Amitav Banerji, J.:— A Division Bench comprising Shri P.K Kartha, Vice-Chairman (J) and Shri D.K Chakravorty, AM made a reference by an order dated 18.1.1991 to constitute a Larger Bench to consider the following question:—
Whether there is any legal or constitutional bar to the appointment of an enquiring authority and the presenting officer envisaged in Rule 14(5)(b) & (c) simultaneously with a service of a, Memorandum on a Government servant proposing to hold an enquiry against him pursuant to Rule 14(3) and before the expiry of the time limit specified for submitting a written statement of the defence of the Government servant concerned under Rule 14(4) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965.
2. The two Members differed in their interpretation of Rule 14(5) of the C.C.S (CCA) Rules, 1965. The point urged by the learned counsel for the applicant before the Division Bench was that the entire disciplinary proceeding was vitiated since the Disciplinary Authority simultaneously with the issue of the charge-sheet had appointed the Inquiry Officer. It was urged that Rule 14(5) was very clear that the appointment of Inquiry Officer could be made only after the written statement had been filed by the delinquent Government servant. In support of his contention he had cited a decision of the Cuttack Bench of the Tribunal, decision of the Orissa High Court and decisions by the Chandigarh Bench and the Principal Bench of the Tribunal. While Shri P.K Kartha, Vice-Chairman (J) was of the view that “there is no legal or constitutional infirmity in the appointment of an inquiry officer simultaneous with the service of charge-sheet on the delinquent Government servant concerned”, Shri D.K Chakravorty, AM was of the view that “the appointment of an inquiry officer simultaneous with the issue of a charge-sheet to a Government servant, is not in conformity with the provisions of the CCS (CCA) Rules, and is not legally sustainable.” Shri R.P Oberoi, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that he has filed a Misc. Petition for reframing the question deleting the reference to constitutional provisions. He did not, therefore, argue on the question of constitutional limitations and confined himself entirely to the provisions of the CCS (CCA) Rules and to the decisions as of the Orissa High Court.
3. Shri R.P Oberoi submitted that Rules 14(5) of the CCS (CCA) Rules was clear. It permitted the appointment of Inquiry Officer only after the Disciplinary Authority has received a written statement of defence. He urged that this was mandatory provision and any breach thereunder would render the entire proceedings illegal. Admittedly, he argued the order of appointment of the Inquiry Officer was made simultaneously with the order issuing charge-sheet to the applicant. He urged that this could not be done and was well supported by a series of decisions to which reference would be made later. He also urged that similar Rules as in Rule 14(5) exist in the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 [for short, AIS (D & A) Rules, 1969] and in the Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962, which have come in for interpretation before the Benches of the Tribunal. He further urged that there was prejudice caused to the applicant because the Disciplinary Authority had a closed mind when he appointed the Inquiry Officer simultaneously with the issue of the charge-sheet. The order of appointing the Inquiry Officer was unwarranted. He urged that if there be an error of law, it would vitiata the proceedings. He further, submitted that if there was an infringement in sub-rule (5), it is liable to be quashed.
4. Mrs. Raj Kumari Chopra appearing for the respondents contended that the simultaneous order of appointment of the Inquiry Officer along with the issue of charge-sheet to the delinquent Government servant does not amount to any illegality and at best could be an irregular. She urged that no prejudice has been caused to the applicant because of the appointment of an Inquiry Officer and as such, the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is not liable to be struck down. She further urged that the plea of the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority appointing Inquiry Officer even before the written statement was filed was not taken up at any stage before the Inquiry Officer or the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority. The matter has been taken up for the first time before the Division Bench of; the Tribunal. Learned counsel urged that the provision of Rule 14(5) of the CCS (CCA) Rules was not mandatory in nature and as such even if there was an infringement thereof, it did not affect the applicant at all.
5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at some length and have also perused the case law cited by them at the Bar
6. Part VI of the CCS(CCA) Rules pertains to procedure for imposing penalties. Rule 14 pertains to procedure for imposing major penalties. Reference may be made to sub-rules (2), (4) and (5)(a), (b) and (c) of Rule 14 of the CCS(CCA) Rules which are in the following words:
“14. Procedure for imposing major penalties.
