Order
1. By order dated 7-9-2012 SLP (Cri) Crl. MP No. 16249 of 2012, limited notice was issued in this case confined to the question of sentence only.
2. The appellant who has been convicted for the offence under Section 302 IPC was awarded the death penalty by the learned trial court. The reference made by the learned trial court to the High Court has been confirmed 2012 SCC OnLine MP 3081 and the appeal filed by the appellant-accused against the said conviction and sentence has been dismissed.
3. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. In view of the limited notice that has been issued by the order dated 7-9-2012 SLP (Cri) Crl. MP No. 16249 of 2012, we have confined the present consideration to the question of sentence which alone is being dealt with by the present order.
4. No doubt, the appellant-accused has been found guilty of triple murder including the murder of both his parents. The manner in which the crime was committed is, indeed, brutal and cruel. The question that confronts the Court is whether the offence of triple murder and the manner of commission of crime alone would be sufficient to justify the imposition of the death penalty.
5. We need not burden this order by an exhaustive consideration of the large number of precedents that would be available on the point laying down the principles on the basis of which the justification for death penalty awarded to an accused is required to be considered. Suffice it would be to notice that some of the principles which have emerged are:
(1) the age of the accused [Bachan Singh v. State Of Punjab . (1980) 2 SCC 684, para 206];
(2) the possibility of reform [Bachan Singh v. State Of Punjab . (1980) 2 SCC 684, para 206], [Rajesh Kumar v. State (2011) 13 SCC 706, para 74];
(3) the socio-economic background of the accused [Mulla v. State of U.P. (2010) 3 SCC 508, paras 80 and 81];
(4) the circumstances in which the crime has been committed [Dharmendrasinh Alias Mansing Ratansinh v. State Of Gujarat . (2002) 4 SCC 679, para 20];
(5) the quality of the evidence which had prevailed with the Court in upholding the conviction [Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State Of Maharashtra . (2009) 6 SCC 498, para 56 and
(6) lack of criminal antecedents [Gudda Alias Dwarikendra v. State Of Madhya Pradesh .. (2013) 16 SCC 596, para 31];
The above enumeration, we must hasten to add, is certainly not exhaustive but is merely illustrative.
6. In the present case, the appellant-accused at the time of commission of the crime was admittedly 23 years of age. There is no criminal history of the appellant-accused. Though the appellant-accused has been in custody for over about five years, there is no material on record to show that his conduct while in custody suffers from any blemish.
7. From the deposition of Shivraj Singh (PW 2), who has been declared hostile and cross-examined by the prosecution, it is clear that the appellant-accused used to take “Marijuana” and that he used to forcibly take money from his father. It is also evident from the evidence of PW 2 that the accused was unemployed and had no source of earning. The family of the appellant-accused belongs to a poor and backward socio-economic background. The evidence in the case is entirely circumstantial. Though the same would not be a determinative factor, undoubtedly, as held by this Court in Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State Of Maharashtra . (2009) 6 SCC 498 the same would be one of the factors that could be taken into account in adjudging the sentence to be awarded.
8. From the above, it would appear to us that the appellant-accused is a young man addicted to drugs who needed money to sustain his habits. The accused comes from a deprived socio-economic background without any criminal history and his conduct while in custody does not suffer from any blemish. The possibility of reformation, on the materials on record, cannot be ruled out. Having regard to the broad and illustrative principles discussed above, we are of the view that the present is a case where we would be justified in holding that instead of death penalty the punishment of life imprisonment subject to the provisions of remission, etc. under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 would be adequate to meet the ends of justice. We, therefore, order accordingly and commute the sentence of death penalty to life imprisonment.
9. The appeal consequently is partly allowed in the above terms.
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