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Smart Summary

Judicial Opinion Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This batch of writ petitions challenged proceedings initiated by the Enforcement Directorate under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (FERA), arising from Memorandum of Show Cause No. T-4/10/D/95 (SCN-I) dated 24 February 1995.

The petitioners were employees (cashiers) at the Standard Chartered Bank's Parliament Street Branch, having joined the Bank in 1979, 1981 and 1973 respectively. In January 1992, certain foreign currency cash deposits were made in an NRE account of Dr. Subhash Gupta at that branch. The petitioners state that they accepted those deposits in bona fide compliance with FERA, Reserve Bank of India (RBI) guidelines and Bank practices. On 14 November 1994 the petitioners received summons under Section 40 of FERA and gave statements on 29 November 1994.

The RBI issued a clarificatory circular on 31 July 1995 prescribing measures for operation of NRE accounts; the petitioners say these measures were not part of the Exchange Control Manual at the relevant time (1992).

On 24 February 1995 a show cause memorandum (T-4/10/D/95 (SCN/1)) alleged that Dr. Subhash Gupta had contravened Section 8(1) of FERA and that certain persons, including the petitioners, as Bank employees, had abetted the contravention by negligence, rendering them liable under Section 50 of FERA. The petitioners received no further communication for many years and believed they had been discharged; they were later served with a notice of hearing before the Adjudicating Authority dated 29 November 2004. Aggrieved, they filed these writ petitions seeking quashing of the proceedings.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the show cause notice and subsequent revival of adjudicatory proceedings after a prolonged unexplained delay (about ten to fourteen years) was arbitrary and liable to be quashed for failure to disclose reasons for the delay.
  2. Whether a show cause notice that fails to specify particular allegations and the statutory provisions and facts relied upon, thereby denying adequate particulars, is invalid for depriving the recipient of a fair opportunity to show cause.
  3. Whether the allegation that the petitioners "abetted" the offence by negligence is legally sustainable, given the requirements of abetment under the Indian Penal Code (IPC) as applied via the General Clauses Act.
  4. Whether the petitioners were obliged to exhaust alternative remedies under FERA/FEMA (such as adjudicatory or appellate remedies) before approaching the High Court under Article 226, and whether the existence of such remedies precluded the Court from interfering in the present circumstances.
  5. Whether the impugned notice violated any time-bar or bar introduced by later statutes (reference made to Section 49(3) of FEMA) as argued by petitioners.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The revival of proceedings after a long unexplained lapse (about ten to fourteen years) vitiates the proceedings and shows arbitrariness and non-application of mind by the respondents; the impugned notice did not explain why proceedings were being revived after ten years.
  • The alleged contraventions related to transactions in 1992, whereas the RBI clarificatory circular relied upon was issued in 1995; thus liability is sought to be imposed ex post facto.
  • There were no standing instructions relating to acceptance/operation of NRE accounts in 1992, so criminal liability based on later guidelines is improper.
  • The notice alleges abetment by negligence; but abetment as a criminal concept requires intention/knowledge/wilful omission (per IPC §107) and cannot be established by mere negligence.
  • Because the petitioners were Bank employees, the Bank ought to have been made a party to the proceedings; in its absence, allegations are vague and unsupportable.
  • Reliance was placed on Shanti Prasad v. Director of Enforcement (AIR 1962 SC 1764) for the proposition that quasi-criminal proceedings demand precise particulars and disclosure of reasons for revival; and on Section 49(3) of FEMA to argue that the adjudicating authority's power was time-limited.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The impugned notice was issued under Sections 50 and 51 of FERA and therefore valid; the petition is not maintainable because alternative remedies under Section 52 of FERA (corresponding to Section 19 of FEMA) were not exhausted.
  • Cited authority (Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse (2004) 3 SCC 440) to contend that writ petitions should not be routinely entertained where a show cause notice exists unless the notice is totally non est in law; petitioners should respond to the notice and raise their points before the statutory authority.
