-2015. This contention has been raised by way of application for urging additional grounds. During the course of arguments, the counsel for the State produced a copy of the Government Order dated 18-10-2015, the same reads thus:

    “Abstract Preventive Detention — Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Cyber Law Offenders, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Sand Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Slum-Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982) — Empowering Commissioner of Police, Chennai under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Act — Orders — Issued. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Home, Prohibition and Excise (xvi) Department G.O (D) No. 189 Dated: 18-10-2015. Read: 1. G.O (D) No. 137, Home, Prohibition and Excise (XVI) Department, dated 18-7-2015. Read also: 2. From the Commissioner of Police, Chennai Letter No. 235.S.B.XIII/IS/2015, dated: 9-9-2015. ---------------------- Order whereas, the Commissioner of Police, Chennai has reported that the dangerous activities of certain anti-social elements such as bootleggers, cyber law offenders, drug offenders, forest offenders, goondas, immoral traffic offenders, sand offenders, sexual offenders, slum-grabbers and video pirates, besides endangering life and health of the public are creating alarm and a feeling of insecurity among the general public, and this adversely affects the maintenance of public order; and whereas, the Commissioner of Police, Chennai has requested that in view of the aforesaid circumstances now prevailing and likely to prevail in the immediate future in the local limits of Chennai, he may be allowed to exercise the powers conferred by sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Cyber Law Offenders, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Sand Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Slum-Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982) by invoking sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the said Act. and whereas, the Government are also satisfied that having regard to the circumstances now prevailing and the circumstances likely to prevail in the immediate future in the local limits of Chennai it is necessary that the power to make orders detaining persons under sub-section (1)
    of Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Cyber Law Offenders, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Sand Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Slum-Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982) shall be exercised by the Commissioner of Police, Chennai for a future period of 3 months; now, therefore, in exercise of powers conferred by sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Cyber Law Offenders, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Sand Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Slum-Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982), the Governor of Tamil Nadu hereby directs that the power to make orders detaining the bootleggers, cyber law offenders, drug offenders, forest offenders, goondas, immoral traffic offenders, sand offenders, sexual offenders, slum grabbers and video pirates under sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the said Act shall be exercised by the Commissioner of Police, Chennai in the Chennai City Metropolitan Area as specified in the notification issued under Section 8 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974) for a future period of 3 months with effect from the date of issue of this order. (By Order of the Governor) Apurva Varma Principal Secretary to Government To, The Commissioner of Police, Chennai City, Chennai-600 007. The Director General of Police, Tamil Nadu, Chennai-600 004. The Additional Director General of Police (Law & Order), Chennai-600 004. The Commissioner of Prohibition & Excise, Chepauk, Chennai-600 005. The Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, Chennai-600 015. The Additional Director General of Police/Inspector General of Prisons, Chennai-600 008. The Public (Law & Order) Department, Chennai-600 009. The Deputy Secretary/Under-Secretary, Law Department, Chennai-600 009. The Home, Prohibition & Excise (IX), (X), (XI), (XII), (XIII), (XIV) and (XV) Department, Chennai-600 009. S.F/S.C //forwarded/by order// 18-10-2015 sd/- Section Officer”

    14. To examine the correctness of the arguments, we deem it apposite to reproduce the detention order, in which reference is made to the above document. The same reads thus:

    “No. 1227.BCDFGISSSV/2015 Dated: 4-12-2015 Detention Order Whereas, I, T.K Rajendran, IPS, Commissioner of Police, Greater Chennai Police, am satisfied that with respect to the person known as Thiru Murugan, male, aged 26, s/o Easkki Muthu, No. 10/23, Subash Street, Thandiarkulam Village & Post, Tirunelveli District is a Goonda as contemplated under Section 2(f) of Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 and that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it is necessary to make the following order. Now, therefore, in exercise of the power conferred on me by sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Cyber Law Offenders, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Sand Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Slum-Grabbers and Video Pirates Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982) read with orders issued by the Government in G.O (D) No. 189, Home, Prohibition and Excise (XVI) Department dated 18-10-2015 and under sub-section (2) of Section 3 of the said Act, I hereby direct that the said Goonda Thiru Murugan, s/o Esakki Muthu be detained and kept in custody at the Central Prison, Puzhal, Chennai. sd/- Commissioner of Police Greater Chennai Police, Chennai-7 Given under my hand and seal of this office, on this 4th day of December, 2015.”

    15. From the plain language of the impugned detention order, it is seen that the stated Government Order dated 18-10-2015 is an order issued by the State Government authorising or delegating power to the Commissioner of Police, Chennai, to issue order under Section 3(2) of the 1982 Act. The question is, whether it was mandatory for the detaining authority to supply copy of this government order to the detenu. The order having been issued in exercise of powers conferred under Section 3(1) of the 1982 Act and being a statutory order has nothing to do with the grounds of detention. What is imperative is to supply all the documents which are relied upon by the detaining authority for forming subjective satisfaction for the purposes of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. The government order, however, is regarding the delegation of power to the Commissioner of Police to issue detention order. The validity of that order has not been challenged by the petitioner. In other words, the power of the Commissioner of Police, Greater Chennai Police, Chennai to pass a detention order, is not put in issue. The said government order is not relevant for forming subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority. The grounds of detention are about the prejudicial activities in which the detenu had indulged in the past; or in the view of the detaining authority the detenu has the propensity to indulge in similar prejudicial activities even in future. That is the quintessence for exercising power to detain any person. Suffice it to observe that the subject document, not being a relied upon document in the grounds of detention or for forming subjective satisfaction by the detaining authority, failure to furnish copy thereof to the detenu does not vitiate the action taken by the detaining authority nor the continued detention of the detenu. In our opinion, even this submission is devoid of merits.

    16. The counsel for the petitioner, relying on the decision in R. Kalavathi v. State of T.N (2006) 6 SCC 14, lastly contended that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority is founded only on solitary ground case being Crime No. 2348 of 2015. According to him, an action under the 1982 Act can be initiated or resorted to only against habitual offenders and not where it is a case of solitary crime. The argument, though attractive at the first blush, deserves to be stated to be rejected. The ground of detention must be read as a whole. No doubt, it principally relies on the ground case being Crime No. 2348 of 2015 but also adverts to other serious offences registered against the detenu and pending trial, such as Crime No. 598 of 2015 registered at D.6 Anna Square Police Station; Crime No. 3 of 2015 registered at Aavudaiyar Koil Police Station and including the conduct of the detenu when he tried to escape from police custody. The totality of the circumstances having been taken into account by the detaining authority, there is no reason to doubt the subjective satisfaction arrived at for issuance of the impugned detention order, in the fact situation of the present case. Notably, this ground has been urged in the rejoinder submissions. Accordingly, even this contention does not deserve any further consideration.

    17. For the above reasons, this petition must fail and is dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    E. Subbulakshmi v. State Of Tamil Nadu Through Secretary To Government And Others
    (Nov 17, 2016)