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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • Section 306 of the I.P. Code.
  • Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Sections 279, 338, 304A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
  • Section 279, 338, 304A of the Indian Penal Code, and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
  • Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act.
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 306 of the I.P. Code.
  • Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code
  • Sections 279, 338, 304A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
  • Section 279, 338, 304A of the Indian Penal Code, and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act,
  • Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (based exclusively on the provided text)

Factual and Procedural Background

This Application was filed by the Applicant seeking quashing and setting aside of First Information Report No.43 of 2016 (offence under Section 306 Indian Penal Code) dated 28th February 2016, registered at Murud Police Station, Taluka and District Latur.

Material factual assertions recorded in the opinion include:

  • Baban Surwase was the departmental driver for the Rural Hospital Murud.
  • On 7th October 2014, Respondent No.2 (son of deceased Baban) allegedly drove the departmental vehicle and met with an accident; Crime No.97 of 2014 was registered at Murud Police Station for offences under Sections 279, 338, 304A IPC and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act; the trial in that criminal case is pending before the learned J.M.F.C.
  • Deceased Baban was deputed for duties at Nashik for Sinhastha and, on 29th September 2015, sustained injuries in another accident while returning; thereafter he remained absent from duties and was treated as an outdoor patient on 5th October 2015 at the Rural Hospital.
  • The opinion records that Baban thereafter committed suicide; the opinion itself contains multiple date references regarding the suicide: paragraph 3 states "on 28th December 2016", paragraph 16 records the suicide as occurring "on 23rd February 2016", and the FIR complained of is dated 28th February 2016. (These varying dates are recorded as they appear in the opinion.)
  • Initially, an entry of accidental death (Crime No.11 of 2016) was recorded; subsequently, Respondent No.2 lodged a complaint after a delay (noted in the record as more than twelve hours), which resulted in registration of Crime No.43 of 2016 under Section 306 IPC against the Applicant.

Procedurally, the Court made Rule returnable forthwith and heard the matter finally with the consent of counsel for the parties. After considering submissions and material, the Criminal Application was allowed and the Rule was made absolute in the terms recorded at the end of the opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the First Information Report registered under Section 306 IPC (Crime No.43 of 2016) against the Applicant should be quashed and set aside.
  2. Whether the allegations and material on record prima facie establish that the Applicant had the requisite intention or committed acts amounting to abetment, instigation or intentional aiding of the deceased to commit suicide (i.e., whether ingredients of Section 306 IPC are made out).

Arguments of the Parties

Applicant's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • The Applicant contended that the impugned FIR under Section 306 IPC contains frivolous allegations and is a gross abuse of the process of law; it was presented after an unexplained delay (noted as more than twelve hours).
  • The Applicant pointed to prior incidents and correspondence: Respondent No.2 had driven a departmental vehicle without authorization and been charged in Crime No.97/2014; the deceased had an earlier accident (29th September 2015), sustained injuries, and thereafter remained absent from duty.
  • Documentation on record included letters from the Medical Superintendent (the Applicant) to the District Civil Surgeon and letters to the deceased asking him to resume duties on production of medical certificate, and correspondence regarding vehicle repair expenses and unpaid travelling allowance (T.A.). The Applicant maintained these actions were official and administrative in nature.
  • The Applicant argued that mere administrative acts — asking the deceased to resume duties, not paying T.A., asking for deposit of water charges, requesting repair expenses for the official vehicle — cannot be construed as instigation, abetment or aiding of suicide under Section 306 IPC.
  • Counsel for the Applicant relied on Supreme Court authority (Madan Mohan Singh) and various High Court decisions to submit that intention to abet or active aiding is required to sustain a prosecution under Section 306 and that absent specific material of a definite nature the FIR should be quashed.

State's (Prosecution) Arguments

  • Learned A.P.P. for the State relied on investigation papers, particularly the contents of the suicide note and the handwriting expert's opinion (that the suicide note was written by deceased Baban), to submit that the prosecution had collected sufficient material to proceed to trial.

