K.J Paratwar, Presiding Officer:— The order passed on 2nd February, 2005 by learned Recovery Officer (Smt. H.D Gajbhiye) of this Tribunal disallowing M.A No. 17/2004 iri R.P No. 150/2003 (arising from O.A 185/2001) has aggrieved the appellant-objector, who had taken out the said application.
2. The appellant's case in this appeal (as also in the M.A before the learned Recovery Officer) has been that he is in possession of the property commonly called as ‘Shivaji Mangal Karyalaya’ as lessee since from 1st November, 1998. It is the appellant's case that respondent Nos. 4 to 10 executed Deed of Lease with yearly rent of Rs. 1.50 lakhs and put the appellant in possession. On, or about 3rd November, 2004 respondent No. 3 along with 10-15 persons came over the property and claimed that he had purchased it in auction conducted by Recovery Officer of this Tribunal and that the sale certificate has been issued in his favour pursuant to confirmation of the sale. Thus the appellant's possession was seriously threatened. That was why the appellant took out objection under Rule 11 of 2 Schedule to Income Tax Act, 1961 seeking order directing the respondent No. 3 not to interfere in lawful physical and peaceful possession.
2. The respondent No. 2 contested the objection. The appellant's possession, muchless legal, is contested. The Lease Deed is said to be sham and bogus document.
3. The learned Recovery Officer, after taking into consideration the evidence and circumstances on record and on hearing the learned Counsel for the parties was pleased to disallow the objection and direct the appellant to deliver vacant possession within 15 days failing which forcible possession was directed to be taken. The learned Recovery Officer found that the property was mortgaged way back in 1987; that the certificate debtors allegedly leased the property much thereafter (1.11.98) without knowledge of the mortgagee-respondent No. 1 Bank. The Lease Deed being not registered, is not legal document. No one had pointed out in that recovery proceedings during the course of one year when the proclamation was pasted on 3 occasions about the lease between the appellant and respondent Nos. 4 to 10. That is how the learned Recovery Officer had turned down the contentions taken up by the appellant while disposing of the objection.
4. The impugned order is said to be bad inter alia because the learned Recovery Officer exceeded her jurisdiction inasmuch as she went on to disallow the appellants claim of being tenant. That was in contravention of the legal position that the Recovery Officer cannot go into the question of appellant's right of possession. The appellant's contention is that no sooner the learned Recovery Officer was shown that the appellant is in possession, she should have directed delivery of only symbolic possession. The direction to give physical possession contravenes the appellant's statutory right of remaining in possession. The order, therefore, is said to be unsustainable and is sought to be struck down in this appeal.
5. The respondent No. 2 filed the reply at Ex. 12 and has set out events from the beginning till end. It is reiterated that lease is nothing but eye-wash for depriving the respondent No. 3 from coming into possession and in fact frustrating the execution of Recovery Certificate. The respondent No. 2 had filed reply to the stay application (Ex. 14) which was considered to be say to the appeal. He has also contested the appellant's claim and has supported the order passed by the learned Recovery Officer.
6. I have heard arguments of learned Counsel representing the rival parties. I have gone through the relevant record as necessary for disposal of the appeal.
7. There is unanimity amongst the parties that the objection/claim taken out by the appellant before the Recovery Officer was required to be considered as per provisions of Rule 11, Schedule II under the Income Tax Act, Sub-rules 3 to 5 of which are reproduced for ready reference
“(3) The claimant or objector must adduce evidence to show that-
(a) (in the case of immovable property) at the date of the service of the notice issued under this Schedule to pay the arrears, or
(b) (in the case of movable property) at the date of the attachment, he had some interest in or was possessed of, the property in question.
(4) Where, upon the said investigation, the Tax Recovery Officer is satisfied that, for the reason stated in the claim or objection, such property was not, at the said date, in the possession of the defaulter or of some person in trust for him or in the occupancy of a tenant or other person paying rent to him, or that, being in the possession of the defaulter at the said date, it was so in his possession, not on his own account or as his own property, but on account of or in trust for some other person, or partly on his own account and partly on account of some other person, the Tax Recovery Officer shall make an order releasing the property, wholly or to such extent as he thinks fit, from attachment or sale.
(5) Where the Tax Recovery Officer is satisfied that the property was, at the said date, in the possession of the defaulter as his own property and not on account of any other person, or was in the possession of some other person in trust or in the occupancy of a tenant or other person paying rent to him, the Tax Recovery Officer shall disallow the claim.
The provision thus is made for protecting the settled and rightful possession of a party and ensuring that none should be dispossessed except in accordance with Law.”
8. The position emerging from the provision is that in case the objector/claimant is found to be in possession of the property and that such possession is rightful, the Recovery Officer cannot dispossess such party and the purchaser of the property would have to be given only symbolic possession. If in the investigation done under Rule 11, the objector's/claimant's possession is not believable, he would not be entitled to protection as a result of which the party who has purchased the property in the recovery proceedings would be entitled to possession since in law the possession flows with the ownership.
9. It is undisputed that the property in question was mortgaged by respondent Nos. 4 to 10 in favour of the respondent No. 2 Bank way back in the year 1987. On account of default in repayment, the Bank filed Spl. Civil Suit 475/97 in the Court of Civil Judge, Sr. Dn., Nagpur which on establishment of DRT, Mumbai transferred there, being O.A 916/99 and after establishment of this Tribunal was retransferred here and registered as O.A 185/2001. My learned predecessor while disposing of the O.A by judgment dated 21.8.2003 declared that the Bank's outstandings are secured by the property in question. The property has been sold in the execution of recovery certificate issued by this Tribunal the ownership of respondent No. 3 cannot be and is not questioned.
