S.S Chadha, J.:— This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India questions the validity of the order of reference, being Delhi Administration Order No. F. 24 (291)/73-Lab. dated June 26, 1973, passed in exercise of the powers conferred by Sections 10(1)(c) and 12(5) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 referring an industrial dispute between the Management of M/s Daily Tej Pvt. Ltd. and its workmen S/Shri Jagdish Raj, Ramesh Chander, Ranbir Singh, Rup Kishore Gupta and Pardeep Kumar Kasbyap, as represented by Tej employees Uuion and the resultant award dated 23rd September, 1974 made by Shrj D.D Gupta, the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Delhi.
2. Mr. S.N Bhandari, the learned counsel for the petitioner took great pains to take me through the material before the appropriate Government at the time of making the order of reference and also the entire evidence recorded by the Labour Court, Delhi as well as the award and made the following submissions in support of the challenge. So far as the order of reference made by the appropriate Government is concerned, the submission is that there was no material before the appropriate Government that an industrial dispute exists between the workmen and its management. Reference was made to the demand notice dated 22nd September, 1972, the Union's statement dated 4th Oct. 1972 before the Conciliation Officer, the management's reply dated 10th November, 1972 the Union's rejoinder dated 25th December, 1972 and further rejoinder of the management dated 15th January, 1973. The appropiiate Government is competent to take a prima facie view on the jurisdictional facts and is not expected to determine the jurisdictional facts. If there is any dispute whether a particular employer is management within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) or whether a particular employee is a workman within the meaning of the Act or whether an Industrial Dispute exists within the meaning of the Act, these matters, if raise complicated and intricate questions of law and facts, are to be determined by the Tribunal. No doubt, the petitioner had raised a contention that the workmen specified in the demand notice were not in the employment of the petitioner management but were employees of an independent contractor, yet the appropriate Government must have takers a prima facie view on this jurisdictional fact when it was expressed that from the reports submitted by the Conciliation Officer under Section 12(4) of the Act, it appears that an industrial dispute exists between the management of M/s. Daily Tej Pvt. Ltd. and its workmen. The issue whether the workmen specified in the order of reference were in the employment of the management, was specifically raised and formed the subject matter of issue No. 1 before the Labour Court.
3. Another fact of the submission of the learned counsel is that the order of reference is at variance with the demand raised by the workmen in the demand notice. The allegations of termination of the services of the workmen illegally or without a justification are urged not to have been made during the course of the conciliation proceedings. I was taken through the demand notices as well as the statements before the Conciliation Officer. The substance of the dispute raised is about the illegal termination of the services of the five work-men without any basis. In law, no written demand is necessary for the purpose of ascertaining the existence of an industrial dispute. If any authority is needed, I may refer to Shambu Nath Goyal v. Bank Of Baroda. (1)
4. Another challenge to the order of reference is that the alleged dispute was between the labour and contractor under the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and could not form the basis of an order or reference under the Act. Reliance is placed on “Management of Burmahshell Oil Storage and Distribution Co. of India Ltd., Madras and The Industrial Tribunal, Andhra Pradesh”. (2) The provisions of the contract labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act. 1970 were enacted to regulate the employment of contract labour in certain establishments and to provide for the abolition in certain circumstances. The dispute in the order of reference does not relate to the regulation of employment of contract labour. It the management of Burmashell's case (Supra) the order of reference was as to how far the demand of the Union, namely, that functions of storage and distribution of the company should not be handed over to the outside agencies or contractors; that no depots which are carrying out these functions should be closed, are justified. On this a finding was given to the applicability of the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 and it was held that the Government had no jurisdiction to refer a dispute relating to regulation or abolition of contract labour under Section 10 of the Act to the Industrial Tribunal. That case, therefore, has no application at all to the facts of this case. The dispute here is of the illegal termination of the services of workmen and squarely falls under the Act.
5. The next main submission of Shri S.N Bhandari is that the labour Court has assumed jurisdiction which it otherwise does not possess by giving a finding of fact which is perveise. The challenge is to the finding recorded on issue No. 1, namely, whether the workmen specified in the order of reference were in the employment of the management. The submission is that this Court can interfere in the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion. Reliance is placed on State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Sree Rama Rao. (3) Reliance is also placed on Central Bank of India Ltd. New Delhi v. Prakash Chand Jain, (4) to contend that if there be no legal evidence to support a finding by the tribunal, then the finding is perverse and cars be quashed by this Court. If the finding recorded by the Tribunal is such as no reasonable person could have arrived at, even then this Court could interfere. With that background, the counsel criticises the entire evidence placed on the record and the special features of the case tabulated by the Labour Court in para 10 of the judgment.
6. On the other hand, Shri Madan Mohan, the learned counsel for the workmen contends that whether or not in a given case the relationship of management and workmen exists is a question of fact and if the Tribunal on a review of the evidence has come to conclusion that the relationship of the management and workmen exists, then the finding of fact recorded by the tribunal is not open to judicial review as this Court while exercising juris diction under Article 226 of the Constitution does not sit as a Court of appeal. He points out certain tests laid down by the Supreme Court in Dharan Gadhara Chemical Works Ltd. v. State of Saurashtra, (5) and D.C Dewan Mohal Been Sahib & Sons v. United Bidi Workers' Union, Salem, (6) to determine the question whether relationship of master and servant subsists between an employer and workman. He also points out that the labour Court has referred to and considered the tests laid down in the said two cases and then appreciated the oral evidence an the light of those principles to return the finding in favour of the workmen.
