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  • Article 136 of the Constitution of India
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  • Article 136 of the Constitution of India
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The case concerns an incident in which the deceased and PW 2 were attacked while travelling in an autorickshaw. PW 2 survived with injuries and PW 3 allegedly witnessed the occurrence. The Additional District and Sessions Judge (Ad Hoc) No. II, Manjeri, by judgment dated 2-6-2005, acquitted the appellants of all charges. The State and the complainant pursued Criminal Appeal No. 1768 of 2005 before the High Court of Kerala, which on 5-11-2009 reversed the acquittal, convicted the appellants and imposed sentences. The appellants thereafter filed the present criminal appeal before the Supreme Court challenging the High Court’s decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the trial court’s order of acquittal by re-appreciating the evidence of PW 2, PW 3 and the forensic material.
  2. Whether the evidence of the injured eyewitnesses (PW 2 and PW 3) and the forensic reports constituted reliable and sufficient grounds for conviction.
  3. What standards govern appellate interference with an order of acquittal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • The High Court erred in overturning a plausible view taken by the trial court, contrary to settled law that an acquittal should not be disturbed unless findings are perverse.
  • PW 2’s credibility is doubtful because he failed to disclose the accused persons’ names when first examined in hospital and only named them ten days after discharge.
  • PW 3 told the treating doctor that the assailants were “unknown persons,” undermining his reliability as an eyewitness.
  • The trial court rightly disbelieved the fingerprint evidence; the expert admitted that the record did not show that chance prints were actually lifted from the autorickshaw.
  • The FSL report only proved the presence of human blood on the recovered weapons; it could not link the blood to the deceased, rendering it inconclusive.
  • Accordingly, the High Court’s conviction is unsupported by substantive legal evidence and violates the principles laid down by the Supreme Court on appellate review of acquittals.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The High Court correctly re-evaluated the entire evidence and found the trial court’s acquittal erroneous.
  • Testimony of injured eyewitnesses (PW 2 and PW 3), corroborated by medical evidence, fingerprint analysis and FSL reports, firmly connects the appellants to the crime.
  • Citing Krishna Pal v. State of U.P., Ambika Prasad v. State (Delhi Admn.) and Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P., the respondents argue that evidence of injured witnesses is inherently reliable and cannot be lightly discarded.
  • The Supreme Court should not interfere under Article 136 because the High Court has given cogent reasons for conviction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Krishna Pal v. State of U.P. (1996) 7 SCC 194 Conviction can rest on trustworthy testimony of injured eyewitnesses. Cited by the respondents; not ultimately relied upon by the Supreme Court in allowing the appeal.
Ambika Prasad v. State (Delhi Admn.) (2000) 2 SCC 646 Weight to be given to evidence of injured witnesses. Cited by the respondents; Court did not adopt it as determinative.
Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P. (2011) 6 SCC 288 Reliability of injured eyewitnesses. Cited by the respondents; Court distinguished on facts.
Arulvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206 If two plausible views exist, the one favouring acquittal should prevail. Relied on by the Supreme Court to justify restoring the trial court’s acquittal.
Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (2002) 6 SCC 650 High Court should not interfere with acquittal absent manifest illegality or perversity. Expressly followed by the Court in reinstating the acquittal.
Rathinam v. State of T.N. (2011) 11 SCC 140 Re-affirmation of limited scope for reversing acquittal. Cited as part of the Court’s reasoning on appellate restraint.
Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra (2010) 13 SCC 657 Same principle on acquittal interference. Referenced in support of the Court’s conclusion.
Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699 Presumption of innocence is a human right; benefit of doubt goes to the accused. Used by the Court to emphasise the burden on the prosecution.
State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180 In circumstantial cases, guilt must be established beyond reasonable doubt; acquittal cannot be reversed unless evidence is incompatible with innocence. Relied upon to hold that High Court’s reversal lacked adequate basis.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court scrutinised the findings of both the trial court and the High Court. Key points of its analysis include:

  • Credibility of PW 2: His failure to name the appellants immediately after the incident and the ten-day delay in recording his statement created reasonable doubt, a factor the trial court had correctly treated as fatal to the prosecution case.
  • Credibility of PW 3: PW 3 told the doctor that the assault was by “unknown persons,” contradicting the prosecution narrative. The trial court’s rejection of his testimony was held to be a plausible view.
  • Fingerprint evidence: The expert (PW 19) conceded in cross-examination that the record did not establish that chance prints were lifted from the autorickshaw, casting serious doubt on the reliability of this piece of evidence.
  • FSL report: Although human blood was detected on the alleged weapons, the quantity was insufficient for DNA comparison with the deceased, rendering the evidence inconclusive.
  • Doctrine of Appellate Restraint: Citing Arulvelu, Bindeshwari Prasad Singh and related cases, the Court reiterated that where two reasonable views are possible, the one favouring acquittal must be preferred. The trial court’s view was held to be reasonable and free of perversity.
  • Accordingly, the High Court’s interference was described as unjustified, lacking a showing of manifest illegality, perversity or miscarriage of justice.

