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  • SECTION 2 NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES AMENDMENT ACT 2014
  • Sections 8(c), 21(c), 27A and Section 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act),
  • P.C Act under Section 46A of the Banking Regulation Act after deletion of Sections 161 to 165A of IPC
  • NDPS Act, the existing Section 2(viiia) was relettered as Section 2(viiib) and before Section 2(viiib)
  • clause 2(viiib) of the 2014 Amendment Act, consequential amendment in Section 27A of the NDPS Act
  • rule 3 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981,
  • provisions of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, Penal Statutes.36.
  • Section 27A with retrospective effect, since Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India
  • clause (viiia) as clause (viiib) of Section 2 of the NDPS Act, the entire Section 27A
  • provisions in Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
  • provisions contained in Section 2(xxiiia) and Section 2(viia) of the NDPS Act,
  • PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1988
  • provisions contained in Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India.35.
  • sub clauses (i) to (v) of clause (viiib) of Section 2 of the NDPS Act,
  • NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES AMENDMENT ACT 2014
  • Sections 7 to 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
  • section of the Malicious Injuries to Property Act, 1861,
  • Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.
  • provisions of NDPS Act and 2014 Amendment to NDPS Act,
  • Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
  • Prevention of Corruption Act, Dowry Prohibition Act
  • provisions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act
  • Sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
  • Sections 7 to 12 of the Prevention of Corruption
  • provisions contained in Section 37 of NDPS Act,
  • BANKING REGULATION ACT
  • bail.46. Section 37(1)(b) of the NDPS Act,
  • SECTION 2 DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT
  • SECTION 278 B INCOME TAX ACT
  • DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT
  • Section 437(1) of Cr.P.C
  • section 18(1)(g)
  • Rule 3(1)(a)(ii),
  • Section 276-B;
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 2 NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES AMENDMENT ACT 2014
  • Sections 8(c), 21(c), 27A and Section 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act),
  • P.C Act under Section 46A of the Banking Regulation Act after deletion of Sections 161 to 165A of IPC
  • NDPS Act, the existing Section 2(viiia) was relettered as Section 2(viiib) and before Section 2(viiib)
  • clause 2(viiib) of the 2014 Amendment Act, consequential amendment in Section 27A of the NDPS Act
  • rule 3 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981,
  • provisions of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, Penal Statutes.36.
  • Section 27A with retrospective effect, since Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India
  • clause (viiia) as clause (viiib) of Section 2 of the NDPS Act, the entire Section 27A
  • provisions in Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
  • provisions contained in Section 2(xxiiia) and Section 2(viia) of the NDPS Act,
  • PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT 1988
  • provisions contained in Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India.35.
  • sub clauses (i) to (v) of clause (viiib) of Section 2 of the NDPS Act,
  • NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES AMENDMENT ACT 2014
  • Sections 7 to 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
  • section of the Malicious Injuries to Property Act, 1861,
  • Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947.
  • provisions of NDPS Act and 2014 Amendment to NDPS Act,
  • Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
  • Prevention of Corruption Act, Dowry Prohibition Act
  • provisions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act
  • Sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
  • Sections 7 to 12 of the Prevention of Corruption
  • provisions contained in Section 37 of NDPS Act,
  • BANKING REGULATION ACT
  • bail.46. Section 37(1)(b) of the NDPS Act,
  • SECTION 2 DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT
  • SECTION 278 B INCOME TAX ACT
  • DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT
  • Section 437(1) of Cr.P.C
  • section 18(1)(g)
  • Rule 3(1)(a)(ii),
  • Section 276-B;
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicant has been charged under Sections 8(c), 21(c), 27A, and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act) in connection with a raid conducted by the Narcotic Drugs Bureau (NCB) on 01/11/2016. During the raid at the applicant's Bar and Restaurant premises, pouches containing cocaine and cash were seized. The applicant was denied bail by the Additional Sessions Judge, Mapusa, by order dated 30/12/2016. The applicant sought bail before this Court, which is the subject of this opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the applicant is entitled to bail despite being charged under serious offences under the NDPS Act, particularly Section 27A.
  2. Whether the apparent drafting error in Section 27A of the NDPS Act (reference to clause (viiia) instead of clause (viiib) of Section 2) can be corrected by the Court or whether it must be left to the legislature.
  3. The applicability and interpretation of the strict construction rule for penal statutes in the context of the NDPS Act and correction of obvious legislative errors.
  4. Whether the quantity of cocaine seized qualifies as commercial quantity or intermediate quantity and its impact on bail considerations.
  5. The sufficiency of material on record to infer involvement of the applicant in financing or harbouring offences under Section 27A of the NDPS Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • There is no material on record to reasonably suspect the applicant's involvement in the alleged offences.
  • The applicant is a woman and a mother, which should be considered favorably at the bail stage.
  • The actual quantity of cocaine seized is 84.856 grams (intermediate quantity), not commercial quantity, thus Section 37 rigours should not apply.
  • The reference in Section 27A to clause (viiia) of Section 2 is erroneous, as clause (viiia) does not contain sub-clauses (i) to (v); the correct reference should be to clause (viiib).
  • The Penal Statutes must be strictly construed and courts cannot amend or substitute legislative provisions; only Parliament can correct such errors, which cannot be retrospective due to Article 20(1) of the Constitution.
  • There is no material to suggest financing or harbouring under Section 27A; the presence of a co-accused in the premises does not amount to harbouring.
  • Procedural safeguards under Section 50 of the NDPS Act were not complied with, particularly no reference to harbouring or financing at the time of arrest.
  • The complaint has been lodged and no further investigation is pending; the applicant can be put to terms to prevent fleeing from justice.
  • The case is fit for grant of bail.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The offences are serious and attract rigorous imprisonment of 10 to 20 years under Section 27A.
  • Material such as seizure of cocaine (84.856 grams), cash, and presence of co-accused in the premises supports the charge.
  • Section 27A applies to both harbouring and financing offences; the drafting error in reference to clause (viiia) is obvious and should be corrected by the Court to clause (viiib).
  • Section 37 of the NDPS Act requires "reasonable grounds" which is more than a prima facie case; the applicant is likely to flee justice given the severity of punishment.
  • The Court has the power and duty to correct obvious legislative errors to give effect to the legislative intent, preventing the nullification of Section 27A.
  • Reliance on precedents supports rejection of the bail application.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher; 1949 (2) KB 481 Judicial correction of obvious drafting errors to give effect to legislative intent Approved and applied to justify correction of the drafting error in Section 27A of the NDPS Act.
Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa; (1978) 2 SCC 213 Creative approach to statutory interpretation to uphold legislative purpose despite poor drafting Supported the principle that courts should not strike down poorly drafted statutes but interpret to give effect to intent.
CBI v. Ramesh Gelli; (2016) 3 SCC 788 Approval of Lord Denning’s approach in Seaford Court Estates for statutory interpretation Reinforced the court’s power to correct legislative omissions or errors in criminal statutes.
Pramod Wankhede v. State of Maharashtra; 2002 (2) Mh.L.J 547 Principles applicable to bail in serious offences under NDPS Act Applied to determine bail eligibility considering severity of punishment and material on record.
Union Of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari; (2007) 7 SCC 798 Interpretation of "reasonable grounds" for bail under NDPS Act Used to explain the threshold required for bail under Section 37 of the NDPS Act.
Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement; (2005) 4 SCC 530 Strict construction of penal statutes and its modern application Clarified that strict construction does not preclude fair and reasonable interpretation to uphold legislative intent.
Rajinder Singh v. State Of Punjab; (2015) 6 SCC 477 Rule of strict construction in penal statutes and application of mischief rule Supported the approach of fair interpretation over narrow literalism in penal law context.
Balram Kumawat v. Union of India; (2003) 7 SCC 628 Interpretation of penal statutes with regard to legislative intent and object Reinforced that penal statutes should be interpreted to prevent offenders from escaping liability.
Wentworth Securities Ltd. v. Jones; (1979) 2 WLR 132 Conditions for courts to read words into statutes to correct omissions Applied to justify correction of the drafting error in Section 27A after satisfying three conditions.
Inco Europe Ltd. v. First Choice Distribution (A Firm); (2000) 2 All ER 109 (H.L) Judicial power to correct obvious drafting errors by reading in or omitting words Used to support the court’s interpretative exercise in correcting Section 27A's reference.
Salmon v. Duncombe; (1886) 11 App. Cases 627 (P.C) Legislative intent prevails over draftsman’s unskillfulness in penal statutes Supported the principle that obvious drafting errors should not nullify statutes.
Adler v. George; (1964) 2 KB 7 Correction of statutory language to avoid redundancy in penal statutes Applied to illustrate courts’ power to interpret penal statutes reasonably.
Vaijanath Shinde v. Secretary, Marathwada Shikshan Prasarak Mandal; 2006 (6) Mh.L.J 682 Supplementing omissions in statutory rules for harmonious construction Relied upon to justify judicial supplementation of legislative omissions.
Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State of Maharashtra; (1976) 3 SCC 684 Strict construction does not warrant pedantic interpretation to benefit offenders Applied to reject overly narrow construction of penal provisions.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the applicant’s bail plea in light of the offences charged under the NDPS Act, particularly Section 27A, which prescribes rigorous imprisonment of 10 to 20 years and a substantial fine. The Court noted the procedural history and material on record, including the seizure of cocaine (84.856 grams), cash, and presence of a co-accused in the applicant’s premises. The Court recognized the applicant’s status as a mother but emphasized that Section 37 of the NDPS Act, with its non-obstante clause, overrides the general bail provisions favoring women under Cr.P.C.

