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  • provisions of Rule 3 (1)(i), 3(1) (ii) and 3(1)(iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules,
  • provisions of Rule 33(2)
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • provisions of Rule 3 (1)(i), 3(1) (ii) and 3(1)(iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules,
  • provisions of Rule 33(2)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The applicant, a Postal Assistant employed under the Respondent Ministry of Telecommunication, was served a Charge Memo dated 21.2.2000 under CCS (CCA) Rule 14 (Annexure A/1). The Article of Charge alleged that the applicant failed to check and challenge certain re-discharged paid NSC/KVP vouchers for various dates and serials, causing a departmental loss of Rs. 99,955 and allegedly violating Rule 33(2) of PO SB Manual Vol. II and Rules 3(1)(i), 3(1)(ii) and 3(1)(iii) of the CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.

An inquiry was conducted and the Inquiry Officer (IO) found the charges not proved and recorded findings indicating that the charged official had been deprived of reasonable opportunity to some extent and that the prosecution could not establish abstraction resulting in loss to the Department. Despite this, the Disciplinary Authority (DA) issued a Disagreement Note and, by order dated 18.8.2005, imposed a penalty of reduction of pay by one stage in the time scale (from Rs. 5,200 to Rs. 5,100) for two years without cumulative effect (Annexure A/3). The Appellate Authority (AA) upheld the DA's order by order dated 10/13.3.2006 (Annexure A/4).

The present Original Application seeks quashing of the DA's and AA's impugned orders as well as the Charge Memo and the DA's Disagreement Note (Annexures A/1–A/4). The applicant advanced grounds including that the penalty was imposed on a charge not framed in the Charge Memo, denial of reasonable opportunity, absence of evidence constituting misconduct, and unjustified delay in prosecution and imposition of penalty.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Disciplinary Authority could legitimately impose a penalty based on a charge or factual basis that was not part of the Charge Memo served on the charged official.
  2. Whether there was a denial of reasonable opportunity to the charged official during the inquiry sufficient to vitiate the disciplinary outcome.
  3. Whether the material before the inquiry and authorities constituted evidence of "misconduct" as distinguished from negligence, error of judgment, or innocent mistake.
  4. Whether the inordinate or unjustified delay in instituting or concluding disciplinary action (including imposition of penalty years after the alleged cause of action) warrants quashing of the impugned orders.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments

  • The penalty was imposed on a factual charge that did not form part of the Charge Memo; the DA's Disagreement Note sought to prove an allegation different from the one framed in the Charge Memo.
  • The Inquiry Officer had found the charges not proved; despite that, the DA disagreed and imposed penalty without an objectively demonstrable basis.
  • There was denial of reasonable opportunity during the inquiry (relevant defence witness and certain evidence were not allowed by the IO), which prejudiced the defence.
  • Even if some negligence existed, negligence or error of judgment does not amount to "misconduct" as defined by higher court authority.
  • There was an unjustified and substantial delay between the alleged cause of action (1995–1996), the Charge Memo (2000), and the penalty order (2005–2006), causing prejudice and harassment.
  • The applicant contended that the re-discharging of the KVPs had been carried out by another officer (SPM Idgah Colony) and that the applicant had in fact brought the matter to higher authorities' notice.

Disciplinary Authority / Respondents' Position

  • The DA recorded disagreement with the IO's report, relying on an asserted statement (referred to as exhibit K/1 dated 23.09.2003) in which the charged official allegedly admitted noticing overwriting and discrepancy in the KVPs and nonetheless discharged them, thereby showing negligence that allowed the fraud to succeed.
  • The Appellate Authority simply reiterated the view taken by the DA and upheld the penalty imposed by the DA.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Inspector Prem Chand v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2007) 4 SCC 566 Definition of "misconduct": misconduct arises from ill motive; acts of negligence, errors of judgment, or innocent mistake do not constitute such misconduct. The Court relied on this authority to support the conclusion that mere negligence or an error of judgment by the charged official would not, by itself, constitute misconduct warranting disciplinary penalty; this informed the conclusion that there was no misconduct in the strict sense.
Baldev Singh v. Union of India, (1994) 8 SLR 797 (Punjab & Haryana High Court) Principle that an employee cannot be punished for a charge which was not levelled against him; punishing on a charge not framed breaches principles of natural justice and renders the order nullity. The Court invoked this dicta to hold that the order of penalty rested on a charge or factual basis not framed in the Charge Memo, and that imposing punishment on such unlevelled charge violated natural justice, supporting quashing of the impugned orders.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the inquiry report, the DA's Disagreement Note, the DA's order imposing penalty, and the AA's order upholding that penalty. The IO had concluded that the charges were not proved, expressly recorded that the charged official had been deprived of reasonable opportunity to some extent (noting that certain defence evidence and an FIR were not allowed by the IO), and found that the prosecution had not established abstraction of the vouchers due to the charged official's negligence.