(1)………..
(2) Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against a Government servant, it may itself inquire into, or appoint under this rule or under the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850, as the case may be, an authority to inquire into the truth thereof.
Explanation— Where the disciplinary authority itself holds the inquiry, any reference in sub-rule (7) to sub-rule (20) and in sub-rule (22) to the inquiring authority shall be construed as a reference to the disciplinary authority.
(3)………….
(4) The disciplinary authority shall deliver or cause to be delivered to the Government servant a copy of the articles of charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehavior and a list of documents and witnesses by which each article or charges is proposed to be sustained and shall require the Government servant to submit, within such time as may be specified, a written statement of his defence and state whether he desires to be heard in person.
(5)(a) On receipt of the written statement of defence, the disciplinary authority may itself inquire into such of the articles of charge as are not admitted, or, if it considers it necessary to do so, appoint under Sub-rule (2), an inquiring authority for the purpose, and where all the articles of charge have been admitted by the Government servant in his written statement of defence, the disciplinary authority shall record its findings on each charge after taking such evidence as it may think fit and shall act in the manner laid down in Rule 15.
(b) If no written statement of defence is submitted by the Government servant the disciplinary authority may itself inquire into the articles of charge, or may, if it considers it necessary to do so, appoint, under Sub-rule (2), an inquiring authority for the purpose.
(c) Where the disciplinary authority itself inquires into any article of charge or appoints an inquiring authority for holding any inquiry into such charge, it may, by an order, appoint a Government servant or a legal practitioner, to be known as the “Presenting Officer” to present on its behalf the case in support of the articles of charge.
7. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules empowers the Disciplinary Authority to deliver to the Government servant a copy of the articles of charge, the statement of the imputations of misconduct or misbehavior and a list of documents and witnesses by which each article or charges is proposed to be sustained and shall require the Government servant to submit, within such time as may be specified, a written statement of his defence and state whether he desires to be heard in person.
8. Sub-rule (5)(a) of Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Ruies, the provision of which we have to interpret makes it clear that after the written statement of defence has been received, the disciplinary authority has to decide whether he would himself inquire into the article of charges as are not admitted or appoint an inquiring authority for the purpose. However, where all the article of charges have been admitted by the Government servant in his written statement of defence, the disciplinary authority shall record its findings on each charge after taking such evidence as it may think fit and proceed in the manner laid down in Rule 15. Sub-clause (b) of sub-rule (5) of Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules provides that if a delinquent Government servant does not submit a written statement, it is open to the disciplinary authority to himself inquire into the charges or appoint an Inquiry Officer for the purpose. Sub-clause (c) of sub-rule (5) provides that the disciplinary authority or an inquiring authority, as the case may be, have the power to appoint a Government servant or a legal practitioner, to be known as the “Presenting Officer” to present the case, on behalf of the Government in support of the articles of charge.
9. Sub-rule 5 (a) of Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules thus makes a provision for the disciplinary authority himself to inquire into the matter or appoint an inquiry officer to do so the same. This is, however, subject to the provisions that where one or more charges is/are not admitted by the delinquent officer, he has to be proceeded with under Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. In case he admits all the charges, then it is for the disciplinary authority to record its finding on each charge after taking evidence as he may think it fit and proceed in accordance with Rule 15, i.e to take action in the inquiry report including imposing the penalty. But sub-sule 5(a) speaks of a condition and that is confined to opening few words of the said sub-rule, viz., “On receipt of the written statement………………………” The disciplinary authority has been given power to inquire into the matter or appoint an inquiry officer after a written statement is filed. Great emphasis was given by the learned counsel for the applicant that the rule is clear viz., that the disciplinary authority cannot appoint an inquiry officer until he had received a copy of the written statement of defence. We do not find any prohibition in sub-rule 5(a) that the disciplinary authority is not entitled to make an appointment before the written statement of defence is filed. The rule as it exists, empowers the disciplinary authority to proceed in the matter after considering the defence statement submitted by the delinquent officer, viz., whether he has denied the charges. Even if he has denied one of the several charges, it becomes mandatory for the disciplinary authority appointing an inquiry officer. He has, therefore to merely scan the written statement of defence and find out whether there is denial of charges. Even if there be a denial of one charge, he had no option but to proceed with the inquiry as mentioned above.