Regarding the quantity of drugs seized, the Court found that the amount qualifies as intermediate quantity under the NDPS Act, which does not exempt the applicant from the rigours of Section 37, given the offence under Section 27A.

The Court thoroughly analyzed the alleged drafting error in Section 27A referring to clause (viiia) of Section 2, which after the 2014 Amendment should have been clause (viiib). It acknowledged that the literal reading would render Section 27A a nullity, thus defeating legislative intent. The Court applied established principles of statutory interpretation, including the mischief rule and purposive construction, and cited authoritative precedents to hold that courts can and must correct such obvious and patent errors to give effect to the legislature’s true intent. It rejected the applicant’s contention that only Parliament can correct such errors, emphasizing that judicial correction in such clear cases is neither legislation nor retrospective amendment but interpretation.

On the merits, the Court found sufficient material to believe that the applicant was involved in financing or harbouring offences as contemplated by Section 27A. The presence of cocaine, cash, and the co-accused in the premises under the applicant’s control, coupled with the absence of satisfactory explanation, provided reasonable grounds to deny bail.

The Court also held that there was no substantial procedural violation under Section 50 of the NDPS Act warranting bail at this stage, leaving such issues to be examined at trial.

Holding and Implications

The bail application of the applicant is dismissed.

The Court’s decision directly affects the parties by denying bail to the applicant, holding that the material on record and the legal provisions, including the corrected interpretation of Section 27A of the NDPS Act, justify continued custody. The Court clarified that its observations are confined to the bail application and shall not influence the trial court’s decision on merits. No new precedent was created beyond affirming the established principles of statutory interpretation and bail jurisprudence under the NDPS Act.

    Julie Singh v. Union Of India

    M.S Sonak, J.:— Heard Ms. Collasso for the applicant and Mr. J. Godinho, Special Public Prosecutor for the respondents.

    2. The applicant, who has been charged for offences under Sections 8(c), 21(c), 27A and Section 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), seeks her release on bail. The Additional Sessions Judge, Mapusa, by her order dated 30/12/2016, had denied bail to the applicant.

    3. Ms. Collasso, the learned Counsel for the applicant, has made the following submissions in support of the application for bail:—

    a) There is no material whatsoever on record to even entertain any reasonable ground that the applicant is involved in the offences alleged;

    b) The appellant is a lady and a mother and this aspect is required to be taken into consideration at the stage of consideration of bail application;

    c) At the raid, conducted by the Officers of the Narcotic Drugs Bureau (NCB) on 01/11/2016, it was alleged that four packets of cocaine, totally weighing 138.23 grams, were seized from the premises allegedly under the control of the applicant. However, the report of a Chemical Analyser, has confirmed that one of the packets contained Lactose and, therefore, the quantity of cocaine allegedly seized is 84.856 grams. Ms. Collasso submits that the quantity allegedly seized, is less than the commercial quantity and, therefore, the rigour of section 37 of ndps act, ought not to apply to the case of the applicant.

    d) Ms. Collasso submits that section 27a of the ndps act provides that whoever indulges in financing, directly or indirectly, any of the activities specified in subclauses (i) to (v) of clause (viiia) of Section 2 or harbours any person engaged in such activities, shall be punishable with Rigorous Imprisonment for a period, which shall not be less than 10 years, but which may extend to 20 years. Ms. Collasso submits that clause (viiia) of section 2 of the ndps act does not even have sub clauses (i) to (v) and further, the clause (viiia) defines the expression ‘essential narcotic drugs’. She submits that the applicant cannot be said to have committed any offence under section 27a of the ndps act. She submits that Penal Statutes like the NDPS Act, must receive strict construction. It is impermissible for a Court of law to add or substitute any provision, in the guise of interpretation.

    e) Ms. Collasso submits that even if it is assumed that there is some error in the draft of Section 27A, including more particularly, in its reference to clause (viiia) instead of clause (viiib) of section 2 of the ndps act, the benefit of such error, has to essentially be granted to the applicant. Besides, the Courts are quite powerless to correct such error, as any attempt at correction will constitute an attempt at legislation or rewriting of a legislative provision. Ms. Collasso submits that this is clearly impermissible, more so in a Statue, which deals with criminal law. She submits that it is only a competent legislature, which, in the present case, would be the Parliament, can correct the so called error in the context of the legislative provision. She further submits that even the Parliament will not be in a position to amend Section 27A with retrospective effect, since Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India bars expost-facto criminal legislation. She, therefore, strongly contends that even if it is assumed that there is a defect, such defect being legislative in character, can only be corrected by the competent legislature with prospective effect. In the meantime, the applicant is entitled to the benefit of the legislative provision, as it exists, in consequently, her release on bail.

