G.R Majithia, J.:— The appellant/defendants have come up in Regular Second Appeal against the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court reversing on appeal those of the trial judge and decreeing the suit of the plaintiff/respondent for declaration that order of termination from service dated May 17, 1978 was null and void.

2. The facts:—

Hindu Vidya Sabha Avam Dharmarth Society which is registered under the Societies Act, 1860 is running Hindu College, Sonepat. This college is affiliated to Maharshi Dayanand University, Rohtak. The respondent/plaintiff was appointed as a Sports Assistant in the College in September 1965. He fell ill. He sent intimation on January 18, 1977 showing his inability to join his duties. After recovering from illness, he reported for duty but the College refused to take him back on duty. On November 3, 1979, he submitted an application to the College to permit him to job the duty but he was informed vide letter dated November 17, 1979 that his services stood terminated with effect from May 17, 1978. It is the validity Of this order which was challenged in the suit principally on the ground that the order was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and was thus void. The defendants justified the order on the ground that he was given a show cause notice. The plaintiff appeared in the College on May 17, 1978 but he could not justify his absence from duty. Resultantly, the order terminating his services was issued.

3. The trial judge framed the following issues arising out of the pleadings of the parties:—

1) Whether the order dated 17.5.78 is illegal, void and arbitrary and is liable to be set aside? OPP.

2) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to all the emoluments, pay, house rent etc. if issue No. 1 is proved? OPP.

3) Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD.

4) Whether this court has got no jurisdiction to try the suit? OPD.

5) Whether the suit has not been properly valued for purposes of court fee and jurisdiction? OPD.

6) Relief.

4. The trial judge answered issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff and held that the order dated May 17, 1978 whereby his services were terminated was illegal and void; issue No. 2 was decided in favour of the plaintiff and it wa??? held that he was entitled to all emoluments pay, house rent etc.; issue No. 3 was decided in favour of the defendants and it was held that the suit was barred by time; issues No. 4 and 5 were answered against the defendants being not pressed and in view of finding under issue No. 3, the suit was dismissed.

5. The defendants did not challenge the correctness of the findings recorded by the trial Court under issues No. 1 and 2 by way of appeal or cross-objections. The palintiff assailed the judgment and decree of the trial judge in first appeal.

6. The first Appellate Court on evidence gave a firm finding that the impugned order of termination was passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. The plaintiff was not afforded any opportunity before imposing the major penalty of termination from service on the charge of his wilful absence from duty. The impugned order dated May 17, 1978 reads thus:—

“Shri Sadhu Ram, Sports Assistant was asked to appear for personal hearing on 17.5.1978 He is present on 17.5.1978 but he refused to give any statement either oral or in writing. He is not co-operating. Charges against him stand proved. His services are therefore, terminated with immediate effect. He is directed to collect one month salary in lieu of due notice on any working day.”