  • Argued that delay is not a ground to refuse to proceed in serious economic offences; relied on V.K. Aggarwal v. Vasantraj Bhagwanji Bhatia (AIR 1988 SC 648) where a long lapse was not held to bar proceedings in serious economic matters.
  • Relied on a prior decision of this Court (S.K. Mittal v. Union of India, WP (Crl) No.699/2004) to support the proposition that the petitioner may agitate all points before the authority and that interference by the High Court prima facie may be unwarranted.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shanti Prasad v. Director of Enforcement, AIR 1962 SC 1764 Quasi-criminal FERA proceedings require precise particulars of allegations and reasons for revival; duty to disclose particulars. Cited by petitioners; Court recognized the need for particularity and reasons to revive proceedings after long delay and relied on that requirement in explaining why the show cause notice was defective.
Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse, 2004 (164) E.L.T 141 (S.C) : 2004) 3 SCC 440 Writ petitions should not be entertained routinely where a show cause notice exists; petitioners should ordinarily respond to notice and pursue statutory remedies unless notice is totally non est in law. Respondents relied on it to argue non-maintainability; Court considered the principle but distinguished the present case on facts (extreme delay and lack of explanation) and did not bar writ jurisdiction here.
V.K. Aggarwal v. Vasantraj Bhagwanji Bhatia, AIR 1988 SC 648 (1988 Supp SCC 308) Delay, even long delay (twenty years), is not necessarily a ground to stop proceedings in serious economic offences. Respondents relied on it to argue delay does not automatically invalidate proceedings; Court acknowledged principle but held that unexplained revival after long delay without reasons was unlawful here.
Dwarkanath v. ITO, AIR 1966 SC 81 Article 226 confers wide powers on High Courts to reach injustice wherever found. Cited to support the proposition that High Court's writ jurisdiction is plenary and may be exercised where gross injustice is shown despite alternative remedies.
State of Tripura v. Manoranjan Chakraborty, (2001) 10 SCC 740 Plenary nature of Article 226; court can interfere notwithstanding existence of alternative remedies where substantial injustice is shown. Used to justify the exercise of writ jurisdiction despite existence of statutory remedies, given the facts of long unexplained delay and potential injustice.
Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. of the City of Ahmedabad, (1999) 4 SCC 468; Shyam Kishore v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi, (1993) 1 SCC 22 Support for the proposition that procedural requirements and the discretion under statutes must be considered in context; courts can intervene where gross injustice occurs. Invoked as part of reasoning on the scope of judicial intervention under Article 226.
Canara Bank v. Debashish Das, (2003) 4 SCC 557; Food Corporation of India v. State of Punjab, (2001) 1 SCC 291 Support for the requirement that a show cause notice must be effective in giving a fair and reasonable chance to be heard (i.e., contain sufficient particulars). Cited to bolster the Court's view that the impugned notice lacked necessary particulars and was deficient for that reason.
Tuposhi Chakaravarti v. State, (2000) 55 DRJ 267; Shiv Ram v. State of U.P, (1975) 3 SCC 495 Authorities regarding the scope of 'abetment' and mental element required for abetment offences. Petitioners relied on them to argue that abetment requires intention/knowledge/wilful omission; Court adopted this approach in concluding negligence alone does not amount to abetment.
Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618; State of Haryana v. Jaswinder Singh, (2000) 9 SCC 387; Mohan Chand v. State, (2003) 109 Cr LJ 10 Support for the proposition that the mental state for abetment requires intention, knowledge or wilful omission; negligence is insufficient. These decisions were used to underpin the Court's conclusion that allegation of abetment by negligence is unsustainable.
S.K. Mittal v. Union of India, WP (Crl) No. 699/2004 (High Court) High Court decision to the effect that petitioners should be allowed to agitate points before the adjudicatory authority and writ may be premature. Respondents cited it; Court distinguished and declined to follow it to deny writ relief because of the long unexplained delay and injustice in the present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a multi-part analysis limited to the facts and authorities presented in the opinion:

