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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 301 of the Code
  • Section 270 of the Criminal Procedure Code (1898)
  • Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “CrPC”), Section 301 CrPC, Section 156(3) CrPC, Sections 109, 193, 196, 200, 465, 467 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act (not mentioned in the excerpt)
  • The Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC)
  • Section 2(u) of the Code
  • CrPC (Code of Criminal Procedure)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 301 of the Code
  • Section 270 of the Criminal Procedure Code (1898)
  • Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “CrPC”), Section 301 CrPC, Section 156(3) CrPC, Sections 109, 193, 196, 200, 465, 467 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC)
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act (not mentioned in the excerpt)
  • The Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC)
  • Section 2(u) of the Code
  • CrPC (Code of Criminal Procedure)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant lodged a private complaint under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) alleging offences under Sections 109, 193, 196, 200, 465, 467 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Indian Penal Code. Acting on the complaint, the Magistrate ordered investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC, the police registered an FIR and eventually filed a charge-sheet, leading to Criminal Case No. 927/PW/2007.

When the accused moved an application for discharge under Section 239 CrPC, the appellant orally asked the Magistrate to be heard along with the Assistant Public Prosecutor. The Magistrate granted that request. The accused challenged this order in the High Court of Bombay, contending that the complainant’s role is limited by Section 301 CrPC. The High Court partially allowed the writ petition, holding that the complainant’s counsel could participate only under the directions of the Assistant Public Prosecutor. The complainant appealed to the Supreme Court by way of special leave.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, at the stage of framing of charge or considering discharge under Section 239 CrPC, a private complainant may independently address the Magistrate or must act only under the directions of the Public Prosecutor as prescribed by Section 301 CrPC.
  2. Whether the complainant could invoke Section 302 CrPC to conduct the prosecution independently without having filed a written application to that effect.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The High Court erred in relying solely on Section 301 CrPC and ignoring the scope of Section 302 CrPC, which specifically empowers a Magistrate to permit a complainant to conduct the prosecution.
  • Section 302 CrPC applies exclusively to trials before a Magistrate, distinguishing them from sessions trials; hence the complainant should be allowed to address the Court directly when so permitted.
  • Reliance was placed on J.K. International v. State (2001) 3 SCC 462 and Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 16 SCC 623.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Section 301 CrPC governs the participation of private counsel in all criminal courts; therefore the complainant can only act under the directions of the Public Prosecutor and, with permission, submit written arguments.
  • No written application under Section 302 CrPC was ever filed, and the complainant’s request before the Magistrate was only an oral prayer falling under Section 301 CrPC; consequently the High Court’s order is correct.
  • Any inconsistency between J.K. International and Shiv Kumar v. Hukam Chand (1999) 7 SCC 467 should be reconciled in favour of the restriction laid down in Shiv Kumar.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shiv Kumar v. Hukam Chand (1999) 7 SCC 467 Section 301 CrPC applies to all courts; Section 302 CrPC is confined to Magistrate’s courts; a private counsel in Sessions Court must act under the Public Prosecutor. Used to show that Section 301 limits private counsel’s role unless Section 302 permission is obtained in a Magistrate’s court.
J.K. International v. State (2001) 3 SCC 462 A Magistrate may permit a private complainant to conduct prosecution independently under Section 302 CrPC if justice so demands. Cited to demonstrate that a written application seeking such permission is necessary and that the Magistrate must form an opinion before granting it.
Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 16 SCC 623 Reaffirmed the distinction between the roles of Public Prosecutor and private counsel, reiterating the principles of Shiv Kumar. Relied on to highlight the importance of prosecutorial fairness and the limited role of private counsel without Section 302 permission.
Anthony D'Souza v. State (1984) 1 Bom CR 157; 1983 SCC OnLine Bom 257 Private counsel’s participation must remain within the confines of Section 301 CrPC. Referenced by the High Court; acknowledged by the Supreme Court while analysing the High Court’s reasoning.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court first set out the statutory texts of Sections 301 and 302 CrPC. Drawing on Shiv Kumar and J.K. International, the Court explained:

  • Section 301 applies to all criminal courts and confines a private pleader’s role to acting under the directions of the Public Prosecutor, with the additional liberty of submitting written arguments after evidence is closed and with the court’s permission.
  • Section 302, applicable only to Magistrate’s courts, empowers the Magistrate to permit “any person” (other than certain police officers) to conduct the prosecution independently; such permission is discretionary and must be predicated on a specific request.
  • No contradiction exists between Shiv Kumar and J.K. International; both hold that independent conduct of prosecution by a private complainant before a Magistrate is possible only upon permission under Section 302.
  • In the present case, the appellant never filed a written application invoking Section 302; the Magistrate had merely allowed him to “be heard” under Section 301.

Because the statutory pre-condition for Section 302 relief—a written application articulating why independent conduct would serve the interests of justice—was absent, the Court declined to overturn the High Court’s restriction. However, recognising that the complainant may still wish to seek such permission, the Court clarified that Section 302 applies “to every stage including the stage of framing charge” and that any future application must be considered on its own merits.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSED OF.

The appeal was disposed of with liberty to the appellant to file a proper application under Section 302 CrPC before the Magistrate. The Magistrate is to consider any such application uninfluenced by the earlier orders. The decision re-affirms the distinction between Sections 301 and 302 CrPC and clarifies that a complainant’s independent right to conduct prosecution in a Magistrate’s court is contingent upon a formal request and judicial permission; no broader precedent beyond this clarification was established.

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    Dhariwal Industries Limited v. Kishore Wadhwani And Others

    Dipak Misra, J.— Leave granted. The present appeal, by special leave, assails the order dated 13-2-2012 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Kishore Wadhwani v. State of Maharashtra 2012 SCC OnLine Bom 211, (2012) 5 Mah LJ 252 whereby the learned Single Judge has modified the order dated 30-8-2010 whereunder the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, 8th Court, Esplanade, Mumbai in CC No. 927/PW/2007 had permitted the appellant to be heard at the stage of framing of charge under Section 239 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short “CrPC”), by expressing the view that the role of the complainant is limited under Section 301 CrPC and he cannot be allowed to take over the control of the prosecution by directly addressing the Court, but has to act under the directions of the Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of the case.

    2. The facts which are requisite to be stated for the purpose of adjudication of the present appeal are that the appellant filed a complaint under Section 200 CrPC for the offences punishable under Sections 109, 193, 196, 200, 465, 467 and 471 read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The learned Magistrate exercising the power under Section 156(3) CrPC directed the police to investigate into the allegations. The investigating agency registered an FIR and eventually laid the charge-sheet before the Court and thereafter the case was registered as CC No. 927/PW/2007.

    3. After the charge-sheet was filed, the accused persons filed an application under Section 239 CrPC seeking discharge. At that juncture, the appellant made an oral prayer before the learned Magistrate seeking permission to be heard along with the Assistant Public Prosecutor. The learned Magistrate after hearing the learned counsel for the parties observed that the original complainant is not alien to the proceeding and, therefore, he has a right to be heard even at the stage of framing of charge and, accordingly, granted the permission.

    4. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order, the respondent-accused preferred the criminal writ petition before the High Court. The High Court referred to Section 301 CrPC and certain authorities of this Court and came to hold thus: (Kishore Wadhwani case 2012 SCC OnLine Bom 211, (2012) 5 Mah LJ 252, SCC OnLine Bom para 16)