    f) Without prejudice, Ms. Collasso submits that even otherwise, there are absolutely no grounds much less reasonable grounds for inferring that the applicant is involved in the commission of offence under section 27a of the ndps act. She submits that there is absolutely no material to suggest any financing, whether direct or indirect. She submits that there is no material to suggest that the applicant was harbouring any person engaged in the activities in the contemplation of Section 27A. She submits that the term ‘Harbour’ has not been defined under the NDPS Act and, therefore, one has to fall upon the definition under the Indian Penal Code (IPC). She submits that the Nigerian Chindu was merely found in the premises through which, it is alleged that the applicant was operating a Bar and Restaurant. This circumstance, by itself, is not at all suggestive of harbouring. There is not even any allegation that the applicant was in league with the said Chindu or that the applicant was, in any manner, aware of his alleged criminal antecedents or that the applicant was screening the said Chindu from the legal process. In the absence of this, there are more than reasonable grounds to hold that the applicant is not at all involved in the offence under section 27a of the ndps act.

    g) Ms. Collasso also submits that there is infirmity in the procedural compliance as prescribed under section 50 of the ndps act. In particular, she points out that at the time of applicant's arrest, there was no reference to any charge of harbouring or indulging in direct or indirect finance to the activities specified in sub clause (viiib) of section 2 of the ndps act. Ms. Collasso submits that neither before the learned Sessions Judge nor before this Court, there is really any material to make out a case of harbouring.

    h) Finally, Ms. Collasso submits that the complaint has already been lodged before the Competent Court and this means that there is no further investigation pending. She submits that the applicant can be put to terms, in case there is even slightest suspicion that she may flee from justice. Further, she submits that this is a fit case for grant of bail.

    4. Ms. Collasso has relied upon the decisions in Hira Devi v. Disrict Board, Shahjahanpur; AIR 1952 SC 362, G.N Varma v. State of Zharkhand; (2014) 4 SCC 282 and Uday Vaigankar v. State of Goa (Criminal Application (Bail) No. 71/2016), decided on 03/05/2016 in support of her aforesaid submissions.

    5. Mr. Godinho, the learned Special Public Prosecutor for the respondents submits that the applicant has been charged with serious offences, which, inter alia, provide for Rigourous Imprisonment for a term, which shall not be less than 10 years, but which may extend to 20 years. He submits that in such a situation, the principles and certain observations made by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Pramod Wankhede v. State of Maharashtra; 2002 (2) Mh.L.J 547 ought to apply. Mr. Godinho has referred to the panchanama and on the said basis, has submitted that there is material on record to suggest that the applicant was operating a Bar and Restaurant and it is from these premises that there was seizure of 84.856 grams of cocaine. He submits that Chindu Mawafor, who was also another accused, was found in the same premises as that of the applicant. He submits that certain other incriminating materials, including large amount of cash was also found in the raid. He submits that Section 27A applies not just to the case of harbouring, but also applies to a person, who indulges in financing directly or indirectly any of the activities, as specified under section 27a of the ndps act. He submits that reference to clause (viiia) of Section 2 is a very obvious mistake and there is no question of any party deriving any benefit on the basis of such obvious mistake. He submits that section 37 of the ndps act makes reference to “reasonable grounds”, which expression has been judicially interpreted to mean something more than “prima facie case” He submits that the limitations prescribed under section 37 of the ndps act are in addition to the limitations, which already exist in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. He submits that if the punishment prescribed is taken into consideration, then, possibility of the applicant fleeing from justice, cannot be ruled out. On this ground, Mr. Godinho submits that this application may be dismissed.

    6. Mr. Godinho, also submits that since this is a case of obvious error in the portion of section 27a of the ndps act, this Court is not only empowered, but is duty bound, to read and construe reference to clause (viiia) of section 2 of the ndps act as clause (viiib) of section 2 of the ndps act. He submits that such an interpretative exercise is necessary, as the literal interpretation proposed by Ms. Collasso, will virtually obliterate the provisions of section 27a of the ndps act from Statute book.

    7. Mr. Godinho has relied upon the decisions in Union Of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari.; (2007) 7 SCC 798, Intelligence Officer v. Shambu Sonkar, (2001) 2 SCC 562 : 2001 AIR SC 830, Floyed Lopes s/o Pascoal Lopes v. Union of India; 2007 ALL MR (Cri.) 177, Pramod Wankhede v. State of Maharashtra; (2002) 2 Mh.L.J 547, in support of his plea that this bail application be rejected.

    8. Rival contentions now fall for determination.

    9. In the course of raid conducted by the NCB on 01/11/2016, the officials found the applicant and one Chindu Mawafor (a Nigerian) in the Bar and Restaurant “City Corner”, which was run and operated by the applicant. She is alleged to have stated that the entire premises, in which the Bar and Restaurant was being operated, was in her possession. Upon substantial compliances with the procedural safeguards prescribed under section 50 of the ndps act, the raiding party found two white coloured pouches with tied knots from the room situated in first floor, which were kept under the mattress of the bed in the said room. Further, the raiding party also found two more white coloured pouches from the upper storage areas situated above the bathroom, adjacent to the previous room. They also found one small white coloured pipe at the backside of the house. Upon preliminary test, the material in the pouches was found positive for cocaine. The applicant and Chindu are alleged to have admitted that the material belonged to them and was meant for sale. The weight of the material from the four pouches came to 138.23 grams, which is in excess of 100 grams i.e commercial quantity for cocaine. The raiding party also recovered cash in denomination of Rs. 500/- and 1000/-, totally amounting to Rs. 1,56,000/- from almirah of steel in the first floor room. The raiding party also found several bank documents, Aadhar cards, licences, etc. in the course of the raid.

    10. The circumstance that the applicant is a mother, is no doubt required to be taken into consideration in terms of first proviso to Section 437(1) of Cr.P.C However, regard is to be had to the provisions contained in Section 37 of NDPS Act, which commence with non-obstante clause and provide that notwithstanding anything contained in Cr.P.C, no person accused of offences under Sections 19, 14 and 27A and also for offences, involving commercial quantity, shall be released on bail or bond unless the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offences and that he is not likely to commit any offences while on bail. This provision, which begins with a non-obstante clause, will, therefore, override the special provision made in favour of the women under the first proviso to Section 437 of Cr.P.C

    11. In the course of the raid, although it was stated that 138.23 grams of cocaine were found under the control of the applicant, the official report of the Chemical Analyser suggests that one of the pouch contained lactose and, therefore, the total quantity of cocaine tested positive was 84.856 grams. Taking into consideration the provisions contained in Section 2(xxiiia) and Section 2(viia) of the NDPS Act, the quantity allegedly recovered, is neither small quantity nor commercial quantity, but can be styled as intermediate quantity.

    12. The aforesaid circumstance, though sufficient for the applicant, to contend that she has not been accused of offence dealing with narcotic drugs in commercial quantity, does not assist the applicant any further, since the applicant is accused of offence punishable under section 27a of the ndps act. The additional conditions prescribed in section 37 of the ndps act will, therefore, apply to the case of the applicant for enlargement on bail.

    13. In order to examine Ms. Collasso's contention in relation to the provisions contained in section 27a of the ndps act, reference to the position of the said provision prior to the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Amendment) Act, 2014, which came into force from 10/03/2014, is necessary. Section 27A, prior to 2014 amendment, reads as follows:

    “27A. Punishment for financing illicit traffic and harbouring offenders.- Whoever indulges in financing, directly or indirectly, any of the activities specified in sub-clauses (i) to (v) of clause (viiia) of section 2 or harbours any person engaged in any of the aforementioned activities, shall be punishable with rigourous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which may extend to twenty years and shall also be liable to fine which shall not be less than one lakh rupees but which may extend to two lakh rupees:

    Provided that the court may, for reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a fine exceeding two lakh rupees.”

