AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • The 1983 Income Tax Act
  • statute of limitation
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 65
  • Section 11-A, as amended by Act 68 of 1984
  • Section 16(2) of the Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • The 1983 Income Tax Act
  • statute of limitation
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Article 65
  • Section 11-A, as amended by Act 68 of 1984
  • Section 16(2) of the Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) issued a preliminary notification on 17-7-1984 and a final notification on 28-11-1986 for acquisition of a large tract of land, including two parcels now in dispute. A possession mahazar was drawn on 6-11-1987 and a Gazette notification under Section 16(2) was published on 4-7-1991, whereupon BDA asserted that the land vested in it free from encumbrances.

Two sets of private parties claimed ownership: (i) M. Venkatesh by inheritance from his grandfather (sale deed 7-7-1954) and (ii) Prabhaudas Patel by purchase (sale deed 22-8-1990). After earlier writ petitions were disposed of with liberty to sue, the plaintiffs instituted five suits (OS Nos. 3075 & 7945 of 2000; 6925, 5742 & 5791 of 2001) seeking injunctions against BDA.

The trial court decreed all suits, answering the key issues (title by adverse possession, lawful possession, interference by BDA, and entitlement to injunction) in favour of the plaintiffs.

BDA preferred Regular First Appeals (RFAs 911, 912, 914, 915 & 916 of 2002). A Single Judge of the High Court of Karnataka allowed RFAs 912, 914, 915 & 916, but dismissed RFA 911, holding that the plaintiff in that appeal ran a long-standing saw-mill and was in established possession.

BDA (SLP (C) 12016/2013) challenged the dismissal of RFA 911, while the unsuccessful plaintiffs appealed against the decisions in the remaining RFAs (SLP (C) 38601/2012 and SLP (C) 12013-15/2013). The Supreme Court heard all matters together and delivered the present judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether plaintiffs who assert ownership can simultaneously rely on adverse possession against BDA for the same property.
  2. Whether occupation of vacant land constitutes “settled possession” warranting injunctive protection under the principle in John B. James v. BDA.
  3. Whether sale deeds executed after publication of the preliminary acquisition notification confer any title enforceable against BDA.
  4. Whether BDA lawfully took possession so that the land vested in it free from encumbrances.
  5. Whether the plaintiffs had completed 12 years of open, hostile and continuous possession so as to perfect title by adverse possession.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiffs’ Arguments

  • Claimed title by inheritance or purchase and recognition as khatedars; property tax and electricity charges were being paid.
  • Alleged ignorance of acquisition proceedings and receipt of no compensation.
  • Asserted “settled possession” (including operation of a saw-mill) entitling them to permanent injunction against BDA.
  • Alternatively, pleaded that long, open possession had ripened into title by adverse possession.