Holding and Implications

Appeal ALLOWED; High Court conviction and sentence set aside; trial court’s acquittal restored.

Immediate effect: the appellants, already on bail, are discharged from their bail bonds and stand acquitted. Broader implication: the judgment reinforces the principle that appellate courts must exercise caution before overturning an acquittal and may do so only when the trial court’s view is perverse or manifestly illegal; no new substantive precedent was created beyond applying established standards of appellate review.

    Madathil Narayanan And Others v. State Of Kerala And Another

    Order

    1. The present criminal appeal arises out of the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court of Kerala in Madathil Narayanan v. State of Kerala Criminal Appeal No. 1768 of 2005 dated 5-11-2009, wherein the High Court reversed the judgment and order passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge (Ad Hoc) No. II, Manjeri dated 2-6-2005 acquitting the appellant-accused. The High Court set aside the same and convicted and sentenced the appellants. The appellants have questioned the correctness of the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, urging various legal grounds.

    2. Our attention was drawn to the judgment and orders passed by both the High Court Criminal Appeal No. 1768 of 2005 and the trial court by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the parties in justification of their respective submissions. Mr Sidharth Luthra, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants invited our attention to the findings recorded by the High Court in the impugned judgment Criminal Appeal No. 1768 of 2005 and submits that the High Court held that the findings and reasons recorded by the trial court are erroneous in law and accordingly in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, reappreciated the evidence on record and came to a different conclusion than the trial court. It is submitted that the same is contrary to the factual and legal evidence on record and therefore, the High Court has erred in law in reversing the findings recorded by the trial court on the charges levelled against the appellants as the same is contrary to the principles of law laid down by various judgments of this Court.

    3. The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants further contends that the High Court, after reappreciation of the evidence on record has reversed the finding of acquittal which is not correct, for the reason that the evidence of PW 2, who was also severely injured in the incident cannot be relied upon to convict the appellants. It is submitted that though PW 2 was admitted to the hospital on the night of the incident along with the deceased, he did not disclose the names of the accused persons who were involved in the commission of the offence to the investigating officer. It is further submitted that the statement of PW 2 under Section 161 CrPC was recorded by the investigating officer after 10 days from his discharge from the hospital, by which time, the accused persons had already been apprehended.

    4. It is further submitted that apart from PW 2, PW 3 is another eyewitness to the occurrence according to the prosecution, who had accompanied the deceased to the hospital. He had told the doctor, who recorded the injuries in the post-mortem certificate of the deceased and the injury certificate of PW 2, that the injuries were caused to the deceased by some unknown persons. The evidence of the said witness did not inspire confidence in the mind of the Sessions Judge to record the finding of guilt on the charges levelled against the appellants. It is submitted that the trial court, being the original court of appreciation of evidence on record, found fault with the case of the prosecution and did not accept the same and held that the charges are not proved against the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. It is contended that this finding of fact has erroneously been reversed by the High Court, though there is no substantive and legal evidence on record to prove the charges levelled against the appellants.

    5. It is submitted that having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3, injured eyewitnesses of the occurrence, whose evidence was not believed by the trial court, the High Court has erred in placing reliance on the very same evidence and reversing the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court, which approach is wholly erroneous and contrary to the law laid down by this Court. The learned Senior Counsel has thus, prayed for setting aside the same and restoring the judgment of acquittal of the appellants passed by the trial court.

    6. On the other hand, Mr C.U. Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent 2, wife of the deceased has sought to justify the correctness of finding recorded by the High Court in the impugned judgment Criminal Appeal No. 1768 of 2005. The learned Senior Counsel has elaborately taken us through the evidence of the prosecution witnesses produced before the trial court and contended that the High Court is justified in reversing the finding of acquittal of the appellants recorded by the trial court. It is submitted that the High Court has properly reappreciated the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3, along with the doctor's evidence, the evidence of fingerprint expert, the Forensic Science Laboratory reports and other evidence and concluded that the trial court has erroneously arrived at the conclusion of recording the finding of acquittal of the appellants. The learned Senior Counsel places reliance on the decision of this Court in Krishna Pal v. State of U.P. (1996) 7 SCC 194 in support of the proposition of law that when there is evidence of injured eyewitness and other witnesses, the same cannot be ignored while recording the findings on the charge against the accused. Reliance has also been placed on the decision of this Court in Ambika Prasad v. State (Delhi Admn.) (2000) 2 SCC 646. Further, reliance has been placed on the decision of this Court in Brahm Swaroop v. State of U.P. (2011) 6 SCC 288 in support of the contention that the evidence of the injured witness is reliable by itself. It is contended that the same has not been considered by the trial court while recording its finding on the charges against the appellants. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel submits that the finding of reversal of the acquittal by the High Court is justified, as it has assigned valid and cogent reasons. The learned Senior Counsel submits that therefore, this is not a fit case for this Court to exercise its appellate jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India and interfere with the finding of convictions and sentence awarded by the High Court in the impugned judgment Criminal Appeal No. 1768 of 2005.