  1. On alternative remedies and Article 226: The Court acknowledged the well-settled rule that ordinarily where alternative statutory remedies exist a writ court will be cautious in exercising its jurisdiction (relying on Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and related authorities). However, the Court emphasized the plenary nature of Article 226 (citing Dwarkanath and State of Tripura) and held that where gross injustice would result, the High Court may exercise writ jurisdiction notwithstanding the availability of alternative remedies. Given the impugned notice dated 1994 and the 14-year delay before revival, the Court found it would be unjust to direct the petitioners to pursue the statutory appellate processes.
  2. On the effect of delay and duty to give reasons: Although delay alone does not always preclude proceedings in serious economic offences (per V.K. Aggarwal), the Court distinguished that principle on the facts: revival of proceedings after a long unexplained gap without disclosing reasons is arbitrary. The Court held that the respondents owed a duty to disclose reasons for the delay and the failure to do so rendered the revival unlawful and arbitrary. The duty to give reasons is a sine qua non of executive action; absent explanation, the action can be struck down.
  3. On adequacy of the show cause notice: The Court explained the purpose of a show cause notice — to provide the recipient a fair opportunity to be heard — and held that an effective notice should give a brief sketch of the facts and the nature of the offence alleged. The Court found that the impugned notice lacked specific allegations relating to the petitioners' involvement and did not specify the guidelines or norms supposedly violated (especially problematic because the RBI circular relied upon was issued after the events). Thus the notice was procedurally defective for failure to furnish particulars necessary for a fair hearing.
  4. On the allegation of abetment by negligence: The Court applied Section 3(1) of the General Clauses Act (which imports definitions from the IPC) and Section 107 IPC's definition of abetment. It noted authority that mental states for abetment must involve instigation, intentional aid, or conspiracy, and that intention, knowledge or wilful omission are required. Negligence does not satisfy these mental states. Consequently, the part of the notice alleging that the petitioners "abetted by negligence" was legally unsound.
  5. On ex post facto imposition of liability: Because the RBI circular prescribing NRE account measures was issued in July 1995 — after the 1992 transactions — the Court held that imposing liability on the basis of that later clarification would amount to ex post facto imposition of obligations where no explicit guidelines existed at the time. The Court characterized such retrospective imposition as arbitrary and oppressive.
  6. Balancing public interest and fairness: While recognizing public interest in prosecuting economic offences, the Court found that fairness required explanation for the long hiatus and adequate particulars. In the absence of those, reviving the proceedings was unlawful. The Court therefore struck down the notices and subsequent proceedings.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The impugned show cause notices and all proceedings pursuant to them are quashed; the writ petitions are allowed. No costs.

Immediate consequences and practical effect:

  • The adjudicatory proceedings founded on Memorandum of Show Cause No. T-4/10/D/95 (SCN-I) and any consequent actions against the petitioners are terminated by this order.
  • The petitioners are relieved of the prospective legal jeopardy created by the impugned notices and the resumed adjudicatory process.

Broader implications:

The Court's decision rests on the specific facts: prolonged unexplained delay in reviving proceedings, failure to disclose reasons for delay, lack of particulars in the notice, and the legal insufficiency of alleging 'abetment by negligence'. The opinion does not purport to lay down a new general rule beyond these conclusions; it applies established principles (as cited) to the facts to invalidate the particular notices and proceedings.

End of summary — based exclusively on the provided opinion.

Show full summary ...

    R.M Mehrotra v. Enforcement Directorate

    1. In this batch of writ petitions, directions are sought from this Court for quashing the proceedings Before the Enforcement Directorate, in respect of memorandum of show cause bearing No. T-4/10/D/95 (SCN-I), dated 24th February, 1995.

    2. The relevant facts of the case are follows. The petitioners joined the Standard Chartered Bank (hereafter ‘the Bank’) in 1979, 1981 and 1973 and were posted as cashier with the Parliament Street Branch. In January, 1992, certain foreign currency, cash deposits were made in the NRE account of Dr. Subhash Gupta being Account No. 105/03/20009 with the said Branch of the Bank. The Petitioners aver that in their capacity as cashiers of the Bank, accepted bona fide, the said deposits in compliance with the provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 (hereafter referred to as the ‘FERA’), the guidelines issued by the Reserve Bank of India (hereafter referred to as the ‘RBI’) and Rules and practices of the Bank. On 14th November, 1994, they received summons from the first respondent, under Section 40 of the FERA. In due compliance with the summons they appeared Before the first respondent on 29-11-1994; and their statements were recorded. Thereafter, the RBI issued a clarificatory circular on 31-7-1995 in which certain measures for the operation of NRE accounts and acceptance of deposits in such accounts were prescribed. It is averred that, prior to the clarification, aspects concerning operation and acceptance of NRE accounts were dealt with under the Exchange Control Manuals, and that the measures contained in the clarificatory circular were not contained in the relevant Exchange Control Manual, at the relevant time.