10. Keeping in mind the above legal position, I would now look into the evidence in support of appellant's possession. The appellant relies on solitary evidence viz. Deed of Lease dated 1.11.1998 on stamp folio of Rs. 100/- executed by respondent Nos. 4 to 10. It seems to be lease in perpetuity on yearly rent of Rs. 1.50 lakhs, which (rent), however, was payable in two instalments each of Rs. 75,000/-. The document also recites that the lease was monthly which commenced from the day of execution but was terminable by 6 months' prior notice, apart from that the lessor had put the lessee (appellant) into possession of the property. It is this document which probed for the limited purpose of possession. Since the Deed was executed in respect of mortgaged property, the mortgagor's power to lease was within Section 65A of the Transfer of Property Act and not unqualified as that of the owner. Section 65A(2)(e) lays down that the duration of lease by the mortgagor shall not exceed 3 years. The Deed of Lease (even if the Deed of Lease is believed to be genuine document) in question is not for a specified period and is, therefore, in contravention of the aforesaid provision of law. Yet, for the completeness I would thrash out other contentions.
10A. The contesting respondents have seriously disputed the document and the appellant's possession on the basis of the document. On behalf of the contesting respondents it was urged that the covenants in the Deed of Lease are bizarre in the sense that from the covenant to the effect that the rent agreed is yearly and lease deed is terminable by 6 months, it would appear that it is yearly lease. But the document mentions that it was monthly lease. I find considerable force in this submission. The aforesaid observations have been made for limited purpose as to whether the appellant's possession over the property can be believed on the basis of the said document. There is no independent evidence to believe in the appellant's possession. If the appellant is in possession for more than six years as he claims, there would have come into existence several other pieces of evidence e.g electricity connection/bills, water bills, property tax payments, if any, made by the appellant, entries in the property tax register of the municipal corporation showing the appellant's possession (which may have been recorded because the appellant is claiming to be using the premises for commercial purpose in which case the higher property tax is payable). But there arc no such circumstances on the record to believe the appellant's possession.
11. Since the appellant's possession itself is not proved within the meaning of Rule 11, the question of protecting the same does not arise. The learned Counsel for the appellant has relied on following citations:
(i) AIR 1974 Bom. 155, (Ganpati Ram Bhanade v. Baliram Raghunath Jadhav)
(ii) (1990) 3 SCC 726 : AIR 1991 SC 796 [Paul Brothers (Tailoring Divn.) v. Ashim Kumar Mondal-with-Phani Bhusan Ghosh v. Ashim Kumar Mondal].
(iii) (2000) 10 SCC 405, (Anwarbi v. Pramod D.A Joshi).
(iv) 88 (2000) DLT 863 (DB) : AIR 2001 Del. 175, (Puran Chand v. Ganeshi Lal Tara Chand).
(v) I (2002) SLT 585 : (2002) 2 SCC 656, (Ratan Lal Jain v. Uma Shankar Vyas).
(vi) 2004 (1) Civil LJ 238 (SC), (H. Seshadri v. K.R Natarajan).
12. I have carefully gone through the citations which are under Order 21 of C.P.C which does not in terms apply to the proceedings before this Tribunal. However, even if the spirit in the ratio in said cases is considered, what Their Lordships have held was that in the execution a purchaser is entitled to symbolic possession of the property if the same is in possession of tenant. There cannot be any quarrel about this legal position which is founded on the basic law that no one should be evicted except in due course of law and as such a tenant enjoying the statutory protection cannot be dispossessed without recourse to the law under which he is enjoying the protection. Thus a party in possession with right to be in possession cannot be dispossessed in execution merely because certain property has been purchased. But this legal position cannot be applied to the facts of this case in which I have indicated that the appellant's possession itself is not believable.
13. Mr. Mokadam, learned Counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance on following citations:
(i) ITR (Vol. 177) 176 (Bombay High Court-Nagpur Bench), Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade (No. 2) v. Tax Recovery Officer.
(ii) VII (1998) SLT. 466 : (1998) 6 SCC 658, Tax Recovery Officer II, Sadar, Nagpur v. Gangadhar Vishwanath Ranade.
(iii) III (2003) BC 469 (DB), (A. Stephen Samuel, Proprietor, Industrial Security Agency v. Union of India).
Their Lordships have while, considering the power of Tax Recovery Officer (In case of proceedings before this Tribunal Recovery Officer) held that his jurisdiction extends to examining possession and only incidentally question of right to possession claimed by the objector. It has been held that lawful tenant of defaulter (Certificate debtor in the recovery proceedings before the Recovery Officer) cannot be ousted by the Recovery Officer who cannot declare the transfer (in this case lease) valid. The above said legal position is also well settled. But, I have already indicated that the appellant's possession itself is not believable. If that be so, the question of the appellant getting protection as tenant does not arise. None of the aforesaid authorities lay down that a person (on the basis of simplicitor claim to be in possession through the mortgagor) should not be ousted. The very fact that the question of possession is required to be gone into by the Recovery Officer under Rule 11 implies that the learned Recovery Officer has to consider and apply mind and find out whether the person is really in possession. The position would be absurd if the things were not so, as that would result in Recovery Officer becoming mute and blind spectator on a person claiming however such claim be bald to be in possession. That indeed cannot be (and is) not the position in law.
14. In view of the above, I hold that the objection was rightly held by the learned Recovery Officer to be without merit. I do not find that the learned Recovery Officer committed any error in disallowing the objection. The appeal thus, is devoid of any merit and is liable to be disallowed.
The appeal is disallowed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.