10. The Rule does not begin with a prohibition that no matter can be inquired or no inquiry officer can be appointed until the written statement of defence is filed. That would have been a mandatory provision of law. Sub-rule (5)(a) comtemplates the filing of the written statement where upon the disciplinary authority to take further action depending on whether the charges have been denied. In case all the charges are accepted, he shall proceed under Sub-rule (5)(a) himself and record his finding on each charge after taking such evidence as may be deemed fit. In case there is a denial, he is required to exercise an option whether to be the inquiring officer or appoint someone as inquiry officer. Thus, Sub-rule (5)(a) contemplates appointment of an inquiry officer only after the receipt of a written statement of defence which contains a denial of the charge. However, the pertinent question is whether any harm is done in the case of a premature appointment.
11. We are, however, of the view that Sub-rule (5)(a) is not mandatory in character. The language of the rule does not impose a prohibition in appointing an inquiry officer even prior to the receipt of the written statement of defence. The normal procedure is to wait for the written statement of defence to be filed to peruse it and to notice whether ahy of the charges are denied and then appoint an inquiry officer if the disciplinary authority is not inclined to be the inquiry officer. CCS (CCA) Rules have the authority of law and are to be followed. We may also refer at this stage to the provision of sub-rule (1) of Rule 14 of the CCS(CCA) Rules, which reads as follows:
“(1) No order imposing any of the penalties specified in clauses (v) to (ix) of Rule 11 shall be made except after an inquiry held, as far as may be, in the manner provided in this Rule and Rule 15, or in the manner provided by the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, i850 (37 of 1850), where such inquiry is held under that Act.”
12. This indicates that inquiry shall be held, as far as may be, in the manner provided in this Rule and Rule 15. The expression “this rule” refers to Rule 14 and that includes sub-rules (2), (4), (5)(a), (b) and j(c). Therefore, the procedure that is to be followed has to be, as far as may be, in the manner provided in this Rule. The use of expression “as far as may be” gives liberty to the disciplinary authority to follow the procedure as far as possible to denude the mandatory nature of the provision. However, if the order causes prejudice to the party, in that event, it would give rise jto a question as to whether the delinquent Government servant has been prejudiced in his defence and inquiry proceedings.
13. This brings us to the next question of prejudice. The point has been. raised in the order of Shri P.K Kartha, Vice-Chairman (J) who has clearly stated that the applicant is not prejudiced by the order naming the inquiry officer simultaneously with the sending of the charge-sheet to the delinquent officer. We asked the learned counsel to point out what prejudice has been caused by the above to the applicant. Learned counsel contended that the very fact that the appointment of the inquiry officer was made simultaneously with the sending of the charge-sheet showed that he had a closed mind. In other words, the disciplinary authority had taken a decision to proceed with the inquiry even before the written statement of defence had been filed. Learned counsel also submitted that when the rule contemplates a particular action and it is not followed, it amounts to a breach of law and that causes a prejudice in the trial or the inquiry proceedings. He also submitted that the point at which the inquiry officer is to be appointed is a stage after the receipt of the written statement of defence and the appointment of the inquiry officer even before that stage gives rise to a feeling in the delinquent officer that everything has been set for his conviction and penalty. We are unable to agree with these contentions. Shri P.K Kartha, Vice-Chairman (J) has clearly stated that “there is no legal or constitutional bar to the appointment of an enquiring authority and the presenting officer under Rule 14(5)(b) & (c) of the CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965, simultaneously with the service of the Mamorandum proposing to hold an inquiry against a Government servant, pursuant to Rule 14(3) of the said Rules”. It was urged on behalf of the, respondents that since the inquiry officer and presenting officer did not have any role to play immediately on their appointment, they have not infringed any rule. The inquiry officer could only proceed with the case when the disciplinary authority had made an order to proceed with the inquiry under Rule 14(6). Till that time his appointment is dormant, unless it could be shown that the inquiry officer had started acting.