    14. Prior to the aforesaid 2014 amendment, Section 2(viiia) of the NDPS Act read as follows:

    “2(viiia). “Illicit traffic”, in relation to narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, means -

    (i) cultivating any coca plant or gathering any portion of coca plant;

    (ii) cultivating the opium poppy or any cannabis plant;

    (iii) engaging in the production, manufacture, possession, sale, purchase, transportation, warehousing, concealment, use or consumption, import inter-State, export inter-State, import into India, export from India or transhipment, of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances;

    (iv) dealing in any activities in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances other than those referred to in sub-clauses (i) to (iii); or

    (v) handling or letting out any premises for the carrying on of any of the activities referred to in sub-clauses (i) to (v);

    other than those permitted under this Act, or any rule or order made, or any condition of any licence, term or authorisation issued, thereunder, and includes-

    (1) financing, directly or indirectly, any of the aforementioned activities;

    (2) abetting or conspiring in the furtherance of or in support of doing any of the aforementioned activities; and

    (3) harbouring persons engaged in any of the aforementioned activities;”

    15. Section 2 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Amendment) Act, 2014 reads thus:

    “2. In section 2 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the principal Act,)-

    (a) after clause (iv), the following clause shall be inserted, namely:—

    (iva) “Central Government factories” means factories owned by the Central Government or factories owned by any company in which the Central Government holds at least fifty-one per cent of the paid-up share capital;”

    (b) clause (viiia) shall be relettered as clause (viiib) and before, clause (viiib) as so relettered, the following clause shall be inserted, namely:—

    (viiia) “essential narcotic drug” means a narcotic drug notified by the Central Government for medical and scientific use;

    16. The aforesaid means that after the 2014 amendment to the NDPS Act, the existing Section 2(viiia) was relettered as Section 2(viiib) and before Section 2(viiib) as so relettered, the following clause came to be inserted, namely:—

    “(viiia) “essential narcotic drug” means a narcotic drug notified by the Central Government for medical and scientific use;”

    17. Even after the 2014 amendment, there was no consequential amendment made to section 27a of the ndps act as it stood prior to the 2014 amendment. Since clause 2(viiia) was relettered as clause 2(viiib) of the 2014 Amendment Act, consequential amendment in Section 27A of the NDPS Act was necessary, since what was earlier clause (viiia) was now relettered as clause (viiib). However, it appears that this escaped the attention of the Parliamentary draftsman and a very obvious error has, therefore, crept into section 27a of the ndps act. The question, therefore, is whether any person accused of the offence under section 27a of the ndps act, is entitled to take benefit of such an obvious error, by urging that the Penal Statutes must receive strict construction and further, it is only within the province of the Parliament to correct an obvious error in the Statute, since the Courts are powerless to do the same.

    18. If section 27a of the ndps act is to be read and construed, literally, as submitted by Ms. Collasso, then, the legislative provision would be reduced to a nullity. The legislative provision will make no sense and would be entirely unworkable. Clause (viiia) of Section 2, after 2014 amendment is concerned with “essential narcotic drugs”. The clause does not even have any subclauses (i) to (v). The literal construction, will thus, wipe out the provisions contained in section 27a of the ndps act from the Statute book. From the context, it is absolutely clear and this is a case of an obvious drafting error. However, if reference to clause (viiia) is read as reference to clause (viiib), then the provisions in section 27a make complete sense and will sustain. Ms. Collasso, however, submits that this is not an exercise, which the Courts of law can undertake and the matter will have to be left to the Parliament to make such amendment in the text of Section 27A.

    19. As noted earlier, the error, which is crept into section 27a of the ndps act, is an obvious error. Both on principle as well as authority, it cannot be said that the Courts are not competent to correct such patent and obvious errors, in a situation of this nature.

    20. Reference can be usefully made to the decision of the Kings Bench Division in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher; 1949 (2) KB 481, where, Lord Denning refused to retreat, when faced with ruck in the texture of the Statute. His eloquent words read thus:

    “Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it must be remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is not possible to provide for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. Our literature would be much the poorer if it were. This is where the draftsmen of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly criticized. A judge, believing himself to be fettered by the supposed rule that he must look to the language and nothing else, laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would certainly save the judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of the social conditions which gave rise to it, and of the mischief which it was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the written word so as to give “force and life” to the intention of the legislature. That was clearly laid down by the resolution of the judges in Heydon's case (1584) 3 Co. Rep. 7a, and it is the safest guide to-day. Good practical advice on the subject was given about the same time by Plowden in his second volume Eyston v. Studd; (1574) 2 Plowden 465. Put into homely metaphor it is this: A judge should ask himself the question: If the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, how would they have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which it is woven, but he can and should iron out the creases.’

    [Emphasis supplied]

    21. The aforesaid observation of Lord Denning had invited sharp criticism from the House of Lords. Lord Simonds found this approach to be “a naked usurpation of the legislative function under the thin disguise of interpretation.” Lord Morton (with whom Lord Goddard entirely agreed) observed: “These heroics are out of place” and Lord Tucker said “Your Lordships would be acting in a legislative rather than a judicial capacity if the view put forward by Denning, L.J, were to prevail.”

    22. However, the observations of Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estates Ltd. (supra), have found approval of the Supreme Court in several decisions, including Bangalore Water Supply and Sewarage Board v. A. Rajappa; (1978) 2 SCC 213, M. Paintiah v. Muddala Veeramallappa; AIR 1961 SC 1107 and State of Karnataka v. Hansa Corporation; (1980) SC 697. This position was specifically noted by the Supreme Court in the case of CBI v. Ramesh Gelli; (2016) 3 SCC 788, where after specific reference to the observations of Lord Denning and the rebuke from the House of Lords, the Supreme Court at paragraph 42 observed thus:

    42. Though the above observations of Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estates case; (1949) 2 KB 481 had invited sharp criticism in his own country we find reference to the same and implicit approval thereof in the judicial quest to define the expression “industry” in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa; (1978) 2 SCC 213. Paras 147 and 148 of the opinion of Chief Justice M.H Beg in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board (supra), which are quoted below, would clearly indicate the acceptance of this Court referred to earlier: (SCC p. 285)

    [Emphasis supplied]

    23. In Hansa Corporation (supra), the rule of literal interpretation might have led to the striking down of the Statutes for want of constitutionality. The Statute was not very well drafted, but the object behind the legislation and the purpose for enacting the same, was clearly discernible. In such a situation, the Supreme Court, by specific reference to the observations of Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estate Ltd. (supra), has held that where the Section is not very well drafted, but the object behind the legislation and the purpose for enacting the same is clearly discernible, the Court cannot hold its hands and blame the draftsman and chart an easy course of striking down the Statute. In such a situation, the Court should be guided by a creative approach to ascertain what was intended to be done by the Legislature in enacting the legislation and so construe it as to give force and life to the intention of the legislature. This is not charting any hazardous course, but is amply borne out by an observation worth reproducing in extenso in Seaford Courts Estate Ltd. (supra).

    24. In the present case, as noted earlier, if the obvious error in section 27a of the ndps act, is not corrected by reading and construing reference to clause (viiia) as clause (viiib) of Section 2 of the NDPS Act, the entire Section 27A will be reduced to a nullity or a dead letter. The literal interpretation will reduce the legislative provision to manifest absurdity.