    “16. Undoubtedly the first informant now enjoys a role higher than earlier as already seen in the preceding paragraphs. In fact perusal of the petition shows that the petitioners also not wish to deny participation of the first informant altogether. They only want his role to be limited as under Section 301 CrPC. An application for discharge can result into putting an end to the prosecution either partly or fully. This stage is in that respect similar to the stage of consideration of the police report by the Magistrate under Section 173(2) CrPC and the proceedings for quashing of the complaint filed by the accused person. The first informant, therefore, is likely to be interested in seeing that the matter reaches the stage of trial and is disposed of after recording of evidence. If by judicial pronouncements, he is now granted hearing at the earlier two stages, he can be granted hearing at the stage of discharge also, though the Criminal Procedure Code does not make provision for hearing to him at that stage. If the first informant appears before the court and desires to participate in the application, opportunity cannot be refused to him. Now the next question would be about the nature of the hearing to be given to the first informant. Should the hearing be independent to the hearing to the Public Prosecutor or it be through the Public Prosecutor. In my opinion, his role will have to be limited as under Section 301 CrPC for the same reasons, as given in Anthony D'Souza case (1984) 1 Bom CR 157, 1983 SCC OnLine Bom 257 and keeping in focus the role of the Public Prosecutor. He cannot be allowed to take over the control of prosecution by allowing to address the court directly. … Therefore, the petition is partly allowed. The impugned order is modified to the extent that the counsel engaged by Respondent 2 shall act under the directions of the Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of the case.”

    5. Questioning the legal propriety and the approach of the High Court, it is submitted by Mr K.T.S. Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant that the High Court has gravely erred by placing reliance on Section 301 CrPC and completely ignoring the stipulations inherent in Section302CrPC. According to Mr Tulsi, there is a distinction between a trial before a Magistrate and a sessions trial and Section 302 CrPC has exclusive application to a magisterial trial and hence, the complainant can address the Court directly, if permitted by the Court. To strengthen the said submission, he has commended us to the authorities in J.K. International v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2001) 3 SCC 462 and Sundeep Kumar Bafna v. State of Maharashtra (2014) 16 SCC 623.

    6. Mr Vikas Singh, learned Senior Counsel, in his turn, contends that Section 301 CrPC is applicable to all categories of cases and therefore a complainant is entitled to assist the Court under the directions of the Public Prosecutor. That apart, submits Mr Singh, he has the only other liberty to file the written arguments with the permission of the Court. Mr Singh would vehemently urge that the appellant had never sought to conduct the case under Section 302 CrPC and as envisaged, no application in that regard was filed and, therefore, no fault can be found with the order of the High Court. It is his further submission that as the factual matrix would exposit, the learned Magistrate allowed the prayer on the basis of an oral submission which is one under Section 301 CrPC and, in such a situation, no laxity should be given to him to take the benefit of Section 302 CrPC. Additionally, propones Mr Singh, that there is slight disharmony in the pronouncement in J.K. International (2001) 3 SCC 462 and Shiv Kumar v. Hukam Chand (1999) 7 SCC 467 which needs to be reconciled.

    7. Section 301 CrPC reads as follows:

    “301. Appearance by Public Prosecutors.—(1) The Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of a case may appear and plead without any written authority before any court in which that case is under inquiry, trial or appeal.
    (2) If in any such case any private person instructs a pleader to prosecute any person in any court, the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of the case shall conduct the prosecution, and the pleader so instructed shall act therein under the directions of the Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, and may, with the permission of the Court, submit written arguments after the evidence is closed in the case.”

    8. In Shiv Kumar (1999) 7 SCC 467, the Court has clearly held that the said provision applies to the trials before the Magistrate as well as the Court of Session.

    9. Section 302 CrPC which is pertinent for the present case reads as follows:

    302. Permission to conduct prosecution.—(1) Any Magistrate inquiring into or trying a case may permit the prosecution to be conducted by any person other than police officer below the rank of Inspector; but no person, other than the Advocate General or Government Advocate or a Public Prosecutor or Assistant Public Prosecutor, shall be entitled to do so without such permission:
    Provided that no police officer shall be permitted to conduct the prosecution if he has taken part in the investigation into the offence with respect to which the accused is being prosecuted.
    (2) Any person conducting the prosecution may do so personally or by a pleader.”