Defendant BDA’s Arguments

  • The land stood validly acquired and vested in BDA pursuant to the 1984/1986 notifications, approval of compensation (21-8-1986) and possession mahazar (6-11-1987).
  • Any post-notification sale deeds are void and convey no interest against BDA.
  • No plaintiff could establish 12 years’ hostile possession after vesting; occupation of vacant land cannot amount to settled possession.
  • BDA’s mode of taking possession by panchnama is legally recognised.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
John B. James v. BDA, 2000 SCC OnLine Kar 561; (2001) 1 Kant LJ 364 Injunction cannot protect possession of mere vacant land; only settled possession of built-up property is protected. Used to reject plaintiffs’ claim to injunction over vacant sites; confirmed that saw-mill site alone might attract protection if possession were settled.
U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd., (1996) 3 SCC 124 Sale after Section 4(1) notification is void; transferee acquires no title against acquiring authority. Held sale deed of 22-8-1990 void; plaintiffs could at best claim compensation.
Ajay Krishan Shinghal v. Union of India, (1996) 10 SCC 721 Same principle as above regarding post-notification transfers. Reinforced invalidity of plaintiffs’ purchase.
Mahavir v. Rural Institute, (1995) 5 SCC 335 Post-notification sales confer no enforceable right. Cited in support of BDA’s title.
Gian Chand v. Gopala, (1995) 2 SCC 528 Acquisition nullifies later private transfers. Relied on to negate plaintiffs’ ownership plea.
Meera Sahni v. Lt. Governor of Delhi, (2008) 9 SCC 177 Transferee after notification limited to compensation claim. Applied to restrict plaintiffs’ rights.
Tika Ram v. State of U.P., (2009) 10 SCC 689 Same as above. Strengthened BDA’s contention.
Tamil Nadu Housing Board v. A. Viswam, (1996) 8 SCC 259 Drawing of a panchnama is a recognised mode of taking possession. Supported finding that BDA had lawfully taken possession.
Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (1998) 4 SCC 387 Panchnama as valid evidence of possession. Same application as above.
Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Union of India, (2004) 10 SCC 779 Essentials of adverse possession (nec vi, nec clam, nec precario). Court used to emphasise plaintiffs’ failure to prove animus and continuity.
S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina, AIR 1964 SC 1254; Parsinni v. Sukhi, (1993) 4 SCC 375; D.N. Venkatarayappa v. State of Karnataka, (1997) 7 SCC 567 Further elucidation of adverse possession requirements. Cited illustratively while rejecting plaintiffs’ plea.
Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Raj Kumari Sharma, (1996) 8 SCC 128 Burden lies on claimant to establish every element of adverse possession. Ground for dismissing plaintiffs’ claim.
Vasantiben P. Nayak v. Somnath M. Nayak, (2004) 3 SCC 376 Limitation period starts when possession becomes adverse. Found plaintiffs had not completed 12 years post-vesting.
Md. Mohammad Ali v. Jagadish Kalita, (2004) 1 SCC 271 Animus possidendi indispensable for adverse possession. Used to show plaintiffs lacked requisite intent.
Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar, (1996) 1 SCC 639 Plea of title and adverse possession are mutually destructive. Applied to reject dual plea of ownership and adverse possession.
Annasaheb B. Patil v. Balwant, (1995) 2 SCC 543 Possession referable to lawful title cannot become adverse. Reinforced above reasoning.
Saroop Singh v. Banto, (2005) 8 SCC 330 Need to establish animus and continuity for Article 65 limitation. Cited while concluding adverse possession not proved.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court noted that the High Court had rightly denied relief to plaintiffs whose structures had been demolished, because no one can claim settled possession over vacant land. Relying on John B. James, the Court affirmed dismissal of RFAs 912, 914, 915 and 916.

With respect to RFA 911 (saw-mill premises), the Court held that:

  • The plaintiff’s sale deed (22-8-1990) was executed after the preliminary notification and was therefore void against BDA (U.P. Jal Nigam line of cases).
  • BDA had taken possession by drawing a panchnama; such a mode is judicially accepted (T.N. Housing Board; L&T).
  • The plaintiff had not completed 12 years’ hostile possession after vesting, nor proved the animus required for adverse possession (Karnataka Board of Wakf and allied authorities).
  • Claiming ownership through a sale deed and simultaneously pleading adverse possession is legally incompatible (Mohan Lal; Annasaheb Patil).

Because the essential ingredients of adverse possession were absent, the plaintiff had no enforceable right to an injunction. The High Court therefore erred in dismissing BDA’s RFA 911.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Civil appeals filed by the private plaintiffs (SLP (C) 38601/2012; SLP (C) 12013-15/2013) are DISMISSED. BDA’s appeal (SLP (C) 12016/2013) is ALLOWED; judgment of the High Court in RFA 911/2002 is set aside, BDA’s appeal restored and the plaintiff’s suit dismissed.

Implications: All suits against BDA stand dismissed, reaffirming that (i) post-notification transfers confer no title against an acquiring authority, (ii) vacant land cannot be the basis of “settled possession” for injunction, and (iii) a party cannot succeed on mutually inconsistent pleas of ownership and adverse possession. The decision applies existing precedent and sets no new legal rule, but underscores stringent requirements for adverse possession claims against statutory authorities.

    M. Venkatesh And Others v. Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority .

    T.S. Thakur, J.— Leave granted. These appeals arise out of a common judgment and order dated 30-5-2012 passed by a Single Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore whereby the High Court has allowed RFAs Nos. 912, 914, 915 and 916 of 2002, set aside the judgments and orders of the courts below and dismissed the suits relevant to those appeals. The High Court has, at the same time, affirmed the decree passed in OS No. 6925 of 2001 and dismissed RFA No. 911 of 2002 filed by the appellant against the same. The factual backdrop in which the suits and the appeals mentioned above came to be filed may be summarised as under.