    25. In such a situation, as held by the Supreme Court in Hansa Corporation (supra), the Court cannot hold its hands, blame the draftsman and thereby render the legislative provisions under Section 27A a nullity or a manifest absurdity. The Court, in such a situation, must be guided by creative approach to ascertain what was intended to be done by the legislature in enacting the legislation and shall construe the legislation as to give force and life to the intention of the legislature. A Judge must ask himself the question, how if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this patent and obvious error in section 27a of the ndps act, they would have straightened it out? A Judge must then do what the makers of the Act would have done. Having regard to the obvious intention of the legislature and the patent oversight, by which 2014 amendment act relettered clause (viiia) to clause (viiib), but forgot to make the consequential relettering in section 27a of the ndps act, the Court would be justified in correcting the patent and obvious error, in a situation of this nature. The Court, in such a situation, is really not legislating, but merely ironing out the obvious creases.

    26. There are several instances, where the Courts have corrected such obvious and patent errors in legislation. In a very old decision of the Privy Counci in Salmon v. Duncombe; (1886) 11 App. Cases 627 (P.C), Lord Hobhouse observed that where main object and intent of a Statute is clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman's unskillfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used.

    27. In The King v. Vasey and Lally; (1905) 2 KB 748, Lord Alverstone, C.J quoted with approval Maxwell on interpretation of Statutes in the following terms:

    “In Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 3rd ed. p. 319, the principle of construction is laid down in these terms: “Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, hardship, or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words, and even the structure of the sentence”, and for that proposition several authorities are cited. In Salmon v. Duncombe; (1886) 11 App. Cas. 627 Lord Hobhouse in delivering the judgment of the Privy Council says (4): “It is, however, a very serious matter to hold that when the main object of a statute is clear it shall be reduced a nullity, by the draftsman's unskillfulness or ignorance of law.”

    Applying those principles to the present case we have to see whether the amending section requires modification, on the ground that if it is to be taken literally it will be reduced to a nullity. It seems to me that the object of the section is perfectly plain, and no one can doubt that the intention of the Legislature was to prevent the destruction of fish in salmon rivers by putting lime or other noxious substances into the water. The draftsman must, however, have forgotten exactly how the section of the Malicious Injuries to Property Act, 1861, which deals with the matter runs. I have no doubt that he meant to provide that for the purposes of this Act the expression “salmon river” should be substituted for the description of waters enumerated in the earlier Act. If, therefore, the exact phraseology of the section of the amending act is disregarded, and the words “or in any salmon river” are inserted in the earlier section after the words “in any such pond or water,” that makes sense, and carries out the manifest object of the amendment.

    This case is a good instance of the principle that the manifest intention of a statute must not be defeated by too literal an adhesion to its precise language.”

    [Emphasis supplied]

    28. The House of Lords, speaking through Lord Diplock, when confronted with obvious drafting errors in Statute, adopted the following approach in the case of Wentworth Securities Ltd. v. Jones; (1979) 2 WLR 132:—

    “My Lords, I am not reluctant to adopt a purposive construction where to apply the literal meaning of the legislative language used would lead to results which would clearly defeat the purposes of the Act. But in doing so the task on which a court of justice is engaged remains one of construction; even where this involves reading into the Act words which are not expressly included in it. Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd. [1971] A.C 850 provides an instance of this; but in that case the three conditions that must be fulfilled in order to justify this course were satisfied. First, it was possible to determine from a consideration of the provisions of the Act read as a whole precisely what the mischief was that it was the purpose of the Act to remedy; secondly, it was apparent that the draftsman and Parliament had by inadvertence overlooked, and so omitted to deal with, an eventuality that required to be dealt with if the purpose of the Act was to be achieved; and thirdly, it was possible to state with certainty what were the additional words that would have been inserted by the draftsman and approved by Parliament had their attention been drawn to the omission before the Bill passed into law. Unless this third condition is fulfilled any attempt by a court of justice to repair the omission in the Act cannot be justified as an exercise of its jurisdiction to determine what is the meaning of a written law which Parliament has passed. Such an attempt crosses the boundary between construction and legislation. It becomes an usurpation of a function which under the constitution of this country is vested in the legislature to the exclusion of the courts.”

    [Emphasis supplied]

    29. To the same effect, is yet another decision of the House of Lords in the case of Inco Europe Ltd. v. First Choice Distribution (A Firm); (2000) 2 All England Reporter 109 (H.L). This is what Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead had to say when the House of Lords was confronted with an obvious drafting mistake in the Statute.

    “I am left in no doubt that, for once, the draftsman slipped up. The sole object of paragraph 37(2) in Schedule 3 was to amend section 18(1)(g) by substituting a new paragraph (g) that would serve the same purpose regarding the Act of 1996 as the original paragraph (g) had served regarding the Act of 1979. The language used was not apt to achieve this result. Given that the intended object of paragraph 37(2) is so plain, the paragraph should be read in a manner which gives effect to the parliamentary intention. Thus the new section 18(1)(g), substituted by paragraph 37(2), should be read as confined to decisions of the High Court under sections of Part I which make provision regarding an appeal from such decisions. In other words, ‘from any decision of the High Court under that Part’ is to be read as meaning ‘from any decision of the High Court under a section in that Part which provides for an appeal from such decision’.

    I freely acknowledge that this interpretation of section 18(1)(g) involves reading words into the paragraph. It has long been established that the role of the courts in construing legislation is not confined to resolving ambiguities in statutory language. The court must be able to correct obvious drafting errors. In suitable cases, in discharging its interpretative function the court will add words, or omit words or substitute words. Some notable instances are given in Professor Sir Rupert Cross' admirable opuscule, Statutory Interpretation, 3 ed. (1995), pp. 93-105. He comments, at page 103:

    ‘In omitting or inserting words the judge is not really engaged in a hypothetical reconstruction of the intentions of the drafter or the legislature, but is simply making as much sense as he can of the text of the statutory provision read in its appropriate context and within the limits of the judicial role.’

    This power is confined to plain cases of drafting mistakes. The courts are ever mindful that their constitutional role in this field is interpretative. They must abstain from any course which might have the appearance of judicial legislation. A statute is expressed in language approved and enacted by the legislature. So the courts exercise considerable caution before adding or omitting or substituting words. Before interpreting a statute in this way the court must be abundantly sure of three matters: (1) the intended purpose of the statute or provision in question; (2) that by inadvertence the draftsman and Parliament failed to give effect to that purpose in the provision in question; and (3) the substance of the provision Parliament would have made, although not necessarily the precise words Parliament would have used, had the error in the Bill been noticed. The third of these conditions is of crucial importance. Otherwise any attempt to determine the meaning of the enactment would cross the boundary between construction and legislation: see Lord Diplock in Jones v. Wrotham Park Settled Estates [1980] A.C 74, 105-106. In the present case these three conditions are fulfilled.”