14. We are firmly of the view that until some over-action is taken by the disciplinary authority before the receipt of the written statement of defence, there is no question of any prejudice being caused to the delinquent officer. It is significant to note that there was not a whisper of prejudice in the written statement or in the proceedings before the inquiry officer or before the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority. The point has been taken before the Tribunal for the first time. If he was prejudiced, he ought to have taken this plea before the inquiry officer at the outset. But he was also required to show what was the prejudice. Learned counsel for the applicant admitted that the plea of prejudice was not taken before the inquiry officer or the disciplinary authority to urge that he is not precluded from taking this plea before the Tribunal. True, he can surely take the plea which raises a question of law before the Tribunal but had he taken the plea before the inquiry officer or the disciplinary authority, it would have supported his case.
15. Learned counsel for the applicant while concluding his arguments stated that in the present case the inquiry officer had started acting even before the written statement of defence was filed. If it was so, it may be raised and urged before the Division Bench hearing the Application. This matter has neither been mentioned nor raised in the referring order, and hence, we decline to make any observation in this regard.
16. We now refer to the cases which have been cited at the Bar to notice how different Benches of the Tribunal and Courts have interpreted Rule 14(5)(a) of the CCS(CCA) Rules and similar Rules in other enactments.
17. In the case of B.K Mishra v. U.O.I through Secretary M.O.H.A [ATR 1988 (1) CAT 454], one of the questions that came up was in regard to the violation of Sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 of A.I.S (D & A) Rules, 1969. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 of A.I.S(D & A) Rules, 1969 reads as follows:
“8. Procedure for imposing major penalties:—
(2) Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any
imputation of misconduct or misbehaviour against a member of the Serivce, it may appoint under this rule or under the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act 1850, as the case may be, an authority to inquire into the truth thereof.”
18. Similar is the provision under Rule 14(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules 1965, In paragraph 28 of the report, a Division Bench of the Principal Bench of the Tribunal held:
“A mere reading of Sub-rule 6 (a) of Rule 8 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 shows that it is only on receipt of the written statement of defence that the disciplinary authority may appoint, under Sub-rule (2), an inquiring authority for the purpose of inquiring into such of the articles of charge as are not admitted. In the present case, the disciplinary authority initially approved the appointment of the Inquiry Officer even before receipt of the written statements of defence. Shri N.S Mehta, learned counsel for the respondents, argued that Sub-rule (2) of Rule 8 empowers the disciplinary authority to appoint the Inquiry Officer even without waiting for the statement of defence. We are afraid that such a meaning of Sub-rule (2) will be incompatible with the provision in Sub-rule(6)…………”
19. However, in para 30 of the report the Bench made it clear that:
“the charge-sheet itself, although issued on 26-5-1980, was served on the petitioner only towards the end of June 1980 and he submitted his reply within the stipulated time.”
20. The Bench observed:
“As such, appointment of the Inquiry Officer in regard to the charge-sheet dated 26-5-1980 on the same date viz., 26-5-80 cannot be held to be in order. The written statement of defence, however, cryptic, was required to be placed before the disciplinary authority in compliance with Sub-rule 6 of Rule 8 of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969 before notifying the appointment of the Inquiry Officer……………….”
21. The Division Bench further observed:
“…….the appointment of the Inquiry Officer after expiry of the time limit given for submission of the defence would be in order……………….”
22. In the case of B.K Misra (supra), the proceedings were at the inquiry stage when he approached the Tribunal. The Division Bench, therefore, observed in paragraph 31 as under:
In both the enquiries, not much progress has been made so far except for examination and inspection of documents by the petitioner and supply of statements of witnesses earlier recorded and no prejudice has been caused to him either because the communication of the appointment of Inquiry Officer in one charge-sheet was not communicated to him separately or that an Inquiry Officer has been appointed without considering his statement of defence in the other charge-sheet.”
