A.N Sapru, J.M (November 25, 1955):— This is a defendant's appeal and it arises out of a suit under Section 180, U.P Tenancy Act. Trial: court dismissed the suit holding the defendant's to be sub-tenants. The Additional Commissioner in appeal disagrees with the finding of the trial court that the defendants were sub-tenants and finds that they were trespassers when they re-enacted in possession of the land in 1357F. after the loan money had been paid up. Originally the plaintiffs made no reference to the mortgage and the loan but subsequently they took this case by having the plaint amended. Trial court allowed amendment of the plaint in regard to this question but at the same time refused to accept the plaintiff's case that the defendants were mortgagees whose possession was lawful while the mortgage money was not paid up but who became trespassers when they forcibly brought the land under their possession after the loan money had once been realised from usufruct of the land.
2. We have two sarkhats on record—the sarkhat of 1945 and the sarkhat of 1948. The loan was, however, advanced by the defendant's grandfather to the plaintiffs through a sarkhat dated January 25, 1942 which is not on record.
3. The two subsequent sarkhats are merely revival of this first sarkhat of 1942. The defendants have pleaded in defence that their possession was independent of the loan transaction and that they were sub-tenants with 12 years' duration at the time of entering on their defence. In the khatauni of 1356F. the defendants are recorded as sub-tenants of two years' duration on a rent of Rs. 70/-. The Additional Commissioner records the opinion that no reliance can be placed on this entry and this this entry is contradicted even by the defendants own claim of 12 years' possession.
4. The chief point in the case is whether the defendants were mortgagees or not and if they were not mortgagees whether respondent's learned counsel is right in contending that they need not necessarily be sub-tenants but can be licensees. Learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon Sections 58 and 59 of the Transfer of Property Act and Section 91 of the Indian Evidence Act for arguing that the defendants' position cannot be accepted as that of mortgagees and that the finding which the Additional Commissioner has given on this question is a finding which has resulted from a completely erroneous view of the law. The loan which was advanced was admittedly of the value of more than Rs. 100/-. Section 59, Transfer of Property Act enjoins that where the principal money secured is Rs. 100/-. or upwards a mortgage can be effected only by a registered instrument, signed by the mortgagor and attested by at least two witness. The sarkhats in this case are not registered instruments and appellant's learned counsel, therefore, argues that it cannot be legally held upon the basis these sarkhats that the defendants have become mortgagees and that the loan transaction of 1942 created a mortgage. Section 91, Indian Evidence Act make it clear that in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document no evidence is admissible of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of the property, or of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents when such secondary evidence is admissible. Because of Section 59, Transfer of Property Act the mortgage could only have been created by a registered instrument and, therefore, I think appellant's learned counsel is entirely right in contending that oral evidence cannot be the basis for holding that the loan transaction created a mortgage of it. The finding which the Additional Commissioner has reached on this point seems to me to be clearly the result of an erroneous view of the law and it is not a finding which can bind me in any manner in tins' second appeal.
5. Furthermore, I am satisfied that on the appellant's behalf a distinction has also been correctly made between a zar-6-peshki lease and a mortgage. The argument on this point is borne out by the rulings cited for the appellants—1938 Pat. 35, 157 Indian Cases 365, and 1937 P.C 124 (at page 126). As has been pointed out in 1938 Pat. 35, what takes place in a zar-e-peshgi lease properly so-called is that there is an advance to the lessor in consideration of which the lessee is given possession of the land for a term during which he recoups himself for the same advance and interest out of the profits of the land of which he is put in possession. No question of redemption upon paying of an advance arises with respect to such a lease and the lease terminates at the expiration of the term and the lessor may re-enter as on the termination of any other lease. The test for the purpose of determining whether a document is a lesae or a mortgage are whether there is a secured debt and a right of redemption. I have carefully perused the terms of the two sarkhats and I cannot find that there is anything in them to show that the debt became a secured debt and that the plaintiff had the right of redemption. In the Privy Counsel case, upon which appellants' learned counsel is relying, it has been clearly laid down that the fact of the debt being a secured debt should be quite clear from the language of the deed creating the mortgage. In view of the reasons given above I do not think it was open to the Additional Commissioner to come to the conclusion that the defendants were mortgagees even though it might be maintained that the defendant's possession was not an independent possession but that it started with the loan transaction. Their position could very well have been of lessees holding on zar-e-peshgi lease and, appears to have been such.