    [Emphasis supplied]

    30. In the present case, three conditions referred to in Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd. (1971) A.C 850, or in Inco Europe Ltd. (supra), stand fulfilled. From the perusal of the provisions of NDPS Act and 2014 Amendment to NDPS Act, there is no ambiguity whatsoever as regards the mischief, which the act or the amendment act, was to remedy. The intended purpose of ndps act and 2014 amendment to the ndps act, is very clear and really admits of no ambiguity. This means that the first condition stands fulfilled. Secondly, this is a clear case of an obvious error in as much as the draftsman and the Parliament have, by inadvertence, overlooked and omitted the effect of consequential relettering of clause (viiia) as clause (viiib) in section 27a of the ndps act. It is, therefore, obvious that the draftsman and the Parliament had by inadvertence, failed to give effect to the purpose of the provisions in question. It is obvious that the draftsman and the Parliament had, by inadvertence, overlooked and omitted to deal with the eventuality that was required to be dealt with, in order to achieve the purpose of the Act or the Amendment to the NDPS Act. This means that even the second condition as aforesaid stands fulfilled. Fortunately, in the present case, the substance of the provision, which the Parliament would have made, can also be stated with certainty. If the attention of the draftsman and the Parliament were to be drawn to the patent error under section 27a of the ndps act, the draftsman and the Parliament, would have only relettered clause (viiia) as clause (viiib) in section 27a of the ndps act, similar to relettering brought about by 2014 Amendment to the NDPS Act. This means that third and the most important condition as pointed out in Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. (supra) and Inco Europe Ltd. (supra) also stands fulfilled. In such circumstances, it is not possible to accept the contention of Ms. Collasso that the Courts are helpless in the matter and cannot correct such obvious errors or drafting mistakes in the text of the Statute.

    31. A Full Bench of this Court in the case of Vaijanath Shinde v. Secretary, Marathwada Shikshan Prasarak Mandal, Devgiri College Campus, Aurangabad; 2006 (6) Mh.L.J 682, when faced with an unintended accidental omission under rule 3 of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981, did not hesitate to supplement the omission by reading the word “trained” in the rule after the word “senior most” and before the word “teacher”, so that harmonious construction of the Act and the Rules was possible. In doing so, the Full Bench also relied upon the observations of Lord Denning in the case of Seaford Court Estates Ltd. (supra). At paragraph 12, the Full Bench has observed thus:

    “12. To us, it does appear that had the attention of the rule makers been drawn to rule 3(1)(a)(i) and (ii) and more particularly, in regard to the absence of the word “trained” in Rule 3(1)(a)(ii), they would have filled in the omission by inserting the word “trained” in Rule 3(1)(a)(ii). As we are convinced that absence of word “trained” in Rule 3(1)(a)(ii) is an unintended accidental omission, the same has to be supplemented by having recourse to the rule of construction, as stated by Denning, L.J, which has been approved by the majority judgment of the Apex Court viz. seven Judges judgment rendered in Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa (supra). Failure to have recourse to the same, would result in destroying the whole fabric of the scheme laid down by the Act and the other provisions of the Rules. In this view of the matter, we deem it appropriate to read the word “trained” in Rule 3(1)(a)(ii) after the word “seniormost” and before the word “teacher” so that a harmonious construction of the Act and the other provisions of the Rules is possible. Accordingly, we supplement the word “trained” in Rule 31)(a)(ii) and answer the reference herein below thus:

    For appointment to the post of Head Master (by promotion) of a primary school, the seniority of the teacher is to be counted from the date he acquires educational and training qualifications as prescribed under Schedule “B” of the M.E.P.S Rules. The seniority cannot be counted from the date of initial appointment and continuous officiation devoid of requisite qualification as prescribed in Schedule “B”.”

    [Emphasis supplied]

    32. Maxwell on the interpretation of Statutes (12th Edition) in Chapter 11 entitled “Exceptional Construction”, has noted that where the language of a Statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some inconvenience or absurdity, which can hardly have been intended, the construction may be put upon it, which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar, by giving an unusual meaning to particular words or by rejecting them altogether, on the ground that the Legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify, and the modifications made are mere corrections of a careless language and really give true meaning. In such a situation, the Courts will depart from the literal rule. Such instances are, however, exceptional and it is impossible to lay down any category of cases, in which ordinary grammatical interpretation will inevitably be abandoned.

    33. Maxwell has given several instances, where the Courts have corrected patent and obvious errors in legislations. In The Beta; (1869) 3 MOO PC (N.S) 23, the Privy Council corrected “obvious oversights” in the text of Merchant Shipping Act, 1854. In Adler v. George; (1964) 2 KB 7, the Kings Bench read some words in a Statute, as the literal construction of the Statute, which was incidentally a Penal Statute, would lead to redundancy. In Re Wainewright (1843) 1 Phil. 258, Lord Lyndhurst accepted that clerical errors or slips in drafting can always be corrected by the Courts by observing that omission should be supplied, in order to give effect to the obvious intention. In R. Wilcock (1845) 7 Q.B 317; Re Boothroyd (1846) 15 L.J.MC 15, where an act refers to another Statute by Title and date, mistaking the date, the Court was prepared to read the error as corrected. In The Arabert (1963) p.102, where a word appears to be in consolidating Statute, but was not found in the Acts consolidated, the Court may treat it as inserted per incuriam. Some times where the sense of the Statute demands it or where there has been obvious mistake in drafting, the Court will be prepared to substitute another word or phrase for that which actually appears in the text of the Act and instance of this, is found in the case of Eton College v. Minister of Agricultural, Fisheries and Food; (1964) Ch. 274.

    34. Ms. Collasso however contends, that though such corrections may be tolerated in Statutes which concern civil law, there is no question of such corrections being effected in Statutes, which concern the criminal law. She submits that the Penal Statutes like NDPS Act, have to be strictly construed. If there is a mistake in the drafting of the section, then, the benefit of such mistake has to necessarily enure to the benefit of the accused person. She submits that a correction of the mistake has to be by the Parliament, which is again fettered from giving any retrospective effect to its amendment on account of the provisions contained in Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India.

    35. There are several instances where errors in legislations, which concern the criminal law, have been corrected by the Courts. Further, by correcting the obvious errors, the Court is not legislating and, therefore, there is no question of any ex-post facto application of criminal law. In such a situation, the Court, merely declares the law as it always was. In such a situation, the Court gives effect to the obvious intention of the legislation or the purpose for the enactment of the legislation rather than permitting the legislation to be reduced to a nullity or a manifest absurdity. The rule of strict construction of Penal Statutes cannot be stretched to the extent of reducing a legislative provision to a nullity or manifest absurdity. Salmon v. Duncombe (supra), was a case dealing with a Penal Statute. Similarly, Adler v. George (supra), was also a case dealing with Penal Statute. The Concept of “strict construction” has been explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Standard Chartered Bank v. Directorate of Enforcement; (2005) 4 SCC 530, which is again, a matter dealing with liability under the criminal law. CBI v. Ramesh Gelli (supra) is again a matter dealing with criminal law. So also, Rajinder Singh v. State Of Punjab.; (2015) 6 SCC 477, was a matter dealing with the provisions of Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, Penal Statutes.

    36. In Standard Chartered Bank (supra), the Constitution Bench was deciding whether a Corporate Body can be prosecuted for offences for which the sentence of imprisonment is mandatory. The contention of the defence was that penal provisions in a Statute have to be strictly construed and since, it is impossible to imprison a Corporate Body, the Corporate Bodies can never be prosecuted for offences, for which the sentence of imprisonment is prescribed as mandatory by the Penal Statute. In this context, Balkrishnan J. (SCC paras 23 and 24) has held thus:

    “23. The counsel for the appellant contended that the penal provision in the statute is to be strictly construed. Reference was made to Tolaram Relumal v. State of AIR 1954 SC 496 at p. 164 and Girdhari Lal Gupta v. D.H Mehta; (1971) 3 SCC 189. It is true that all penal statutes are to be strictly construed in the sense that the court must see that the thing charged as an offence is within the plain meaning of the words used and must not strain the words on any notion that there has been a slip that the thing is so clearly within the mischief that it must have been intended to be included and would have been included if thought of. All penal provisions like all other statutes are to be fairly construed according to the legislative intent as expressed in the enactment. Here, the legislative intent to prosecute corporate bodies for the offence committed by them is clear and explicit and the statute never intended to exonerate them from being prosecuted. It is sheer violence to common sense that the legislature intended to punish the corporate bodies for minor and silly offences and extended immunity of prosecution to major and grave economic crimes.