Respondent No.2's Arguments (as presented in the opinion)

  • Respondent No.2 contended that the Applicant habitually harassed deceased Baban — refusing to allow him to resume duties, not paying travelling allowance, and threatening to disconnect water supply — and that this persistent harassment left Baban with no option but to commit suicide.
  • Counsel for Respondent No.2 relied on the suicide note and other investigation papers to assert that the Applicant abetted the suicide. Reliance was placed on Supreme Court precedents (Praveen Pradhan and S.S. Chheena) where persistent harassment by an employer was found relevant to a prosecution for abetment of suicide. Counsel also invoked the principle that statements in the nature of a suicide note are to be considered akin to a dying declaration under Section 32 of the Indian Evidence Act (reliance on Sharad Sarda).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court (as recorded in the opinion)
Madan Mohan Singh vs. State of Gujarat (2010 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5101) Requirement that intention to aid, instigate or abet is necessary for offence under Section 306 IPC; courts must be cautious where main witness (deceased) is not available for cross-examination. The Court relied on this authority to emphasize that specific abetment, with requisite mens rea or positive act aiding suicide, must be shown before permitting trial under Section 306; applied its reasoning to find no such material against the Applicant.
State of Kerala & ors. vs. S. Unnikrishnan Nair & ors. ((2015) 9 SCC 639) Cited by Applicant's counsel in support of legal propositions about quashing prosecutions under Section 306 IPC (as part of authorities dealing with similar factual situations). The opinion records reliance on this Supreme Court decision among other authorities in considering the requisite threshold for permitting a trial under Section 306; it formed part of the body of precedents the Court examined.
Tushar s/o Mahadeorao Arsul vs. State of Maharashtra (Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench, Cr. App. No.3683 of 2012, 26-11-2012) — unreported Holding that acts of insult alone do not constitute abetment; there must be an allegation showing instigation or aiding that led to suicide. The Court quoted and applied the principle that without description of instigation or aiding, an FIR will not contain ingredients of Section 306; the Court relied on this in assessing the sufficiency of allegations against the Applicant.
Mahesh s/o Shashikant Jape & ors. vs. State of Maharashtra (Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench, Cr. App. No.4362 of 2015, 11-12-2015) — unreported Cited as supporting authority (unreported) on similar questions concerning Section 306 allegations. The opinion records that counsel relied on this decision among other Bombay High Court decisions to support the Applicant's position; the Court considered it as part of the judicial context applied to the facts.
Dilip s/o Ramrao Shirasao & ors. vs. State of Maharashtra (Bombay High Court, Nagpur Bench, Cr. App. No.332 of 2016, 5-8-2016) — unreported Reiterated that for Section 306 IPC, prosecution must prima facie establish intention to aid, instigate or abet; absent mens rea or active aiding, trial would be abuse of process. The Court relied on this reasoning (quoted in the opinion) to conclude that absent clear mens rea or a positive direct act by the accused, a trial under Section 306 would amount to abuse of process; applied to find insufficient material against the Applicant.
Praveen Pradhan vs. State of Uttaranchal (2012) 9 SCC 734 Authority where persistent harassment by an employer was held relevant and prosecution for abetment of suicide was not quashed in the facts of that case. Presented by Respondent No.2's counsel to argue that persistent harassment can sustain prosecution; the Court considered this line of authority but distinguished/appraised the facts before concluding material was insufficient in the present case.
S.S. Chheena vs. Vijay Kumar Mahajan (2010) 12 SCC 190 Cited to support the proposition that sustained harassment may amount to abetment leading to suicide. Counsel for Respondent No.2 relied on this precedent; the Court noted the reliance while assessing whether the present facts showed the necessary proximate and intentional conduct by the Applicant.
Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra (1984) 4 SCC 116 Authority cited in relation to the evidentiary value of statements resembling dying declarations (Section 32 Evidence Act) and treatment of such statements in criminal proceedings. The opinion records that Respondent No.2 relied on this case to argue that the suicide note should be treated akin to a dying declaration; the Court considered the suicide note and other material in the investigation but concluded that the note did not, on its face, supply the necessary material to sustain Section 306 charges against the Applicant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded by examining the FIR, the suicide note, the investigation papers (including a handwriting expert's opinion), and correspondence and letters on the record — in particular letters written by the Applicant to deceased Baban (including letters dated in October 2015 and 12th December 2015) that asked the deceased to resume duties on producing medical certificates and raised administrative/financial matters (T.A. bills, water charges, and repair expenses for the official vehicle).