    3. It is averred that on 24th February, 1995, a Memorandum of show cause bearing No. T-4/10/D/95(SCN/1) was issued to the Petitioners by the first Respondent, where it was alleged that some discrepancies relating to transactions made by Dr. Subash Gupta, were found and that he had allegedly contravened Section 8(1) of the FERA. It was also alleged that one Mr. Aditya Aggarwal had abetted the offence by procuring foreign exchange from persons other than the authorized dealer and depositing them in the account of the former. Further, that the Petitioners as employees of the Standard Chartered Bank during the relevant period, had allegedly abetted the offence, through their negligence and were in contravention of Section 8(1) of the FERA, and therefore, liable to be prosecuted under Section 50 of the FERA.

    4. It is averred by the Petitioners that, they received no communication from the first Respondent thereafter; therefore, felt, a genuine by and under bona fide belief that the show cause notice being ex facie untenable, were discharged by the Respondents. However, on 9th November, 2004, they were shocked to receive a notice of hearing Before the Adjudicating Authority on 29th November, 2004. Aggrieved by the show cause notice and the notice of hearing, the Petitioners filed the present writ proceeding.

    5. The Petitioners allege that the initiation of the proceedings after an unexplained lapse often years ipso facto vitiates the proceedings and is proof of arbitrariness and non-application of mind by the Respondents. It is contended on their behalf that the alleged offence and abetment is sought to be imputed to them on the basis of an ex post facto clarificatory circular issued by the RBI in 1995, whereas the alleged irregularities occurred in 1992. There were no standing instructions relating to the acceptance of NRE accounts in 1992 and therefore the very basis of terming the transaction as illegal was absent during that time.

    6. Mr. P.P Tripathi, learned Senior Counsels contend that the notice also did not contain any reason as to why the proceedings were being revived after a gap of ten years. Relying upon a decision of the Supreme Court reported as Shanti Prasad v. Director of Enforcement, AIR 1962 SC 1764, it is urged that proceedings under the FERA being quasi-criminal in nature, the Respondents were duty bound to disclose the precise particulars of the allegations, the provisions of law which were contravened and also the reasons for reviving the proceedings after a delay of ten years. Reliance on Section 49(3) of the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999 (hereafter referred to as the ‘FEMA’) is also placed; it stipulates that no Adjudicating Officer shall take notice of any contravention under section 51 of fera after the expiry of a period of 2 years from the date of commencement of FEMA; which period expired on 31st May, 2002. Therefore, he contends that the impugned notice is ultra vires the FEMA.

    7. Learned Counsel contends that the allegation in the impugned notice is that the Petitioners abetted the offence through negligence; however, he submits, that concept of abetment through negligence is alien to law and is ex facie a contradiction in terms. It is submitted that to establish an offence of abetment, it must be shown that the alleged abettor had not only facilitated the offence but also done so with a knowledge and intention to facilitate such an offence and not mere negligence. He places reliance on the definition of ‘abetment’ given under section 107 of the ipc and the decisions in Tuposhi Chakaravarti v. State, (2000) 55 DRJ 267 and Shiv Ram v. State of U.P, (1975) 3 SCC 495. Moreover, the omission to mention the conclusiveness of guilt on the part of the principal offender, strikes at the very root of the impugned notice. It is also contended that since the Petitioners were employees of the Bank, the Bank also ought to have been made a party to the proceedings; in its absence, the allegations are vague and unsupportable.