The DA, however, disagreed with the IO and imposed penalty. The DA's reasoning rested principally on an asserted statement (identified as exhibit K/1 dated 23.09.2003) allegedly showing that the charged official had observed discrepancies and still discharged the KVPs, thereby enabling the fraud. The Court identified a critical factual error in the DA's reasoning: the statement relied upon by the DA was not made by the charged official but by another witness (DW‑1, Shri B.R. Karoria), revealing a prima facie non-application of mind and a hasty, unsupported inference by the DA.

The Court further noted the applicant's contentions, supported by the IO's report, that the re-discharging had been done by the SPM Idgah Colony and that the applicant had, in fact, brought the matter to the attention of higher authorities. The IO's report corroborated these defenses and recorded procedural deficiencies in the inquiry (denial of opportunity to produce defence evidence).

The Court considered the legal standard for "misconduct" and, invoking the Apex Court's authority in Inspector Prem Chand, observed that negligence or error of judgment does not amount to misconduct unless ill motive or culpable intent is established. The DA had not demonstrated any motive or direct complicity; its conclusion appeared to rest on negligence inferred from a misattributed statement.

The Court also addressed delay. It observed a substantial and unexplained delay — nearly a decade from the cause of action to the penalty imposition — and noted authorities establishing that while delay alone may not automatically invalidate disciplinary action, an unjustified and protracted delay is a source of harassment and can prejudice the defence. Considering the collective circumstances — the IO's exoneration, denial of reasonable opportunity, the DA's non‑application of mind, the absence of proof of misconduct, and the long delay — the Court concluded that the impugned orders could not stand.

Holding and Implications

The Original Application is allowed; the impugned orders are quashed and set aside.

Implications and consequences:

  • The charged official (applicant) is entitled to all consequential benefits arising from quashing of the disciplinary and appellate orders.
  • Respondents are directed to pass appropriate orders giving effect to this decision within two months from the date of receipt of a copy of the Court's order.
  • There shall be no order as to costs.

The opinion does not purport to set any new legal precedent beyond application of cited authorities; the decision's direct effect is to quash the specific disciplinary and appellate orders and to grant consequential relief to the applicant.

    Ajab Singh Postal Assistant v. Union Of India

    Veena Chhotray, Member (A):— The applicant, a Postal Assistant under the Respondent-Ministry of Telecommunication, was vide Disciplinary Authority's (for short DA) order dated 18.8.2005 imposed a penalty of reduction of pay by one stage in the time scale of pay of Rs. 5200/- to 5100/- for a period of two years without cumulative effect (Annexure A/3). This penalty was upheld by the Appellate Authority (AA) vide order dated 10/13.3.2006 (Annexure A/4). This OA seeks to quash the aforesaid impugned orders imposing the penalty along with the Charge Memo dated 21.2.2000 (Annexure A/1) and the Disagreement Note by the DA (Annexure A/2).

    2. The charge sheet under CCS (CCA) Rule 14 was served on the applicant vide order dated 21.2.2000 The article of charge reads as follows:—