7. There is no dispute to the principles expounded in the two Supreme Court cases relied upon by Shri Bhandari. I briefly refer to the special features noticed by the Labour Court from the evidence placed on the record to consider whether the conclusion arrived at in issue No. I by the Labour Court is perverse or arbitrary to the core. One of the real tests to find out whether a person was a workman is whether he had been employed by the management. The finding of the Labour Court is that the workmen were appointed by Shri Radhey Lal, composing incharge of the petitioner. This finding is supported in case of four workmen by the evidence of all the four workmen who appeared before the Labour Court and deposed individually about his own contract of employment. There is a denial by Shri Radhey Lal about this engagement by him on behalf of the management. It was for the Labour Court to appreciate the oral evidence placed on the record and to believe or disbelieve either the workmen or Shri Radhey Lal. If the Labour Court has returned the finding which is based on the material on the record that the workmen were engaged by Shri Radhey Lal, composing incharge of the workmen, on behalf of the management, then this finding is not open to judicial review. The next test laid down is of the existence of the right in the employer not merely to direct what work was to be done but also to control the manner in which it was done and the nature and extent of such control. The correct approach is to consider whether, having regard to the nature of the work, there was due control and supervision of the employer. In this regard, the finding of the Labour Court is that the work of composing is of perennial nature and it appears to be not only an essential part of the industrial concern but also the main work, that the entire work is done at the press of the management with the composing material and other equipments supplied by it, that the workmen were not at liberty to take any other assignment excepting the one given by the management, that they did the composing work under the control and supervision of Radhty Lal, Incharge of the composing Department, that the proofs were read by the management and they had to carry out the corrections according to the directions of Shri Radhey Lal and that the daily attendance of the workers allegedly working under the contractor was recorded by Shri Radhey Lal who also kept and maintained the accounts and paid them their salary. These inferences are supported by the evidence of the workmen as well as of Shri Nand Kishore and Shri Radhey Lal who appeared on behalf of the management. The workmen attended the press which belonged to the petitioner-management and worked there on the machines which also belonging to the petitioner-management and it was considered as a very important factor. Then there was the extent of the control which was considered as an indicative of the nature of the relationship and on that basis the finding of fact recorded is that there is relationship of an employer and employee between the management and the workers. From the material on the record, the labour Court also found that the so-called contractor is an indigent person and a mere compositor under the management paid on monthly basis. The finding was recorded that the so-called contractor seems to be an impecunious person who could hardly afford to have a contract of composing work because he was not even in a position to prepare a voucher. In the light of these the alleged agreement dated 1st March, 1970 between the management and the contractor and the subsequent letters of extension of the contract and the management's letter not to further renew the contract beyond 31st July, 1972, were considered. A finding recorded is that the system of carrying out the composing work through the so-called contractor was mere camouflage, devised by the management. This finding is plausible from the evidence recorded before the Labour Court. The inference drawn is that the provision regarding the responsibility of hiring and firing by the alleged contractor were deliberately put in the agreement by the management to escape such statutory duties and obligations as may lie on it under several statutory enactments. The workmen did not specifically put to the alleged contractor (Shri Nand Kishore) these written documents, and cross-examined hire on the fictitious nature of the agreement and this may be a circu nstance in favour of the management, but if two views are possible on the evidence and one had been accepted by the Labour Court, this Court will not say that the other view was more sound. Mr. Bhandari has pointed out certain other aspects of the evidence, about the non-existence of letters of appointment by the management, not entering the names of the workmen in the wage register of the management, not entering the names of the workmen in the attendance register of the management and non-payment of any wages to these workmen by the management, to contend that there was no documentary evidence in existence to conclude that the workmen were employees of the petitioner management. The non-existence of these documents is implicit from the finding recorded that the so-called contractor was mere camouflage devised by the management. The said documents could, therefore, be not in existence. Reference was made by the petitioner's counsel to the inference drawn by the Labour Court on the basis of certain letters addressed by the management to E.S.I or deductions regarding E.S.I and provident fund made by the management. My attention was invited to the provisions of the Employees State Insurance Act as well as the Employees Provident Fund Act. These facts are natural facts and were consistent whether the workmen were employees of the management or of the independent contractor. The Tribunal has further returned the finding that the registers produced by the management were forged, subsequently in order to escape the liability. The cumulative effect of the special features of the work of the employees at the press of the management leads to the conclusion that the finding of fact recorded by the Labour Court is not perverse in the sense that there was no legal evidence or that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion with the result that the finding of the Labour Court on issue No. 1 is not further open to judicial review.