    2. M. Venkatesh, appellant in SLP (C) No. 38601 of 2012 claimed ownership over the suit schedule property by inheritance from his grandfather Munishamappa who is said to have purchased the same under a registered sale deed dated 7-7-1954. In connected SLP (C) No. 12016 of 2013 Prabhaudas Patel also claimed to be the owner of suit schedule property relevant to his suit on the basis of purchase of the said property from its previous owner. The aforementioned two parcels of land together with a larger extent in the vicinity were acquired by the Bangalore Development Authority (“BDA”, for short) for the formation of Hosur Road, Sarjapur Layout in terms of a preliminary Notification dated 17-7-1984 and a final Notification dated 28-11-1986 published on 25-12-1986, after notices to the khatedars and the persons interested, some of whom had filed their claims before the competent authority.

    3. Determination of amount of compensation payable to the landowners having been approved by the competent authority on 21-8-1986, BDA claimed that possession of the land was taken over from the landowners and handed over to the engineering section of the Authority by drawing a possession mahazar on 6-11-1987. A Notification under Section 16(2) of the Act was also published in the Karnataka Gazette dated 4-7-1991 which, according to BDA, signified that the land in question stood vested with BDA free from all encumbrances whatsoever. The further case of BDA is that long after the land had vested in BDA, sites were carved out and sold to different persons by the erstwhile owners, the unauthorised act of the plaintiffs, however, got vacated and the possession was taken over.

    4. The case of the plaintiffs M. Venkatesh and Prabhaudas Patel, on the other hand, was that they were always in established possession of the suit schedule property owned and that apprehending their dispossession from the same they had approached the High Court along with several others to restrain BDA from interfering with their peaceful occupation of the suit property. Those petitions were disposed of by the High Court reserving liberty to the writ petitioners to approach the civil court for appropriate relief in a proper civil action. It was only after the disposal of the said petitions that OSs Nos. 3075 and 7945 of 2000, 6925, 5742 and 5791 of 2001 came to be filed by the aggrieved parties in which the plaintiffs claimed to be the owners and occupants of the suit property and prayed for an order restraining BDA from interfering with their peaceful occupation. The plaintiffs also claimed that they had the title over the suit schedule property by prescription.

    5. The suits aforementioned were contested by the defendant BDA in which they, inter alia, claimed that the suit property stood duly acquired and its ownership vested in BDA was free from all encumbrances whatsoever and that the plaintiffs had no right, title or interest in the same nor were they entitled to any declaration of title or injunction.

    6. According to the trial court the pleadings of the parties gave rise to the following issues which were clubbed together for a common disposal:

    (1) Whether the plaintiffs prove that they have acquired and perfected their alleged title to the suit schedule properties by virtue of the alleged law on adverse possession, as claimed?
    (2) Whether the plaintiffs prove their alleged lawful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties, as on the date of the suit?
    (3) Whether the plaintiffs further prove the alleged illegal interferences and obstructions by the defendant?
    (4) Whether the defendant proves that the suit schedule properties are duly acquired by the defendant, in accordance with law and as such, the same have stood vested with the defendant, free from all the encumbrances?
    (5) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the suit relief of declaration and injunction, against the defendant?
    (6) What order or decree?

    7. The trial court answered Issues 1 to 3 and 5 in the affirmative while Issue 4 was answered in the negative. The suits were on those findings decreed.

    8. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial court, BDA filed RFAs Nos. 911, 912, 914, 915 and 916 of 2002 before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore. A Single Judge of the High Court, as noticed earlier, has allowed RFAs Nos. 912, 914, 915 and 916 of 2002 but dismissed RFA No. 911 of 2002. The High Court took the view that the respondents in RFA No. 911 of 2002 who happened to be the respondents in SLP No. 12016 of 2013 were running a saw mill which was in operation long prior to the filing of the suit and which continues to be in existence even on the date of the suit and the judgment of the High Court.

    9. The High Court held that the legal position stated by the Division Bench of that Court in John B. James v. Bangalore Development Authority 2000 SCC OnLine Kar 561, (2001) 1 Kant LJ 364 was clearly applicable to the said appeal entitling the owner in occupation to protection against attempted eviction by BDA. The High Court, on that basis, dismissed RFA No. 911 of 2012 filed by BDA upholding the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and restraining BDA from interfering with possession of the plaintiff over the suit schedule property. As regards the remaining appeals, the High Court held that the plaintiffs in those appeals were claiming settled possession of vacant pieces of land which even according to the pronouncement in John B. James case 2000 SCC OnLine Kar 561, (2001) 1 Kant LJ 364 did not entitle them to any relief as no one could claim to be in established possession of a vacant piece of land.