    8. The Respondents submit that the impugned notice was issued under Sections 50 and 51 of the FERA and therefore cannot be said to be illegal. They aver that the present petition is not maintainable since the alternative remedies under Section 52 of the FERA (corresponding to Section 19 of the FEMA), have not been exhausted. They draw this Court's attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse, 2004 (164) E.L.T 141 (S.C) : (2004) 3 SCC 440, where the Court held that

    “Unless, the High Court is satisfied that the show cause notice was totally non est in the eyes of law for absolute want of jurisdiction of the authority to even investigate into facts, writ petitions should not be entertained for the mere asking and as a matter of routine, and the writ petitioner should invariably be directed to respond to the show cause notice and take all stands highlighted in the writ petition. Whether the show cause notice was found on any legal premises is a jurisdictional issue which can even be urged by the recipient of the notice and such issues also can be adjudicated by the authorities issuing the very notice initially, Before the aggrieved could approach the Court. Further when the court passes an interim order it should be careful to see that the statutory functionaries specially and specifically constituted for the purpose are not denuded of powers and authority to initially decide the matter and ensure that ultimate relief which may or may not be finally granted in the writ petition is accorded to the writ petitioner even at the threshold by the interim protection, granted.”

    9. The Respondents submit that this principle has been settled by the recent judgment of this Court dated 28-5-2004 in S.K Mittal v. Union of India WP (Crl). No. 699/2004 where it was held that the petition is not maintain able and it was observed that:

    “there appears no justification warranting any interference with the adjudicatory process pursuant to show cause notice as the petitioner is at liberty to agitate all the points available to him Before the authority concerned to seek adjudication thereon.”

    10. It is urged on behalf of the respondents that the contention of the Petitioners that the proceedings are time barred is unsustainable in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in V.K Aggarwal, Assistant Collector of Customs v. Vasantraj Bhagwanji Bhatia, 1988 Supp SCC 308 : AIR 1988 SC 648 where it was held that:

    “The fact that twenty years have elapsed since the date of seizure is not ground for not proceeding further with the matter in as much as the offence in question is a serious economic offence, which undermines the entire economy of the Nation and also the fact that delay occasioned in the working of the judicial system by the ever increasing workload which cannot provide an alibi for upholding such a plea.”

    11. The power of the High Courts under Article 226 is indeed wide and any attempt to place a narrow construction upon its jurisdiction would militate the spirit of the Constitution itself. As was observed in Dwarkanath v. ITO, AIR 1966 s.c 81 article 226 ‘ex facie confers a wide power on the High Courts to reach injustice wherever it is found’. It is true that while exercising its power of review under Article 226 the Courts have a wide discretion, and would ordinarily, where alternative remedies exist, desist from exercising using them. But that cannot amount to a mechanical rejection of the power itself in the face of an alternative remedy. In State of Tripura v. Manoranjan Chakraborty, (2001) 10 SCC 740 the Supreme Court, speaking about the plenary nature of the jurisdiction under Article 226, stated as follows:

    “As we see it, the point in issue is no longer res Integra. This Court in Gujarat Agro Industries Co. Ltd. v. Municipal Corpn. of the City of Ahmedabad - (1999) 4 SCC 468 dealing with an analogous provision, where discretion to waive pre-deposit was limited only to the extent of 25 per cent of the tax, was upheld by this Court. To the same effect is the decision of this Court in Shyam Kishore v. Municipal Corpn. of Delhi, (1993) 1 SCC 22.

    4. For the reasons contained in the said decisions, we hold that the impugned provisions are valid. It is, of course, clear that if gross injustice is done and it can be shown that for good reason the court should interfere, then notwithstanding the alternative remedy which may be available by way of an appeal under Section 20 or revision under Section 21, a writ court can in an appropriate case exercise its jurisdiction to do substantive justice. Normally of course the provisions of the Act would have to be complied with, but the availability of the writ jurisdiction should dispel any doubt which a citizen has”

    (Emphasis supplied)

    12. Therefore, the contention of the Respondents that the Court must not exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 because of the existence of an alternative remedy cannot be accepted. The impugned notice was issued way back in 1994, and after a lapse of fourteen years it would unjust for this Court to direct the Petitioners to take recourse to the appellate procedures under the relevant enactments.