    10. In Shiv Kumar (1999) 7 SCC 467 interpreting the said provision, the Court has ruled:( & 11-12)

    “8. It must be noted that the latter provision is intended only for Magistrate Courts. It enables the Magistrate to permit any person to conduct the prosecution. The only rider is that Magistrate cannot give such permission to a police officer below the rank of Inspector. Such person need not necessarily be a Public Prosecutor.
    9. In the Magistrate's Court anybody (except a police officer below the rank of Inspector) can conduct prosecution, if the Magistrate permits him to do so. Once the permission is granted the person concerned can appoint any counsel to conduct the prosecution on his behalf in the Magistrate's Court.
    ***
    11. The old Criminal Procedure Code (1898) contained an identical provision in Section 270 thereof. A Public Prosecutor means “any person appointed under Section 24, and includes any person acting under the directions of a Public Prosecutor” [vide Section 2(u) of the Code].
    12. In the backdrop of the above provisions we have to understand the purport of Section 301 of the Code. Unlike its succeeding provision in the Code, the application of which is confined to Magistrate Courts, this particular section is applicable to all the courts of criminal jurisdiction. This distinction can be discerned from employment of the words “any court” in Section 301. In view of the provision made in the succeeding section as for Magistrate Courts the insistence contained in Section 301(2) must be understood as applicable to all other courts without any exception. The first sub-section empowers the Public Prosecutor to plead in the court without any written authority, provided he is in charge of the case. The second sub-section, which is sought to be invoked by the appellant, imposes the curb on a counsel engaged by any private party. It limits his role to act in the court during such prosecution “under the directions of the Public Prosecutor”. The only other liberty which he can possibly exercise is to submit written arguments after the closure of evidence in the trial, but that too can be done only if the court permits him to do so.”

    11. It is apt to note here that in the said decision in Shiv Kumar case (1999) 7 SCC 467 it has also been held that from the scheme of CrPC, the legislative intention is manifestly clear that prosecution in a Sessions Court cannot be conducted by anyone other than the Public Prosecutor. It is because the legislature reminds the State that the policy must strictly conform to fairness in the trial of an accused in a Sessions Court. The Court has further observed that a Public Prosecutor is not expected to show the thirst to reach the case in the conviction of the accused somehow or the other irrespective of the true facts involved in the case.

    12. In J.K. International (2001) 3 SCC 462, a three-Judge Bench was adverting in detail to Section 302 CrPC. In that context, it has been opined that the private person who is permitted to conduct prosecution in the Magistrate's Court can engage a counsel to do the needful in the court in his behalf. If a private person is aggrieved by the offence committed against him or against any one in whom he is interested he can approach the Magistrate and seek permission to conduct the prosecution by himself. This Court further proceeded to state that it is open to the court to consider his request and if the court thinks that the cause of justice would be served better by granting such permission the court would generally grant such permission. Clarifying further, it has been held that the said wider amplitude is limited to the Magistrate's Court, as the right of such private individual to participate in the conduct of prosecution in the Sessions Court is very much restricted and is made subject to the control of the Public Prosecutor.

    13. Having carefully perused both the decisions, we do not perceive any kind of anomaly either in the analysis or ultimate conclusion arrived at by the Court. We may note with profit that in Shiv Kumar (1999) 7 SCC 467, the Court was dealing with the ambit and sweep of Section 301 CrPC and in that context observed that Section 302 CrPC is intended only for the Magistrate's Court. In J.K. International (2001) 3 SCC 462 from the passage we have quoted hereinbefore it is evident that the Court has expressed the view that a private person can be permitted to conduct the prosecution in the Magistrate's Court and can engage a counsel to do the needful on his behalf. The further observation therein is that when permission is sought to conduct the prosecution by a private person, it is open to the court to consider his request. The Court has proceeded to state that the court has to form an opinion that cause of justice would be best subserved and it is better to grant such permission. And, it would generally grant such permission. Thus, there is no cleavage of opinion.