23. It may be mentioned here that in the present case not only the inquiry proceedings had been completed but penalty of reduction of pay of the applicant by two stages in the pay scale of Rs. 2000-3500 (from Rs. 3500 to Rs. 3300) for a period of one year with directions that increment of pay will not be earned during the period of reduction and the same will not have the effect of postponing future increments has been imposed (Annexure-I).
24. We may now refer to another decision of the Cuttack Bench of the Tribunal in the case of Ratnakar Behura v. U.O.I [ATR 1989 (1) CAT 391]. The Division Bench was dealing with the provisions of Rule 14(i) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 and Rule 14(4) of the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850. The Division Bench of the Tribunal at Cuttack was of the view that an inquiring officer has to be appointed only when the disciplinary authority is of the opinion that there are grounds to be proceeded against the delinquent officer. Referring to Sub-rule (5)(a) of Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, the Division Bench referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Kasinath Dikshita v. Union of India [1986 (2) SLR 620 (SC)] where it was laid down that:
“When a Government servant is facing a disciplinary proceeding, he is entitled to be afforded a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges against him in an effective manner. And no one facing a departmental enquiry can effectively meet the charges unless the copies of the relevant statements and documents to be used against him are made available to him. In the absence of such copies, how can the concerned employee prepare his defence, cross-examine the witnesses, and point out his inconsistencies with a view to show that the allegations are incredible?”
25. Thereafter the Division Bench observed:
“In view of the aforesaid observations of their Lordships another point which needs to be determined is as to the stage in which the defence is prepared. In our opinion, the defence is prepared at the stage when the explanation is submitted because the provisions contained relating to the procedure laid down as quoted above under Rule 14 are not meant to be mechanically applied or they are not the pious wishes of the rule making authority. Those rules have been framed to be strictly applied to a particular case and the orders according to law have to be passed by the disciplinary authority. The rule contemplates that an Inquiring Officer has to be appointed only when the disciplinary authority is of opinion that there are grounds to be proceeded against the delinquent officer and the disciplinary authority can come to such a conclusion only when it considers the defence of the delinquent officer as to whether it is acceptable or not. If the judicial mind of the disciplinary authority is of opinion that the explanation is acceptable and so also the defence prepared by him in the explanation, then there would be no further scope for the disciplinary authority to appoint an inquiring officer. The charges are to be dropped at that stage…………….”
(Emphasis supplied)
26. With great respect, we are unable to agree with the view mentioned in the portion italicized above. The case of the Kasinath Dikshita (supra) has no relevance in the present case. It is not the applicant's case that he was not given copies of the relevant material to effectively defend himself. But we are in this case at a stage prior to the regular inquiry proceedings. The stage is when should the inquiry officer be appointed and whether the appointment of the inquiry officer even before the receipt of the written statement is violative of any rule which vitiate the inquiry proceedings. There is nothing in Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules and the sub-rules thereof to indicate that when the written statement is filed, the disciplinary authority has to go into the merits of the written statement and form an opinion that there are grounds to be proceeded against the delinquent officer nor has he to consider the question whether the written statement is acceptable or not. A bare reading of Sub-rule (5)(a), (b) and (c) makes it clear that the jurisdiction to hold an inquiry stems from one fact, viz., whether the delinquent officer has denied all or any of the charges spelt out in the charge-sheet. If he had done so, an inquiry must be held against him and it may be done either by the disciplinary authority himself or by an inquiry officer. The inquiry officer does not come into the picture at all nor he is effective until the disciplinary authority asks him to proceed with the inquiry under Rule 14(6). There is no stage where the disciplinary authority has to consider the merits of the written statement of defence and to find out whether it is acceptable or not. With great respect, we are unable to accept the above view expressed by the Division Bench at Cuttack as there is no such provision in the CCS (CCA) Rules.