    ‘ARTICLE 1

    That the said Shri Ajab Singh while functioning as NSC/KVP discharge counter PA Agra HO during the period 22.11.95 to 10.2.96 committed a grave misconduct in-as-much as he failed to check and challenge the re-discharged paid vouchers dated 6.1.96, 21.12.95, 8.1.96, 19.1.96, 22.1.96 and 24.1.96, in respect of Agra Fort HQ KVP No. 05BB 445588 dated 21.3.90 Regn. No. 1179, Agra HO NSC VI issue No. 19F 649934 dtd. 28.11.88 Regn. No. 64748, NSC VIII issue No. 00EE 112120 dtd. 29.8.89 Regn. No. 210, 00EE 112165 dtd. 20.9.89 Regn. No. 305 and 00EE 112187 dtd. 5.10.89 Regn. No. 366 and Agra HO KVP No. 03CC 220394 dtd. 24.4.90 Regn. No. 5727 received from Idgah colony PO Agra amounting to Rs. 99955/-. The above mentioned NSCs/KVPs were already discharged at Agra HO on 23.9.95, 31.8.95, 2.9.95, 30.9.95, 5.10.95 & 27.10.95 respectively. Thus the department had to sustain a loss of Rs. 99955/- due to his gross negligence, carelessness and non-observance of Rules.

    Thus the said Shri Ajab Singh is therefore, alleged upon that he violated the provisions of Rule 33(2) of PO SB Man. Vol. II and also failed to maintain absolute integrity, devotion to duty and acted in such a manner which is unbecoming of a Govt. servant violating the provisions of Rule 3 (1)(i), 3(1) (ii) and 3(1)(iii) of CCS (Conduct) Rules, 1964.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    The charges were not found proved during the enquiry. The DA, however, recording Disagreement Note and providing the Charged Officer (CO) an opportunity to represent his case, held the charge proved and imposed the aforesaid penalty. This was upheld by the AA.

    3. We heard the learned counsels on both sides and also perused the written submissions. The main ground for challenging the impugned orders is that the penalty in this case has been imposed on a charge which was not a part of the Charge Sheet served on the CO. Para 5 of the OA avers that while the Inquiry Officer (IO) had held the charge against the applicant as ‘not proved’, the DA vide Disagreement Note sought to prove something which did not form a part of the charge. It is further averred that as per the Charge Memo, the charge framed against the applicant was that he had filed to check and challenge the re-discharged paid vouchers of Agra Fort HO NSCs/KVPs and thereby the Department had sustained a loss. However, in the Disagreement Note it was alleged that the applicant had re-discharged the already discharged Kisan Vikas Patrikas and thus there was a difference and a contradiction between the charge sheet and the charge penalized by the DA.

    3.1 While the Article of Charge in the charge sheet has been recounted with relevant portion high lighted in para 2 above, the charge as mentioned in the Disagreement Note of the DA is extracted as here under:

    “I disagree with the enquiry report findings since the charged official in his statement exhibit K/1 dated 23.09.2003 had mentioned that he noticed some overwriting and discrepancy in the KVPs, he even wrote to Sr. P.M regarding the same out in absence of reply. He discharged the KVPs knowing fully well that all was not right with the KVPs in question. He showed negligence leading to success of the fraud, hence he is guilty of not having direct complicity in the fraud. Copy of the enquiry report is enclosed h/w.”

    4. The other grounds adduced pertained to an alleged denial of reasonable opportunity; the case being of no evidence with no “misconduct”; and inordinate delay in the impugned actions. The averments regarding denial of reasonable opportunity to the CO have been made in para-5 (G) (H) (I) and (J) of the OA. Similarly para 5 (M) of the OA relates to this being a clear case of no evidence.

    4.1 It is noticed that both the above contentions of the applicant are supported by the IO's report. In the portion relating to ‘EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE”, the following observations by the IO have been made:

    “The Statement of SPM Idgah Colony Agra was relevant because re-discharge of already paid NSC/KVP vouchers in Agra HO was alleged in the article of charge against him at Idgah Colony Post Office. Like wise F.I.R as requisitioned at Sl. No. 4 of his application was also relevant in this case to disclose the fact as to how the fraud to came to light but this was also not allowed by the then IO. Moreover the defence witness, Shri Babu Lal, the then Sr. Post Master Agra HPO was also not allowed by the I.O vide order sheet No. 5 dated 5-6-2000 while he was not a prosecution witness.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    The relevant conclusive ‘FINDINGS’ from the inquiry report are also extracted as below:

    “In the light of facts and circumstances, the charged official was deprived of the reasonable opportunity to some extent, and the prosecution could not establish the abstraction of the discharged NSC/KVP vouchers Exh. Ka-19, Ka-5, Ka-22, Ka-28, Ka-16 and Ka-13 from the custody of the charged official due to his negligence resulting in loss of Rs. 99955/- to the Department”.