    10. The High Court found that there was no dispute that all the structures on the suit properties relevant to those suits had been demolished and that the land was a vacant piece of land all along and at all material times including the date of the judgment. The High Court accordingly non-suited all the plaintiffs except plaintiff in RFA No. 911 of 2002. In SLP (C) No. 12016 of 2013 BDA has assailed the judgment of the High Court insofar as the same has dismissed RFA No. 911 of 2002 filed by it. SLP (C) No. 38601 of 2012 and SLPs (C) Nos. 12013-15 of 2013 have been on the other hand filed by the appellants to assail the orders passed by the High Court insofar as the same have dismissed RFAs Nos. 912, 914, 915 and 916 of 2002.

    11. We have heard Mr Rama Jois, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for the appellants and Mr S.K. Kulkarni, Counsel appearing for BDA. We may first deal with the question whether the plaintiffs in the suits relevant to RFAs Nos. 912, 914, 915 and 916 of 2002 could claim to be the owners of the suit property on the basis of inheritance or sale instruments in their favour and yet plead adverse possession over the very same property. The case set up by the plaintiffs in their suits was that they were the lawful owners of the suit schedule property and that they had been duly recognised as khatedars by the village panchayat concerned. It was further alleged that property tax was also being assessed and levied by the competent authority from time to time and is being paid by them. It was alleged that the suit properties were being used for carrying on business in different names and style. The local authorities had also issued no-objection certificates for grant of electricity supply connections in their favour and that they were paying electricity charges as and when demanded. The appellants claim to have set up their business which was their source of livelihood. Whatever may be the rights vested in BDA pursuant to the notifications and the award, BDA was not entitled to disturb the peaceful occupation of the landowners according to the averments made in the plaint. The plaintiffs, on that basis claimed the relief of permanent injunction restraining BDA and its officials from disturbing their possession over the suit schedule properties. The plaintiffs, it is noteworthy, claimed ignorance about the acquisition proceedings and alleged that they had not received any compensation and that they had continued to be in occupation as owners to the knowledge of BDA and its officials.

    12. In the written statement filed by BDA it was asserted that the suit schedule properties stood acquired and vested in BDA as early as in the year 1986-1987 and that the question of anyone developing or using any part of the same did not arise. The documents relied upon by the plaintiffs were, according to BDA, of no value or relevance.

    13. The High Court has, as noticed earlier, on an appraisal of the material on record, held that the suit schedule properties relevant to RFA No. 911 of 2002 was a vacant piece of land from which structures stood demolished and removed before the institution of the suits. The High Court in this regard observed:

    “But, insofar as the other respondents are concerned, whether the appellant was justified in law or not in carrying out the demolition, there is no dispute that all structures in the respective suit properties have been razed to the ground and it was vacant land during the pendency of the suit and as on the date of the judgment. Therefore, the trial court was clearly in error in holding that the plaintiffs continued in settled possession of what was vacant land. The law, as laid down in John B. James case 2000 SCC OnLine Kar 561, (2001) 1 Kant LJ 364 clearly disentitled persons claiming to be in settled possession of vacant land. Therefore, the remedy of damages which was certainly available to the plaintiffs was unfortunately not claimed and though the plaintiffs are said to have sought to reserve their right to claim such damages, it is not shown that the court below has expressly granted any such relief.”

    14. There is, in our opinion, no infirmity in the above reasoning. The decision in John B. James case 2000 SCC OnLine Kar 561, (2001) 1 Kant LJ 364 upon which heavy reliance was placed by the plaintiffs before the courts below itself did not permit anyone to claim that he is in settled possession of vacant land. The following passage from the said decision in this regard is apposite: (SCC OnLine Kar para 80)

    “80. If anyone, who has trespassed into BDA land or in unauthorised possession of BDA land, has put up a structure and completes and accomplishes the act of possession and continues in such settled possession asserting possession and ownership in himself, openly, peacefully and uninterruptedly to the knowledge of BDA for more than 12 years, then it is possible for him to contend that he has perfected his title to such property by adverse possession and consequently the title of BDA stood extinguished. It is needless to say that such adverse possession for 12 years should be subsequent to the date of vesting of land in BDA. The person claiming such title by adverse possession cannot call in aid any possession on his part or his predecessor, for any period prior to date of vesting of land in BDA, to establish adverse possession, or possession during the tendency of any litigation regarding the property, cannot be considered as possession adverse to BDA.”