    24. The distinction between a strict construction and a more free one has disappeared in modern times and now mostly the question is “what is true construction of the statute?” A passage in Craies on Statute Law, 7 Edn. reads to the following effect:

    “The distinction between a strict and a liberal construction has almost disappeared with regard to all classes of statutes, so that all statutes, whether penal or not, are now construed by substantially the same rules. ‘All modern Acts are framed with regard to equitable as well as legal principles.’ ‘A hundred years ago,’ said the court in Lyons' case [Lyons v. Lyons, 1858 Bell CC 38: 169 ER 1158], ‘statutes were required to be perfectly precise and resort was not had to a reasonable construction of the Act, and thereby criminals were often allowed to escape. This is not the present mode of construing Acts of Parliament. They are construed now with reference to the true meaning and real intention of the legislature.”

    At p. 532 of the same book, observations of Sedgwick are quoted as under:

    “The more correct version of the doctrine appears to be that statutes of this class are to be fairly construed and faithfully applied according to the intent of the legislature, without unwarrantable severity on the one hand or unjustifiable lenity on the other, in cases of doubt the courts inclining to mercy.”

    37. Concurring with Balkrishnan, J., Dharmadhikari, J. added thus:

    “36. The rule of interpretation requiring strict construction of penal statutes does not warrant a narrow and pedantic construction of a provision so as to leave loopholes for the offender to escape (see Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State of Maharashtra [(1976) 3 SCC 684. A penal statute has to also be so construed as to avoid a lacuna and to suppress mischief and to advance a remedy in the light of the rule in Heydon's case [(1584) 3 Co. Rep 7a. A common-sense approach for solving a question of applicability of a penal statute is not ruled out by the rule of strict construction. (See State of A.P v. Bathu Prakasa Rao; (1976) 3 SCC 301 and also G.P Singh on Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 9 Edn., 2004, Chapter 11, Synopsis 3 at pp. 754 to 756.)”

    [Emphasis supplied]

    38. Further, Arun Kumar, J. concurring with both aforesaid Judges, followed the two earlier decisions of this Court thus:

    ““49. Another three-Judge Bench of this Court in a judgment in Balram Kumawat v. Union of India (2003) 7 SCC 628, to which I was a party, observed in the context of principles of statutory interpretation: (SCC p. 635, para 23)

    “23. Furthermore, even in relation to a penal statute any narrow and pedantic, literal and lexical construction may not always be given effect to. The law would have to be interpreted having regard to the subject-matter of the offence and the object of the law it seeks to achieve. The purpose of the law is not to allow the offender to sneak out of the meshes of law. Criminal jurisprudence does not say so.”

    50. In M.V Javali v. Mahajan Borewell & Co. [(1997) 8 SCC 72; this Court was considering a similar situation as in the present case. Under Section 278-B of the Income Tax Act a company can be prosecuted and punished for offence committed under Section 276-B; sentence of imprisonment is required to be imposed under the provision of the statute and a company being a juristic person cannot be subjected to it. It was held that the apparent anomalous situation can be resolved only by a proper interpretation of the section. The Court observed: (SCC p. 78, para 8)

    “8. Keeping in view the recommendations of the Law Commission and the above principles of interpretation of statutes we are of the opinion that the only harmonious construction that can be given to Section 276-B is that the mandatory sentence of imprisonment and fine is to be imposed where it can be imposed, namely on persons coming under categories (ii) and (iii) above, but where it cannot be imposed, namely on a company, fine will be the only punishment.”

    [Emphasis supplied]

    39. The majority of the Constitution Bench in the case of Standard Chartered Bank (supra), has specifically approved the passage in Craies on Statue Law 7 Edition to the effect that the distinction between strict and liberal construction has almost disappeared with regard to all clauses of Statutes, so that all Statutes, whether penal or not, are now construed substantially by the same rules. All modern Acts are framed with regard to equitable as well as legal principles. A hundred years ago, said the Court in Lyon's case (1858 Bell CC 38) that the Statutes were required to be perfectly precise and resort was not had to a reasonable construction of the Act and thereby criminals were often allowed to escape. This is not the present mode of construing the Acts of Parliament. They are construed now with reference to the true meaning and real intention of the legislature. In Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State of Maharashtra; (1976) 3 SCC 684, the Supreme Court has, in turn, held that the rule of interpretation requiring strict construction of Penal Statues does not warrant a narrow and pedantic construction of a provision, so as to leave loopholes for the offenders to escape. A Penal Statute has to also be so construed as to avoid a lacuna and to suppress mischief and to advance a remedy in the light of the rule in Heydon's case; (1976 ER 637). A common sense approach for solving a question of applicability of a Penal State is not ruled out by the rule of strict construction, as held in the case of State of A.P v. Bathu Prakasha Rao; (1976) 3 SCC 301.

    40. In Balram Kumawat v. Union of India; (2003) 7 SCC 628, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that even in relation to a Penal Statute any narrow and pedantic, literal and lexical construction may not always be given effect to. The law would have to be interpreted having regard to the subject matter of the offence and object of the law it seeks to achieve. The purpose of law is not to allow an offender to sneak out of the meshes of law. Criminal jurisprudence does not say so.

    41. In Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam; (2004) 3 SCC 199, again the Supreme Court rejected the submissions based upon strict construction and instead, applied the mischief rule in Heydon's case to construe the provisions of Dowry Prohibition Act in the text of Section 498-A, by specifically referring to the observations of Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estate Ltd. (supra).

    42. In Rajinder Singh (supra), the Supreme Court was dealing with Penal Statues like the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The contention on behalf of the defence was that since these are Penal Statutes, in case of any ambiguity in their language, it should be construed very strictly in favour of the persons, who are accused of the offences. Nariman J. has dealt with this contention at paragraphs 13, 14 and 20 which read thus:

    “13. In order to arrive at the true construction of the definition of dowry and consequently the ingredients of the offence under Section 304B, we first need to determine how a statute of this kind needs to be interpreted. It is obvious that Section 304B is a stringent provision, meant to combat a social evil of alarming proportions. Can it be argued that it is a penal statute and, should, therefore, in case of ambiguity in its language, be construed strictly?