Key points in the Court's reasoning, as recorded in the opinion:

  1. The allegations against the Applicant concern acts performed in his official capacity (letters asking the deceased to resume duties, requests regarding T.A. bill payment, deposit of water charges, and recovery of vehicle repair expenses).
  2. The Court evaluated whether those acts could be construed as instigation, abetment or intentional aiding of suicide under Section 306 IPC. It concluded that administrative directions and financial claims, standing alone, do not demonstrate the specific mental element (mens rea) or positive acts required to constitute abetment for the purpose of Section 306.
  3. The Court applied established Supreme Court and High Court authority (notably Madan Mohan Singh and the Bombay High Court decisions) which hold that prosecution under Section 306 requires prima facie material demonstrating that the accused intended to aid, instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide; absent such material the accused should not be put to trial because the primary witness (deceased) cannot be cross-examined and the consequences of a criminal trial are grave.
  4. The Court also considered authorities relied upon by Respondent No.2 (Praveen Pradhan; S.S. Chheena) which recognize that sustained harassment in some fact patterns may sustain Section 306 allegations; however, after fact-specific comparison the Court found that the material before it did not establish such sustained and proximate conduct by the Applicant that would prima facie constitute abetment.
  5. On the basis of the foregoing analysis and the material on record, the Court concluded that there was no proximate or intentional nexus between the Applicant's official acts and the suicide of Baban sufficient to warrant continuing a prosecution under Section 306 IPC; to do so would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

Holding and Implications

Holding: THE CRIMINAL APPLICATION IS ALLOWED; THE RULE MADE ABSOLUTE.

Direct consequences and implications (as recorded in the opinion):

  • The Application to quash the FIR under Section 306 IPC (Crime No.43 of 2016) succeeded and the Criminal Application was allowed in terms of the Applicant's Prayer Clause (B); the Rule was made absolute.
  • As a direct effect on the parties, the Applicant will not be compelled to face trial on the impugned FIR under Section 306 IPC based on the material considered by the Court in this proceeding.

The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel legal principle beyond applying existing authorities; the Court's order is a fact-specific determination about sufficiency of material to sustain prosecution under Section 306 IPC in this case.

[Judges: K.K. Sonawane, J. and S.S. Shinde, J.]

Reference: The summary above is confined to and compiled exclusively from the information contained in the provided opinion text.

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    Dr. Shivanand v. State Of Maharashtra

    1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally with the consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties.

    2. This Application is filed by the Applicant praying therein to quash and set aside the impugned First Information Report bearing Crime No.43 of 2016 for the offence punishable under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code dated 28th February 2016 registered with Murud Police Station, Taluka and District Latur.

    3. It is the case of the Applicant that Baban Surwase was working as driver on the vehicle of Rural Hospital Murud. Respondent No.2 Gurudeo Baban Surwase, son of deceased Baban, who is cra3149.16 informant in this case, in one of the incident, had driven the vehicle of department, which he was not supposed to drive and consequently met with an accident on 7th October 2014, wherein Crime No.97 of 2014, has been registered with Murud Police Station for the offence punishable under Section 279, 338, 304A of the Indian Penal Code, and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act, and the trial is pending before the learned J.M.F.C. It is the further case of the Applicant that, when the deceased Baban was assigned the duties at Nashik for Sinhastha, with vehicle bearing registration No. MH24 F6377 on deputation for the period of one month, on 29th September 2015, while returning back he met with an accident and sustained injuries to his hand, neck and head and thereafter deceased Baban had chosen to remain absent from duties. On 28th December 2016 Baban, father of Respondent No.2 committed suicide by strangulating himself. It is the case of the Applicant that after delay of almost twelve hours crime came to cra3149.16 be registered under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code with frivolous allegations as against the Applicant, which deserves to be quashed and set aside to avoid gross abuse of process of law.

    4. Learned counsel for the Applicant submits that there were certain complaints about discharge of duties by deceased Baban Surwase as in one of the incident, Respondent No.2, son of deceased Baban, had driven the vehicle of the department though he was not employed by the department and was not supposed to drive the same. When Respondent No.2 was driving the vehicle of the department, met with an accident on 7th October 2014 wherein Crime No.97 of 2014, has been registered with Murud Police Station and Respondent No.2 is chargesheeted for the offence punishable under Sections 279, 338, 304A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The learned counsel appearing for the Applicant has invited our attention to the cra3149.16 copy of the chargesheet. He further submits that coupled with the registration of aforementioned offence against Respondent No.2, when deceased Baban was assigned the duties at Nashik for Sinhastha, with vehicle bearing registration No. MH24 F6377 on deputation for a period of one month, while returning back, deceased Baban met with an accident and consequently remained absent from duties. The said fact was reported by the Medical Superintendent, Rural Hospital to District Civil Surgeon on 29th September 2015. Deceased Baban did not report on his duties therefore Applicant written letter to him stating that deceased Baban would bear the expenses required for the repair work of the official vehicle bearing registration No. MH24 F6377. The absence of deceased Baban was reported by the Applicant to District Civil Surgeon by his letter dated 9th October, 2015, which further makes a reference submitting the vehicle fitness certificate in the wake of occurrence of accident dated 28th cra3149.16 September, 2015 and sustaining injuries to the hand, head and neck.