27. We were referred to the case of Nilamadhab Sahu v. Registrar of Co-Operative Societies, decided by the Division Bench of the Orissa High Court and reported in 1978 Vol. XLVI The Cuttack Law Times page. 115. It was a matter under the Orissa Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962 and the reference was to Rule 15(4) which is as follows:
“On receipt of the written statement of defence or, if no such statement is received within the time specified the disciplinary authority may itself inquire into such of the charges as are not admitted or, if it considers it necessary so to do, appoint a board of inquiry or an inquiring officer for the purpose.”
28. This provision is similar to the CCS (CCA) Rules. In the judgment of the Orissa High Court it is mentioned:
“………..As per Rule 15 of the Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962, after the charges are served on the delinquent by the disciplinary authority, the delinquent is to be afforded an opportunity to submit his written statement of defence. Sub-rule (4) thereof states that on receipt of the written statement of defence, or if no such statement is received within the time specified the disciplinary authority may itself inquire into such of the charges as are not admitted, or, if he considers it necessary so to do, appoint a Board of Enquiry or ah enquiring officer for that purpose. The language of Sub-rule (4) makes it clear that after submission of the written statements of defence by the delinquent within the time specified for the same and consideration of the same by the disciplinary authority, or if no such statement is submitted within the time specified, then only the disciplinary statement is submitted within the time specified, then only the authority can appoint an enquiring officer, and no enquiring officer can be appointed before that.”
29. The Division Bench of the Hight Court observed:
“The learned counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner has already submitted his written statement of defence but that has been filed before the enquiring officer as directed in Annexure-1. The explanation shall be deemed to be the written statement of defence of the petitioner under Sub-rule(4) of Rule 15…………..
30. In this case before us, as stated above, the enquiring officer has been appointed simultaneously with the framing of the charges against the petitioner. That certainly is not permissible under the law. Accordingly, the appointment of the enquiring officer as mentioned in Annexure-1 has to be and is hereby quashed.”
31. It was also a case in which disciplinary proceedings were pending and had not come to an end.
32. In the case of Gurbachan Singh v. Commandant 259. Coy Asc (Sur) Type ‘G’ (1990 (2) A.T.J Vol. 9 page 369) a Division Bench of the Tribunal at Chandigarh after quoting Rule 14(5)(a) of the CCS (CCA) Rules observed:
“It is obvious that the action contemplated in the above sub-rule is to be initiated on receipt of the written statement of defence. Consequently, the order dated 23.5.1981 (Annexure P/3) appointing the Enquiry Officer before receiving the statement of defence was in contravention of the provisions of Rule 14(5)(a) of the Rules and is, thus, not sustainable.”
33. The remaining part of the aforesaid paragraph pertains to the petitioners not being allowed to appoint the defence Assistant of their choice and that was Held to be denial of reasonable opportunity to the petitioners for defending themselves. That question has not been raised before us in this case. The other point raised was that no subsistence allowance was paid to the petitioners till their removal from service. Another argument raised before that Bench was that the Inquiry Officer was biased against them and that the entire enquiry proceedings stand vitiated. This is also not a matter referred to us. Consequently, in the case of Gurbachan Singh (supra) the view taken by the Bench was that the appointment of the inquiry officer before the receipt of the written statement of defence was in contravention of the provisions of Rule 14(5)(a) of the CCS (CCA) Rules and thus not sustainable. Question of prejudice has not been considered in this case nor the question whether the aforesaid provision is mandatory in nature has been discussed.
34. In the case of Nilakantha Mishra v. Union of India [1990 (13) ATC 870] a Division Bench of the Tribunal at Cuttack commenting upon the appointment of an inquiry officer before filing the written statement observed in paragraph 8 as under:
“Without lengthening the judgment any further, we would simply observe that from Annexure 2 series it would be found that before any written statement of defence was filed an enquiring officer was appointed. The rules prescribe that after the written statement of defence is filed, the disciplinary authority shall decide whether an enquiry would be necessary or not. Therefore, prior to the filing of the written statement of defence, it is not permissible to appoint an enquiring officer as that would amount to putting the cart before the horse. There are also other infirmities in the procedure adopted by the enquiring officer in that some records which were siezed by the Central Bureau of Investigation were not made available to the applicant during the enquiry though he requested for production of those documents. For all these reasons we would hold that the order of punishment is vitiated and accordingly the punishment order is quashed……”