    15. Once the High Court recorded a finding that the property was vacant as on the date of the filing of the suit there was no question of the plaintiffs claiming settled possession of the said property assuming the view taken in John B. James case 2000 SCC OnLine Kar 561, (2001) 1 Kant LJ 364 was otherwise legally sound since the so-called settled possession of the appellants in RFA No. 911 of 2002 stood vacated from the suit schedule property, no prayer for injunction as set out in the petition filed by the appellants in those appeals could help them for an injunction issues only to protect what is in lawful possession of the plaintiffs. Injunction could not be claimed when the plaintiffs stand dispossessed from the suit property prior to the filing of the suit. The question of establishing settled possession did not, therefore, arise in relation to the properties that already stood cleared of any structures by demolition of whatever stood on the same. The High Court was, in that view, justified in setting aside the decree passed by the trial court and dismissing the suit filed by the plaintiffs.

    16. That brings us to the question whether Prabhaudas Patel and other respondents in SLP (C) No. 12016 of 2013 were entitled to any relief from the Court. These respondents claim to have purchased the suit property in terms of a sale deed dated 22-8-1990 i.e. long after the issuance of the preliminary Notification published in July 1984. The legal position about the validity of any such sale, post issuance of a preliminary notification is fairly well settled by a long line of the decisions of this Court. The sale in such cases is void and non est in the eye of the law giving to the vendee the limited right to claim compensation and no more. Reference may in this regard be made to the decision of this Court in U.P. Jal Nigam v. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. (1996) 3 SCC 124, AIR 1996 SC 1170, wherein this Court said:

    “3. … It is settled law that after the notification under Section 4(1) is published in the gazette any encumbrance created by the owner does not bind the Government and the purchaser does not acquire any title to the property. In this case, Notification under Section 4(1) was published on 24-3-1973, possession of the land admittedly was taken on 5-7-1973 and pumping station house was constructed. No doubt, declaration under Section 6 was published later on 8-7-1973. Admittedly power under Section 17(4) was exercised dispensing with the enquiry under Section 5-A and on service of the notice under Section 9 possession was taken, since urgency was acute viz. pumping station house was to be constructed to drain out flood water. Consequently, the land stood vested in the State under Section 17(2) free from all encumbrances. It is further settled law that once possession is taken, by operation of Section 17(2), the land vests in the State free from all encumbrances unless a notification under Section 48(1) is published in the gazette withdrawing from the acquisition. Section 11-A, as amended by Act 68 of 1984, therefore, does not apply and the acquisition does not lapse. The notification under Section 4(1) and the declaration under Section 6, therefore, remain valid. There is no other provision under the Act to have the acquired land divested, unless, as stated earlier, notification under Section 48(1) was published and the possession is surrendered pursuant thereto. That apart, since M/s Kalra Properties, respondent had purchased the land after the notification under Section 4(1) was published, its sale is void against the State and it acquired no right, title or interest in the land. Consequently, it is settled law that it cannot challenge the validity of the notification or the regularity in taking possession of the land before publication of the declaration under Section 6 was published.”

    17. To the same effect are the decisions of this Court in Ajay Krishan Shinghal v. Union of India (1996) 10 SCC 721, AIR 1996 SC 2677, Mahavir v. Rural Institute (1995) 5 SCC 335, Gian Chand v. Gopala (1995) 2 SCC 528, Meera Sahni v. Lt. Governor of Delhi (2008) 9 SCC 177 and Tika Ram v. State of U.P. (2009) 10 SCC 689 More importantly, as on the date of the suit, the respondents had not completed 12 years in possession of the suit property so as to entitle them to claim adverse possession against BDA, the true owner. The argument that possession of the land was never taken also needs notice only to be rejected for it is settled that one of the modes of taking possession is by drawing a panchnama which part has been done to perfection according to the evidence led by the defendant BDA. Decisions of this Court in T.N. Housing Board v. A. Viswam (1996) 8 SCC 259, AIR 1996 SC 3377 and Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (1998) 4 SCC 387, AIR 1998 SC 1608, sufficiently support BDA that the mode of taking possession adopted by it was a permissible mode.