    13. It is no doubt true public interest dictates that economic offences are curbed and offenders duly prosecuted. The show cause notice in the present case was issued in 1994 much Before the FERA was repealed. The notice of hearing is a mere continuation of the process, and therefore, it cannot be argued that action is time-barred. However, the revival of proceedings after a time gap of ten years, without the notice of hearing disclosing any reason for the delay, is not a mere matter of impropriety; the respondents were under a duty to disclose what compulsions held up the adjudicatory process for so long. Absent such explanation, revival of the proceedings would be unlawful and arbitrary. The duty to give reason is a sine qua non of any executive action, without which the action is liable to be struck down.

    14. This duty to give reasons, in the case of the impugned notice is necessarily accompanied by a duty to give furnish details regarding allegations contained in the notice. The purpose of issuing a show cause notice is to ensure that its recipient is not deprived of a fair and reasonable chance of showing cause and being heard. Taken so, an effective notice, containing at the a brief sketch of the facts leading to the allegations and the nature of the offence alleged, is a necessary corollary of the right to be heard. However, the Courts cannot lay down any straightjacketed standards in this regard and ever case must be examined on its terms. The Supreme Court's decisions in Canara Bank v. Debashish Das - (2003) 4 SCC 557 and Food Corporation of India v. State of Punjab, (2001) 1 SCC 291 lend strength to the aforesaid proposition.

    15. The relevant portions of the impugned notice are extracted below:

    And whereas, it further appears that Smt. C.M Devika, S/Shri Ashok Khanna, R.M Mehrotra, employees of Standard Chartered Bank, during the relevant period, abetted the aforesaid contravention by Dr. Subhash Gupta through their negligence namely by not ensuring that the foreign exchange being deposited was legally brought into India and the person depositing the same was genuine before accepting such foreign exchange at the counter and as such they also appears to have contravened the provisions of Section 8(1) read with Section 64(2) of Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 and have thereby rendered themselves liable to be proceeded against under Section 50 of the said Act;

    Now, therefore, the said S/Shri Dr. Subhash Gupta, Aditya Agarwal, Ashok Khanna, R.M Mehrotra and Smt. CM. Devika are hereby required to show cause in writing (in duplicate) within 30 days of the receipt of this Memorandum as to why adjudication proceedings as contemplated in Section 51 of the Foreign exchange Regulation Act, 1973 should not be held against them for the aforesaid contraventions;

    16. A perusal of the contents of the notice would show that there are no specific allegations in relation to the Petitioners' involvement in the alleged offence. Especially, in the light of the fact that the RBI circular regarding the operation and management of the NRE accounts was issued a year later after the occurrence of the events mentioned in the notice, it should have contained specificities of the guidelines and norms violated. Apart form this procedural impropriety; the show-cause notice also is liable to be struck down on substantial grounds. The offence is alleged to have been committed in 1994, when there were no regulations/guidelines in place. In the absence of explicit guidelines for the bank employees to transact NRE accounts, it would amount to ex post facto imposition of a liability on the Petitioners. Such imposition would be arbitrary and oppressive. Moreover, the notice alleges that the Petitioners' abetted the commission of the offence through their negligence. Neither the FERA nor the FEMA contain the definition of ‘abetment’, therefore reliance must be placed on Section 3(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897. It declares that the phrase ‘abet’ with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall have the same meaning as in the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). Section 107 of the IPC, states that abetment of a thing can happen in three ways: through instigation, through intentional aid or through conspiracy. Various decisions of the Supreme Court including Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhatisgarh, (2001) 9 SCC 618, State of Haryana v. Jaswinder Singh, (2000) 9 SCC 387 and Mohan Chand v. State, (2003) 109 Cr LJ 10, lend support to the proposition that the mental state of the accused must be conditioned by one of the following states: intention, knowledge or wilful omission. The accused must have intentionally aided or incited or knowingly conspired or wilfully omitted to do the act alleged. Negligence on the part of the Petitioners does not imply any of these mental states and therefore, the impugned notice in so far as it alleges that the Petitioners have abetted the offence, is not sound in law.

    17. In view of the aforesaid findings, the impugned notices and all proceedings pursuant to them are hereby quashed. The writ petitions are accordingly allowed. No costs.

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    R.M Mehrotra v. Enforcement Directorate
    (Feb 4, 2008)