7. The first Appellate Court found that the plaintiff was denied the protection of Rules VI and VII of the Kurukshetra University Rules which were adopted by Maharshi Dayanand University with which the defendant college indisputably stands affiliated. No proper charge sheet was served upon the plaintiff for wilfully remaining absent from duty. He was not afforded any opportunity of hearing before passing the order. If, as alleged by the defendants, the plaintiff refused to give explanation for having remained absent from duty then a finding should have been recorded that the plaintiff was served with the charge sheet; that he was given an opportunity of hearing which he did not avail and after recording that finding, the follow up action could have been taken. Apart from this, the facts proved on the record establish that the defendants acted in great haste and they were evolving methods for terminating the services of the plaintiff. The plaintiff was placed under suspension for not attending to his duties on May 17, 1978 vide Ex. D.W 2/9 and his services were terminated on that very day i.e May 17, 1978 vide Ex. DW 2/7. The order vide which his services were terminated was communicated to him through forwarding letter dated November 17, 1979, Ex. P1. If the services of the plaintiff had been terminated on May 17, 1978, as is alleged, the order of termination should have been communicated to to him forthwith. The defendants did not communicate this order till November 17, 1979 and remained silent for more than 1-½ years. This per se establishes that the defendants acted in an undesirable manner. The services of a Class IV employee has been dispensed with in a most perfunctory manner. If the plaintiff had remained wilfully absent from duty then a proper charge sheet should have been served upon him. He should have been afforded an opportunity to render his explanation and proper enquiry should have been held and thereafter action should have been taken as is warranted by the proved facts on enquiry. Kurukshetra University framed regulations governing service and conduct of employees in the non-government affiliated colleges. The provisions of the Haryana Affiliated Colleges (Security of Service) Act (for short the Act) with certain modifications were made available to the employees of the non-affiliated colleges. Section 2 of the Act deals with definitions. Clause (c) of Section 2 defines the term “employee” which means any person who is in the whole-time employment of an affiliated college. Section 7(1) envisages that no employee shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank except after an enquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. In compliance with Section 7(1) of the Act, no charge sheet was framed and served on the respondent and he was not given any opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. The opportunity pre-supposes an effective opportunity and not a mere eye wash. The college acted in breach of these provisions. The proved facts on the record establish that the plaintiff was not afforded any opportunity of hearing before passing the order of termination of his services which apparently has cast a stigma on him and the order thus cannot be sustained. The impugned order having been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and, breach of the statutory rules is thus rendered void. The void order is thus non-existent in the eye of law. The instant case will fall under Article 113 of the Limitation Act. Time under this Article runs from the date when the ‘right to sue’ accrues. The word ‘right to sue’ means, a right to seek relief i.e a right to prosecute by law to obtain relief by means of legal procedure; the right to sue accrues when the cause of action arises. In order that there may accrue a right to sue there must;(i) has come into existence a substantive right asserted in the suit; and (ii) such right must have been infringed or threatened to be infringed. The right should itself be an infringement or threat to infringement constitute a cause of action and gives a right to sue. The term ‘right to sue’ as in Article 113 by Act of 1963 (corresponding to Article 120 of Act No. 1 of 1908, came up for consideration before the Privy Council in Mt. Bolo v. Mt. Koklan, A.I.R 1930 Privy Council 270 and it was held thus:—

“There can be no “right to sue” until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its infringement or at least clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted.” The ratio of this judgment was affirmed by the apex Court in Cannon Bunkerley and Co. Ltd. v. The Union of India, (1969) 3 SCC 607 : AIR 1970 Supreme Court 1433 and it was held thus:—

“In our judgment, there is no right to sue until there is an accrual of the right asserted in the suit, and its infringement, or at least a clear and unequivocal threat to infringe that right by the defendant against whom the suit is instituted.”

8. The first Appellate Court on evidence found that the plaintiff came to know of the order dated May 17, 1978 vide which his services were terminated on November 17, 1979. The ‘right to sue’ accrued to him on November 17, 1979. The suit was filed by him on September 21, 1981 i.e within three years from November 17, 1979 when the right to sue accrued to him.

9. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the plaintiff cannot be granted relief of re-instatement in service. In support of his submission, he relied upon The Kayastha Pathshala, Allahabad v. State of UP, 1989 Supp (2) SCC 732 : A.I.R 1990 S.C 415. The submission is based upon mis-reading of the ruling. The apex Court after referring to the authorities in Bank of Bank Of Baroda Ltd. v. Jeewan Lal Mehrotra, (1970) 3 SCC 677 and Sirsi Municipality v. Kom Francis, (1973) 3 SCR 348 where the Court rounded off the conclusion thus, “On a consideration of the authorities mentioned above, it is therefore, clear that a contract of personal service cannot ordinarily be specifically enforced and a court normally would nqt give a declaration that the contract subsists and the employee, even after having been removed from service can be deemed to be in service against the will and consent of the employer. This rule, however, is subject to three well recognised exceptions : (i) where a public servant is sought to be removed from service in contravention of the provisions of Article 311 of the Constitution of India; (ii) where a worker is sought to be reinstated on being dismissed under the Industrial Law; and (iii) where a statutory body acts in breach or violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute”,-ultimately re-affirmed the conclusions. It is true that a contract of personal service cannot strictly be specifically enforced but this rule is subject to the exceptions reproduced supra that where a statutory body acts in breach of the violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute, the contract of service can be enforced. The submission of the learned counsel that the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief of re-instatement thus cannot be sustained.

10. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is devoid of any merit and is dismissed.

11. Since the respondent is not represented by any counsel, he be informed about this decision.

12. Appeal dismissed.