    7. We have carefully considered the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the parties.

    8. It is a well-settled principle of law that if two views are plausible, the view which goes in favour of acquittal has to be adopted. This legal principle has been reiterated by this Court in Arulvelu v. State (2009) 10 SCC 206. In Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar (2002) 6 SCC 650, this Court has held that in the absence of any manifest illegality, perversity or miscarriage of justice, the order of acquittal passed by the trial court may not be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. The aforesaid view has further been reiterated by this Court in the following two cases viz. Rathinam v. State of T.N. (2011) 11 SCC 140 and Sunil Kumar Sambhudayal Gupta v. State of Maharashtra (2010) 13 SCC 657.

    9. This Court in Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. (2004) 10 SCC 699 has recognised the principle that presumption of innocence is a human right and observed that the benefit of doubt belonged to the accused. In State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram (2003) 8 SCC 180, this Court observed that while considering the appeal against the acquittal where the case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. The circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused can be drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. The cumulative effect of the circumstances must be such so as to negative the possibility of the innocence of the accused and bring home the guilt of the accused beyond any reasonable doubt. If the evidence relied upon is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. Thus, if the trial court takes the view that the accused deserves to be acquitted on the basis of the evidence on record, the same cannot be reversed unless and until it is found that the same is vitiated on account on some gross perversity and erroneous appreciation of evidence on record.

    10. We have gone through the evidence recorded by the learned trial court which was the first court to appreciate the evidence. Non-disclosure of the names of the accused persons by PW 2 and disclosure of the names after 10 days from the date of occurrence created suspicion in the mind of the trial court Judge and therefore, the same have not been relied upon.

    11. Our attention was drawn to the injury certificate of PW 2 by the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants. PW 3 has made a categorical statement to the doctor that injuries were caused to the deceased and PW 2 by some unknown persons. So the evidence of PW 3 cannot be relied upon to accept the case of the prosecution. Therefore, the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 has not been rightly accepted by the trial court.

    12. Our attention was drawn by Mr C.U. Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent 2, wife of the deceased, to the report of the fingerprint expert to show that the fingerprints of the appellants were found on the glass of the autorickshaw in which the deceased and PW 2 were travelling at the time of the incident. According to the report, it was found that the fingerprints of A-1, Madathil Narayanan were matching with the fingerprints on the glass of the autorickshaw. This evidence was considered by the trial court and not accepted. The trial court disbelieved the same as the fingerprint expert, PW 19 had stated in his cross-examination that “it is not recorded in Ext. P-11 that 11 chance prints from autorickshaw were taken”. It was thus, held that the fact of the chance print having in fact, being recovered from the autorickshaw could not be believed.

    13. The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents further places strong reliance on the FSL report to contend that there were human bloodstains on the weapons which were used in committing the offence. They were recovered at the residence of A-1. On account of the weapons being embedded in the soil, DNA analysis of the bloodstains could not be done to find out whether the bloodstains were that of the deceased. In this regard also, the trial court on proper appreciation recorded the evidence and held that the same is not legal evidence to connect the appellants to the crime to hold that they are guilty of the offence for which they are charged. It was held that the blood was human blood but the quantity was too little to be able to carry out grouping with the blood of the deceased.

    14. We have carefully gone through the said findings and conclusion arrived at by the learned trial Judge and also considered the reversal of the said finding of the aforesaid reports by the High Court. In our considered view, the trial court has properly appreciated the evidence and arrived at the right conclusion and taken the plausible view that it will not be proper to convict the appellants based on the said evidence as the same is not reliable to hold them guilty of the charges levelled against them. Therefore, reversing the finding of acquittal by the High Court in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction is not just and valid. For the foregoing reasons, the reversal of the finding of acquittal by the High Court is not correct.

    15. In the result, the appeal is allowed, the judgment and order Criminal Appeal No. 1768 of 2005 of the High Court is set aside and the judgment of the trial court is restored. The appellants are on bail. Since we have allowed the appeal, the appellants are discharged from their bail bonds.

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    Madathil Narayanan And Others v. State Of Kerala And Another
    (Jul 21, 2016)