35. This is more or less in the line of the earlier decisions taken by the Cuttack Bench of the Tribunal.
36. Learned counsel for the applicant thereafter referred to the case of Dr. Ashok Kumar Seth v. The State of Bihar [1988 (1) SLJ (CAT) 179]. Here the proceedings were quashed because there was no charge-sheet. It was observed that the charge-sheet had to be in proper form containing all necessary information and issued by a proper authority and a letter cannot be called a charge-sheet. The facts of this case are entirely different and have no relevance to the question referred to the Full Bench.
37. Reliance was placed on the case of Udey Bir Singh v. Union of India [1987 (2) ATC 251] decided by a Division Bench of the Principal Bench. A perusal of this case shows that it has no relevance to the question at issue. All that was said was that if there was an error in law, it would vitiate the proceedings. It was a case in which no inquiry was held and the disciplinary authority relied on a medical report to hold that the applicant had consumed alcohol and on its basis he was punished. The order of compulsory retirement was quashed and he was reinstated. This case is also not, relevant.
38. We now refer to the case of K. Venkatraman v. Controller General of Defence Accounts [ATR 1989 (1) CAT 218]. The allegation was that during the inquiry, the inquiry officer did not follow the procedure laid down in Rule 14(8), 14 (9), 14 (14), 14 (16), 14 (17) and 14 (18). The learned Single Member points out that “A perusal of the inquiry file reveals that here is clear infringement of procedure setout in Sub-rule (14), (16), (17) and (18) of Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules 1965.” The learned Single Member held that a penalty order imposing “censure” on the applicant cannot be sustained, legally and, therefore, the impugned order was quashed. The provisions of Sub-rule (14), (16), (17) and (18) require that certain procedure had to be followed by the inquiry officer. It had to be followed during the inquiry and these provisions pertain to the oral and documentary evidence, examination of witnesses, the role of the presenting officer. In other words, it gives an opportunity to delinquent officer to defend himself. The question which, when and how witnesses are to be examined and relevant are material. In this case the Single Member Bench was clearly of the view that there was a violation of Sub-rules (14), (16), (17) and (18) of Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. It is clear from a perusal of Sub-rules (14), (16), (17) and (18) that these pertain to the procedure to be followed in an inquiry and it was mandatory in nature. Non-following of the same would cause a prejudice to the applicant and it can be said that he has been denied an opportunity to defend himself adequately. The provisions in Sub-rules (14), (16), (17) 1 and (18) are on a different plane. They are for conduct of proceedings in an inquiry and not before the inquiry has started. All that could be argued on the basis of this case was that provisions of Sub-rules (14), (16), (17) and (18) of Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules were infringed. The inquiry proceedings were quashed and same would be the position with regard to Sub-rule (5)(a) of Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965. We do not agree
39. Reference may be made to the case of Clement Dungdung v. Union of India, 1987 (3) SLJ (CAT) 323] also decided by the Cuttack Bench of the Tribunal. There too the applicant was charge-sheeted and before the statement of defence, an inquiry officer was appointed. The allegation was that the disciplinary authority had a closed mind. The Bench took the view that inquiry officer is to be appointed, if necessary, only after considering the defence statement. In this case the Bench referred to the case Nilamadhab Sahu (supra) and the case of Jagannath Mohapatra… v. Utkal University…Opp. Party. [1979 (47) CLT 5]. In the above judgments it was specifically laid down that the inquiry officer had to be appointed if the disciplinary authority was satisfied that the explanation submitted by the delinquent officer was not acceptable and there was prima facie case against him for conducting a disciplinary proceeding against him. The above statement, of law, in our opinion, is not quite correct and we have made reference to the same in the case of Ratnakar Behura (supra). However, the Division Bench held that Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules 1965 is in par with the Rules embodied in Orissa Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1962 and as such, the Division Bench took the stand that they could follow the decisions of the High Court in the matter. They, therefore, held that:
“In the present case, we find that the disciplinary authority has committed the same illegality and therefore, we have no hesitation in our mind to accept the view of the Hon'ble High Court of Orissaj to the above effect and we would hold that illegality having been committed by the disciplinary authority, the petitioner has been prejudiced. We would hereby quash the order of punishment and exonerate the petitioner from the charges levelled against him.”