    14. In Sundeep Kumar Bafna (2014) 16 SCC 623 the Court was dealing with rejection of an order of bail under Section 439 CrPC and what is meant by “custody”. Though the context was different, it is noticeable that the Court has adverted to the role of Public Prosecutor and private counsel in prosecution and in that regard, has held as follows:

    “30. … in Shiv Kumar v. Hukam Chand (1999) 7 SCC 467, the question that was posed before another three-Judge Bench was whether an aggrieved has a right to engage its own counsel to conduct the prosecution despite the presence of the Public Prosecutor. This Court duly noted that the role of the Public Prosecutor was upholding the law and putting together a sound prosecution; and that the presence of a private lawyer would inexorably undermine the fairness and impartiality which must be the hallmark, attribute and distinction of every proper prosecution. In that case the advocate appointed by the aggrieved party ventured to conduct the cross-examination of the witness which was allowed by the trial court but was reversed in revision by the High Court 1996 SCC OnLine P&H 1366, (1997) 115 PLR 406, and the High Court permitted only the submission of written argument after the closure of evidence. Upholding the view of the High Court, this Court went on to observe that before the Magistrate any person (except a police officer below the rank of Inspector) could conduct the prosecution, but that this laxity is impermissible in the Sessions by virtue of Section 225 CrPC, which pointedly states that the prosecution shall be conducted by a Public Prosecutor.”

    15. Mr Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel, has drawn inspiration from the aforesaid authority as Shiv Kumar (1999) 7 SCC 467 has been referred to in the said judgment and the Court has made a distinction between the role of the Public Prosecutor and the role of a complainant before the two trials, namely, the Sessions trial and the trial before a Magistrate's Court.

    16. As the factual score of the case at hand is concerned, it is noticeable that the trial court, on the basis of an oral prayer, had permitted the appellant to be heard along with the Public Prosecutor. Mr Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel submitted such a prayer was made before the trial Magistrate and he had no grievance at that stage but the grievance has arisen because of the interference of the High Court that he can only participate under the directions of the Assistant Public Prosecutor in charge of the case which is postulated under Section 301 CrPC.

    17. We have already explained the distinction between Sections 301 and 302 CrPC. The role of the informant or the private party is limited during the prosecution of a case in a Court of Session. The counsel engaged by him is required to act under the directions of the Public Prosecutor. As far as Section 302 CrPC is concerned, power is conferred on the Magistrate to grant permission to the complainant to conduct the prosecution independently.

    18. We would have proceeded to deal with the relief prayed for by Mr Tulsi but, no application was filed under Section 302 CrPC and, therefore, the prayer was restricted to be heard which is postulated under Section 301 CrPC. Mr Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents would contend that an application has to be filed while seeking permission. Bestowing our anxious consideration, we are obliged to think that when a complainant wants to take the benefit as provided under Section 302 CrPC, he has to file a written application making out a case in terms of J.K. International (2001) 3 SCC 462 so that the Magistrate can exercise the jurisdiction as vested in him and form the requisite opinion.

    19. Mr Tulsi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant submits that he intends to file an application before the learned Magistrate and hence, liberty may be granted. Mr Singh has seriously opposed the same. Regard being had to the rivalised submissions, we only observe that it would be open to the appellant, if so advised, to file an application under Section 302 CrPC before the learned Magistrate. It may be clearly stated here that the said provision applies to every stage including the stage of framing charge inasmuch as the complainant is permitted by the Magistrate to conduct the prosecution. We have said so to clarify the position of law. If an application in this regard is filed, it shall be dealt with on its own merits. Needless to say, the order passed by the learned Magistrate or that of the High Court will not be an impediment in dealing with the application to be filed under Section 302 CrPC. It is also necessary to add that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the application to be filed.

    20. The criminal appeal is, accordingly, disposed of.

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    Dhariwal Industries Limited v. Kishore Wadhwani And Others
    (Sep 6, 2016)