6. If then we cannot hold that a mortgage was created and the defendants became mortgagees learned counsel for the appellant argued that they could only be sub-tenants as pleaded by them. On the other hand respondent's learned counsel contended that they could also be licensees and counsel contended that they could also be licensees and that in fact their position should be held to be that of licensees. The submission advanced by respondent's learned counsel on the point was that they were licensees who had the plaintiff's permission to remain in possession till the loan was paid off from the usufruct of the property and that after that they became trespassers. This is a new case which has been put before me and I do not think that it can be allowed to be taken haying regard to all the circumstances of the case. Moreover, if I understand rightly, the position of the licensee is that his licence is terminable at any moment and the argument which has been put forward does not seem to be compatible with this position. The result, therefore, is that the conclusion seems to follow necessarily that the defendants were sub-tenants. Appellant's learned counsel has argued that if they were sub-tenants they remained such even though the loan may have been realised from the susfruct of the property. I think the correctness of this contention would have to be accepted but for the finding given by the Additional Commissioner that after the loan was fully paid up the defendants gave up their possession once and thereafter committed trespass. This finding of fact has been given most clearly. It is a finding which appellant's learned counsel disputed before me arguing that the trial court, for the very good reasons given by it, came to the contrary finding and that the Additional Commissioner has not considered trial court's reasons. There is no doubt that the finding of the trial court is different and that the trial court had found that there was no break in the defendant's possession. If we accept this finding the arguments of the appellant's learned counsel become of material importance. The conclusion that follows then is that the defendants are sub-tenants, not erstwhile mortgagees, who have become trespassers because the loan money has-been paid up and they have committed fresh trespass. I am, however, prepared to respect the finding of the lower appellate court that the defendants did give up possession, after payment of the loan money and committed fresh trespass in the middle of 1357F. The result of accepting this finding would be that the argument on behalf of the appellants that they are sub-tenants cannot prevail. They have to be treated as trespassers.
7. But appellant's learned counsel is also relying upon the vast and unusually elastic resources of Section 20, U.P Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and his argument is that the defendant was a recorded occupant in 1356F. and this entry must be accepted in view of the law as laid down in Lala Nanak Chand v. Board of Revenue, U.P (H.C) ( 1955 R.D 165). The plaintiff-respondent has apparently two replied to this claim. One is that this plea was not taken in the courts below although it could have been taken since both the Judicial Officer and the Additional Commissioner have decided the case after the date of vesting. Appellant's learned counsel has answered this point by pointing out that till the judgments of the two courts below were given it was not settled law that the entry of recorded occupant could not be challenged after the date of vesting but must be accepted. It is true, as has been contended for the respondent, that the law is not affected by the fact that the judgment in Lala Nanak Chand v. Board of Revenue, U.P (H.C) ( 1955 R.D 165) was not pronounced till later but my own view is that in the circumstances the plea cannot be rejected on this ground. The entry of recorded occupant an entry of recorded occupant—an entry of sub-tenancy is such an entry—is there and in accordance with the view of the High Court, as I understand it, this entry has to be accepted since its correctness was not disputed till the date of vesting. The second reply of the respondent was reference to Explanation I for arguing that since the defendants were not evicted from the land after June 30, 1948 but volutarily gave up possession they cannot be persons entitled to regain possession of the land and, therefore, they are also not persons who as adhivasis can retain possession. This argument does not trike me as a tenable argument. If the defendants committed trespass in 1357F. but they were recorded occupant in 1356 F. they are entitled to continue the possession as adhivasis by virtue of Section 20. I have already given reasons above that they were not mortgagees,’
8. The result, therefore, is that this appeal must succeed on the question of adhivasi rights. Subject to the concurrence of my learned colleague I would allow the appeal set aside the decree of the lower appellate court and restore the judgment, of the trial court dismissing the plaintiff's suit. No costs as the decision results from a change in the law.
S.N Mitra, J.M (November 28, 1955):— Perused objection. I concur.
9. Appeal allowed.
10. C.C.O No. 1661 for R.D