40. In regard to the matter of prejudice, we may refer to the observation made by Shri P.K Kartha in this referring order which reads as follows:
“I am unable to agree with the aforesaid views of the, Cuttack Bench, the Chandigarh Bench and the Principal Bench of the Tribunal. There is no indication in these judgments as to how the applicants concerned were prejudiced by the mere appointment of the enquiring authority and the presenting officer. Such appointment does not also necessarily indicate that the disciplinary authority had a closed mind. The appointment of an enquiring authority and the presenting officer will have relevance only if and when an inquiry is to be held and not otherwise. If such appointment is to be viewed as disclosing a closed mind of the disciplinary authority, it could even be argued that the very proposal to hold an enquiry discloses a closed mind.”
41. This aspect of the matter has not been considered by any of the Division Benches of the Tribunal sitting at Cuttack, Chandigarh or New Delhi or any High Court. We can understand that where a prejudice has been caused by not applying the provisions of Rules, it would be just and proper to quash or set aside such appointment of inquiry officer. There could be a case where an inquiry officer had started functioning even before the filing of the written Statement of defence by the delinquent officer. We refrain from expressing our views since this is not referred to this Full Bench.
42. But where the inquiry officer has not played any role whatsoever even though his appointment is prior to the filing of the written statement of defence, we cannot visualise any prejudice at all. Where there is a denial of any charge and an inquiry has to be ordered, there is no requirement to go into the merits of the written statement of defence or record whether it is acceptable or not. The disciplinary authority is only required to find out whether there is a denial of the charges by the delinquent officer and then he has to make up his mind whether he will do the inquiry himself or it will be done by an inquiry officer. The proper course for him is to appoint the inquiry officer only after the written statement is filed. But where this has not been followed, it would not vitiate the entire proceedings, for as seen above, firstly, it does not cause any prejudice, secondly it is not a mandatory order and, thirdly, Rule 14(1) or CCS (CCA) Rules makes it clear that the inquiry be held, as far as may be, in the manner provided in this Rule.
43. We are, therefore, unable to agree with the views expressed in the decisions of the Principal Bench, Cuttack and Chandigarh Benches of the Tribunal as mentioned above for the reasons indicated. We say so with great respect. So long as the delinquent officer does not suffer due to any act of the inquiry officer, his premature appointment by itself does not cause him a prejudice. It may be mentioned here that the inquiry officer is empowered to commence his proceedings as provided under Rule 14(6) of the CCS (CCA) Rules. Reference may also be made to the observation by Hegde, J. in the case of State Of Uttar Pradesh v. Om Prakash Gupta [1969 SLR 890 (SC)] where it is said:
“Any minor irregularity in the matter of conducting the enquiry cannot vitiate a finding which is so obviously correct.”
44. Their Lordships further said:
“It is true that an enquiry under Section 240 of the Government of India Act, must be conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. But those principles are not embodied principles. What principle of natural justice should be applied in a particular case depends on the facts and circumstances of that case. All that the courts have to see is whether the non-observance of any of those principles in a given case is likely to have resulted in deflecting the course of justice.”
45. Our answer, therefore, is as follows:
(1) Where the Inquiry Officer has been appointed simultaneously with the issue of the charge-sheet or even before the receipt of the written statement of defence from the delinquent officer, it may be an irregular exercise of power but does not amount to an illegality unless it is shown that a prejudice has been caused to the delinquent Government servant.
(2) Sub-rule (5)(a) of Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules contemplates the appointment of an Inquiry Officer after the receipt of the written statement of defence. But its breach by a premature appointment does not result in vitiating the disciplinary proceedings so long as no prejudice has been caused to the delinquent Government servant.’
46. We order accordingly.
47. The papers of this case will be placed before the Division Bench for further order.