    (emphasis supplied)

    4.2 As per the inquiry report, the charge against the CO could not be proved and he was exonerated there from. The DA, however, took a different view. The sole ground for DA's disagreement with the inquiry report was on the basis of a purported statement by the CO and certain inferences drawn from that, as would be evident from the following extracts from the DA's order:

    “The charge has not been proved by the I.O A copy of inquiry report dated 30-6-2005 was sent to the charged official for submitting the defence on 21-7-2005, in which a note of disagreement was issued by the undersigned, that charged official in his statement exhibit K/1 dated 23-09-2003 had mentioned that he noticed some overwriting and discrepancy in the KVPs, he even wrote to Sr. P.M regarding the same. But in absence of reply, he discharged the KVPs knowingly well that all was not right with the KVPs in question. He showed negligence leading to success of the fraud, hence he is guilty if not having direct complicity in the fraud.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    A perusal of CO's comments on the Disagreement Note (Annexure A/6) as well as enquiry report show that no such statement dated 23.09.2003 was made by the CO and this instead refers to a deposition on that date by DW-1 Shri B.R Karoria, the then ASPO (C), Agra. To say the least, this prima facie error shows a non-application of mind and some apparently hasty conclusions on the part of the DA.

    The case of the applicant is that the KVPs in question had been re-discharged by SPM Idgah Colony, PO Agra who was solely responsible for the loss allegedly sustained by the Department. Besides, the rule cited in the Article of Charge only required a general checking which in this case had been done by the applicant. Further, it was he who had brought it to the notice of the higher authorities the fact of re-discharging of already discharged KVPs by Idgah Colony P.O Agra. These contentions of the applicant are borne out by the report of the Inquiry Officer.

    4.3 The learned counsel for the applicant would also contend that even as per the DA's order, no motive to make a fraud successful has been found. It is averred that even presuming that there was a negligence on the part of the CO, this would not amount to ‘misconduct’. In support, the judgment of the Apex Court in Inspector Prem Chand v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, (2007) 4 SCC 566, upholding the following definition of misconduct is referred:—

    ‘Misconduct means, misconduct arising from ill motive; acts of negligence, errors of judgment, or innocent mistake, do not constitute such misconduct.”

    4.4 Further the plea of delay defeating justice has been averred in para-5(ix) of the OA. While the cause of action occurred in 1996-97, the Charge Memo was served on 21.2.2000; the order by DA on 18.8.2005 and the AA's order upholding the penalty on 13.3.2006, thus while six years were taken to pass the order of penalty from the date of issue of Charge Memo, there was a gap of nearly 9 to 10 years from the point of cause of action itself.

    5. To conclude, nearly all the contentions made in support of the OA are found to merit consideration. There is, apparently unjustified delay of more than 10 years in imposition of the penalty. It is established in a catena of judgments of the Apex Court and of various High Courts that in the matter of disciplinary proceedings and imposition of penalty while delay in itself would not ordinarily be a cause for quashing the orders, still unjustified delay is a source of harassment for the officer besides also causing a prejudice in defence. Further, the order of penalty rests on a charge that was not framed against the charged official. We would respectfully refer to the following dicta made by the Hon'ble High Court of Punjab & Haryana High Court in Baldev Singh v. Union of India, (1994) 8 SLR 797:—

    “It is clear from the above noted cases that an employee cannot be punished for a charge which is not levelled against him. Employer's action of punishing an employee in respect of the charge which is not levelled against him results in breach of the principles of natural justice and it has the effect of rendering the order passed by the employer in nullity.”

    This is a case in which despite a finding of clear exoneration by the Inquiry Officer, the Disciplinary Authority chose to disagree without any objectively demonstrable basis. The order of the Appellate Authority only chooses to reiterate the view taken by the Disciplinary Authority. We also find this being a case of virtually no evidence and there being no ‘mis-conduct’ in the strict sense of the term. Besides, even as per the inquiry report, there has been a denial of reasonable opportunity for self-defence to the CO.

    6. For the foregoing reasons, the OA is allowed and the impugned orders are quashed and set aside. Consequently the CO is entitled to all consequential benefits. Respondents are directed to pass appropriate order within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. There shall be no order as to costs.

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    Ajab Singh Postal Assistant v. Union Of India
    (Sep 17, 2006)