    18. Coming then to the question whether the respondent-plaintiffs could claim adverse possession, we need to hardly mention the well-known and oft-quoted maxim nec vi, nec clam, nec precario meaning thereby that adverse possession is proved only when possession is peaceful, open, continuous and hostile. The essentials of adverse possession were succinctly summed up by this Court in Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Union of India (2004) 10 SCC 779 in the following words:

    “11. In the eye of the law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Non-use of the property by the owner even for a long time would not affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. It is a well-settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is ‘nec vi, nec clam, nec precario’, that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. (See S.M. Karim v. Bibi Sakina AIR 1964 SC 1254, Parsinni v. Sukhi (1993) 4 SCC 375 and D.N. Venkatarayappa v. State of Karnataka (1997) 7 SCC 567.) Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. (Mahesh Chand Sharma v. Raj Kumari Sharma (1996) 8 SCC 128.)”

    19. Reference may also be made to the decision of this Court in Saroop Singh v. Banto (2005) 8 SCC 330, wherein this Court emphasised the importance of animus possidendi and observed:

    “29. In terms of Article 65 the starting point of limitation does not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to the plaintiff but commences from the date the defendant's possession becomes adverse. (See Vasantiben Prahladji Nayak v. Somnath Muljibhai Nayak (2004) 3 SCC 376.)
    30. ‘Animus possidendi’ is one of the ingredients of adverse possession. Unless the person possessing the land has a requisite animus the period for prescription does not commence. As in the instant case, the appellant categorically states that his possession is not adverse as that of true owner, the logical corollary is that he did not have the requisite animus. (See Md. Mohammad Ali v. Jagadish Kalita (2004) 1 SCC 271, SCC para 21.)”

    20. Also noteworthy is the decision of this Court in Mohan Lal v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar (1996) 1 SCC 639, wherein this Court held that claim of title to the property and adverse possession are in terms contradictory. This Court observed:

    “4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea. Having come into possession under the agreement, he must disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12 years i.e. up to completing the period of his title by prescription nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. Since the appellant's claim is founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by implication that he came into possession of the land lawfully under the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the appellant.”

    21. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v. Balwant (1995) 2 SCC 543, wherein this Court elaborated the significance of a claim to title vis-à-vis the claim to adverse possession over the same property. The Court said:

    “15. Where possession can be referred to a lawful title, it will not be considered to be adverse. The reason being that a person whose possession can be referred to a lawful title will not be permitted to show that his possession was hostile to another's title. One who holds possession on behalf of another, does not by mere denial of that other's title make his possession adverse so as to give himself the benefit of the statute of limitation. Therefore, a person who enters into possession having a lawful title, cannot divest another of that title by pretending that he had no title at all.”

    22. The courts below have not seen the respondent-plaintiff's claim from the above perspectives. The High Court has, in particular, remained oblivious of the principle enunciated in the decisions to which we have referred hereinabove. All that the High Court has found in favour of the plaintiffs is that their possession is established. That, however, does not conclude the controversy. The question is not just whether the plaintiffs were in possession, but whether they had by being in adverse possession for the statutory period of 12 years perfected their title. That question has neither been adverted to nor answered in the judgment impugned in this appeal. Such being the case the High Court, in our opinion, erred in dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant BDA. The fact that the plaintiffs had not and could not possibly establish their adverse possession over the suit property should have resulted in dismissal of the suit for an unauthorised occupant had no right to claim relief that would perpetuate his illegal and unauthorised occupation of property that stood vested in BDA.

    23. In the result:

    23.1. Civil appeals arising out of SLP (C) No. 38601 of 2012 and SLPs (C) Nos. 12013-15 of 2013 fail and are, hereby, dismissed.

    23.2. Civil appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 12016 of 2013 succeeds and is, hereby, allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside insofar as the same dismisses BDA's RFA No. 911 of 2002. Resultantly RFA No. 911 of 2002 shall stand allowed and the suit filed by the plaintiff dismissed but in the circumstances without any order as to costs.

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    M. Venkatesh And Others v. Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority .
    (Sep 24, 2015)