    5. Learned counsel appearing for the Applicant further submitted that deceased Baban was treated as outdoor patient on 5th October 2015 with Rural Hospital itself. It is evident from the record maintained in the Rural Hospital itself that on several occasions the deceased Baban was asked to resume the duties, however he avoided to resume the duties. Learned counsel appearing for the Applicant invites our attention to the contents of the letter dated 12th December, 2015, copy of which is placed on record. It is submitted that since Baban remained absent from duties after occurrence of the accident on 29th September 2015, said Baban committed suicide on 28th February 2016 by strangulating himself. Initially, crime as an accidental death bearing Crime No.11 of 2016 was registered. However Respondent No.2, who is also an accused and is chargesheeted in Crime No.97 of cra3149.16 2014 for the offence punishable under Sections 279, 338, 304A of the Indian Penal Code and Section 184 of the Motor Vehicles Act, for using unauthorized vehicle of the department, presented complaint with the police station at about 6.37 p.m. after the inordinate delay of more than twelve hours with an unexplained delay, with allegations that the present Applicant is responsible for commission of an offence wherein his father Baban has strangulated himself. In fact deceased Baban, avoided to resume the duties in the wake of accident dated 29th September 2015 to the vehicle bearing registration No. MH24 F 6377 wherein he sustained injuries, is evident from his own letter. Moreover, the ingredients of Section 306 of the I.P. Code are not attracted at all nor even perusal of F.I.R. satisfy the necessary ingredients. As such, the impugned F.I.R. is nothing but gross abuse of process of law. Apart from the same, the learned counsel appearing for the Applicant submits that the cra3149.16 informant in the present case, is accused of driving the unauthorized vehicle of the department resulting into accident and consequently Crime No.97 of 2014 with Murud police station is registered against him and trial is pending.

    6. It is submitted that the complaint is lodged with a solitary object to counter the registration of crime against the informant after inordinate delay of twelve hours. Equally, there is complete absence of proximate reason for commission of offence. Applicant is Medical Superintendent and there is no criminal antecedent against present Applicant. It is submitted that Applicant neither abetted or aided in alleged act of commission of suicide and therefore the F.I.R. deserves to be quashed.

    7. Learned counsel appearing for the Applicant submits that the Supreme Court in the case of Madan Mohan Singh vs. State of Gujarat and cra3149.16 another1, while dealing with the similar fact situation like in the present case, has taken a view that the intention of the accused to aid or to instigate or to abet the deceased to commit suicide is a must for offence under Section 306 of the I.P. Code. It is further observed by the Supreme Court that the Courts have to be extremely careful as the main person is not available for crossexamination by the accused. Unless there is specific allegation and material of definite nature it would be hazardous to ask the accused to face the trial. It is further submitted that, in that case also the Appellant therein was superior officer and the person who committed suicide was driver of his official vehicle. Learned counsel appearing for the Applicant further placed reliance on the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Kerala and others vs. S. Unnikrishnan Nair and others2. In support of his submissions, learned counsel also placed

    1 2010 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5101

    2 (2015) 9 Supreme Court Cases 639 cra3149.16 reliance on the ratio laid down by the Bombay High Court, Bench at Aurangabad in unreported Judgments in the case of Tushar s/o Mahadeorao Arsul vs. State of Maharashtra and another (Criminal Application No.3683 of 2012) decided on 26th November 2012, Mahesh s/o Shashikant Jape and others vs. the State of Maharashtra and another (Criminal Application No.4362 of 2015) decided on 11th December 2015. Learned counsel further placed reliance on the ratio laid down by the Bombay High Court, Bench at Nagpur in the unreported Judgment in the case of Dilip s/o Ramrao Shirasao and others vs. State of Maharashtra and another (Criminal Application No.332 of 2016) dated 5th August 2016. Learned counsel appearing for the Applicant submits that the Application deserves to be allowed.

    8. On the other hand, learned A.P.P. appearing for the State, relying upon the cra3149.16 investigation papers and in particular contents of suicide note and also the opinion received from the handwriting expert that the said suicide note was written by deceased Baban, submits that the prosecution agency has collected sufficient material and on the basis of said material trial can proceed.