8. The next submission of Shri Bhandari is that though the order of reference mentions the name of five workmen, the dispute before the Labour Court was confined to four workmen. Factually, the counsel for the petitioner is right. After the Presiding Officer of the Labour Court was seized of the reference, notices were issued. A statement of claim was filed by S/Shri Jagdish Raj, Rap Kishore, Pardeep Kumar Kashyap and Ramesh Chander through the Tej Employees Union. On 24th September, 1973, Shri Pathak who was representing these workmen closed his evidence and stated that he did not represent Ranbir Singh and Roop Kishore Gupta. Roop Kishore later appeared before the Labour Court on 23rd October, 1973 and gave his evidence. Ranbir Singh neither filed any statement of claim before the Labour Court nor was he represented. Under Section 15 of the Act, where as industrial dispute has been referred to a Labour Court, it shall hold its proceedings expeditiously and shall, as soon as it is practicable on the conclusion thereof, submit its award to the appropriate Government. Rule 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 provides that if without sufficient cause being shown, any party to proceedings before a Labour Court fails to attend or to be represented, the Labour Court may proceed, as if the party had duly attended and had been represented. To that extent the Rule provides a complete adjudication of their reference made by the appropriate Government. In the case before me, however, Shri Ranbir Singh is not represented. One of the factual controversies raised is whether Shri Ranbir Singh is in the employment of the management. The management denies the employment of Ranbir Singh as also other workers. The four workmen who have appeared before the Labour Court have not made any statement relating to Ranbir Singh as also other workers. The four workmen who have appeared before the Labour Court have not made any statement relating to Ranbir Singh. There was thus no material before the Labour Court to hold under issue No. 1 whether Ranbir Singh was in the employment of the petitioner-management. The finding so far as Ranbir Singh is concerned, is not supported by any evidence on the record. The award of the Tribunal is thus vitiated to that extent.
9. The last submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the award of the tribunal directing the reinstatement with continuity of service and full back wages is without determination of the issue of gainful employment or otherwise of the workmen,. It is urged that the Labour Court has failed to frame the necessary issue as to whether the workmen were entitled to back wages or not and that the award of full back wages is without any material on the record in the case. Reliance is placed on Sadanand Patankar v. New Prabhat Silk Mills, (7) to contend that it is the duty of the industrial adjudicator himself to frame the necessary point for determination in each and every case and allow parties to lead evidence with regard to it, A failure to do so will tantamount to failure to exercise jurisdiction and an order either granting or refusing back wages, in the absence of such determination will be void, being an improper exercise of the jurisdiction. Reliance is next placed on Oriental Refrigeration and Engg. (P) Ltd. v. Shri Pawan Kumar, (8) and Krishan Murari Lal Kapur and Presiding Officer. (9) The latter judgment is of this Court. In Krishan Murari Lal Kapur's case (Supra), H.L Anand, J. held that it is well settled that the claim of back wages would not succeed merely because the termination or dismissal is set aside. The aggrieved workman would still be bound to make out a case for award of back wages by producing sufficient material which may show that during the period of this forced unemployment by the management he had remained unemployed or partly employed or was otherwise not able to earn what his employment if subsisting with the management would have entitled him to On the other hand, Mr. Madan Mohan has placed reliance on Hindustan Tin works Limited and Its Employees, (10) wherein it was held that in the very nature of things there cannot be a straight jacket formula for awarding relief of back wages. All relevant considerations will enter the verdict. More or less, it would be a motion address to the discretion of the Tribunal. Full back wages would be the normal rule and the party objecting to it must establish the circumstances necessitating departure. At this stage, the Tribunal will exercise its discretion keeping in view all the relevant circumstances. Mr. Madan Mohan submits that the management did not raise the question of gainful employment by the workmen or objected to the payment of full back wages in case of reinstatement.
10. The stand of the management has been of a complete denial and would impliedly include the denial of the relief of reinstatement as also other relief to which the workmen would be entitled. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Hindustan Tin Works Limited's case (supra) have pointed out that full back wages is the normal rule and the party objecting to it must establish the circumstances necessitating departure. This may have a bearing on the onus of proof. The law laid down by this Court by H.L Anand, J. is clear that the Tribunal has to determine whether the workman had remained unemployed or partly employed or was otherwise not able to earn what his employment, if subsisting with the management, would have entitled him to and it is only thereafter that a case could be made out for back wages. The adjudicator, therefore, had to frame an issue and whether on the facts and circumstances of the case the onus lies on the management or the workmen, it can be determined by the Tribunal and I wish to express no opinion.
11. For the above reasons, the award of the Tribunal in so far as Shri Ranbir Singh is concerned is completely vitiated. So far as other four workmen are concerned, the award is set aside to the extent of the relief granted to the four workmen of full back wages. The Labour Court will now frame an issue with regard to the gainful employment and then determine the relief of the award of full back wages to these four workmen. The parties are directed to appear before the Labour Court now presided over by Shri N.L Kakkar on 7th May, 1979. I make no order as to costs. C.M 18 of 1979.
12. This petition has become infructuous. It will be open to the management to agitate the question of the closure of the Composing Department in appropriate proceedings. C.M 18 of 1979 is dismissed as infructuous.