    14. The answer is to be found in two path-breaking judgments of this Court. In M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State Of Kerala, 1963 Supp. (2) SCR 724, a Constitution Bench of this Court was asked to construe Section 5(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. In construing the said Act, a penal statute, Subba Rao, J. Stated: (AIR p.1118, para 9)

    “9. The preamble indicates that the Act was passed as it was expedient to make more effective provisions for the prevention of bribery and Corruption. The long title as well as the preamble indicate that the Act was passed to put down the said social evil i.e bribery and corruption by public servant. Bribery is form of corruption. The fact that in addition to the word “Bribery” the word “corruption” is used shows that the legislation was intended to combat also other evil in addition to bribery. The existing law i.e Penal Code was found insufficient to eradicate or even to control the growing evil of bribery and corruption corroding the public service of our country. The provisions broadly include the existing offences under Sections 161 and 165 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 committed by public servants and enact a new rule of presumptive evidence against the accused. The Act also creates a new offence of criminal misconduct by public servants though to some extent it overlaps on the pre-existing offences and enacts a rebuttable presumption contrary to the well known principles of Criminal Jurisprudence. It also aims to protect honest public servants from harassment by prescribing that the investigation against them could be made only by police officials of particular status and by making the sanction of the Government or other appropriate officer a pre-condition for their prosecution. As it is a socially useful measure conceived in public interest, it should be liberally construed so as to bring about the desired object, i.e to prevent corruption among public servants and to prevent harassment of the honest among them.

    10. A decision of the Judicial Committee in Dyke v. Elliott; (1872) LR 4 PC 184, cited by the Learned Counsel as an aid for construction neatly states the principle and therefore may be extracted: Lord Justice James speaking for the Board observes at page 191:

    “No-doubt all penal Statutes are to be construed strictly, that is to say, the Court must see that the thing charged as an offence is within the plain meaning of the words used, and must not strain the words on any notion that there has been a slip, that there has been a casus omissus, that the thing is so clearly within the mischief that it must have been intended to be included if thought of. On the other hand, the person charged has a right to say that the thing charged although within the words, is not within the spirit of the enactment. But where the thing is brought within the words and within the spirit, there a penal enactment is to be construed like any other instrument, according to the fair commonsense meaning of the language used, and the Court is not to find or make any doubt or ambiguity in the language of a penal statute, where such doubt or ambiguity would clearly not be found or made in the same language in any other instrument.”

    In our view this passage, if we may say so, restates the rule of construction of a penal provision from a correct perspective.”

    20. Given that the statute with which we are dealing must be given a fair, pragmatic, and common sense interpretation so as to fulfil the object sought to be achieved by Parliament, we feel that the judgment in Appasaheb v. State of Maharashtra; (2007) 9 SCC 721, followed by the judgment of Vipin Jaiswal v. State of A.P; (2013) 3 SCC 684, do not state the law correctly. We, therefore, declare that any money or property or valuable security demanded by any of the persons mentioned in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, at or before or at any time after the marriage which is reasonably connected to the death of a married woman, would necessarily be in connection with or in relation to the marriage unless, the facts of a given case clearly and unequivocally point otherwise.”

    43. In Remesh Gelli (supra), the Surpreme Court was dealing with the provisions in Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the Indian Penal Code, 1860. By virtue of Section 46A of the Banking Regulation Act, office bearers/employees of the Banking Company, including a Private Banking Company were “public servants” for the purposes of Chapter IX of IPC. With the enactment of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, offences under Sections 161 to 165A included in Chapter IX of IPC came to be deleted from Chapter IX and incorporated in Sections 7 to 12 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. With the deletion of such provisions from Chapter IX of IPC and inclusion of the same in the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, there ought to have been a corresponding insertion in Section 46A of Banking Regulation Act, with regard to the deeming provision therein being continued in respect of the officials of a Banking Company in so far as the offences under Sections 7 to 12 of the Prevention of Corruption are concerned. However, this was not done. The contention on behalf of the accused persons was that the Prevention of Corruption Act being a Penal Statute, it must receive strict construction and the Courts were powerless to fill up lacuna in the law by process of interpretation. The Supreme Court, by a specific reference to observations of Lord Denning in Seaford Court Estate Ltd. (supra) and other decisions of the Supreme Court, which had specifically approved such observations, rejected such contentions. The Supreme Court held that in a situation where the legislative intent behind the enactment of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, was inter alia, to expand the definition of “public servant”, the omission to incorporate the relevant process of the P.C Act under Section 46A of the Banking Regulation Act after deletion of Sections 161 to 165A of IPC from Chapter IX “can be construed to be a wholly unintended legislative omission, which the Court can fill up by process of interpretation.” The Supreme Court went on to hold that the rule of casus omissus i.e “what has not been provided for in the Statute, cannot be supplied by the Courts” is a strict rule of interpretation, to which there are certain well known exceptions.

    44. The aforesaid discussion is sufficient to reject Ms. Collasso's contention that having regard to the principle of strict construction of Penal Statutes, the Courts are obliged to permit even patent or obvious errors in the Statute to persist, rather than prefer a reasonable construction so as to avoid a lacuna, suppress mischief and advance remedy in the light of the rule in Heydon's case. The rule of construction of a penal provision from the correct perspective as stated in Rajinder Singh (supra) and other decisions referred to in case of criminal legislations like the Prevention of Corruption Act, Dowry Prohibition Act ought to equally apply to a legislation like the NDPS Act which is aimed at eradicating the social evil of trade and indulgence in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

    45. Upon examination of the material on record and after due consideration of the submissions made by Ms. Collasso, it is not possible to accept her contention that no reasonable grounds exist for believing that the applicant is not guilty of the offence under section 27a of the ndps act or that she is not likely to commit any offence whilst on bail. It must be noticed that section 27a of the ndps act deals not merely with harbouring any person engaged in activities referred to in sub clauses (i) to (v) of clause (viiib) of Section 2 of the NDPS Act, but also refers to financing, directly or indirectly of such activities as specified in the sub clauses. In this case, as noted earlier, the pouches of cocaine weighing 84.856 grams were recovered from the premises under the control of the applicant. Considerable cash amount i.e Rs. 1,56,000/- was also recovered from the said premises. The presence of Chindu Mawafor, whom the applicant is alleged to have harboured, has not been satisfactorily explained. In such circumstances, it is not possible to accept Ms. Collasso's contention that no reasonable grounds exist for believing that the applicant is not guilty of offences under section 27a of the ndps act or that she is not likely to commit any offence whilst on bail.

    46. Section 37(1)(b) of the NDPS Act, which begins with non-obstante clause uses the expression “reasonable grounds”. The expression means something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged and this reasonable belief contemplated in turn, points to existence of such facts and circumstances, as are sufficient in themselves to justify recording of satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged. (See Union Of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari. (supra) and Union of India v. Rattan Mallik (supra)).

    47. section 27a of the ndps act provides for rigourous imprisonment for a term, which shall be not less than 10 years, but which may extend to 20 years and shall also be liable to fine, which shall not be less than Rs. 1 Lakh, but which may extend to Rs. 2 Lakhs. Applying the principles in the case of Pramod Wankhede (supra) and taking into consideration the material on record as also the position in law, this is really not a fit case for enlargement of the applicant on bail, particularly when the case of the applicant falls short of the standards prescribed under section 37 of the ndps act, so as to entitle her, enlargement on bail.

    48. There is no case made out to establish any serious non-compliance with the safeguards prescribed under section 50 of the ndps act at this stage. The matter will have to be examined and determined at the trial. Taking into consideration the special provisions contained in Section 37 of the NDPS Act as well as the magnitude of the sentence prescribed, should a person be convicted under section 27a of the ndps act, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, it cannot be said that reasonable grounds exist for believing that the applicant is not guilty of the offences alleged and that she is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

    49. Needless to observe, however, that the observations in this order are made only for the purpose of disposal of the bail application and the same need not influence the NDPS Court, in disposing of the complaint against the accused on its own merits and in accordance with law.

    50. For all the aforesaid reasons, the application for bail is dismissed.

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