    9. Learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.2 submits that as Applicant practically every day harassed the deceased Baban by not allowing him to join the duties and not paying the travelling allowance bill and also sending him notice to disconnect the water connection in case he fails to deposit the water charges of the official residence occupied by deceased Baban, said Baban left with no option but to commit suicide. He submits that the contents of the suicide note and other investigation papers would unequivocally indicate that the Applicant abetted and aided in the act of commission of suicide by cra3149.16 Baban. As a matter of fact, admittedly Baban was starving due to harassment caused by the Applicant. In support of his contention that in case there is humiliation and harassment and as a result the person commits suicide, in that case the person who has caused the harassment which led to commission of suicide by the victim and in such case prayer for quashing the F.I.R. may not be considered, the counsel placed reliance on the reported Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Praveen Pradhan vs. State of Uttaranchal and another3 and also in the case of S.S. Chheena vs. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and another4. It is submitted that the Supreme Court in the case of Praveen Pradhan, supra, in Para 19 of the Judgment, in the facts of that case, observed that, alleged harassment had not been a casual feature, rather remained a matter of persistent harassment. The deceased therein was forced to work continuously for long durations in the factory visavis other

    3 (2012) 9 S.C.C. 734

    4 (2010) 12 S.C.C. 190 cra3149.16 employees. He was mercilessly harassed by the employer and ultimately he committed the suicide. Therefore, the Supreme Court declined to quash the proceedings. It is submitted that the statement of the deceased in the nature of suicide note has to be considered like dying declaration under Section

    32 of the Indian Evidence Act. In support of aforesaid contentions, the counsel placed reliance on the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra5.

    10. We have given careful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the Applicant, learned A.P.P. appearing for State and learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.2. We have also carefully perused the averments in the Application, the grounds taken therein, annexures thereto and other documents placed on record, the original record of

    5 (1984) 4 S.C.C. 116 cra3149.16 the case and also the Judgments cited across the Bar by the counsel appearing for the parties. It is true that during investigation suicide note written by deceased Baban was seized. It appears from the perusal of the contents of the First Information Report that father of Respondent No.2,

    i.e. Baban committed suicide on 23rd February 2016 and left chit. In the said chit it is written that, Dr. S.S. Birajdar i.e. present Applicant did not allow him to resume the duties and also caused harassment by not paying T.A. bill, which resulted into commission of suicide by the father of the informant.

    11. We have carefully perused the investigation papers and also the documents placed on record and letters written by the Applicant to deceased Baban. There is a letter written in the month of October 2015 and also on 12th December 2015 asking father of the informant i.e. deceased Baban to join the duties. Therefore, the Applicant cra3149.16 did write letters to the deceased Baban to join the duties. Upon careful perusal of the allegations against the Applicant, it relates to his duties in official capacity. It appears from the material collected by the Investigating Officer that the Applicant asked the deceased Baban to join the duties after producing the medical certificate. Applicant further did not pay the T.A. bill and also asked Baban to deposit water charges of the water connection at his official residence and also asked the Applicant to deposit the expenses towards repair of the official vehicle since the said vehicle met with an accident which was driven by deceased Baban. In our opinion, neither of the act of the Applicant can be construed to mean that the Applicant abetted or instigated or aided the act of commission of suicide by deceased Baban. The Supreme Court in the case of Madan Mohan Singh (supra), while considering the prayer of the appellant therein for quashing the F.I.R., has cra3149.16 made reference to the suicide note written by the deceased who was driver on the official vehicle of the appellant therein, in Para 5 of the Judgment. It appears that, in that case also the deceased who was driver, committed suicide by writing suicide note in following words: "I am going to commit suicide due to his functioning style. Alone M.M. Singh, D.E.T. Microwave Project is responsible for my death. I pray humbly to the officers of the department that you should not cooperate as human being to defend M.M. Sigh. M.M. Singh has acted in breach of discipline disregarding the norms of discipline. I humbly request the Enquiry Officer that my wife and son may not be harassed. My life has been ruined by M.M. Singh." . The Supreme Court considered the contents of the said suicide note and in Para 8 of the Judgment, observed thus: "We could not find anything in the FIR or cra3149.16 in the socalled suicide note which could be suggested as abetment to commit suicide. In such matters there must be an allegation that the accused had instigated the deceased to commit suicide or secondly, had engaged with some other person in a conspiracy and lastly, that the accused had in any way aided any act or illegal omission to bring about the suicide. In spite of our best efforts and microscopic examination of the suicide note and the FIR, all that we find is that the suicide note is a rhetoric document in the nature of a departmental complaint. It also suggests some mental imbalance on the part of the deceased which he himself describes as depression. In the socalled suicide note, it cannot be said that the accused ever intended that the driver under him should commit suicide or should end his life and did anything in that behalf. Even if it is accepted that the accused changed the duty of the driver or that the accused asked him not to take the keys of the car and to keep the keys of the car in the office itself, it does not mean that the accused intended or knew that the driver should commit suicide because of this. In order to bring out an offence under Section 306, IPC specific abetment as contemplated cra3149.16 by Section 107, IPC on the part of the accused with an intention to bring out the suicide of the concerned person as a result of that abetment is required. The intention of the accused to aid or to instigate or to abet the deceased to commit suicide is a must for this particular offence under Section 306, IPC. We are of the clear opinion that there is no question of there being any material for offence under Section 306, IPC either in the FIR or in the socalled suicide note." . The Supreme Court in Para 9 of the Judgment observed that: "It is absurd to even think that a superior officer like the appellant would intend to bring about suicide of his driver and, therefore, abet the offence. In fact, there is no nexus between the socalled suicide (if at all it is one for which also there is no material on record) and any of the alleged acts on the part of the appellant. There is no proximity either. In the prosecution under Section 306, IPC, much more material is required. The Courts have to be extremely careful as the main person cra3149.16 is not available for crossexamination by the appellant/accused. Unless, therefore, there is specific allegation and material of definite nature (not imaginary or inferential one), it would be hazardous to ask the appellant/accused to face the trial. A criminal trial is not exactly a pleasant experience. The person like the appellant in present case who is serving in a responsible post would certainly suffer great prejudice, were he to face prosecution on absurd allegations of irrelevant nature."

    12. In the case of Tushar s/o Mahadeorao Arsul (supra), the Division of the Bombay High Court, Bench at Aurangabad, in para 6 of the Judgment observed that: "We are of the considered view that the act or acts of accused to insult do not by themselves constitute abetment. It has to be shown from a statement in the complaint that these accused have actually instigated and aided in the victim's act of committing suicide. In absence of any such description, the FIR is liable to be viewed cra3149.16 as a text which does not contain the ingredients of offence."

    13. In the case of Dilip s/o Ramrao Shirasao (supra), the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, Bench at Nagpur considered the various Judgments of the Supreme Court and the High Court and in Para 20 of the Judgment, held thus: "20. As has been held by Their Lordships of the Apex Court that for permitting a trial to proceed against the accused for the offence punishable under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, it is necessary for the prosecution to at least prima facie establish that the accused had an intention to aid or instigate or abet the deceased to commit suicide. In the absence of availability of such material, the accused cannot be compelled to face trial for the offence punishable under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. As has been held by Their Lordships of the Apex Court that abetment involves mental process of instigating a person or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing and without a positive act on the part of the cra3149.16 accused in aiding or instigating or abetting the deceased to commit suicide, the said persons cannot be compelled to face the trial. Unless there is clear mens rea to commit an offence or active act or direct act, which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option or the act intending to push the deceased into such a position, the trial against the accused under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code, in our considered view, would be an abuse or process of law."

    14. In the facts of the present case, on perusal of contents of the F.I.R. and also the suicide note, we find that the allegations against the Applicant are that the Applicant did not allow the deceased Baban to resume the duties, not paid his T.A. bills and also asked him to pay the money for repair of the official vehicle which was driven by Baban and met with an accident, and asked him to deposit the water charges else water connection will be discontinued. In our opinion all the acts attributed to the Applicant are in the official capacity. The material placed on cra3149.16 record unequivocally indicates that the Applicant had written letters to deceased Baban to resume the duties on furnishing medical certificate. By any stretch of imagination it cannot be said that the Applicant intended or abetted or instigated the deceased Baban to commit suicide. Unless there is clear mens rea to commit an offence or active act or direct act which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option or the act intending to push the deceased into such a position, the trial against the Applicant under Section 306 of the

    I.P. Code, in our considered view, would be an abuse of process of law.

    15. In that view of the matter, the Application succeeds. The Criminal Application is allowed in terms of Prayer Clause (B) to the Application. Rule made absolute in above terms. [K.K. SONAWANE, J.] [S.S. SHINDE, J.] asb/FEB17

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    Dr. Shivanand v. State Of Maharashtra
    (Mar 2, 2017)